The lazy lavatory syndrome refers to a peculiar, but apparently not uncommon, ailment in the office building in which I work at the University of British Columbia, Canada. Throughout the building, the washroom entrances, cubicle doors, and bathroom mirrors are adorned with signs asking all visitors to “Please Flush after Every Use.” A female colleague has confirmed that the signage is not a decorative feature of the men’s rooms only.

Not surprisingly, the signs attract graffiti. Some of this includes intelligent political debate concerning the sustainability of the university’s human waste management system in the midst of water shortages that have afflicted British Columbia during recent summer droughts. But despite the acumen that informs the bathroom break exchange, no one denounces what I believe is the most jarring political reality signalled by the signs: some of the most privileged, learned citizens in our society are so dismissive of the obligations one must fulfill to sustain the communities that make privilege possible that they require regular reminders to take responsibility for disposing of their own waste rather than free riding off the flushing of fellow citizens.

The (momentary?) absence of civility that characterizes the lazy lavatory syndrome is symbolic of the alleged decline of civic-spiritedness with which much normative political discourse has engaged over the past two decades. Kymlicka and Norman (1994, 352; 2000, 5; 2003) document this reorientation in their series of review articles analyzing the “explosion of interest in the concept of citizenship” that emerged in the 1990s. In contrast to scholarship about Rawlsian theories of justice and the resulting focus on basic social institutions that dominated Anglo-American political philosophy into the late 1980s, the analytic shift toward citizenship signalled renewed recognition among theorists...
that citizenry qualities, attitudes, and Tocquevilleian “habits of the heart” are also integral to the health and stability of modern democracies. Attention to civic virtues and the social duties they imply emerged across political camps, including among “third way” scholars toward the left of centre, neoliberals and social conservatives on the right, as well as new communitarians and feminists for whom the left/right divide offers a less than satisfactory categorical framework. Among the many virtues identified, theorists accorded prominent interest to citizens’ willingness to accept responsibility for personal choices that affect the broader community and environment, particularly with respect to economic demands on the state.

The convergence of disparate philosophical traditions around the concept of citizenship obligations produces a cacophony of critiques about the rights bias and atomism perceived in the social liberalism that informed welfare regimes in affluent English-speaking democracies following the Second World War. These critiques call into question the intellectual foundation of state welfarism in these countries, generating a crisis of legitimation (Cox 1998). In response, there has occurred a rhetorical shift away from a discourse of rights toward one of duties that links eligibility for social entitlements to the fulfillment of social obligations – what S. White (2000) refers to as a shift toward “welfare contractualism.” This transition is observed in Canada (for example, Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003), the United States (for example, Mead 1986), Australia (for example, Shaver 2002), New Zealand (for example, Larner 2000), the United Kingdom (for example, Lister 1998), as well as continental Europe (Bussemaker 1998), where social democratic and corporatist welfare regime patterns dominate over Anglo-liberal traditions.

Although the rise of duty discourse is evident across political traditions, the New Right has enjoyed the most political success in English-speaking countries by re-emphasizing the language of social obligations. Responding to an era of fiscal austerity, right-of-centre political parties won electoral support in Canada and elsewhere by synthesizing the concept of welfare contractualism with an overarching animosity toward state provision in an effort to dismantle postwar social security systems. Although Pierson (2001) argues that welfare systems cross-nationally have shown considerable resilience in the face of this challenge, more pronounced qualitative restructuring of state architecture cannot be denied in the liberal welfare regime cluster, including in Canada (for example, McBride and Shields 1997).

The term “regime” merits definitional attention in light of its recent appropriation by politicians and pundits preoccupied with the so-called
war on terror. Whereas the latter use the term “regime” to refer principally to state leaders and government apparatuses that allegedly support terrorist organizations, the term is used in comparative welfare literature to capture the “combined, interdependent way in which welfare is produced and allocated between the state, market and family” (Esping-Andersen 1999, 34-35). Evers, Pilj, and Ungerson (1994) further refine this triangular definition of “regime” by aligning the concept with a welfare diamond that appends the voluntary sector to Esping-Andersen’s state-market-family framework.

Working with this definition, qualitative regime restructuring does not just denote that policy changes since the 1980s have reduced public expenditures. In the Canadian context, the quantitative cutbacks of resources for social services during the 1980s and 1990s were not new, although they often were more dramatic in scope. Citing work by Banting (1982), McBride and Shields (1997, 22) observe that the social benefits institutionalized under the welfare regime after the Second World War were “in constant flux, expanding in some periods and contracting in others.” What is distinct about the more recent round of expenditure reductions is their departure from the commitment to postwar welfare services and the distribution of responsibility for social provision across the welfare diamond that this policy framework assumed. McBride and Shields report that, “in the past ... cuts were carried out with the intention that they were ‘temporary’ and would be restored with the economic recovery” (ibid.). But spending cuts in the 1990s were enacted as part of an emerging paradigm shift in which federal and provincial governments identified a reduced role for the state in welfare provision as a critical element for an adequate postindustrial social policy course. The commitment to reduce the state’s role as a central plank of a new platform is particularly evident at the federal level. The Government of Canada (2000, Chapter 3) lists the achievement of a fifty-year low in federal program spending as a share of GDP (at 11.7 percent in 1999-2000) as a key component of federal efforts to restore public fiscal health, solidifying the foundation for a new welfare regime order.

Jenson (1997a) and her many co-authors portray this shift in paradigm in the language of citizenship that has garnered so much influence in normative literature in recent years (see also Jenson and Phillips 1996; Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003; Jenson and Sineau 2001). Jenson (1997a, 631) employs the term “citizenship regime” to refer not only to the “institutional arrangements” and “rules” that “guide and shape state policy,” but also to the concepts and assumptions that occupy centre stage in political-cultural thinking, or what she refers to as
“understandings” and the “problem definition employed by states and citizens.” A shift in citizenship regime, therefore, signals a recoding of the shared ideas and criteria by which issues are recognized as appropriate subject matter for politics, and, thus, a reorganization of the boundaries of political debate. A restructured citizenship regime articulates a new “paradigmatic representation of ... the ‘model citizen,’ the ‘second-class citizen’ and the ‘non-citizen,’” recasting what these ideal types can legitimately expect of their neighbours, markets, and governments (632). In the light of emerging duty discourses, regime restructuring seeks to shift “the boundaries of the responsibility mix” between points on the welfare diamond (Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003, 81). The contemporary citizenship regime identifies new forms of security that downplay the social safety net in favour of the now familiar trampoline metaphor. This metaphor signals the state’s eagerness to bounce citizens from public assistance toward families, the voluntary sector, and especially the market as part of a strategy to assign more responsibility for welfare creation to these social domains.

The success with which the New Right deployed a duty discourse to recalibrate the postwar citizenship regime prompts some critics of neoliberal restructuring to view the concept of welfare contractualism as an attack on the tradition of social citizenship to which T.H. Marshall (1964) gave voice following the Second World War (Roche 1992; Shaver 2002). I wish to challenge this judgment in this book. I argue that the recent convergence in political thought, which treats fulfillment of social obligations as a condition for social entitlement, actually needs to be advanced further to integrate care as a constitutive responsibility and right of social citizenship that binds men as much as women. This development would complement the attention that policy circles presently pay to employment duties and human-capital acquisition by integrating a new analytic dimension concerned with caregiving throughout all social citizenship commitments. The resulting redesign of the social policy blueprint would dramatically help to minimize inequalities suffered by diverse groups of women, while also addressing a number of the most pressing postindustrial socioeconomic trends that are undergirding fiscal challenges which strain modern welfare systems.

There are solid strategic reasons for scholars and political actors critical of the neoliberal paradigm to embrace the duty discourse. The convergence across disparate philosophical traditions in favour of renewed concern for social responsibilities identifies a starting point for what Gramsci (1971) terms a “counterhegemony.” Hegemony is the set of processes that generate “the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great
mass of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” (12). A. Hunt (1993, 229) adds that hegemony involves “the production, reproduction, and mobilization of popular consent” to secure the “leadership” and privilege of those who are already dominant. One implication of this view is that a project becomes dominant only if it addresses, even if just partially, “some aspects of the aspirations, interests and ideology of the subordinate groups” (230).

The heightened concern with social duties that different political camps, including feminists, share with the neoliberal paradigm suggests that some notion of welfare contractualism may represent a part of what is appealing about the reigning citizenship discourse to social groups whose less-privileged status it reinforces. Once recognized, this and other points of convergence that I identify in the book provide openings to refashion constitutive elements of the neoliberal hegemony by revealing issues on which the dominant discourse is silent, as well as by introducing new dimensions that effectively transcend the discourse. Thus, the path to replacing the neoliberal paradigm does not lie so much in negating its vision, which partly resonates with much of the citizenry, but in reconstructing it to reprioritize what is currently missing and, therefore, relocate or exhaust problematic elements that are presently dominant. The concern to move beyond the left/right political framework urged by third way proponents (Giddens 1994, 1999, 2000) and new communitarians (Etzioni 1993, 1996) shares some affinity for this strategic insight. At the very least, points of convergence between disparate political traditions mark cornerstones in a foundation for social citizenship from which individuals with diverging viewpoints can identify areas of agreement that make possible the compromises that are necessary for alternative political movements to succeed.

Beyond strategic considerations, a concern to further develop the duty discourse is theoretically important because it builds on the emerging consensus in the literature, which indicates that “most writers believe that an adequate theory of citizenship requires greater emphasis on responsibilities and virtues” (Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 353). In particular, re-emphasis on social obligations is appropriate to respond to the morally hazardous dynamics that accompany gendered systems of social provision present in families, the voluntary sector, markets, and state infrastructure. The moral hazard concept is typically found in the discourse of economists, particularly in respect of public and private insurance systems. It illuminates how policy may provide individuals and firms that are insured against loss with incentives to behave in
socially nonoptimal ways by taking less care to prevent that loss than they would in the absence of insurance. In the current political context, this logic principally informs critiques of employment insurance, social assistance, and the so-called welfare wall, which ostensibly erode motivation to engage in paid work. But the logic is just as germane to what Taylor-Goodby (1991, xi-xii) identified over a decade ago as the perverse policy, economic, and cultural “incentives which encourage men to evade a duty to share in the unwaged labour of social care.” These perverse incentives are a primary concern of this book.

The veracity of Taylor-Goodby’s diagnosis of the gender division of labour and its link to morally hazardous dynamics remains salient today, although his work is relatively silent about the policy implications of his diagnosis. This lack of attention to policy ramifications is consistent with “the timidity with which authors apply their theories of citizenship to questions of public policy,” which Kymlicka and Norman (1994, 368) describe as “a striking feature of the current debate” in the literature. Many authors, they report, “focus more on describing desirable qualities of citizens, and less on what policies should be adopted to encourage or compel citizens to adopt these desirable virtues and practices” (Kymlicka and Norman 2000, 7). The result is that “all too often in the citizenship literature” the work reduces to the platitude that society would function better “if people in it were nicer and more considerate” (Kymlicka and Norman 2003, 217).

This book suffers no such timidity. In the final chapters, I advance the concept of “carefair,” after which the book is titled. Just as many governments employ active labour market and other workfare policies to encourage or compel citizens to discharge their paid work obligations, so we also need a carefair policy commitment to encourage or compel citizens who neglect informal care activities to discharge citizenship duties in the domestic domain. Given the persistent patriarchal division of care, the activities of many men are the primary target of a carefair policy framework as it seeks to institutionalize an equitable distribution of caregiving across sexes, classes, and ethnic groups. Cross-nationally, more governments are cracking down on so-called deadbeat dads to ensure their fulfillment of financial obligations to children (Hobson 2002). But this financial crackdown does not obviously interrogate cultural norms and practices which distance care provision from many social conventions that define fatherhood and masculinity. In response, I argue that a similar level of tenacity must be demonstrated specifically to urge fathers to fulfill more care responsibilities. The policy levers available to achieve this end are the subject of Chapters 8 and 9.
They examine in detail the incentives associated with existing policies and cultural patterns with the intention of boldly addressing how the state should entice men to assume a just share of unpaid care labour in recognition that provision of this care is an important civic virtue and obligation of citizenship.

Any effort to integrate care as an obligation of citizenship must be attuned to the diverging needs and experiences of care provision and receipt that depend on whether the care recipient is a child, a person with a physical or mental disability, a senior citizen, or an able-bodied, psychologically healthy adult. This book singles out care for children as the primary model for exploration, particularly when assessing existing policies and proposing alternatives. Although care for the elderly is and will be a growing social need as the baby boom generation ages and health care reform stalls, a life-course perspective reveals that child care is an especially significant policy problem in regard to the gender division of care. Research shows that the birth of a child pushes many straight couples along a path of neotraditionalism regardless of their intentions or attitudes about gender roles (Zvonkovic et al. 1996). By the time elder care becomes a concern for members of the new sandwich generation, who at some point will care simultaneously for children and parents, domestic care roles are often already established within heterosexual couples.

The choice to examine child care also responds to the political reality that children are one of the few social groups to be condoned as legitimate dependants within the neoliberal paradigm (Brodie 1996, 135). The paradigm’s preoccupation with self-reliance has meant that most other dependency on the state is viewed somewhat suspiciously as an indication of personal failure. The demarcation of children from adults under the guise of legitimate dependency has contributed to a neoliberal preference for targeting income-maintenance programs to children, particularly in an effort to combat child poverty. One result of this policy orientation is that it risks theoretically removing children’s well-being from the circumstances of their parents or other guardians. I defend against this risk by directing attention to children and child care in the context of the social citizenship needs of adults.

While principally concerned with the gender division of labour that emerges in response to families’ child care needs, the policy analysis in the book is far broader than this one issue. Just as the early post-Second World War era acknowledged a symbiotic relationship between economic policy in its Keynesian guise and social policy designed to refashion the inadequate intra-war social security system, so we again live in an era
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where there is potential to re-initiate a virtuous circle between economic and social policy. Specifically, I will argue that some measures designed to mitigate systemic gender inequalities and foster work-family balance are necessary to remedy ailments in modern labour markets more generally. Problems that I examine include the looming labour shortage that is anticipated from the warped population pyramid, polarization in the paid hours that people work and the resulting earnings inequality and un(der)employment, as well as declining real wages for young workers, especially men.

The ambition to articulate principles by which to reshape the overarching framework for Canada’s social policy blueprint follows in the tradition of two of the most cogent and comprehensive right-of-centre critiques of the Canadian welfare state: Thomas Courchene’s (1994a) *Social Canada in the Millennium* and John Richards’s (1997) *Retooling the Welfare State*, which were published in partnership with the C.D. Howe Institute. The impressive breadth of policy expertise demonstrated by these authors positions them both to illuminate the manner in which social policy re-emerges in the contemporary context as an indispensable economic factor. As Courchene (1994a, 233) explains, “in an era where knowledge is at the cutting edge of competitiveness, social policy as it relates to human capital and skills formation becomes indistinguishable from economic policy” – a theme he develops further in his subsequent book, *A State of Minds* (2001). Working from this perspective, Courchene and Richards have been important intellectual architects for social policy in Canada over the past decade, exerting particular influence in terms of the delivery of income assistance for children, as well as in respect of the evolution of fiscal federal relations. The federal government’s introduction of the Canada Child Tax Benefit and its heightened respect for “competitive federalism” both track policy prescriptions advanced by Richards (1997, Chapter 12 and 243-49) and Courchene (1994a, 154-55, 324; 1997).

The breadth of policy knowledge in their respective treatises is not matched by a similarly strong normative foundation, however. This lacuna is problematic given the ambitious task that Courchene and Richards set for themselves. Courchene (1994a, 3), for instance, begins his book by explaining that its purpose “is to describe, to evaluate, and, ultimately, to redesign Canada’s social policy infrastructure ... Given that the manner in which we Canadians decide to rework our social envelope will be one of the defining characteristics of our nation in the twenty-first century, redesigning Social Canada is tantamount to redefining Canada.” Invoking Jenson’s terminology, Courchene’s objective
is no less than the redefinition of the country’s citizenship regime. But this project does not just require policy expertise. It also demands philosophical inquiry about the kind of society we ought to live in by raising questions of justice, including the requirements of social inclusion, the scope and kinds of inequality we will permit, and so on. The assumptions about these issues that underpin Courchene’s alternative vision are, therefore, critical and merit more attention than he provides.

Richards is more attentive than Courchene to normative issues. His analysis includes a careful examination of the philosophical framework of the “Traditional Left,” which parented the welfare state in Canada in its first decades. But, like Courchene, Richards does not provide a comparable discussion of the normative framework that guides his own vision for a welfare system appropriate for the postindustrial context. One result, we will see, is that both authors defend social policy blueprints that retain vestiges of what Pateman (1988) referred to as the patriarchal “sexual contract,” which is a historical foundation of the liberal philosophical tradition within which the two men work.

Illuminating the patriarchal character of the dominant vision of social citizenship in Canada that Courchene and Richards represent is a key objective of this book. My approach to the subject of social policy redesign thus departs from their methodology by embracing a much stronger concern to merge normative theory from political science, philosophy, sociology, and law with public policy analysis. This approach does not fit the quantitative/qualitative framework through which much policy work is categorized. Nor does the policy work follow in the path of rational choice scholars, power resource theory, or one of the many brands of institutionalism. Instead, policy research in this book is the progeny of the citizenship theorists whom Kymlicka and Norman note have so far been hesitant to enter the foray of policy analysis. It aims to provide an example of the value of expanding public policy scholarship to include theorists as key partners in the world of practical policy review and design.

The normative framework I employ in Carefair is unabashedly feminist. Although issues of caregiving now receive attention from third way scholars such as Giddens (1999, 2000) and Esping-Andersen (1999, 2002), new communitarians like Etzioni (1993, 1996), and social conservative organizations, including the Canadian group REAL Women, it remains a uniquely feminist endeavour to treat care as a lens of analysis for citizenship and social policy. As Daly and Lewis (1998, 4) remark, “care is one of the truly original concepts to have emerged from feminist scholarship, and it has served as a central hinge in thinking
about how welfare states are or can be gendered. The origins of the concept lie in an attempt to define in its own right the work that makes up caring for others and to analyze how that work reinforced the disadvantaged position of women. Over time, however, the labour focus came to be complemented by a consideration of the wider notion of the social (societal) division of caring and the state’s role therein.”

The analysis developed in this book is the product of third wave feminism, which resists the hyphenated feminisms of the past. Rather than aligning my analysis with liberal-feminism, socialist-feminism, or communitarian-feminism, the book is better located in feminist literature in terms of its reliance on three fundamental internal debates. The first is research initiated by Gilligan’s (1982) work on the ethic of care. The second is literature associated with Pateman’s (1989, 179-209) presentation of the limited citizenship options available to women in her discussion of Wollstonecraft’s dilemma, especially the ensuing research by Fraser (1994), who articulates the universal caregiver model of postindustrial welfare to transcend this dilemma. The third debate is captured by Collins (1991, 1994), who cogently argues for the experiences of women of colour to be placed at the centre of feminist theorizing and policy research. Readers who are less familiar with feminist scholarship can rest assured that the meaning and significance of these streams of literature will become clear in the following chapters.

Over the course of the analysis, I draw upon insights from these feminist debates to evaluate the ideological deployment of duty discourses in liberal welfare regimes. The intention is to defend a heretofore undeveloped pillar for Canada’s social policy framework that would accord far more value to remedying the gender division of labour by obliging men to care, while also acknowledging that private time for domestic care is a necessary condition for social inclusion. The pillar I envision is, therefore, called on to support a balancing act that rejects outright the patriarchal distribution of care without condemning the activity of care itself. The carefair vision expects and demands men to care more in order to minimize gender inequality, including inequality in income, participation in the labour market, and access to political power. But this expectation should not be viewed as the imposition of some punishment or hardship on diverse groups of men. The feminist debates that inform this book are explicit that caregiving often is a source of great pleasure, fulfillment, and identity – a source from which the breadwinner model of male citizenship has historically marginalized many men. Thus, not only does carefair challenge patriarchy, but it also embraces the potential for public policy to minimize barriers that
some men encounter in accessing and cultivating their spheres of affectivity.

In the process, the carefair concept casts doubt on visions of social citizenship that equate welfare predominantly with income level, market participation, and human capital. Citizens ought not to be counted as full members of society just by virtue of their affluence, employment, or skills. The time citizens must allocate to secure these goods is also an important consideration because long hours in the labour force or in training often confront citizens with a time crunch that requires them to sacrifice participation in other important areas of social life, including participation in their private networks of intimate, familial, and friendship relations. Carefair responds to this risk by suggesting a more nuanced vision of welfare that integrates a richer appreciation for the value that care provision and receipt contribute to individual and group well-being, all the while grappling with the risk that time poverty may constrain citizens’ capacities to balance caring with earning.

**Organization of the Book**

Following this introduction, the book begins in Chapter 2 by returning to the tradition of citizenship defined in seminal social liberal texts by T.H. Marshall (1964) and John Rawls (1971). This starting point is important for three reasons. The first is that the language of social citizenship is relatively foreign to Canadians who are not familiar with the social sciences. In Canada, citizenship is primarily spoken of only in terms of immigration. This observation stands despite the fact that D. White (2003, 58) claims that “social citizenship became the most distinctive dimension of Canada’s citizenship regime ... well into the 1980s” because of our country’s preoccupation with the social programs, especially health care, that distinguish us from our US neighbours. While White’s insight may be accurate, the reality is that the distinction citizens observe between domestic and American social policy is not formally named in Canadian parlance; at least it is not regularly spoken of in the language of social citizenship. Thus, for a Canadian audience, it is necessary to return to key conceptual architects of the idea of social citizenship to unpack its meaning and reveal its radical potential.

The focus on Marshall and Rawls is also important because of their strong liberal intellectual heritage. The stickiness of public policy, to which institutionalist scholars concerned with path dependency have alerted social science disciplines, obliges policy analysts to engage with pragmatic politics. Esping-Andersen (1999, 173) captures this theme by noting that “any blueprint for reform is bound to be naïve if it calls for
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a radical departure from existing welfare regime practice.” His subse-
quent argument “that optimizing welfare in a postindustrial setting will,
one the less, require radical departures” signals the challenge that re-
formists face (ibid.). I propose to tackle this challenge in part by return-
ing to the literature of liberal thinkers like Marshall and Rawls, who
defined the intellectual environment that nourished the postwar wel-
fare state in Anglo-liberal regimes like Canada. Policy proposals that
demonstrate some consistency with this liberal philosophical heritage
are more likely to appeal in the Canadian policy arena than are simple
exhortations to import the Scandinavian model.

Finally, it is helpful to re-examine the work of Marshall and Rawls
because it is assumptions implicit in their thinking that are a principal
target of the duty discourses found across disparate schools of political
thought. Traditional liberal assumptions about autonomy, individual-
ism, and rights represent key issues of concern for commentators who
worry about a decline of civic virtues in Western societies and a corre-
sponding growth in egoism. Put somewhat differently, renewed em-
phasis on social obligations represents a citizenship regime shift in
Canada because it is replacing the shared assumptions of social liberals
like Marshall and Rawls. The restructuring that has occurred in Canada
is, thus, only fully appreciated if we assess the political-cultural order
that is eroding.

Once the target of the duty discourse is presented, the analysis pro-
ceeds by engaging with the newfound attention to social responsibili-
ties given by Courchene and Richards in their respective visions for
social citizenship in Canada. Their invocation of the duty concept is
consistent with scholarship from five distinct political-ideological camps:
neoliberalism, to which I also refer sometimes as economic conserva-
tivism; social conservatism, particularly in its neofamilial guise; communi-
tarianism; the third way; and feminism. Chapter 3 is largely descriptive,
summarizing the manner in which the first four of these different schools
of thought invoke the concept of social responsibility. The renewed
concern with social obligations as a leading normative concept in po-
litical discourse is presented in the context of the history of citizenship
traditions, reflecting the resurgence of themes typical of civic republi-
canism. This tradition emphasizes active over passive visions of citizen-
ship, which I argue merit further attention and refinement if we wish to
embrace care as a constitutive element of citizenship.

Chapters 4 and 5 assess what is right and wrong respectively with
each political camp’s version of the duty discourse. I draw extensively
upon the feminist literatures associated with the work of Gilligan and
Pateman in these evaluations, particularly in regard to the fundamental ambivalence these literatures reveal about caregiving as both a site of rich reward and a deep source of discrimination. This ambivalence motivates the need to develop a policy blueprint that accommodates the finding that caregiving can be a practice that is inherently valuable both socially and privately, but which ultimately requires redistribution within the welfare diamond and across sexes, classes, and ethnic groups in order to minimize discrimination. The analysis lends further support for promoting male obligations to care as well as women's employment responsibilities so long as this promotion unfolds within a policy context that enhances social entitlements to services and programs that facilitate work-family balance.

Chapter 6 addresses in more detail a principal failing of the duty discourses. The problem is the largely one-sided “workerist” approach to social inclusion that they imply, in which paid employment is portrayed as the badge of genuine social inclusion at the expense of participation in other equally important areas of social life, including the domestic sphere. In response, I argue that time for care in one's domestic spaces is an essential element of social belonging that has yet to be fully appreciated by contemporary theorists of inclusion. In this view, obstacles to participation in one's network of intimate, friendship, and familial relations are just as much impediments to the practices of full social membership as are barriers to inclusion in the labour market. This position represents another take on the slogan “The personal is political,” which motivates feminist critiques of the public/private divide. I argue that the domestic sphere, which is often viewed as the most private of citizenry spaces, must be treated as a critical sociopolitical domain for the purposes of promoting social inclusion.

The support I offer for this position draws on work advanced by feminist theorists associated with the literature of Patricia Hill Collins. Collins (1991, 1994) demonstrates that motherhood factors significantly in identity politics and issues of individual and collective power. But these themes are often overlooked in social debate when the mothering experiences of women of colour are marginalized in the analysis, including in feminist theorizing. In response, she calls on feminists to reconstruct the dominant view of motherhood in a manner that embraces the circumstances of ethnic minority women. Chapter 6 contributes to this reconstruction process.

Ultimately, though, it is fatherhood more than motherhood that is the target of reconstruction in this book. The rapid rise in female participation in the labour force reflects how the cultural ideal of motherhood
has expanded to include paid work expectations and aspirations. This expansion is due in part to women’s need to sustain household incomes as a result of the declining real earnings of men since the 1970s. The institution of fatherhood has not kept pace with this postindustrial change, however. It retains strong links to the male breadwinner role to the exclusion of male caregiving, notwithstanding the politically correct, gender-neutral rhetoric that typically accompanies discussions of caring and earning in policy circles and political forums. Following Fraser (1994), I, therefore, argue that the most pressing citizenship innovation requires the reorganization of social policy to induce far more men to modify their behaviour and attitudes to become more like most women today – people who shoulder considerable primary care work in addition to other citizenry obligations and ambitions.

Chapters 7 and 8 conclude the book by exploring the policy changes that are necessary to achieve this cultural transformation. Chapter 7 develops the concept of carefair as a cultural analogue to workfare. The objective is to identify and institutionalize policy incentives that will reorganize the existing context of choice that privileges many men economically as a result of their socially sanctioned irresponsibility for caregiving. The chapter also recognizes that some men may be socially excluded from enjoying fully the rewards that can be associated with care provision.

Chapter 8 locates the proposed policy measures designed to minimize the patriarchal division of care in a much broader policy framework under the rubric of what I term the politics of time. Among other issues, this politics interweaves gender equality strategies into a policy tapestry concerned with labour supply, the polarization in earnings, a shift in poverty from the elderly to families with young children, waning fertility, and the rise in time stress reported by Canadians, particularly women. The scope of the analysis points to the value of broadening the analytic boundaries typically associated with the concept of work-family balance to capture a more diverse range of policy issues. In this manner, the discussion shares an affinity with the child-centred social investment strategy and new gender contract recently argued for by Esping-Andersen (2002) and other third way proponents. Ultimately, however, the proposed politics of time distances itself from Esping-Andersen’s new welfare vision because his work accommodates primarily those aspects of feminist analysis that pose the least challenge to the male model of citizenship and remains resistant to elements of feminist research that require a more dramatic departure from androcentric assumptions. The analysis in Chapter 8 is also explicitly strategic in tone, conceeding that
gender equality does not appear to be a primary motivation for dramatic policy departures in the current context. While the book in no way implies that the pursuit of gender equality is only instrumentally valuable, it proposes to capitalize on policy blueprints that represent a win-win strategy for gender justice and other socioeconomic policy envelopes that presently enjoy more political appeal.