Statesmen, Strategists, and Diplomats
Contents

Foreword / ix
John English

Acknowledgments / xi

Introduction / 3
Patrice Dutil

1 The Imperial Prime Minister: The Central Role in Canadian Foreign Policy / 12
Patrice Dutil

2 Sir John A. Macdonald and Alexander Mackenzie in the Nascent North Atlantic Triangle / 38
Barbara J. Messamore

3 The Realism of Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s Foreign Policy / 73
Graeme Thompson

Patrice Dutil

5 The Very Double Life of Mackenzie King’s Foreign Policy / 121
Robert Teigrob

6 The Surprising Engagement of R.B. Bennett’s Foreign Policy / 145
Damien-Claude Bélanger
7 The Transformative Foreign Policy of Louis St-Laurent / 166
   Robert Bothwell

8 John Diefenbaker’s “Rogue” Foreign Policy / 190
   Michael D. Stevenson

9 The Limits of Pearsonianism / 212
   Jennifer Tunnicliffe

10 The Twists and Shouts of Pierre Elliott Trudeau's Foreign Policy / 239
    Susan Colbourn

11 Brian Mulroney, Joe Clark, and a New Constructive Internationalism / 261
    Matthew Hayday

12 Jean Chrétien's Reactive Foreign Policy / 285
    P.E. Bryden

13 The Thwarted Ambitions of Paul Martin / 304
    Stephen Azzi

14 Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau on the International Stage / 331
    Jennifer Levin Bonder and Leah Sarson

15 Ranking the Effectiveness of Prime Ministers in Managing Foreign Policy / 354
    Patrice Dutil and Andrea Riccardo Migone

Tribute: Remembering Greg Donaghy / 360
   Patrice Dutil

List of Contributors / 367

Index / 370
After a few years as prime minister, Stephen Harper allowed that he had been surprised to discover how much of his time was devoted to external affairs. For some, this was also a revelation. For specialists, however, it was merely a recognition that “external” looms like a giant iceberg on the prime minister’s agenda: its peaks are visible to the naked eye, but a formidable amount of time and attention is devoted to making it float.

In reality, it has always been so, and the essays in this innovative collection demonstrate it vividly. I say “innovative” for two reasons. The first is that no other book has been devoted to a systematic analysis of the personal role of Canadian prime ministers in fashioning this country’s foreign policy. The second is because of the fresh perspectives that are presented in this volume.

A number of works have been useful in illuminating the contribution of the prime minister in Westminster (or Westminster-like) systems. All the good biographies of Canada’s prime ministers have in some way examined their roles in foreign policy. Sixty years ago, James Eayrs dedicated the first chapter of his The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada to the impact of the prime minister. Kim Richard Nossal devoted a chapter to the prime minister’s role in The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, as well as another on the prime minister and summity. Paul Gecelovsky wrote an important essay on the subject. Nelson Michaud produced a smart historical overview of how prime ministers managed key international events and highlighted the roles of the Privy Council Office (PCO) and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) in shaping policy. In their thoughtful book Canada’s International Policies, Brian Tomlin, Norman Hillmer, and Fen Hampson built on the work of John Kingdon, arguing that his insights on “policy entrepreneurs” in the context of American domestic policy could readily be applied to Canadian foreign policy. In this framework of “multiple streams,” the authors see policy problems and policy solutions as perpetually in competition, consistently mismatched, as problems are hardly ever met by effective solutions. The only way for a link
to be made, in this theory, is for a policy entrepreneur (who could be political, administrative, or indeed outside government) to do what is necessary to amass enough support for a policy idea to break through and actually solve a problem. Within this framework, the prime minister indeed becomes the key policy entrepreneur. He/she decides what will be on the agenda and whether timing permits a workable, winnable solution. Such triumphs, of course, depend on circumstances of all sorts. Pierre Trudeau's recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1970 is a classic case in point. The “problem” of how to approach China in order to increase trade and multiply contacts had existed since Mao Zedong seized Beijing in 1949. The “solution” of recognition had been debated among politicians, prime ministers, and the Department of External Affairs for twenty years but without resolution. It was Trudeau, using his personal knowledge and sensitivity to China, as well as a perfect sense of timing when it came to the impact of a Canadian decision in Washington, DC, who acted as the policy entrepreneur that allowed a breakthrough. Some may feel that the recognition of China was predictable, that the economic forces of globalization made it inevitable. In hindsight, that view is credible but it still leaves questions unanswered. The focus on the prime minister, however, does lead to answers. To put it another way, Trudeau's presence and attitude went a long way to explain “why then?”

Many scholars have pointed to the domestic scene to explain Canada's foreign policy: the imperialist fervour in English Canada during the first half of the twentieth century and the isolationist perspective of French Canada have certainly had that sort of influence. Historians are increasingly aware of the influence of transnational networks – industries, churches, scientists, women's groups, peace movements, diaspora actors, and human rights and environmental organizations, to name but a few. One could certainly add the changing views of the Canadian business community over the past century or the perspectives of Canadian agriculturalists, whether they be grain growers, cattle ranchers, or dairy farmers. Many commentators have argued that the development of the international political economy has had more influence, and that in response Canada has experimented with both protectionist and trade-intensive policies. Others hold that structures such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the United Nations (UN), not differences in the leadership styles of prime ministers, have been the primary determinants for what happens in decision making. In this view, a prime minister would have no autonomy and no ability to shape the external environment except in the smallest details.

What the chapters in this book amply demonstrate is that the centrality of the prime minister in determining the tone and tenor of Canada's foreign policy has been undiminished by the creation of ministerial posts to head departments
in defence, trade, foreign relations, or international development assistance or by the panoply of international affairs bureaus in line ministries. Simply put, the prime ministers of Canada have the greatest single influence on the foreign policy agenda and in determining how policy will be implemented or evaluated; no other single player in the policy arena compares. Although there is no doubt that international events often burst on the radar screen and upset the best-laid plans, those events (such as the necessity of acquiring Rupert’s Land, the outbreaks of the First and Second World Wars, or the Cuban Missile Crisis to cite but a few top-of-mind examples) are typically rare. Because of the centrality of their presence in the ordinary days of the foreign policy game, prime ministers must always command attention.

Prime ministers in Westminster-style governance systems are recognized as typically wielding enormous power, and no more so than in Canada. I would argue that the foreign policy file is especially revealing of this extraordinary latitude. Prime ministers speak with the authority of a monarch, and if they carry a majority in the House of Commons, they easily command the foreign policy apparatus and play the central part in policy making. They are statesmen, but at the same time they must be strategists and, in the day-to-day testing of international relations, diplomats. Canada’s behaviour on the international stage will inevitably bear the stamp of their personality. Remarkably, history shows that, in Canada at least, minority status in the House does not seem to diminish the government’s grip on the country’s external relations policies or practices.

In fact, I borrow much from Sam Goodman’s The Imperial Premiership, which emphasizes the central role of Britain’s prime minister in crafting the foreign policy of that country, but I extend the chronology to reach back to Confederation, when Sir John A. Macdonald ensured that foreign policy questions always landed on his desk first.

Does a prime minister actually make a difference? Many doubt it. Some observers of Canadian foreign policy suggest that the prime minister’s freedom of action is significantly bound by the state of international relations. As Christopher Kirkey and Michael Hawes argue in Canadian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World, the dominance of unipolarity over the past generation may have had a more determining effect on the formulation of foreign policy in Canada than any other factor. Others hold that the wishes of the business community, divided though its interests may be, have far more influence on foreign policy making than does a prime minister.

Observers will point to the United States and contend that Canada’s foreign policy is inevitably affected by what is decided in Washington. I reject that proposition, though I will necessarily add that because the United States is our
only neighbour, has an economy ten times as large as ours, and is armed to the teeth, prime ministers and their advisers must calculate the Canadian interest in light of that inescapable reality. Canada’s prosperity and peace largely depend on it and probably will for decades (centuries?) to come. Structuralists will highlight the impact of political and economic forces emerging from outside the country as key to explaining foreign policy. In such a view, the role of the Canadian government is necessarily reactive, leaving precious little room for it to be innovative and only the narrowest opportunities for the chief executive – the prime minister – to exercise any discretion. An early example was John A. Macdonald’s position regarding Rupert’s Land. He thought it had “no present value to Canada,” as Confederation was being negotiated and was satisfied not to have to deal with it. All the same, he knew that the moment would come when a decision must be made. As he stated, “I fear if Englishmen do not go there, Yankees will.”10 The impact of the United States has always been a key force in effecting the statesmanship of prime ministers.

Many will argue that Canada’s foreign policy was always shaped by domestic politics and the need to guarantee votes. In a democracy (even a creaky one), this surely is not surprising. Macdonald was keenly aware that, in his time, the imperialist strain of thought was gathering speed; Laurier tried to slalom between imperialism and French Canada’s isolationism as he crafted his foreign policy. Borden repeatedly chose to ignore the latter, with the result that his foreign policy poisoned relations between his party and French Canada for generations. Mackenzie King was barely in office when he confided to his diary that his foreign policy goals were nothing more than “extensions of domestic policy.”11 Louis St-Laurent identified national unity as the first principle of his foreign policy during his famous 1947 Gray Lecture at the University of Toronto: “The role of this country in world affairs will prosper only as we maintain this principle, for a disunited Canada will be a powerless one.”12 Lester Pearson was graphic: for him, foreign policy was “domestic policy with its hat on.”13

One point that has been widely underappreciated is the impact of foreign policy decisions on electoral fortunes. I argue that at least half of Canada’s national elections featured substantive discussions on Canada’s place in the world. Most historians agree that the Fenian raids of 1866, which originated in the United States and struck into Canada, particularly consolidated support for the Quebec Resolutions (that were the foundation of Confederation in Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick). The election of 1872 was in part a referendum on Macdonald’s handling of foreign relations, notably the issue of the Treaty of Washington and the early treaties with Indigenous nations in the west. The campaign of 1878 hinged on Macdonald’s new National Policy, one that substantively changed Canada’s trade policy. The same could be said about the
The Imperial Prime Minister

The election of 1891, when the Liberals challenged Macdonald on that policy and advanced their own approach, aiming at some sort of new trade reciprocity with the United States. The re-election of the Laurier government in 1900 was inevitably affected by the policy of quasi-intervention in South Africa, and in 1911 it hinged on two issues: Laurier’s deal with the Taft government for a Reciprocity Agreement and the creation of a navy that could be committed to support the British Empire.

The election of 1917 was all about foreign policy and Canada’s involvement in the First World War. Foreign affairs, one could say, took a back seat during the interwar period, though there is room to think that the national rejection of Borden’s Unionist government in 1921 was partially attributable to Canada’s 1919 anti-Bolshevik military adventure in Siberia after four years of war, tears, and pain. Mackenzie King made an issue of the imperial tie in 1926, asserting that the British-born governor general had no business denying him the right to form a government without dissolving the House of Commons. In 1940, foreign affairs returned to the electoral foreground as he sought a mandate for a new war effort against Nazi Germany. Arguably, the 1944 contest was a judgment on his war and foreign policy management.

The 1952 contest, which saw the re-election of the St-Laurent government, was a judgment on its management of the war effort in Korea. The 1957 election was also marked with an important foreign policy decision, as many voters were not supportive of St-Laurent’s involvement in the Suez Crisis, taking the position that Canada had no business upbraiding Great Britain and its colonial efforts to exert control in Egypt. Surely, the 1963 election was a judgment against Diefenbaker’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. The election of the Pierre Trudeau Liberals was, in part, based on his promise of a new approach to foreign policy. The 1980 election was touched, if only slightly, by the Joe Clark government’s promise to move the Canadian embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. The 1988 election was fought entirely on Canada’s trade agreement with the United States. The Liberal victory in 2004 was undoubtedly a reward for keeping Canada out of the American aggression in Iraq. One could argue that the 2015 election – the only one that actually featured a leaders’ debate focused exclusively on foreign policy – may have been affected by a judgment on the Harper government’s cold-hearted approach to the unfolding tragedy of Syria. Did the Justin Trudeau government lose its majority in 2019 because of the clumsy diplomacy of its leader? Did it manage to stay in power nevertheless because of its generally well-perceived handling of trade negotiations with the Trump administration?

Caught in a geo-political squeeze, restrained by public opinion, and limited by finite resources, Canadian prime ministers are nonetheless called to lead, to
plead, and to act. Some have come to the job with grand ideas, all of which were dashed. Many came to office with vague notions at best and developed their instincts on the job, sometimes tutored by the public service and guided by their cabinet colleagues, and even achieved measures of success.

The contributors to this collection were given free rein to apply their own methods. In the first chapter, I review the unrivalled role of the Canadian prime minister in determining the country’s foreign policy. In Chapter 2, Barbara Messamore examines the impact of John A. Macdonald. As Canada’s first prime minister, he essentially created the north Atlantic triangle by imposing Canada’s presence on the bilateral relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. Much of his policies were pursued by Alexander Mackenzie, who otherwise left little imprint on the country’s foreign relations. The chapter also discusses relations between Ottawa and the Indigenous peoples of the Prairies, as Macdonald and Mackenzie initiated treaty negotiations with them. The acquisition of new territory for settlers necessitated bargaining with the First Nations. Thereafter, negotiations with Indigenous peoples became a matter of dealing with domestic policy stakeholders, much as the Indigenous communities in Eastern Canada.

In Chapter 3, Graeme Thompson readapts the realism of Macdonald’s policy in his treatment of Wilfrid Laurier’s decisions. Laurier proved to be a remarkable actor in defining Canada’s foreign relations, and innovated on many fronts. He, like Macdonald, imposed conditions on Canada’s relations with London and sought to expand trade with the United States. His innovations in terms of establishing a department of external affairs and in creating a Canadian navy were important milestones in the evolution of Canada’s foreign policy.

In Chapter 4, Patrice Dutil introduces the concept of conservative internationalism to explain Robert Borden’s evolving approach to foreign relations. Borden’s personal inclinations were challenged by the events of the First World War, and he moved Canada’s foreign policy into a decidedly more autonomous position. Nonetheless, it was anchored in international organizations such as the British Empire and the emergent League of Nations, and all the more aware of the deepening need to maintain an open dialogue with the United States. Borden’s turn moved Canadian foreign policy from colonial concerns to international perspectives. Nothing would ever be the same again.

William Lyon Mackenzie King is the subject of Chapter 5, written by Robert Teigrob. King followed much of Borden’s policy line in the 1920s and probably had his greatest impact in building up the policy capacity of the Department of External Affairs. He was not compelled to take this step, and the simple policy apparatus used by Macdonald, Laurier, and Borden might have worked well. King’s foreign policy in the 1940s can be seen as furthering Macdonald’s
work in forging an essential role for Canada in the north Atlantic. As Teigrob demonstrates, King asserted Canada's place in the diplomatic world by enthusiastically joining internationalist groups, hopeful that the world community would never again allow for an apocalypse like the Second World War.

In Chapter 6, Damien-Claude Bélanger reveals a surprisingly engaged R.B. Bennett, besieged by the ravages of the Great Depression, who borrowed much from Robert Borden's cautious approach of blending a guarded internationalist policy with a hardened attitude toward the United States. Nevertheless, Bélanger demonstrates that Bennett was something of a romantic Empire booster and that his thinking was always marked by that penchant.

Perhaps no one had a more transformative impact on Canadian foreign relations than Louis St-Laurent. As Robert Bothwell demonstrates in Chapter 7, St-Laurent, in complicity with the mandarins who ran the Department of External Affairs and his good friend and colleague Lester B. Pearson, positioned Canada in a variety of war and peace theatres. Imposing his personal style on Canada's diplomacy, he affected structures and policy substance.

In Chapter 8, Michael Stevenson makes the case that John Diefenbaker's foreign policy was less radical than what first impressions might suggest. He argues that Diefenbaker borrowed much from Louis St-Laurent's blend of realism and internationalism. The difference was Diefenbaker's personality and his diplomatic style, particularly on the issue of nuclear weapons. Both seriously undermined any accomplishments he could have achieved and embroiled him in disagreements with both his cabinet and parts of the John F. Kennedy administration.

Lester B. Pearson fared a little better in managing Canada's foreign policy. There is no doubt that he was the best prepared of all prime ministers to shape Canadian foreign policy. As Jennifer Tunnicliffe argues in Chapter 9, he achieved success on a number of priorities, such as negotiating with the United States on the Auto Pact, dealing with Charles de Gaulle, and adjusting Canadian foreign policy to the demands of the emerging nations in Asia and Africa.

In Chapter 10, Susan Colbourn assesses Pierre Trudeau in a different light. She sets aside the notion that his foreign policy was largely a failure and emphasizes the advancements he brought to the file. His government had a dramatic impact on expanding the various bureaucracies involved in giving shape to foreign policy, but she notes that his approach was often improvised, and carried out independently of the civil service. Trudeau, like all his predecessors, put a personal stamp on the country's diplomacy and his notoriety around the world was undoubtedly unprecedented for a Canadian prime minister. He clearly expanded the bureaucracy, but his policies were unpredictable, shaped by his often contradictory personal style.
In Chapter 11, Matthew Hayday examines the Brian Mulroney years – often seen today as a new golden age of Canadian diplomacy – as a rebirth of internationalism, and yet one reborn in its hard focus on relations with the United States. His chapter highlights a “constructive internationalism” that certainly echoed the conservative internationalism of Borden, Bennett, and Diefenbaker. Hayday sees a root shared by Brian Mulroney and Joe Clark, a common outlook on the world that led to remarkable successes.

In Chapter 12, P.E. Bryden offers a new perspective on Jean Chrétien’s policy. Chrétien undoubtedly had a major impact in slashing the bureaucracies in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the military. His government policy, under the influence of Lloyd Axworthy, minister for foreign affairs and trade, pursued what some have called an “intrusive internationalism,” but Chrétien’s personal instincts were clearly most influential in joining the war effort against the Taliban government in Afghanistan while holding back on joining the United States in its adventure in Iraq.

Allan Gotlieb wondered whether Chrétien’s successor, Paul Martin, could possibly “design a foreign policy that is less overreaching, less narcissistic, less sanctimonious, less ill-defined in its objectives.” Martin’s policies were undoubtedly full of goodwill, but as Stephen Azzi shows in Chapter 13, they never rose to Gotlieb’s challenge. The foreign policy pursued by Martin in his twenty months in office was dominated by bold policy pronouncements, but often left bureaucracies and allies confused as to what Canada’s true intentions really were.

The policy confusion, I would argue, persisted in the Harper and Justin Trudeau years. In Chapter 14, Jennifer Levin Bonder and Leah Sarson compare Harper and Trudeau to highlight the common problems they faced and the remarkably similar outcomes they achieved. On matters of structure, their outlooks were alike, and though there were some clear distinctions in terms of substance, the real difference between the two men was in style.

Inevitably, foreign policy in Canada can be summarized by its prime ministers, and their contributions to the country can also be measured by how they shaped foreign policy via manipulating structures, adopting and rejecting options, and impressing this country’s diplomacy with their personality. In the final chapter, Patrice Dutil and Andrea Riccardo Migone report on a survey that asked the contributors to this volume to rank Canada’s prime ministers on their performance in managing Canada’s foreign policy. Who did the best? Readers are invited to compare their impressions with the writers who heartily contributed intriguing new perspectives on this country’s prime ministers and their unique contributions to giving Canada a voice on the world stage.
Notes


11 Quoted in Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible*, 40.


The Imperial Prime Minister: The Central Role in Canadian Foreign Policy

Patrice Dutil

Times were simpler, if not less stressful, when Sir John A. Macdonald sat at his desk in the posh Arlington Hotel on Vermont Street, just north of the White House, in Washington, DC, to write his letters. He felt a duty to report on progress and, more importantly, to give instructions on what needed to be done in Ottawa and in London.

It was March 1871 and Macdonald was in the American capital as part of a five-man British delegation that was attending a conference there. He had only reluctantly agreed to participate; he would have preferred to stay in Ottawa and defend his government’s record in the House of Commons. But the conference was an important one, and he could not trust British diplomats with the interests of Canada. He had arrived in Washington earlier that month, accompanied by his wife, Agnes; her brother, Hewitt Bernard (who was also Macdonald’s deputy minister of justice); and William Smith, the deputy minister for fisheries. Together, they settled in for what would be lengthy discussions. After a few weeks, Macdonald met with President Ulysses S. Grant, the man who had invited the British government to the capital in order to negotiate an agreement that would compensate the United States for its support of the South during the Civil War and restore relations between the two nations. Grant had also put Canada on his list of unresolved issues. In his State of the Union Address, he denounced it as a “semi-independent but irresponsible agent” due to the way in which it treated American ships on its coasts. Grant was also incensed by the fact that American vessels could not fully engage on the St. Lawrence and called on Congress to give him the authority to disrupt trade between the two countries.

The president was courteous at the brief meeting. Macdonald was formally introduced on the floors of the House of Representatives and the Senate and met a slew of congressmen, senators, and Supreme Court justices. He was also presented to the famed general William Tecumseh Sherman and apparently came away impressed. Back at the hotel, he thought of his many correspondents,
but key among them were Lord Lisgar, the governor general of Canada, an Irish Englishman (raised in County Cavan) who was assigned to manage the attachment to the old metropole, and Dr. Charles Tupper, Canada’s high commissioner to the Court of St. James.

As Barbara Messamore describes well in Chapter 2 of this volume, Canada was hoping for a return to a free-trading agreement and even for some reparations for the damage produced by various Fenian raids that had originated in the United States during the preceding decade. Washington, for its part, wanted a full repayment from Britain for the damages to the Union caused during the Civil War by the British-built C.S.S. Alabama, as well as exclusive rights to the fishing on the Great Lakes. Eager to deal with the Grant administration, Britain was willing to pay practically anything to resume trade with its long-lost colony. Canada was in a no-win situation, caught in a vice between a superpower and the most dynamic new force in hemispheric affairs.

The Washington Conference was a turning point in Canada’s history for two main reasons. First, it was a recognition, in both Washington and London, that Ottawa was indeed the guardian of sovereign interest in Canada. Second, and just as importantly, it showed that the Canadian government had the capacity to legitimately negotiate and to enforce compliance with any treaty. The bilateral relations between Britain and America had now become an Atlantic triangle. The quality of John A. Macdonald’s interventions in thirty-seven sessions that had lasted over almost ten weeks had made that evident.

The negotiations took a bad turn when it seemed that the British representatives were inclined to accept a deal that would allow unrestricted American access to inland fisheries in waters shared with Canada in return for the elimination of US duties on fish, coal, and salt. It was a lopsided arrangement, and Macdonald objected at every turn to the offers being made, pointedly remarking that the various statutes on Canadian fisheries passed at Westminster had been transferred to Ottawa and that therefore the Parliament of Canada had the last word. He returned to these arguments so often that he thought his colleagues would consider him “exceedingly pertinacious.”

It could have been a total disaster. In London, the government of William Gladstone desperately wanted an agreement and ultimately accepted the terms laid down by the Grant administration, paying reparations worth $15.5 million. On the issue of Canada, however, it was far more reluctant to acquiesce, because Macdonald stood in the way. Canada emerged whole from the conference and no territory was ceded. The claims against Britain would be adjudicated by separate commissions that would not involve Canada. Canadian producers of wood, fish oils, coal, and salt would have full and free access to the US market. Americans could access and fish in the Great Lakes and near the Maritime
provinces until 1881 in return for $5.5 million. Britain, at least, recognized that no deal could be official until it had been approved by the Canadian Parliament. It was a condition that challenged Macdonald to use practically every tool in his diplomatic pouch: an ability to convince, to ruse, to manipulate information and disinformation, to laugh, pout, drink. He had for years personally conducted diplomacy with international powers large and small (from Great Britain to Newfoundland and the Maritime colonies), but this was his first trilateral “summit,” to use today’s idiom.

Public relations mattered immensely. Macdonald never lost sight of the fact that he had to connect with his voters. He had been in Washington for seven weeks when he wrote to Alexander Morris, his minister of inland revenue, to lay out a communications strategy. Privately, Macdonald was not very bullish: “Never in the whole course of my public life have I been in so disagreeable a position, and had such an unpleasant duty to perform as the one in which I am
now engaged here.” He needed to put a good spin on what was happening in the American capital, and his idea was to contact all the newspapers friendly to the Conservative Party and ask them not to comment on the treaty until George Brown’s *Globe* published its predictably negative opinion. As he explained to Morris,

I want to endeavour so to manage it, as to let the *Globe* write under the impression that I have assented to the treaty. Brown will then pitch into the treaty and into me for sacrificing the interests of Canada. He will afterwards find out, when it is too late, that he is on the same side as myself, and will not be able to retract. My chief object in doing this is, that if Brown finds that I am opposed to the treaty, he will try to find reasons for supporting it. He may take up the loyalty cry, and state that it is the bounden duty of Canada to sacrifice something for the sake of insuring peace to the Empire ... The French [Canadians] might, if they found that the Grits were strong in England, continue the coquetting which goes on occasionally between them. It is, therefore, of very considerable consequence that Brown and the *Globe* should be committed irretrievably against the treaty. I shall take care of the Toronto *Telegraph* myself ...

This is for yourself alone ... I think you had better not discuss the matter at all with our Quebec colleagues.5

The Washington Conference was important for a third reason: It underscored the centrality of the prime minister in determining Canada’s foreign policy. Macdonald willed a north Atlantic alliance between Great Britain, the United States, and Canada by imposing his country on a bilateral relationship. He personified the policy priorities of the moment and what the best options might be. That reality of power would persist until 1946, when Mackenzie King formally gave the reins of the Department of External Affairs to Louis St-Laurent, one of the cabinet ministers whom he most respected. With the exception of a few months at the end of the Laurier and the beginning of the Borden era, the prime minister was de facto the minister of external affairs.

The exercise in Washington demonstrated how it was done in those days, and it gives modern observers a clue of what to look for now. Macdonald was impressive in the American capital (if not entirely successful, in his eyes) because he had the wisdom to bring key deputy ministers/experts into the matter.6 Smith, his deputy fisheries minister, was just a few years younger than he, a Scot who had been transferred to New Brunswick by the British government to administer customs and shipping matters in Saint John. By the time Confederation was completed, Smith had made himself an expert on trade matters and had become a businessman as president of the Saint John Gas Light Company.
He moved to Ottawa that year to become deputy minister of marine and fisheries.7

Macdonald knew every cog in the machinery of government – he had, after all, designed or at least overseen the development of much of it – but he favoured Smith’s presence and not Peter Mitchell’s, the actual fisheries minister. In turn, this helped the substance of his approach to foreign policy. He, as a prime minister who had already been in and out of cabinet for fifteen years by 1871, brought to the negotiations table an exceptionally substantive knowledge of Canada and of its policy interests. Finally, he had the opportunity of applying his own personal style to the job. In this, he surely succeeded because he knew himself well and could tailor his sincerity and conviction in a manner that projected power diplomatically to a variety of audiences. But there was something else – he was keenly aware of whom he had to convince. His back-benchers, of course, ranked high, but behind them were the voters. Between him and the voters was the press, and Macdonald knew he needed to secure at least a draw with it.

Although there is no doubt that both global and domestic issues will affect Canada’s international posture, the reality is that the prime minister remains at the centre. The question becomes, Can this role be theorized? Macdonald’s approach to the conduct of foreign policy lays out in easily discernable terms what have been constants in Canadian international relations. It also illustrates an interpretive framework that could help students, scholars, and practitioners craft a theory of how prime ministers have shaped Canadian foreign policy.

I argue that a prime minister’s record in managing foreign policy can be measured by the changes made to structures, substantive policy, and style. For me, structures constitute *statecraft*: the ability to construct and fund the apparatus necessary to create and effect policy. Policy substance, or *strategy*, is the output created by the machinery placed at the disposal of the prime minister. It is measured in gestures, alliances (created, maintained, and ended), and treaties. “Style” refers to the ability to execute effective *diplomacy*, and given the prominence of the prime minister as Canada’s first diplomat, this aspect is vitally important in terms of analysis. Style can be understood through a wide range of methods, including biography, studies of bias, and, borrowing from psychology, trait analysis. This analytical framework is not entirely new. Countless historians have closely examined the evolving bureaucratic structures (trade, diplomacy, defence, intelligence, international assistance, and increasingly, energy, environment, and agriculture) that have been deployed to advance
Canada’s foreign policy. The shifts in policy have been well studied over the generations. The issue of style, though certainly a concern of key biographies, remains, I would say, more elusive. It should be kept separate so as to facilitate the distinctions between continuity and change. Very often, it was in style that change was manifested, not in structures or policy.

**Structures**

Canadian prime ministers enjoy a remarkable latitude to make decisions on matters of structures. They generally play a cardinal role in moulding state structures, by which I mean everything from the various bureaucracies to the military.

Structure matters, but how the structures are staffed also matters. Graham Allison’s classic *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* showed how employees trapped in government structures working their “routines” and “standard operating procedures” shaped the decision-making process. The executive is not absolved in this area, caught in the web it has created or tacitly sustained. Managing the bureaucracy is a crucial factor that may well determine the success of a prime minister. The task at hand is to make suitable appointments, create and/or tailor structures so as to improve policy formulation, gather intelligence, or generate better delivery of foreign policy objectives. For many years, studies of the policy apparatus in the Department of External Affairs and the views of the mandarins who created it, and then shaped it, were commonplace.

Bureaucracies are power centres in foreign affairs and are not easy to manipulate. They can paralyze information gathering and stymie policy implementation. Prime ministers can use rewards and cost strategies, or they can change procedures to improve the clarity of one set of policy or actors over another. Governments can also use informational strategies to give primacy to particular voices. Those decisions were all finally made by the prime minister. Paul Gecelovsky ably points to recent instances where prime ministers forced changes on the External Affairs bureaucracy and thus shaped it. Gecelovsky also emphasizes the prime minister’s important appointment powers in his discussion of structures.

Since Confederation, prime ministers have played a significant role in creating bureaucracies, in downsizing them, fusing them, and dividing them. Macdonald headed his own private international intelligence unit to spy on the Fenians and put everything in place for his foreign policy priority: a department of international trade. Laurier may have been labelled a “colonial lion” by Fleet Street, but he created the Department of External Affairs and launched a distinctly
Canadian navy to advance Canadian interests. Borden had no choice but to produce a massive army and build up representation in London, Paris, and Washington. Mackenzie King added significant capacity to External Affairs, and faced with the prospect of fighting Hitler’s Germany, he rebooted the investments in the military. Louis St-Laurent’s mandate included another massive arms buildup and the deployment of Canadian soldiers for peacekeeping. Lester Pearson put everything in place to unify the armed forces and to create the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Pierre Trudeau expanded the bureaucracies on all fronts, fused External Affairs and International Trade, and created the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Brian Mulroney focused the bureaucracy on a demanding new cycle of annual summits, whereas Jean Chrétien’s key contribution was to pare down the bureaucracy and the military. Paul Martin reignited the effort to ensure that the military had the right equipment to be deployed. Stephen Harper dissolved CIDA and rechristened the department, which became the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, or DFATD. Justin Trudeau renamed it Global Affairs Canada and made a commitment to ensure that half the diplomatic corps, including ambassadors, would be women (among them were the first to serve as deputy minister and ambassador to the United States). The point is that these structural changes are the product of the thinking at the centre, not merely decisions made anonymously in the bureaucracy. They were all deployed with strategic objectives. They also all entailed major expenditures that had to be budgeted, thereby again commanding the attention of the prime ministers, as these bureaucracies necessarily informed them directly.11

The same applies to the Canadian military. Figure 1.1 details the proportion of the federal budget that has been devoted to national defence from Confederation to the end of the Harper regime. Typically, it hovered between 5 and 10 percent of total government spending. The only exceptions occurred during the world wars and the first decade of the Cold War, when the outlay spiked. The figure also reveals that the partisan label of the government did not matter much. Laurier doubled the military budget from $3 million in 1896 to $6 million in 1905 and hiked it to $10 million during his last year in power, 1911. Robert Borden added 10 percent in his first year, boosting it to $72 million in 1914, when the First World War had barely begun. At its peak – 1918 – the war cost Canada $439 million.12

With the conclusion of hostilities, expenses dropped dramatically, only to trend upward during the 1920s and 1930s. Mackenzie King increased the budget from $17 to $23 million upon his return to power in 1925, and it amounted to $35 million in 1938, the last year of peace. He had more than doubled it by the time Canada declared war on Germany. The Louis St-Laurent administration
spent lavishly on the military. Its budget grew from $387 million in 1949–50 to
$1.478 billion in 1951–52, reaching a new peak in 1955–56 of $1.838 billion (even
as it assumed a smaller proportion of total government spending). Following
the end of the Korean War, expenditures took a sharp dip but gradually re-
bounded. Figure 1.2 shows that even the Trudeau government kept building the
military budget from $1.77 billion in 1968 to almost $8.0 billion by the time it
was defeated in 1984. Increases were modest but steady in the Mulroney years,
but the Chrétien government slashed the outlay in the mid-1990s, which was
hovering around the $10 billion mark by the turn of the century. After Canada
had been in Afghanistan for almost five years, the Chrétien and Martin govern-
ments had raised the military disbursement to $15.7 billion. The Harper Tories
increased the sum to over $23.5 billion in 2015. That number dropped during
the first years of the Justin Trudeau government but began a steady rise in 2018.

Figure 1.3 captures the Canadian personnel who were deployed in peacekeep-
ing operations from 1950 to 2020.13

A similar pattern occurred in Official Development Assistance, a support
program for developing nations that was initiated by the St-Laurent government,
with the Colombo Plan in 1950. Years later, the United Nations set a goal for
rich countries to donate the equivalent of .7 percent of their gross national

---

**Figure 1.1**

National defence as a share of federal government spending, 1867–2017

![Graph showing national defence spending from 1867 to 2017.](source)

Figure 1.2
Canadian military expenditure, in $billions, 1950–2020

Source: Reproduced with permission from Tradingeconomics.com.

Figure 1.3
Canadian personnel in UN peacekeeping missions, 1950–2020

income. By 1970, Canada had reached .33 percent of its gross national income, and the Trudeau government made a serious effort in funding, reaching .54 percent in 1975. This proved to be the high-water mark. Ever since, the percentage has declined, reaching a low of .22 in 2001. It then bobbed up and down, under both the Martin and the Harper governments. Under Justin Trudeau, it returned to its 2001 level. Canada fares terribly on this front in comparison to its sister countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

The relations between the prime minister and the External Affairs bureaucracy have always been delicate, but they really became contentious only under Pierre Trudeau and Stephen Harper. On occasion, when bureaucracies were inadequate, prime ministers appointed individuals with the right kind of political acuity to help them manage. Macdonald went to Washington in 1871 with the bureaucratic support he critically needed (men who had pursued a career before joining the public service). Robert Borden was not entirely satisfied with the advice available to him from public servants, so he recruited Loring Christie from the outside. Mackenzie King personally hired O.D. Skelton and soon made him undersecretary of the department, announcing that a new guard was on its way. The practice of acquiring a personal staff for foreign policy assistance was reignited when Pierre Trudeau asked Ivan Head, a Montreal lawyer, to join him as special adviser. That practice was made permanent in the 1990s, as the Privy Council Office was restructured and added two positions to report directly to Prime Minister Chrétien: a foreign/defence policy adviser and a national security adviser. For his part, Brian Mulroney hired a veteran External Affairs mandarin, Derek Burney, as his chief of staff.

The Canadian practice in this regard is not unique. In Japan, where a maximum of consultation and accommodation is sought within the bureaucracy, the prime minister must delicately seek and position individuals in the public service who will nonetheless reliably support the party line. As one observer noted, Japanese prime ministers are expected to guide and manage foreign policy, albeit remotely.

Individuals positioned in key departments and agencies can help in solving the problem of “policy lag” on ordinary issues. With the proliferation of state agencies all more or less directly involved in making decisions on foreign policy, the government of any developed country is now facing an increasingly difficult problem of central coordination. Compartmentalization and procrastination – two major symptoms of the disease of over-bureaucratization – seem universal. The prime minister’s manipulation of bureaucratic offices has long been the tool of choice to fight the tendency. Centralizing offices near the prime
minister, whether inside a cabinet office (or Privy Council Office) or by seconding talent directly to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), has been a favourite tactic.

Another strategy, used especially since the Pierre Trudeau years, has been to ensure a steady change of ministers of external relations. Since 1968, only two people have held the portfolio for more than five years: Mitchell Sharp (1968–74) and Joe Clark (1984–91). Chrétien had four different ministers, Harper had five during his nine years, and Justin Trudeau has now featured the same number in seven years. Since 1993, Canada has had a new foreign minister about every twenty months. In such a short span of time, no policy depth is achieved and no alliances are fortified. The winner, in terms of policy strength, is the prime minister, who can count on officers in both the Privy Council Office and the PMO to provide timely advice. It is worth noting that the longest-serving minister was Lester B. Pearson, who held the portfolio for the entirety of the St-Laurent government (1948–57).

There are other structures over which prime ministers have relatively little control. The House of Commons typically plays a negligible part in determining foreign policy. In Canada, prime ministers go essentially unchallenged in their caucus (in striking contrast with the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, where parliamentarians have jealously retained the discretion to turf their leaders, even when they head the government). Canadian prime ministers are also helped by the exceptionally high turnover in the membership of the House of Commons. The net effect is that very few MPs have the opportunity and the time to develop a deep understanding of international relations and Canada’s role in them. The same could be said for the Senate, which has only once been a force in determining Canada’s foreign relations (when, dominated by Liberals, it refused to give the Borden government its assent on sending money to London for the purchase of warships). There have been other small exceptions, of course, but they only prove the point. That said, the use of Parliament by prime ministers for various consultations can offer a clue to a prime minister’s style. Legislative committees, in either the House of Commons or the Senate, have rarely issued influential reports. The provinces, in fact, have probably had a greater impact in convincing a prime minister to act internationally than have House or Senate votes. The same could be said of other countries, communities, and business groups. Each has brought an attitude that tilted prime ministerial choice in one direction or another.

**Policy Substance**

In judging the direction of foreign policies, many scholars favour a framework in which realism is situated at one end of the policy choice spectrum
and idealism (or internationalism) is located at the other. In essence, a nation's immediate defence and trade needs sit at the realism end, whereas long-term multilateral support needs are at the idealism end. Much like all national leaders, prime ministers have had to make key decisions that placed them somewhere on this wide spectrum. Realism and internationalism are thus always battling for pride of place in a prime minister's mind. What matters is which came first and which came second, and when, and why. A “realist” is one whose aims are practical, achievable, and likely to lead to a positive outcome for the country. In foreign policy, realism sees world politics as “anarchy,” where only force and the use of the instruments of the state to pursue narrow and immediate interests can prevail and protect a country. A realist prime minister will focus on the United States (specifically Washington, DC) and maybe two or three other capitals. In terms of structures, a realist will often stress building up the military, guided by the notion that preparedness in a rude world can only be a virtue. A realist might also build trade policy capacity on the inevitable priority of the United States.

For their part, “internationalists” take a more charitable view of international relations and will seek collaboration and cooperation in achieving the needs of their country. In their view, only by promoting group interests can a country such as Canada protect its long-term interests. In the case of trade, internationalists will want to take advantage of alliances with a wide range of regional blocs. In terms of policy, they tend to diminish the practical and the immediate. They reject power politics based on economic or war-making potential, opting for an international strategy that maximizes involvement in cooperative mechanisms so as to maintain relations with as many countries as possible, regardless of whether those relationships will have an immediate payoff. Thus, they will minimize the importance of the military and direct their efforts and resources to all points of the diplomatic world. They enjoy working with global entities such as the United Nations and the G20, as well as with a wide range of non-governmental agencies (environmental, health, feminist, jurist, and academic organizations spring to mind as examples). Their central issues are the problems of achieving lasting peace and cooperation in international relations, and the various methods that could contribute to their achievement. Often known as “multilateralism” in Canada, internationalism has been called “an article of faith” since the Second World War. Allan Gotlieb, in his many positions as government lawyer and, later, deputy minister of external relations and Canadian ambassador to the United States, earned the admiration of many observers for his foreign policy pronouncements. He pointedly referred to internationalism as “romanticism” – a “new trinity of goals ... value-projection, peace building and norm creation” in which “the national interest is barely visible.”
Even in terms of style, there will be differences between internationalists and realists. The former will seek out opportunities to attend summits and global events. This sort of policy entrepreneur will favour the exploration of a wide variety of communications channels and even experiment with the emerging ideas around digital diplomacy. Realists will cast a cold eye on those efforts and will focus on the key priorities, alive to the opportunities of trade issues, relations with Americans first, but also with partners in NATO.

Canadian scholars appear reluctant to debate how prime ministers range on the realist/idealist spectrum, but the practice does seem to be growing for other Westminster and semi-parliamentary systems where prime ministers dominate the executive functions. One compelling study of Australian prime minister Robert Gordon Menzies (1939–41, 1949–66) examined his place on that spectrum during his long years in power. Similarly, a study of Israeli prime ministers that used the spectrum employed “hawks” (realists) and “doves” (idealisists) to differentiate their foreign policies. Another study scrutinized the National and Labour Parties of New Zealand as they evolved on the spectrum. It concluded that the Labour Party’s outlook was basically liberal internationalist, whereas the National Party’s was essentially realist.

The realist/internationalist spectrum is a useful theoretical device, but it must be tested by evidence. The fact is that all prime ministers have been “realists” and “internationalists” at the same time. For instance, the Pearson government aggressively pursued a very realist trade deal in car manufacturing with the United States, but it also challenged the Johnson administration to relent on Vietnam. Realists have focused on the United States, but to varying degrees they have also devoted time, energy, and money to ensuring that Canadian state representatives were functioning in a wide variety of international forums. Hector Mackenzie once described a broad trend of internationalism as “nationalistic” and “constructive,” one that could be interpreted as “internationalism if necessary, but not necessarily internationalism” in that it was always tainted with the realist need to advance Canada’s interests.

Most prime ministers toggle between the two positions, perhaps not with the sophistication of a St-Laurent, but necessarily as they become convinced that a blend of realism and internationalism is the best choice. The end result is often an ad hoc policy, one very much tied to the personality in the PMO. Since St-Laurent, many prime ministers have been tempted to see their internationalism as licence to sermonize regarding other countries. Pearson was the first to do so – in 1966 Dean Acheson, secretary of state in the Truman administration, described Canada as “the stern daughter of the voice of God” – but he was hardly the last. Trudeau, Mulroney, Martin, and especially Harper and Trudeau fils have felt the need to inject their foreign policies with moral lessons.
In his famous 1978 book *Leadership*, James MacGregor Burns raised the bar considerably in assessing how people command. Creating a framework to measure whether leaders had been transformational or more limited, more transactional, in their achievements, he concluded that only the former could really be seen as genuinely successful. To achieve success, they needed more than vision; they also had to tend to detail and to the routine transactions of an organization. In Burns’s view, leaving control of structures to others was a guarantee of failure. Transformational leaders managed budgets and ensured that competencies in their association were evergreen.

This is a demanding measure, and yet many prime ministers certainly played transformational roles in Canadian foreign policy. They built on the legacy of their predecessors and made decisions that set policy in a new direction. Even so, foreign policy has been strikingly consistent throughout the years. Realism in this country is marked by the prioritizing of relations with the United States, a concern for military preparedness, and the pursuit of trade relations. Internationalism displays less concern with US relations and more interest in collaborating with other nations on a host of issues that are not necessarily priorities. The swing between Canadian governments has been fairly limited, clearly. John A. Macdonald was remarkably realist in his pursuit of Canadian interests. He preferred strong trade relations with the United States, and though he did portray himself as a good friend of the United Kingdom, he repeatedly showed that London’s priorities would not condition those in Ottawa. Laurier, I would hold, pursued much the same line of thought, going further than Macdonald in strengthening the policy capacity of the government and creating a navy to defend Canadian interests.

Robert Borden, I contend, blended his imperial sensitivities with a newly found sense of realism and thus produced a conservative internationalism, a sort of realist-multilateralism that would be employed during the interwar years by Mackenzie King and R.B. Bennett. Emerging from the Second World War, King was conflictic. He supported the United Nations and Canada’s involvement in the new international order, but he resisted efforts in multilateral initiatives that were far from the country’s interests. This led to heated disputes with his new minister of external affairs, Louis St-Laurent, and Lester B. Pearson, the undersecretary. St-Laurent was much more at ease in deploying a realist foreign policy that was tinted with clear liberal internationalist leanings.

Elsewhere, I have referred to Louis St-Laurent as an idealist-realist in this regard because of his careful blend of both hard realism (to the point of participating in a three-year struggle to keep South Korea safe from northern encroachments) and an adroit internationalism that championed official
development assistance and peacekeeping. What made St-Laurent unique was the sustainability of his approach. Here’s how he saw it:

No foreign policy is consistent nor coherent over a period of years unless it is based upon some conception of human values. I know that we live in an age when it is fashionable to speak in terms only of hard realism in the conduct of international affairs. I realize also that at best the practice of any policy is a poor approximation of ideals upon which it may be based. I am sure, however, that in our national life we are continually influenced by the conceptions of good and evil which emerged from Hebrew and Greek civilization and which have been transformed and transmitted through the Christian traditions of the Western World. These are values which lay emphasis on the importance of the individual, on the place of moral principles in the conduct of human relations, on standards of judgment which transcend mere material well-being. They have ever influenced our national life as we have built a modern state from east to west across this continent. I am equally convinced that on the basis of this common experience we shall discern the same values in world affairs, and that we shall seek to protect and nurture them.

John Diefenbaker’s tenure marked a return to the conservative internationalism that arose from the 1914–18 experience, but his policy choices did not leave much of a legacy. Lester B. Pearson proved himself to be a realist and so did Pierre Trudeau, although he consistently expressed liberal internationalist views throughout his fifteen years in power. Brian Mulroney, I would argue, augmented the St-Laurent vision, but one could not dismiss the transformative role of Jean Chrétien, whose budget decisions seriously downgraded Canada’s ability to formulate and execute foreign policy. He pursued what Tom Keating labels a “passive internationalism.” “Conservative internationalism” re-emerged with the Stephen Harper government, but it would be very different from earlier versions, which were a great deal more open to helping build international organizations.

Style
Each prime minister has brought their own style to the conduct of foreign policy. Style is inevitably an individual expression of intellectual habits and instinct. Its impact is most obvious in the methods that prime ministers choose to express their personal diplomacy.

For instance, during a 2018 visit to India, Justin Trudeau chose to deck himself and his family in traditional Indian attire, prompting considerable discussion of his choice of garments as cultural appropriation. “Style,” of course, goes far
beyond vestments. The personality of prime ministers will distinguish them dramatically from both their predecessors and their successors – even if they bring little change to state structures or policy. Their personality affects the thousands of major and minor decisions they must make. To act, or not to act? Prime ministers are the ultimate arbiters of what policy issues will make it to the centre of the government’s radar. What methods can be employed to best ascertain their importance in decision making? A perspective on how scholars around the world have interpreted the roles of prime ministers can be helpful.

In comparison to presidents of republics, prime ministers tend to be difficult to discern in terms of their policy influence. Their terms in office are not set, they come and go, and they certainly touch policy but do so typically behind the scenes, so the intensity and consistency of their effort is often difficult to measure.

All of Canada’s prime ministers brought their styles to bear, and it is in this area that they can be most easily distinguished. John A. Macdonald, for instance, was practical and prudent but also very ambitious and disciplined in his approach to foreign policy. He applied the full force of his considerable intelligence to the issues and generally managed them very well. Alexander Mackenzie, in contrast, did not implicate himself heavily in foreign affairs. He was very independent of mind and often proved indecisive, unable to parse the advice he sought and received. Where Macdonald led with his passions, Mackenzie was unemotional and detached.

Wilfrid Laurier, much like Macdonald, was determined and forceful, unafraid to put his own stamp on relations with the United Kingdom and the United States. He was analytical, keenly perceptive of how events might unfold, and determined to play a leading role in shaping Canada’s foreign policy. This instinct survived his electoral defeat of 1911 and continued as the country was embroiled in the First World War. Few of Canada’s leaders have matched the panache he brought to the job. None, arguably, have been as magnetic.

Robert Borden, on the other hand, seemed to govern more by instinct. Born and raised with a romantic “empire” outlook, he changed his mind only as the ravages of war demonstrated that Canada’s interests must be decided in Ottawa. Borden was moody and very probably beset by depression. He sought and followed the advice of many people, inside and outside of government, often clinging to them even though their views were contrary to his own. His skepticism regarding new ideas deeply affected his approach to foreign policy.

Mackenzie King undoubtedly showed that he was clever and energetic. He craved advice but did not necessarily use it. At times, his restlessness, his impulsiveness, and his impatience made life very difficult for the policy advisers he hired. His visit with Hitler in 1937 showed that he could even be a little
reckless. And yet he could be overly cautious, fearful of entangling Canada in particular issues. That said, he was able to convey to other world leaders – notably Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill – that he was an honest, straightforward, and trustworthy ally. Louis St-Laurent brought remarkable ambition, stability, and predictability to Canada's foreign policy. His modesty aside, he was an entrepreneurial, challenging, and practical man. He brought both his humanitarian instincts and a cold calculating mind to bear on the task of transforming Canada's foreign policy.

John Diefenbaker was a man of independent mind, one that had learned not to trust others. He brought a more worrying sort of approach to foreign policy than did his predecessors. Like Robert Borden before him, he clung to idealized visions of the British Empire and feared the continentalist forces that were inevitably drawing Canadians closer to the United States, both culturally and economically. Diefenbaker was consumed with the need to control cabinet and the bureaucracy, and his personal approach clearly had an impact on moulding Canada's international policy. Lester B. Pearson's mind and style were shaped by both his upbringing and his long years in the Department of External Affairs. He was warm-hearted and even playful with friends and colleagues, but he was also intelligent, informed, ambitious, and determined to make a difference. His tenure as prime minister demonstrated those traits, as he pushed for a recalibrated relationship with the United States and a more structured rapport with the developing world.

Pierre Trudeau used his personality to tremendous advantage in forging an international profile. Sensitive to issues of justice, he pleaded for respect for the global South and for international peace at a time when the Cold War reached some of its most tense moments. Trudeau could also be impatient with the foreign policy staff, even quarrelsome. Charismatic as he was, and idealistic and peaceable as he showed himself to be, his personal approach could also be alienating and even appear gullible and self-indulgent.

Brian Mulroney's style seemed to hinge on a mix of realpolitik and emotion. He could be funny and receptive, eager to invest time and effort in cultivating friendships among government heads around the globe, but could also be fickle and hypersensitive. He brought an intuitively compassionate and sympathetic personal style to his diplomacy and managed to be convincing with the likes of Ronald Reagan, George Bush, Margaret Thatcher, and François Mitterrand. Imaginative on issues of environmental protection and the travails of the developing world, he was also willing to engage Canada militarily. Jean Chrétien, in contrast, was less inclined to believe that Canada should pursue a bold international agenda and was content to let others do the talking. He brought a seriousness of purpose to the tasks and proved a patient and careful leader,
but his conservatism necessarily had an impact on the country’s international presence, both militarily and diplomatically.

The short tenure of Paul Martin again showed how the personality of the prime minister could shape the country’s approach. Involved in all sorts of foreign policy issues throughout practically all his political life, Martin sought a diligent and analytical set of policies, but the search for perfection in international relations seemed to result in over-analysis, policy inertia, and over-compensation. If Martin was open to all possibilities, his successor, Stephen Harper, was comparatively closed to most of them. Harper, who had shown precious little interest in foreign policy before becoming prime minister, brought a determined approach to change Canada’s international stance. Intelligent and ambitious, he was unwilling and unable to engage in charm offensives. He was also deeply skeptical of the international affairs bureaucracies and even displayed a resentfulness about them. Justin Trudeau’s personal approach to foreign affairs remains an enigma. Hoping to count on the charisma he might have inherited from his parents, he championed an ambitious policy route but one that has proven remarkably conservative, careful, and much less concerned with breaking a new path.

The impact of the personal style of leaders remains difficult to identify. In the mid-1960s, the American political scientist Margaret Hermann borrowed from the field of psychology to categorize the characteristics of government leaders. Her leadership trait analysis (LTA) approach catalogued attitudes such as “a need for power” or “self-confidence” or “belief in ability to control events.” Although the theory was attractive, the methods used to make it work left many wondering whether the evidence being furnished by various researchers was convincing. After all, many people are supremely self-confident. This does not mean that others will be interested in following their political leadership. In Canada, Nelson Michaud points to the theoretical usefulness of the LTA approach in examining the singular role of prime ministers in shaping foreign policy between 1984 and 2009 but notes that there was a considerable degree of inconsistency in how the various occupants of the position treated the issues, making LTA problematic in its application.

Juliet Kaarbo, an Anglo-American scholar of foreign policy who has written on prime ministers, has imaginatively led the effort to further Hermann’s work. In one of her notable studies, she focused on four compelling variables: their personal experience and interest, their task orientation (a preference for either personal diplomacy or behind-the-scenes policy work), and their predilection for involvement in international relations policy (e.g., as mediator or as bellicerent, either at the domestic policy table or in international relations). The final category was their information management habits. This could range
widely, from their consumption of facts, figures, and interpretations to their communications abilities and inclinations. To evaluate performance on each of these factors, Kaarbo proposed three levels of dependent variables: process, outcome, and output. Each would reveal the leadership style of the individual in question. In her view, prime ministers typically had more impact on the process of policy making. The actual outcomes were less likely to be affected by their leadership style.

In a 2018 study, Kaarbo concluded that traits such as a belief in the ability to control events, conceptual complexity, need for power, distrust of others, in-group bias, self-confidence, and task orientation could yield the best clues regarding the most important leadership qualities. These defining clues could help explain prime ministers’ propensity to challenge or respect constraints in their environments, their openness to information and advice, the structure of their advisory systems, the quality of decision-making processes, and the policies they choose for their country or organization. None of these qualities, of course, were guarantees of revealing insights. Prime ministers who were confident in their ability to shape destinies have teetered on the edge of disaster. Others, with precious little experience in international affairs, turned out to be quite adept and even successful in positioning Canada on the world stage. The issue of available material was always key to successful research, especially when a prime minister died without leaving much indication as to what he was thinking at any given moment. (It’s worth noting that only William Lyon Mackenzie King wrote consistently insightful diaries; Robert Borden kept his daily records very short and reportorial, but he also left a two-volume memoir, as did John Diefenbaker and all his successors up to and including Paul Martin.)

In one study, Kaarbo broadened her examination to include German chancellors Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl, as well as Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major. She focused on four factors: the first was a “responsiveness to political constraints,” the second was “openness to information,” the third was “motivation for the position,” and the last was “political orientation.” Kaarbo concluded that Thatcher and Adenauer were expansionists in their political orientation, that Major was an opportunist, and that Kohl was strategic and conciliatory.

In Canada, Paul Gecelovsky applied the Kaarbo model in his examination of Stephen Harper’s government and had little difficulty in highlighting instances that matched it. Where Kaarbo looked for defining clues of a prime minister’s interest in a certain area, he pointed to Harper’s rapprochement with Israel. Where Kaarbo called for evidence to show how a prime minister acted in “task-orientation,” he pointed to the Harper administration’s “exorcise [of] all Liberal
policies and programs from government." On the issue of managing information, however, Gecelovsky offered no particular instance in foreign policy.

One very effective study of British prime ministers borrowed the analytical framework developed by American political scientist Fred Greenstein, who, in *The Presidential Difference*, outlined six key skills by which to judge presidents and to discern their contributions to policy development: proficiency as a public communicator, organizational capacity, political skills, policy vision, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence. Applying this approach to a Westminster government in his study of British prime minister Gordon Brown, Kevin Theakston concluded that Brown was not well equipped for the highest office, in terms of the key leadership abilities, characteristics, and skills. Theakston did not confirm that Brown was bound to fail, but his skill set seemed to make it difficult for him to succeed.

Scholars in Britain have also examined the style of prime ministers by paying close attention to their language. A study of the words used to articulate foreign policy in John Major’s government revealed that he and his closest associates were progressive by any measure but that their language could not disguise their failures to intervene in the Rwanda massacres of 1994. The personality of the British prime minister again attracted a great deal of attention in 2003, when Tony Blair decided to support the American war effort in Iraq. Many have wondered whether Britain would have gone to war against Saddam Hussein if someone other than Blair worked in 10 Downing Street. Britain did have limited interests in Iraq; it had far greater interests in the United States and in nurturing its “special relationship” with the White House. One observer analyzed Blair’s responses to foreign policy questions in the House of Commons and found that he exhibited a striking belief in his ability to control events, a low conceptual complexity, and a high need for power. The author suggested that these personality traits gave his policy its strongest push.

Others argue that policy considerations are simply too vast for the prime minister to personally affect every aspect. One writer noted that both Blair and his successor, Gordon Brown, sought to forge stronger links with the United States, in a policy thrust that the author identified as “Atlanticism.” This was hardly new; it dated from the depths of the First World War. Another study discerned a divergence in style between Blair and Brown, with the former being particularly gifted in his ability to present policy, but added that their aims were “largely similar.” Another analyst saw a new schizophrenic “utilitarian supranationalism” emerging from the Blair-Brown years. In Italy, the increasing favour toward Israel under the government of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi during the early 2000s was widely seen as a step toward realism that was
anchored in both domestic and foreign policy considerations. Yukiko Miyagi interprets the foreign policy direction of Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi as a realist reinterpretation of the world and of Japan's national interest. This path was possible because of Koizumi's exceptional political strength and his imposition of a new structure to facilitate top-down policy making. The policy, tellingly, was continued under Shinzo Abe. Was the substance of policy under Harper following American influence, just like Italy on Israel? In connection with Cuba, the Harper government was not interested in pursuing a relationship with it or recasting it in a more favourable light. In fact, it seemed to be consciously supporting the perspective of the Bush White House in its general foreign policy thrust in Latin America and in the Middle East.

The personal impact of prime ministers is fairly recognized across democracies – even those that are consistently challenged. For instance, a study of the personal views, behaviour patterns, and attitudes toward Arabs and the Arab states among three of Israel's Labour prime ministers after the 1967 war (Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, and Yitzhak Rabin) showed a remarkably similar diagnosis of the state of Israeli-Arab relations and in terms of policy objectives. Where the three prime ministers did differ was on how to achieve these goals. Eshkol and Rabin believed that Israel should withdraw from most of the territories it had captured during the 1967 war as a condition for partial (Rabin) or full (Eshkol) peace, but Meir did not share this view.

The personal impact of Indian prime ministers has also been studied. Most recently, Narendra Modi's influence on foreign policy has attracted scholarly attention, and the consensus is that he has moved Indian foreign policy in a fundamentally new direction. It is more nativist ("India First") and more ideologically driven than that of his predecessors. He has used religious diplomacy and mercantilist language more than any previous Indian prime minister, but no major changes are evident in the way that India negotiates in trade forums or in its foreign assistance.

The impact of individuals often does lead to policy catastrophes, of course. One study concluded that decision makers who were responsible for foreign policy fiascos exhibited personality traits or political beliefs that differed from those of leaders who managed to avoid disaster. Assessing a vast array of speeches delivered by thirteen British prime ministers, it placed six in a “fiasco group” and seven in a “non-fiasco group.” In comparing the two groups, the author established that fiasco prime ministers displayed certain “extreme” personality traits, above all a considerably higher level of self-confidence. Their political beliefs were more extreme as well: their perception of political life was more conflictual, and they had a correspondingly greater inclination to engage in confrontational strategies when pursuing their goals.
Another intriguing study examined how prime ministers framed foreign policy issues by looking at major policy changes between 2004 and 2007 in four Westminster jurisdictions – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. All four shared many commonalities. Every prime minister asserted that the previous government had failed in its foreign policy. All presented their own foreign policies as consistent with their party’s past practices and with national interests. Where they did suggest reforms, they cited reasons of fairness and taking a logical step in moving policy forward. A later study showed that this approach could be applied to the “new” foreign policy of the Kevin Rudd government.

In the twenty-first century, Canadian prime ministers can avail themselves of technology that was unimaginable in John A. Macdonald’s day. In a matter of hours, jet flight can whisk them across time zones to any major city in the world. And by clicking a few buttons, they can be in instant communication with their counterparts around the globe. Nonetheless, when it comes to managing foreign policy, all of them walk in Macdonald’s shoes. They may have more instruments at their disposal, but their powers remain the same. Like Macdonald, they can manipulate the structures that shape and deliver foreign policy, they have extraordinary powers to delineate it, and inevitably, they will put their own personal stamp on Canada’s behaviour abroad. In spirit, they are not far away from Macdonald, writing his letters at a gaslit table in the chic and fashionable Arlington Hotel of Washington, DC, in 1871.

Notes
5 Macdonald to A. Morris, 21 April 1871, in Pope, Correspondence, 145.
6 Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain (Toronto: MacMillan Co. of Canada, 1965), 82. On page 490 of his book, Creighton writes of “the embarrassed status
of the representatives of the Department of Marine and Fisheries whom Macdonald had
had the effrontery to bring with him to Washington in 1871.” Creighton was clearly not
aware of where expertise actually lay. There was some animosity between Macdonald and
Peter Mitchell, the fisheries minister and it is laid out in A.L. Burt, “Peter Mitchell on John

7 See Gwynneth C.D. Jones, “Smith, William (1821–97),” Dictionary of Canadian Biography,

8 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1971).

9 The key works in this regard are products of the staff in the Historical Section of the de-
partment. See John Hilliker, Canada’s Department of External Affairs, vol. 1, The Early
Years, 1909–1946 (Montreal and Kingston: Institute of Public Administration of Canada
and McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990); John Hilliker and Donald Barry, Canada’s
Department of External Affairs, vol. 2, Coming of Age, 1946–1968 (Montreal and Kingston:
Institute of Public Administration of Canada and McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995);
John Hilliker, Mary Halloran, and Greg Donaghy, Canada’s Department of External Affairs,
vol. 3, Innovation and Adaptation, 1968–1984 (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration
of Canada and University of Toronto Press, 2017); Greg Donaghy and Kim Richard Nossal,
eds., Architects and Innovators: Building the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Donaghy and Michael Carroll, eds., In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909–2009 (Calgary: University
of Calgary Press, 2011); and Patrice Dutil, “The Institutionalization of Foreign Affairs
(1909–2009),” in Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas, 2nd

10 Paul Gecelovsky, “Of Legacies and Lightning Bolts: An Updated Look at the Prime Minister
and Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates
and New Ideas, 2nd ed., ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher Kukucha. (Toronto: Oxford

11 Roy Culpeper, David Emelifeonwu, and Luigi Scarpa De Masellis, “Architecture without
Blueprints: Opportunities and Challenges for the New Prime Minister in International

12 The neat summary of figures is available in Livio Di Matteo, A Federal Fiscal History:
Canada, 1867–2017 (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2017). See also J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s
Army, 3rd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2021), 46.

13 See also A. Walter Dorn, “Canada and UN Peace Operations: Re-Engaging Slowly but
Not so Surely,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Canada in International Affairs, ed. Robert

14 The tensions under Trudeau are explored in Brendan Kelly, The Good Fight: Marcel Cadieux
and Canadian Diplomacy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019). On Harper, see Peter McKenna,
“Stephen Harper and Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Harper’s World: The Politicization of
Canadian Foreign Policy, 2006–2015, ed. Peter McKenna (Toronto: University of Toronto

15 Akio Watanabe, “Foreign Policy Making, Japanese Style,” International Affairs (Royal

16 Tom Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign
Policy, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1. See also Keating’s probing article,
“The Transition in Canadian Foreign Policy through an English School Lens,” International


24 Patrice Dutil, “St-Laurent in Government: Realism and Idealism in Action,” in The Unexpected Louis St-Laurent: Politics and Policies for a Modern Canada, ed. Patrice Dutil (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2020), 23–54. I argue that St-Laurent’s policy approach seemed to owe many features to the thinking of the French philosopher Henri Bergson, who insisted that ideas and idealism had to coexist with the hard realities of “science” and that science, on its own, could not supplant imagination as the driving force of humanity. St-Laurent cited Bergson in his 1956 speech to the National Conference on Higher Education in Ottawa and kept this speech in the private collection that he willed to his children (I am grateful to Jean Riley, one of his granddaughters, for sharing this document with me). I subsequently discovered, while researching the idea of political cycles, that I owed an intellectual debt to an American scholar, Frank L. Klingberg, who explored the cohabitation of the two ideas and developed the concept of realist-idealism. His Positive Expectations of America’s World Role: Historical Cycles of Realistic Idealism (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996) shows that American idealism has been fairly constant in the articulation of foreign policy, even when hard “realist” choices had to be made.


26 Keating, “The Transition in Canadian Foreign Policy.”


29 See Fen Osler Hampson, Master of Persuasion: Brian Mulroney’s Global Legacy (Toronto: Signal/McClelland and Stewart, 2018).


Ibid., 572.

Kaarbo, “Prime Minister Leadership Style and the Role of Parliament,” 40.

Kaarbo, “Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy,” 572.


Victoria Honeyman, “From Liberal Interventionism to Liberal Conservatism: The Short Road in Foreign Policy from Blair to Cameron,” *British Politics* 12, 1 (2017): 43.


Rajiv Dogra, *India’s World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy* (Delhi: Rupa, 2020).


Ibid., 714.

