Segmented Cities?
How Urban Contexts Shape Ethnic and Nationalist Politics
Ethnicity and Democratic Governance Series

How can societies respond to the opportunities and challenges raised by ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural differences and do so in ways that promote democracy, social justice, peace, and stability? The volumes in this series seek answers to this fundamental question through innovative academic analysis that illuminates the policy choices facing citizens and governments as they address ethnocultural diversity. The volumes are the result of a collaborative research project on ethnicity and democratic governance under the general editorship of Bruce J. Berman.

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Preface

The EDG Series: Governing Diversity

The volumes in the Ethnicity and Democratic Governance series are the product of an international Canadian-based Major Collaborative Research Initiative (MCRI) begun in 2006 under Bruce Berman of Queen’s University as principal investigator. Over the course of six years, thirty-nine international researchers and other associated organizations pooled their research and knowledge of one of the most complex and challenging issues in the world today – governing ethnic diversity. The EDG project began with one foundational question: How can societies respond to the opportunities and challenges raised by ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural differences and do so in ways that promote democracy, social justice, peace, and stability?

To approach the complex issue of governing ethnic diversity, our academic investigations were broken into four interrelated research streams represented by four main research questions:

- What are the causes of ethnic community formation, political mobilization, and conflict?
- What are the institutional strategies and policies available to states for developing democracy in multiethnic societies?
- To what extent can the international community facilitate the peaceful resolution of ethnic conflicts?
What normative principles of justice and democracy should be used in formulating or evaluating the governance of diversity?

The themes around which our work has coalesced include nationalism, multiculturalism, federalism, ethnicity and moral economy, recognition and identity, accommodation and integration, conflict resolution, democratic governance, secularism and religious pluralism, citizenship, international intervention, immigration, social integration, self-determination, and territory. Core funding for the Ethnicity and Democratic Governance MCRI comes from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Although the project is headquartered at Queen's University, the Université du Québec à Montréal, the University of Toronto, and the University of Victoria are also partner institutions in the initiative.

It is our hope that readers will discover within all of our volumes – and in other project outputs – new understandings of previously neglected or understudied aspects of the nature of ethnic identity formation, the causes of ethnic conflict, and the relationship between ethnic conflict and democratic governance in the contemporary globalized world. For more information on the EDG project and for a list of other EDG publications, see www.queensu.ca/edg/.
Acknowledgments

This book has its origins in the Globalization, Urbanization, and Ethnicity conference held in Ottawa in December 2009. This was the second and final major public conference of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada’s Major Collaborative Research Initiative on Ethnicity and Democratic Governance (EDG). We were privileged to have had the opportunity to assist in organizing the conference and in editing this final publication in the EDG series. We thank the EDG’s former director and principal investigator, Bruce Berman, and the EDG team at Queen’s University, especially Jennifer Clarke and Anne Linscott, for their dedication and support. We truly could not have completed this book without their help and thank them very much for their efforts. We also thank our editor, Emily Andrew, and her team at UBC Press for their professionalism and strong support. We appreciate the very helpful comments provided by the three referees asked to review the book and hope we have come close to meeting their exacting standards. Finally, we sincerely thank the book’s contributors for their excellent work. It has been a pleasure working with all of them.
Segmented Cities?
Introduction

Ethnic and Nationalist Politics
in a Global and Urban World

Kristin R. Good, Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, Luc Turgeon

In 2007, the United Nations reported that, for the first time in history, more than half of the world’s population would live in urban areas by the following year (UNFPA 2007, 1). Indeed, by 2010, 50.6 percent of the world’s population was urban (UN Habitat 2010-11, 12) and the United Nations predicts that this figure will increase to 70 percent by 2050 (ibid.). Urbanization marks a tectonic shift in how human populations settle and live together that has fundamental implications for economic development, social relations, and politics. Although patterns of urbanization are uneven, all regions of the world are becoming more urban. In 2010, North America was the most urban (82.1 percent) followed by Europe (75 percent). The least urban region of the world was Africa (40 percent): nevertheless, by 2020 even Africa is expected to pass its “tipping point” to become more than 50 percent urban (UN Habitat 2010-11, 12). Understanding urban development is and will continue to be central to managing countries’ economic, social, and political futures. This volume explores the urban roots and dimensions of ethnic and nationalist politics in a wide range of cities in the global North and global South.

Globalization and urbanization are intimately linked. The literature on world cities posits that we are in a stage of capitalist development in which cities are the central driving force – cities have become the places of economic growth, development, and innovation as well as the command and
control centres of the global economy. Since economic and educational opportunities as well as access to services are increasingly concentrated in urban communities, internal migration to cities has accelerated. The vast majority of immigrants also settle in urban places with many concentrating in countries’ largest cities. All across the globe, migrants (both internal and external) are heading to cities, transforming them in a multitude of ways, sometimes at staggering rates. A significant element of this transformation includes altered ethnic configurations. Both internal and international migration are changing the ethnic composition of cities. In Canada, for instance, the migration of indigenous peoples from reserves in rural areas is transforming the ethnic configuration of cities, particularly in the Prairie provinces but also in Toronto and Vancouver. Similar forces of urbanization are transforming cities in the global South in ways that have altered identity politics. In Africa, internal migration is transforming cities in fundamental ways, contributing to the rise in the salience of ethnic politics in communities whose identity politics had previously been focused on nation-building goals.

Nevertheless, although internal migration has also led to significant changes in the ethnolinguistic composition of cities, it is international migration, its impact varying by place, that has resulted in the most dramatic social changes, especially in what urban scholars call “world cities” (Benton-Short, Price, and Friedman 2005). There are more international migrants today than in any other time in recorded history (IOM 2010, 3). Such migration is largely an urban phenomenon. In fact, immigrant settlement is highly spatially concentrated within particular metropolitan areas in the world. According to Marie Price and Lisa Benton-Short’s (2007, 108) pioneering work on the relationship between world city formation and immigration, there are nineteen cities in the world that are home to more than one million immigrants. The pool of international migrants has also become more ethnically and culturally diverse (IOM 2010, 3; Benton-Short, Price, and Friedman 2005, 947). Scholars such as Steven Vertovec (2007) have developed new concepts such as “super-diversity” to describe the increasing complexity of ethnocultural diversity and its multidimensional interactions with other factors such as immigration status, labour market status, gender, and local service providers’ efforts to shape “where, how and with whom people live” (Vertovec 2007, 1025). Super-diversity is most pronounced in metropolitan areas and in particular world cities such as London, New York, Paris, and Toronto. Thus, as urbanization progresses, many city dwellers have experienced sometimes dramatic changes in many aspects of their
day-to-day life, including the social and ethnocultural composition of their populations.

Although migration patterns remain uneven across and within countries, the effect of international migration on urbanization is not restricted to traditional immigrant settlement countries such as Canada, Australia, and the United States. In fact, as Blair Ruble’s (Chapter 1) contribution to this volume highlights, the Russian Federation has become one of the most significant countries of migration (IOM 2010, 115). Both Moscow and St. Petersburg are among the twenty-five top immigrant destinations (Price and Benton-Short 2007, 109). More generally, as Rinus Penninx (2009, 24) observes, although European countries have “consistently defined themselves as non-immigration countries, in contrast to countries such as Canada, Australia and the United States,” demographic data show that “Europe has factually become an immigration continent” (ibid., 22). Nowhere is this more apparent than in large European world cities such as London and Paris that each host more than one million immigrants (and in London’s case about two million) and are among the top twenty-five immigrant destinations in the world (Price and Benton-Short 2007).

Cities in the global South have also been dramatically affected by international migration. Although countries in the global South share a common experience as countries of emigration to the global North, many are also important migrant destinations.2 Several cities in the Middle East, for instance, have populations with a very high percentage of foreign-born individuals. With a population just over 30 percent foreign born, Jerusalem, for example (a city discussed by David Cameron in Chapter 8 of this volume), is among the top twenty-five immigrant destinations as measured by the percentage of foreign-born residents (Price and Benton-Short 2007, 112).

Continental/regional dynamics vary in the global South as they do in all parts of the world. It is estimated that there were nineteen million migrants in Africa in 2010, although the number may in fact be much larger given the poor quality of data available on which such estimates are based (IOM 2010, 127). In African cities such as Cape Town, as David McDonald’s chapter highlights (Chapter 5), the debates and reality of international migration are mainly about the “Africanization” of the city.3 China, another non-traditional country of migration covered in this volume, was host to just over 686,000 migrants in 2010 (IOM 2010, 169); a negligible figure in relation to its population of about 1.3 billion. The on-the-ground impact of immigration, however, may be more dramatic than country level data suggest since immigrants to China also concentrate in urban areas. Wan Yu and
Wei Li’s contribution (Chapter 4) demonstrates the emergence of an “ethnoburb” in Beijing’s Wangjing District; in 2007, Korean residents constituted just over 23 percent of this district. Thus, international migration is significant to all regions of the world, although migrant settlement patterns, both across countries and within them, are spatially uneven.

As the contributions to this volume make clear, ethnic relations are shaped by the particularities of their local contexts. Regional, continental, and national debates and contexts matter, but migrants’ day-to-day experience of ethnic relations takes place at the local level. This volume explores the role of the city in ethnic relations, probing the circumstances under which they are sites of ethnic conflict and division or of interethic reciprocity and harmony. A useful concept here is that of the “social sustainability” of cities. In a rare volume that considers the question of ethnic relations in cities that span the global North and South, Mario Polèse and Richard Stren (2000) define “social sustainability for a city ... as development (and/or growth) that is compatible with the harmonious evolution of civil society, fostering an environment conducive to the compatible cohabitation of culturally and socially diverse groups while at the same time encouraging social integration, with improvements in the quality of life for all segments of the population” (15-16, italics in the original). By their very nature, cities – dense and populous human settlements – create interdependencies: they have the potential to both unite and divide. One might hypothesize that urban face-to-face contact facilitates the exchange of ideas, tolerance of difference, and ethnic harmony. Cities can be places of opportunity, inclusion, and innovation; they have, as contributor Scott Bollens puts it (Chapter 9), an “inherent ability” to bring people together. Nevertheless, as we discuss below, depending on the nature of contact among groups on the ground, city life can also accentuate divisions and contribute to conflict. Urbanization and city life also have the potential to solidify divisions and to further segment populations.

Furthermore, urban places are contexts not only of the integration of international migrants but also sites of deeply embedded multinational co-existence. The distinction here is between polyethnic diversity and multinational diversity (Kymlicka 1995). Many typologies of multicultural diversity view the former as a result of immigration and the latter a consequence of long-standing historical, ethnolinguistic, and religious differences. To these kinds of ethnic differences we would add deep-seated “racial” divisions that exist in cities in both the global North and South, including the legacy of various forms of racial oppression of blacks including,
for instance, slavery and Jim Crow laws in the United States and apartheid in South Africa.

Will Kymlicka (1995) argues that the goals of subnational groups and indigenous peoples are fundamentally different than immigrants’ goals. The former desire degrees of self-government and more fundamental accommodations whereas the latter desire to integrate into common public institutions and request accommodations to facilitate this process. Although the question of whether some immigrants truly wish to integrate is currently subject to a vigorous international debate, the important empirical point to be made here is that many Western states have accepted that multinational groups are entitled to some form of distinct legal and institutional status, and immigrant groups, on the other hand, are expected to integrate into common institutions with comparably minor accommodations to facilitate integration.

Thus, multinational differences are more deeply entrenched historically, institutionally, and constitutionally and, one might argue, are inherently competitive. One important volume on local immigrant politics and policies refers to the historic and deep-rooted forms of diversity in European cities as the “old diversity” suggesting that it has “been accommodated to a very great extent, and [is] now reflected in the institutional arrangements, political structures and processes of decision-making in [divided] cities.” The same volume notes that “the crucial question for [such] cities is whether they are able to accommodate the new [immigrant] diversity” (Penninx et al. 2004, 5). The point worth underlining is that the two types of diversity are not mutually exclusive but coexist and intersect in potentially explosive ways in some cities, threatening to destabilize existing settlements where they exist. For instance, linguistically divided cities such as Brussels (see Chapter 7 by Yoann Veny and Dirk Jacobs as well as Chapter 9 by Scott Bollens, in this volume) and Montreal also receive very high numbers of immigrants, potentially threatening delicate existing multinational accommodations at the national and local levels. In his previous work, Bollens provides a list of cities with a high potential for conflict, including Jerusalem, Belfast, Nicosia, Algiers, Beirut, Montreal, and Brussels – multinational cities that span the global North and South (Bollens 2007, 6). A great deal of work remains to be done with respect to designing institutions to manage multinational and multilingual differences in ways that are responsive to urban contexts, including in European cities. Moreover, an important element of “hyperdiversity” (Price and Benton-Short 2007) or “super-diversity” (Vertovec 2007) includes the multilayering of “deep”
diversity (Taylor 1994) and more recent immigrant diversity. Given the complexity of managing and integrating multiple diversities in cities, we appreciate Olivier Asselin et al.’s (2006, 138, emphasis in the original) definition of integration as “the process in which people and their activities become intertwined in social life and form mutual interdependent relations of some form and to a certain degree” because we view integration as an ongoing process and we acknowledge that accommodating multiple coexisting forms of diversity in cities involves accepting different degrees of integration. And, like Asselin, we also view the process as a “multidimensional” and “multilevel” process. The ultimate goal is to encourage the peaceful cohabitation of groups, as Polèse and Stren (2000) suggest, by encouraging cities to develop in a way that benefits all residents.

To summarize, urban places are contexts of new forms of economic, social, and political division as well as sites of deeply embedded multinational coexistence and competition. They are places where new and old ethnic cleavages intersect. Place matters to our understanding of ethnic relations and urban centres are the foci, the face-to-face meeting grounds of those relations. We therefore need to know more about the conditions under which urban contexts lead to ethnic conflict and exclusion, as well as the conditions under which urban life engenders peaceful and inclusive coexistence.

The volume’s core question is the following: under what circumstances does the intersection of various types of differences in urban contexts cause ethnic conflict and division rather than moderate it? In other words, under what conditions are cities places of integration or places of segmentation? The volume explores the influence of three factors on ethnic relations:

1. The political economy of ethnic relations in cities;
2. The impact of ethnolinguistic configurations of cities on nationalist and ethnic conflicts; and
3. The role of urban institutions and multilevel urban interventions in the management of ethnic conflict and incorporation of intersecting diversities in cities.

As the empirical case studies in the book make clear, these factors typically intersect and reinforce each other. Nevertheless, we believe that highlighting the role of each is analytically useful; understanding the influence of political economy, ethnolinguistic configurations, or urban institutions and multilevel governance on urban ethnic relations allows us to distinguish...
cases where one or the other factor is more important in terms of explaining degrees of integration or segmentation. Perhaps even more importantly, useful policy prescriptions rely on pinpointing the particulars of the problem to be solved: while an entire social-economic-political system may be “broken,” one must understand what particular part of the system is most in need of repair if one is to offer useful policy advice. As we point out below and through the organization of our book into three sections, the chapters in this book often do highlight the particular influence of specific causal factors in explaining the broader outcomes in the cases under consideration. As such, the analytical framework developed here sharpens and complements the empirically oriented work undertaken by the book’s contributors. We will now describe each of these factors in turn.

**Theme 1: Globalization and the Political Economy of Migration and Ethnic Politics**

Urban scholars have demonstrated that, contrary to many predictions about globalization’s effect on the salience of territorial space, place still matters. This broad literature links globalization to urbanization arguing that the relevant territorial scale has become the urban. This broad literature posits the rise of a hierarchy of cities with different functions in the global economic system.

Although a great deal of urban scholarship discusses the increasing prominence of cities, what might be called the “world city literature” is an important strain. This literature stresses the importance of economic factors to urbanization trends. In particular, the literature points to how, beginning in the 1970s and accelerating in the 1980s, the growth of the service economy and the requirements of transnational capital for specialized services led to the concentrated clustering of management, financial, and other high-level services in cities. Although some view this literature as limited to the study of particular urban centres, namely the major players (core financial centres and headquarters of transnational corporations) in the global economy, others conceptualize it more broadly as literature that “attempts to analyze the changing worldwide geographies of capitalism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries” (Brenner and Keil 2006, 9). It is the broader definition of this literature that informs this book.

John Friedmann (1986, cited in Brenner and Keil 2006, 67) was one of the first scholars to link urbanization and globalization, conceptualizing cities as “basing points” for global capital and describing “world cities” as “sites of the concentration and accumulation of international capital.” Saskia
Sassen, also a pioneering contributor to this literature, theorizes a particular kind of world city – the “global city” that is at the top of what has become a hierarchy of cities competing for ascendancy in the global economy. She first developed this concept in *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (1991), which documents parallel processes of change in the economic bases, spatial organization, and social structures of these three cities. She attributes similar patterns of change in cities located in very different national contexts to changes in the global economy. She summarizes the central thesis of one of her more recent books that further develops themes in *The Global City* as follows:

Since the 1980s, major transformations in the composition of the world economy, including the sharp growth of specialized services for firms and finance, have renewed the importance of major cities as sites for producing strategic global inputs. In the current phase of the world economy, it is precisely the combination of the global dispersal of factories, offices and service outlets, and global information integration – under conditions of continued concentration of economic ownership and control – that has contributed to a strategic role for certain major cities. (Sassen 2006, 6)

Sassen indicates that there are about forty such “global cities” in the world today (ibid., 7). According to Sassen (ibid.), from an economic perspective: “today’s global cities are (1) command points in the organization of the world economy; (2) key locations and marketplaces for the leading industries of the current period – finance and specialized services for firms; and (3) major sites of production, including the production of innovations, for these industries.” Furthermore, these cities must be seen as entities that form a network rather than as independent actors in the global sphere (ibid.).

Changes in the global political economy have also been associated with a convergence in patterns of urban governance. Comparative scholars have documented a convergence in the Western world around growth agendas (Pierre 1999, 384). Essentially, the American “growth machines” (Molotch 1976; Logan and Molotch 1987) of the 1970s and 1980s have become pervasive and oriented towards competition at the global rather than national level. This trend has been described in different ways including as the rise of the “entrepreneurial city” (Clarke and Gail, 1998) or the “competitive city” (Kipfer and Keil 2002). Others have argued that the reorganization of capitalism and the rise of select cities are implicated in a process of “rescaling”
power to the global and local levels. These shifting power dynamics have, in turn, resulted in a territorial refocusing of state activities to the local scale (see, for instance, Brenner 2004).

Migration is fundamental to the process by which the new geography of capitalism is emerging. With some recent exceptions, the literature on world cities neglects to consider immigration as a global flow fundamental in shaping urban development and the world city system (Price and Benton-Short 2007, 104). Rather immigration enters the analysis as a flow associated with social polarization (see our discussion of Sassen below). However, globalization has “rescaled” the politics of immigration and of ethnic relations in general. Cities have emerged as both the strategic command and control sites of the global economy and testing grounds for peaceful coexistence in contexts of new, old, and intersecting diversity.

Success at managing diversity is fundamental to economic growth. Immigrant attraction/retention has become an economic development strategy in many cities across the globe (see Good 2009 and Good forthcoming, for examples in Canada). In Chapter 1 of this volume, Blair Ruble utilizes the conceptual framework of diversity capital to examine the potential role of pro-business interests and outlooks in promoting tolerance policies. Ruble argues that business can become a force for progressive change in cities confronting the transition from once autarkic economic regimes. More specifically, he explores the ways in which emerging development machines’ efforts to combat labour shortages in contemporary Russian cities promotes “diversity capital” as policy makers struggle to attract migrants of strikingly different racial, ethnic, and confessional backgrounds. He draws on empirical examples from three large Russian cities – Kazan, St. Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg – to illustrate the ways in which municipal officials manage and promote tolerance as part of a strategy to attract and sustain local labour forces.

Ruble’s piece appears to be consistent with what the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2010, 9-10) has identified as a general consensus among business elites that migration is good for business. World city discourse has also become normative. Local corporate elites are city boosters that strive to attain world city status. Many business leaders and other city boosters associate a city that can integrate a diverse immigrant population with attaining this status. As a result, promoting a city’s multiculturalism is now a strategy for some cities in the competition for elite migrants. In contexts where the term multiculturalism has been discredited, new terms, such as “welcoming society,” have been developed (Bertelsmann Foundation 2010, 9).
In both cases, the aim is to brand the city as open to both diversity and business.

Nevertheless, the IOM also describes a tension between the interests of the global corporate sector, which wants to see barriers to the free movement of people removed, and the interests of states that are embedded in local politics. Changing ethnic demographics have caused tensions in many cities across the globe. In fact, in many ways, support for immigration from the business community and resistance from ordinary residents are global phenomena. The IOM, media articles in countries around the world, and the academic literature document what seems to be rather pervasive social unrest concerning immigration. The IOM (2010, 10) notes the rise of “concerns, both legitimate and unfounded, about the arrival of people from other countries and cultures.” Scholars describe a widespread backlash against multiculturalism in Europe (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) and in new American immigrant gateways (Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008). As David Ley’s contribution to this volume (Chapter 6) and other work suggests (see Good 2009), there have even been growing pains in several local communities in Canada, a country known to be an exceptional case in its support for multiculturalism and immigration and the first country to become “officially multicultural.”

Neil Brenner and Roger Keil (2006, 77) describe debates about the social effects of global city formation as “the most provocative, if also highly controversial, aspects of global cities research.” Sassen (1991) argues that global cities share patterns of social as well as economic change. In particular, she views social polarization as a consequence of global city formation since very high-level services concentrate in cities with a need for low-paying service workers to serve the needs of the transnational elite. Service-based economies are, according to this line of argument, more unequal than manufacturing-based economies.

Well-known planning scholar Susan S. Fainstein rejects the polarization hypothesis as articulated by Sassen (1991) and other global city scholars. She finds that the middle class has not shrunk – although upper-income earners have benefitted disproportionately from growth in global cities, middle- and lower-income groups have suffered only relative losses (in terms of their position in relation to the top group). She also argues that “national” public policies have played a crucial role in mediating labour market inequality (Fainstein 2001, 292-94).

Many of our contributors similarly highlight the importance of national and regional policy contexts on ethnic relations in cities suggesting the
importance of multilevel and multiscalar institutional analysis, a theme to be discussed further below. Where it exists, how might social polarization affect ethnic relations in cities? Sassen (2006, 180-82) found that polarization in global cities also intersects with race and immigrant status, with racial minorities and immigrants disproportionately found in the lower paying service jobs and informal economy. Her work suggests global cities have produced an immigrant underclass that is concentrated in low-end service jobs in service-driven global cities. Fainstein’s work provides only qualified support for this assessment arguing that, although a correlation between low income and racial or ethnic minority status exists, the relationship is complex and varies across global cities (Fainstein 2001, 294). Fainstein points out that in New York, for instance, immigrants have “done quite well” and although “race is highly correlated with income ... within the black population West Indian immigrants fare better than African Americans” (ibid.). In Paris, she finds no correlation between income and immigrant status (ibid.). The case of New York suggests that long-standing ethno-racial differences must be examined separately from immigrant differences. According to Michael Jones-Correa (2001b), differences among immigrants and native-born African Americans have provoked a deep cleavage in the United States’ most numerically significant immigrant destinations. These cleavages “have the potential for triggering conflict” (189). More generally, variation in the experiences of immigrants and long-standing racialized minorities points to the value of asking the central question that guides this volume: under what circumstances do city contexts serve to unite ethnic groups and when do they divide them and why?

The authors in this volume offer complex answers to this question. Several authors stress the importance of placing changes in cities within a historical context. For instance, David McDonald’s chapter on Cape Town (Chapter 5) highlights how the historical legacy of apartheid has contributed to the racialization of world city dynamics. In particular, he shows that the city’s response to global forces has led to a somewhat paradoxical tendency on the part of the transnational elite to sell Cape Town as a white, English-speaking city while at the same time supporting efforts to attract African migrants to the city to meet labour market needs. Here the prerogatives of branding do not necessarily reinforce the logic of business, at least regarding low-skilled workers.

David Ley’s study (Chapter 6) of the reaction of local residents to immigration-driven growth in Vancouver, Canada’s third largest city, demonstrates that racial minorities are not only immigrating to global cities as
cheap labourers in a highly polarized economy (as the social polarization thesis highlights). Rather, many members of the transnational elite are also racial minorities. “Millionaire migrants” from Asia are local agents in world city formation in Canada, the United States, and Australia (see Ley 2010). Like McDonald, Ley’s discussion of Vancouver’s transnational elite also raises paradoxes inherent in world city formation. On the one hand, white residents who have long stood as the principal residents of elite neighbourhoods would prefer to contain growth and otherwise limit change in order to preserve the traditional character of their city districts. At the same time, however, they are part of the class that is driving and benefiting from Vancouver’s growth and insertion into the global economy. This paradox also highlights, at a different and indeed smaller, neighbourhood scale, the tension between global business interests and the local politics of demographic change discussed above. In a classic case of wanting to have one’s cake and eat it too, some business elites want to benefit from economic growth while preserving the cultural face of their neighbourhoods and cities in the face of urban development. Not surprisingly, some of their new, immigrant neighbours do not share their sense of aesthetics or tradition. The end result, as Ley points out, is a debate among new and old elites, shaped in part by racial dynamics.

Also in the book’s first section on globalization and political economy, Dickson Eyoh reminds us in Chapter 2 that the impact of urbanization on national and continental development has been highly uneven. According to Eyoh, although in postcolonial Africa ethnic politics is primarily about resources rather than claims to cultural autonomy, patterns of urbanization in African cities have led to “urbanization without development,” a phenomenon that he argues has led to “heightened investments in ethnic, religious, gender, class and locality-based identities.” Ethnic identities are instrumental in an extremely resource-poor environment; they are used to make claims to resources and to build social networks for survival. His analysis shows how processes of state formation, urbanization, and changes in the political economy of African nations have ushered in a new, often corrosive, politics of identity in African cities that has undermined nationalist projects that are meant to bring ethnic groups together under a common identity.

Another trend, apparent across the globe and linked with both globalization and immigrant settlement patterns, is the suburbanization of cities. The United Nations Habitat’s State of the World’s Cities 2010/2011: Bridging
the Urban Divide report identifies suburbanization (also called horizontal spreading or, more commonly, sprawl) as a global phenomenon and challenge that raises questions about the affordability of urban infrastructure, automobile dependence, and access to services (UN Habitat 2010-11, 10-11). Immigrants increasingly settle directly in suburbs rather than in traditional ethnic enclaves in the core of metropolitan areas (for a collection of essays on this phenomenon in the United States, see Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008). Several contributions to this volume explore instances in which immigrant settlement patterns and suburbanization intersect to create problems of social cohesion. For instance, in Chapter 3, Alan Walks examines how processes of gentrification have altered the immigrant-reception function of urban cores and, consequently, influenced interactions among different ethnic groups in Canada’s three main immigrant destinations – Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. Rather than creating more inclusive downtown communities, Walks argues that gentrification pushes low-income immigrants to the suburbs, disrupting the reception function of the central core and creating a mismatch between where immigrants settle and the services they need to integrate. He concludes that gentrification is associated with greater levels of race and class segmentation in Canada’s most important immigrant destinations rather than more inclusive communities. In an ironic twist, Canada’s tolerant urban centres are becoming less and less diverse as housing prices and other expenses drive recent immigrants to “inner” suburbs (Barber 2007).

Nevertheless, Yu and Li’s contribution in Chapter 4 questions whether ethnic concentration in suburbs constitutes a long-term path to exclusion. Their chapter explores the link between globalization, international migration, and the rise of new immigrant settlements. It explores the global emergence of ethnoburbs – a term Li (1998) developed in the 1990s – through a case study of Monterey Park, California. Yu and Li’s chapter describes Monterey Park’s developmental trajectory since the 1990s, including the emergence of other types of suburban communities in the surrounding area. They also extend the concept geographically to document the emergence of an ethnoburb in a city in the global South, Beijing’s Wangjing District. The phenomenon of sprawl, most strongly associated with North American cities, has now spread to the developing world (UN Habitat 2010-11, 10). Yu and Li (Chapter 4) show that one aspect of this process involves the rise of ethnoburbs in the developing world. Similarities in patterns of urban development across the globe suggest that common structural forces
theme 2: ethnolinguistic configurations and relations in cities

In addition to the political economy of cities, the ethnolinguistic configuration of cities has been identified as potentially contributing to ethnic and nationalist conflict. For proponents of contact theory, social isolation contributes to the stereotyping of members of other ethnic groups, while contact and personal acquaintance promote tolerance (Allport 1954). Not all types of contact, however, promote greater tolerance. In fact, one of the main challenges of contact theory has been to isolate additional variables besides the presence or absence of ethnic minorities to explain attitudes towards diversity. As argued by Donald Forbes (2004, 74), three major variables have been cited in the literature as conditions for positive effects of contact: the equality of status of the different groups in contact; their cooperative or competitive independence in the pursuit of common goals; and the presence or absence of social norms supporting intergroup contact.

A vast literature applies some of the insights associated with contact theory. For example, Mary Jackman and Mary Crane (1986) found that the effect of interracial contact in the United States on whites’ attitudes towards blacks was contingent less on intimacy than on the variety of contacts and on the relative socioeconomic status of black contacts. In France, Nonna Mayer and Pascal Perrineau (1996) have shown that it is neither those who live in the same neighbourhoods as immigrants nor those who live in rural and more homogeneous regions that tend to support the anti-immigrant Front National (FN) party, but rather those with more superficial contact living at the periphery of more diverse neighbourhoods and regions. Others have found ambiguous results for contact theory. Alan Morris’s (1999) study of Hillbrow in Johannesburg, one of the first racially diverse neighbourhoods in South Africa, found that, although respondents felt that racial barriers and acts of overt racism had declined and that racial tolerance had increased, many residents continued to voice racist sentiments during interviews. It is important to stress that government policies play an important part in encouraging, discouraging, and otherwise shaping contact among groups.

Group conflict theory provides an opposite approach to contact theory. According to the economic perspective on group conflict theory, ethnic, racial, or linguistic majorities are more likely to feel threatened by and thus
more likely to express greater hostility towards immigrant or racial minorities in more difficult economic contexts when minorities are perceived as competitors for scarce jobs or as exercising additional downward pressure on wages (Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Semyonov et al. 2004; 2006). In her study of mayoral voting in Los Angeles and New York, for example, Karen Kaufmann (2004) found that perceptions of interracial conflict caused in part by economic dislocation led to Republican victories in overwhelmingly Democratic cities in the early 1990s. Proponents of group conflict theory also argue that a feeling of threat arises in communities in which there are larger proportions of immigrants and racial minorities. Politics is viewed as a competitive struggle for resources and recognition in good and bad economic times: any gain by racial minorities or immigrants is perceived as a loss for the majority group (Glaser 1994; Quillian 1995).

Nevertheless, as many of our contributors show, one cannot assume that either contact or conflict occurs between a monolithic majority (or “host” society) and ethnic minorities or immigrants (in the case of international migration). In many cities, ethnic change, including changes provoked by immigration, involves contact among various minorities rather than between a white majority and racial minority immigrant group. For instance, according to Jones-Correa, in the United States, the most important immigration centres (including Miami, Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Houston, Chicago, and Washington, DC) all have significant native-born black minorities. In these cities, immigrants with low levels of economic and social capital settle alongside and compete with African Americans for scarce resources, including political representation and public sector hiring (Jones-Correa 2001b, 188). Contact among minorities is shaped by a multitude of factors with class chief among them. For instance, class-based ethnic conflicts have emerged between African Americans and Korean immigrants in Los Angeles (Park and Park 2001).

Changing demographics may be seen as a threat to the cultural identity as well as the economic interests of the majority in a given city. Proponents of the social identity approach to group conflict emphasize perceptions of cultural vulnerability in light of such changing demographics (Brown 1995, Capozza and Brown 2000). In Canada, worry regarding the survival of the French language in North America has been posited as the reason residents of Quebec cities – a high proportion of whom have French as their first or perhaps sole language – have been shown to have less positive attitudes towards immigrant groups than residents of cities in other Canadian provinces (Schissel, Wanner, and Frideres 1989). Not all minority groups may be
perceived as threats though. For example, Marylee Taylor (1998) found that, in the United States, as the local black population expands, white negativity towards this group increases, but that increased concentrations of local Asian American and Latino populations does not engender white antipathies towards these two groups.

Changing demographics also have the potential to engender cultural, economic, and political insecurities among long-standing minorities. To African Americans, Latino and Asian immigrants are considered economic threats in many American cities as the example of class conflict between Koreans and African Americans in Los Angeles suggests. In Miami, black–Hispanic relations are also tense as the two groups are “divided by class, power, ideology, language, color, and place of birth and political affiliations” and where blacks feel disenfranchised by the pervasive influence of Cubans in the political, economic, and social spheres (Grenier and Castro 2001, 143).

The first contribution to this section of the volume shows how deep legacies of structural racism create tensions in world city development processes. More specifically, in Chapter 5, McDonald explores the tensions generated by Cape Town’s resistance to “Africanization” in the face of the extensive demographic “Africanizing” that is the result of internal migration from rural areas in South Africa and cross-border migration from other African countries. He argues that despite its Africanization, Cape Town remains culturally and organizationally white through a process of continuing and even increasing class and race segregation that is in great part due to efforts to become a world city. Whereas a great deal of the literature on Western cities indicates that cities’ ethnic diversity is being sold in an effort to attract business capital and migrants, Cape Town is pursuing a different strategy, one of selling the city as largely white. Cape Town’s insertion into the global economy has inherently brought with it neoliberal policies such as privatization and liberalization that have failed to address the extreme poverty in the city and have exacerbated currents of racism and xenophobia, justifying and exacerbating the kinds of spatially exclusionary outcomes created by apartheid and neoliberalism. Reactions to migration (and therefore contact among groups) is shaped by apartheid’s legacy with racist discourses against blacks and Africans common among whites and coloureds and xenophobia also present among the existing black population in Cape Town. As in American cities, competition among long-standing minorities influences responses to immigrant newcomers. Like other chapters in this volume, McDonald’s analysis highlights the complex interplay between
broad structural forces in the global political economy and local identity- and class-based interests, which are themselves shaped by the city’s (and country’s) long-term political development.

The socioeconomic status of a neighbourhood can also influence the nature of group contact and potential conflict. For example, Donald E. Blake (2003) found lower negative attitudes towards diversity in Canadian neighbourhoods with higher socioeconomic status. In Chapter 6, David Ley explores the micropolitics of one such case. He challenges dominant explanations of ethnic conflict in middle- and upper-middle-income neighbourhoods in Vancouver’s West Side that resulted from long-standing residents’ reactions to property redevelopment and landscaping changes on behalf of wealthy East Asian immigrants. He shows that a multiscalar and historical approach to explaining the causes of this ethnic conflict calls into question racism as a dominant explanation of residents’ responses to these changes. He points to the neighbourhood’s historical antigrowth position, beginning in the 1970s prior to the influx of East Asian immigrants, as an alternate or at least contributing factor to residents’ reactions and demonstrates that antigrowth mobilization ceased in 1993 when compromise bylaws were passed by the city to protect historical elements of the neighbourhood.

Ethnic configuration also seems to influence a local government’s approach to ethnic and racial diversity. In her book on municipal multicultural policy in Canada, Kristin Good (2009, 281) found that “bifurcated, biracial municipalities are more likely to be responsive to ethnocultural change than highly heterogeneous, multiracial municipalities.” The ethnic configuration of specific neighbourhoods can facilitate the integration of newcomers, although that topic, tackled by Alan Walks in this volume, requires more study.

Cities are an important site of nationalist conflict. Studies of nationalism have long viewed urbanization as key in the development of such conflicts. Processes of modernization that bring previously isolated and relatively homogeneous groups together in larger urban centres have often resulted in multinational cities in which members of a nationalist group are confronted by other nationalities or religious groups. Unequal distributions of economic and political resources, discrimination, or simply prejudice experienced in the city can all feed nationalist feelings. As such, and as argued by Bollens (2007, 6) in relation to Jerusalem and Belfast, “a city is a focal point or magnet for unresolved nationalist ethnic conflict.” Students of nationalism
have also argued that nationalism has tended in many countries to be first
and foremost a movement associated with an educated urban elite living
in larger cities (see Breuilly 1993, 153), even if this elite often celebrates
traditional or rural aspects of the nation over the artificiality and frivolity of
urban life (Smith 2009, 85-86).

Cities are not only crucial to nationalist conflicts as the sites in which
different national groups come in contact or as the home base of national-
ist elites. Nationalist politics is often, as demonstrated by the title of Marc
Levine’s book Reconquest of Montreal, about the re-appropriation or “taking
back” of a given city (Levine 1991). In a city such as Jerusalem, as David
Cameron’s chapter demonstrates, the political status of the city itself is cen-
tral to a nationalist conflict; the status of Jerusalem, and especially the Old
City of Jerusalem, is one of the main impediments to a peace treaty between
Israel and Palestine. Both sides view the city in almost mythical terms as
embodying – for religious and historical reasons – the heart of their re-
spective nations. In other cities, fear surrounding changing demographics
in metropolitan regions has fuelled nationalist conflict. This is the case in
Barcelona, Brussels, and Montreal, cities in which nationalist conflict has
been driven in large part by the status of Catalan, Dutch, and French re-
spectively. As argued by Dominique Arel (2001, 78), “as long as the language
of the group attempting a reconquest of the city maintains a low status in
the city, while the group’s nationalist movement is able to keep a mobilizing
base (not necessarily in the city), the potential for instability remains.” Such
fears have been exacerbated in the last half-century by the growing num-
bers of immigrants that have settled in these linguistically bifurcated cities.
Immigration in cities can be the source of conflict to the extent that it has
the potential to alter the demographic balance between linguistic groups in
situations in which immigrants are more likely to adopt one language rather
than another.

The final contribution to this section explores a case where the inter-
section of multinational and immigrant diversity is fundamental to under-
standing ethnic contact and conflict. In Chapter 7, Yoann Veny and Dirk
Jacobs show that the growing presence of immigrants in Brussels both ac-
centuates and attenuates linguistic conflict. On the one side, the increasing
presence of immigrants has revitalized entrenched linguistic conflicts. On
the other side, the presence of immigrants has rendered the classic dyadic
logic of Brussels’ linguistic conflict (according to which someone is either
Francophone or Dutch-speaking) increasingly difficult to sustain. Veny and
Jacobs demonstrate that nationalists’ efforts at creating alliances with immigrant groups is an important political element in the power struggle between the contending language groups in Brussels.

Dickson Eyoh’s chapter in the first section (Chapter 2) offers yet another take on the role of cities in nationalist identity-based projects, demonstrating the interplay between resource scarcity, changing patterns of ethnic contact in cities, and country-level postcolonial nationalist projects. In Cameroon, migration from the west and northwest to cities and communities in the Southwest province has led to the “ethnic succession” of the migrant Bamilekes who now outnumber indigenes in Douala (the largest city) as well as other cities and towns. According to Eyoh, this demographic transition coupled with resource scarcity has contributed to the re-emergence of ethnic claims in a country that had stressed an undifferentiated “liberal” citizenship as a nationalist project.

**Theme 3: Institutions and the Management of Difference**

Regardless of the scale at which they occur, social and political interactions among groups and individuals are structured by institutions, understood as the “formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938). Institutions diminish the vagaries of human interaction by affording them a degree of routine and predictability; exchanges among individuals and groups that might otherwise provoke confusion, discomfort, and, potentially, instability and conflict, are mediated by generally accepted “rules of the game” that make much of social life ordinary and predictable. The breakdown of institutions, through political or economic crises or slow disintegration and consequent transformation in the face of shifting ideas and norms, can throw life into flux, increasing insecurity and, in certain instances, imperilling stability (Krasner 1988; Thelen 2006). Whether for good or ill, institutional change is typically accompanied by uncertainty as actors deal with the vagaries of life in a world of shifting rules.

Scholars of nationalism and ethnic politics have drawn on theories of individual behaviour and institutional responses to it to both analyze and devise institutions for regulating relations among groups. Theories of consociational democracy and multination federalism typically assume that groups in diverse societies will behave in a self-interested and hence potentially disruptive manner. Institutional limits to self-interested group behaviour allow for a modicum of stability and cohesion under such conditions...
Questions of institutional design for post-conflict societies have loomed large both in the academic literature, on the agendas of international organizations charged with restoring peace and stability (Simonsen 2005) and in the minds of public servants close to the process of finding institutional solutions for peace, as David Cameron’s case study of the Old City Initiative shows.

There are different strains of thought concerning how to design institutions in ways that encourage ethnic harmony or at least dampen conflict. Some scholars stress the need to institutionalize contact among groups whereas others advocate massive institutional reengineering, through the partition of territories and compulsory “unmixing” of antagonistic groups (Kaufman 1996). Common to these two otherwise very different approaches (power sharing versus partition) is the assumption that groups, or, more accurately, the political elites that take responsibility for their respective groups’ political affairs, are self-interested utility-maximizers whose behaviour can only be mediated through the imposition of institutional solutions. However, often, ethnic segmentation or mixing is not the result of institutional design. Rather, social and economic factors lead to particular patterns of settlement, which, in turn, shape and are shaped by institutions. For instance, as Susan Clarke and Keeley Stokes’s (Chapter 10) contribution to this section (and others discussed below) shows, ethnic concentration can be associated with greater levels of political incorporation where institutions create an incentive among parties to reach out to immigrants and ethnic minorities.

This view of institutions as mechanisms for channelling the conduct of self-interested, utility-maximizing individuals and groups is challenged by a more sociological variant, which sees institutions as providing “moral or cognitive” templates for “interpretation and action” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 939). In this tradition, institutions reflect and embody deeply embedded norms that structure human interaction according to a “logic of appropriateness” rather than a logic of utility maximization (March and Olson 1989). With regard to ethnicity and politics, institutionally oriented scholars working in this more sociologically informed tradition have explored how long-standing and deeply entrenched “traditions of nationhood” or “philosophies of integration” shape interactions between immigrants and host polities, leading to greater or lesser degrees of openness to cultural difference (Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998). For Rogers Brubaker (1992), Germany’s exclusion of guest workers from its citizenship regime was based on a consensus regarding the ethnic dimension of German nationhood; being German
meant being of German descent. Conversely, France’s more assimilatory approach to naturalization was rooted in its civic republican tradition, in which citizenship is premised on shared rights and responsibilities – qualities that are theoretically open to all regardless of their descent. Here institutions drive politics by shaping identities and limiting the degree to which established ways of life are open to political contestation.

In Veny and Jacobs’s contribution (Chapter 7) we see that the coexistence of two main national groups within Belgium has led to the development of two distinct “philosophies of integration” in Brussels, their case study. However, interestingly, they raise the possibility that the strategic context of Brussels as it relates to immigration could lead the utility-maximizing political elites described above to draw upon norms of the “other” nation to further their interests in connecting with immigrant groups. Namely, it raises the question of whether the Francophone Walloons will move from a republican, assimilationist approach to minority relations toward more of a multicultural approach that recognizes minorities as distinct cultural entities with which organizational relationships can be established. The potential interplay of interest-based and more ideationally informed action in Brussels that the authors raise suggests that both decision-making logics can inform group relations. Furthermore, it suggests that urban contexts are important arenas of strategic action in the governance of immigration, contexts that could, in turn, initiate change in deeply embedded norms concerning the recognition and integration of immigrants.

In Chapter 8, David Cameron’s analysis of the Jerusalem Old City Initiative (JOCI) also highlights the importance of ideas to institution building, while also noting their limits in cases where they are not taken up by actors in institutionalized positions of power. Given Jerusalem’s critical importance in any future solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the JOCI, an initiative spearheaded by Canadian academics and former security and bureaucratic officials with experience in the Middle East, has formulated a plan that sets aside the excruciatingly difficult meta-question of sovereignty, to first address less contentious governance issues, most notably security in Jerusalem. The central idea animating the JOCI proposal is that sovereignty can only be dealt with effectively after agreement has been reached on matters relating to the governance of the city in more mundane and practical ways. Cameron notes that the JOCI approach has the advantage of being more workable than alternatives that deal with questions concerning sovereignty as it relates to Jerusalem as part of a comprehensive plan. Institutional elegance and comprehensiveness are considered less important than
potential day-to-day “workability.” And yet, it is not clear whether this approach will influence the strategic decision making of Israeli and Palestinian leaders, who typically do view the fate of Jerusalem in zero-sum terms.

The deliberately incremental, “satisficing,” approach advanced by the JOCI is similar to the messy but ultimately effective approaches detailed in the next chapter in the third section. In Chapter 9, Scott Bollens compares the effectiveness of differing political-institutional approaches to managing multicultural cities in divided societies. He notes that “the capacity of local governance to contribute to intergroup tolerance can be hamstrung by national political settlements.” Cities are always embedded in broader political and institutional contexts over which they have limited influence. Bollens’s comparative analysis also suggests that the outcomes are not driven by the “quality of institutional design”; rather, he maintains that messiness has its virtues. The most successful of his cases are characterized by flexibility and a degree of redundancy that allows governance structures to adapt to changing conditions over time. Conversely, elegant but rigid institutions are often rendered ineffective as a result of inevitable changes in social and political conditions.

Perhaps the more pressing nature of challenges in cities leads local governments to respond to them more quickly than other levels and in a more flexible manner. For instance, some scholars have noted that cities often pursue immigrant integration policies that are more expansive than those of their national government (Sennett 2002). In the case of Germany, neglect of immigrant integration by higher levels of government left cities little choice but to take charge of the issue, leading to quite extensive policy experimentation, which, later on, informed the federal government’s policy approach (Triadafilopoulos, Korteweg, and Garcia del Moral 2013).

Nevertheless, cities’ institutional logics do not always promote greater levels of inclusion of immigrants and ethnocultural minorities. For instance, in Canada, a country whose mass public is exceptionally supportive of immigration and multiculturalism, municipalities vary significantly in the extent to which they have adopted the federal government’s multicultural policy approach to immigrant integration (Good 2009). In fact, institutional logics vary even within a single metropolitan area, highlighting the importance of the question of boundaries in the design of political institutions.5

Another mode of institutional analysis highlights the role of distinctively political institutions such as electoral and party systems, modes of intergovernmental relations, and rules ordering the interaction of executives,
legislatures, and courts (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Thelen 1999; Pierson and Skocpol 2002). The literature on the political incorporation of ethnic minorities shows that political integration is shaped by institutional design factors at the local level, including the establishment of municipal and ward boundaries and party systems. In general, greater levels of political incorporation occur in systems where minorities can translate their territorial concentration into political representation of their interests on local councils. In his comparative study of the political incorporation of minorities in Birmingham, Lille, and Roulaix, Romain Garbaye (2004) finds that ethnic concentration, parties, and the way in which power is organized in local councils are all important opportunity structures shaping political incorporation. In Birmingham, shifting alliances within the Labour Party and ethnic concentration in a first-past-the-post electoral system were important factors influencing political incorporation (ibid., 45-47). In Lille, the attitude of the Socialist Party and a strong mayor with extensive powers of patronage meant that the city’s North African immigrants were poorly incorporated (ibid., 47-48). In Roulaix, strong community organizations and weak parties as well as a large minority population all created an opening for ethnic activists (ibid., 50-51). Institutional differences have created multiple paths of political incorporation in these European cities.

Similarly, in their widely cited Protest Is Not Enough (1984), which compares the responsiveness of ten northern Californian cities to blacks and Latinos, Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb stress the importance of numbers, partisan/ideological factors, and the institutional location of minority representation on councils to minority political incorporation. As they summarize, “minority incorporation was associated with the replacement of conservative dominant coalitions by liberal coalitions, with more Democrats on city councils, and with the growth of minority populations” (243). In terms of the institutional location of minority representation, they stress the importance of representation in the governing coalition or party to minority political incorporation.

In Chapter 10, Clarke and Stokes highlight the interplay of demographic, socioeconomic, and institutional factors in the political representation of black and minority ethnic (BME) councillors on London borough councils between 2002 and 2006. The first-past-the-post system of elections in British (and American) municipalities means that ethnic concentration can be translated into political incorporation (at least at the descriptive level) (on British cities, see Garbaye 2004, 45). Clarke and Stokes maintain that black and minority ethnic representation is driven by specific factors within
a borough: levels of religious and ethnic diversity, levels of socioeconomic deprivation, Labour Party dominance, and, relatedly, the degree to which seats on borough councils are contested among political parties. While Labour Party dominance is correlated with high shares of BME councillors in “old immigrant boroughs,” party competition – spurred in part by electoral rules – has challenged Labour’s dominance in more recently diversifying boroughs in London. Clarke and Stokes’s findings challenge “assumptions that the Labour Party – or any traditional party – is the primary vehicle for BME immigrant incorporation.”

Building on both rational choice and sociological institutionalism, historical institutionalists emphasize the capacity of political institutions not only to set the rules of the political game but to change the very nature of the game and of players’ identities in the process, often in ways that were not foreseen when the institution was initially devised. One of the principal mechanisms in historical institutionalist analysis is path dependency (Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000). At its core, path dependency holds that decisions made at an earlier point in time shape subsequent decision making by narrowing the range of plausible options available to decision makers. “Sunk costs” make radical change costly and “increasing returns,” via policy feedback, empower discreet sets of actors, often shaping their identities and preferences in the process. Policy makes politics in this view. Several contributions in this volume show how past decisions concerning ethnic relations shape current ethnic dynamics in cities. These contributions also show that the influence of city politics must be placed within broader institutional, constitutional and policy structures (and their legacies). In other words, a multilevel analysis of institutions and their impact on the path of ethnic relations in cities is necessary.

A straightforward example of how institutions shape ethnic relations in cities concerns how past decisions to designate particular groups as officially recognized national minorities – often based on self-interested, state-building reasons – shaped subsequent intergroup relations in ways that could not have been anticipated by policy makers (Brubaker 1996). For instance, as Veny and Jacobs’s contribution shows (Chapter 7), Belgium’s multinational federalism and the competition that it has channelled and mediated between Walloons and Flemish have shaped the politics of immigrant integration in Brussels. An implicit finding in their piece is that an unintended consequence of the institutionalization of multinationalism in Brussels, and in Belgium in general, has been a policy context that is open
to immigrants and that has resulted in a sort of “race to the top” to respond to immigrants’ concerns (and to have them identify with each of the national groups). However, their piece also shows how immigrants resist identifying in such a binary way, which suggests that the addition of immigrant diversity to multinational diversity could serve as a source of ethnic harmony by creating a cross-cutting cleavage between the two national groups.

However, the unintended consequences of policy legacies at multiple levels of government can also work to undermine ethnic harmony. In the United States, the failure of policy makers (and the courts in particular) to distinguish between the country’s long-standing racialized minority – African Americans – and immigrants in their application of special rights outlined in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has had the unintended effect of causing tensions between African Americans and immigrants in America’s most significant immigrant destinations (Jones-Correa 2001a, 5-7). Similarly, McDonald’s (Chapter 5) contribution to this volume shows how the legacy of apartheid with its construction of a variety of racial categories has influenced relations among ethnoracial minorities in ways that continue to poison ethnic relations in Cape Town. In fact, as discussed above, he argues that, like whites and coloureds, blacks in Cape Town also exhibit xenophobic tendencies in their orientation towards other African migrants from rural South Africa and the broader continent.

The general point is this: the local governance of ethnic and nationalist politics must take seriously the multidimensional, multiscalar, and multi-level nature of cities’ institutional and policy contexts. In his review essay of conceptualizations of multilevel governance, Paul Stubbs (2005, 67) summarizes the value of the concept of multilevel governance as such: “It allows for an understanding of complexity at and between levels. In this sense, the vertical notion of multi-level governance, including but also seemingly ‘above’ and ‘below’ the nation state, goes alongside the horizontal notion of complex governance to address relationships between state and non-state actors, and new forms of public-private partnerships.”

Such a perspective acknowledges that even in the absence of both formal and informal multilevel governance arrangements or other modes of coordination, cities are governed and affected by the decisions of all levels of government as well as supranational institutions. Furthermore, the causal arrow goes both ways. What happens in cities also has the potential to shape national and supranational institutions in both intentional and unintentional ways. For instance, Good (2009) found that, in Canada, upper-level
government decisions to fund immigrant settlement organizations in cities shapes willing municipal governments’ capacity to develop productive governance arrangements that respond to immigrants’ concerns. Once established, these governance arrangements in turn contribute to policy change at the national and provincial levels, sometimes in unexpected ways (ibid., Chap. 7).

It is important to remember that cities are not simply passive actors within a hierarchical multilevel system. Local actors have also become deliberate agents of change in ethnic relations at the national level. For instance, due to the new challenges of immigration, cities in Europe (Penninx and Martiniello 2004, 158-59) and Canada (Good 2009) have begun to lobby national governments for national policy change, including more autonomy for local institutions. For instance, in Sweden and the Netherlands:

The cities joined forces to demand more executive power and greater resources from their national governments to cope with such problems. In the Netherlands and Sweden in recent years, generalized policies targeting metropolitan areas and integration policies specifically targeting immigrants have been bundled together, formally at least, into a single framework, thus conceivably creating new, wider-ranging possibilities. (Penninx and Martiniello 2004, 159)

Thus, in multilevel systems, the decisions of one level of government have both intended and unintended consequences for other levels of government and for cities’ ability to contribute to ethnocultural harmony. Furthermore, approaches to immigrant incorporation and other policies related to ethnic and nationalist politics can be at odds with different ethnic relations models operating at other levels.

**Concluding Thoughts on the Purpose of This Volume**

Traditionally, case study methodology has been the dominant approach to the study of cities. In the last decade, urban research has become more comparative and, in North America, where this volume has been published, there have been calls to link urban research to theoretical frameworks and developments in the mainstream of various disciplines (See Pierre 2005; Sapotichne, Jones, and Wolfe 2007; Eidelman and Taylor 2010). Most of the comparative studies that have emerged are limited to comparisons of cities in the global North. Essentially, there has been an implicit preference in much of the literature for the “most similar systems” design whereby the
researcher selects highly similar cases that are characterized by variation in the dependent variable in question. The idea is that the researcher can “control” for all of the similarities in the cases and explain the variation in values of the dependent variable by examining the remaining differences among cases. In the discipline of urban political science and other related disciplines, this design is the dominant one. In fact, in classic articles defining the comparative method, subnational, or “intr Nation” comparisons have been presented as useful applications of the most similar systems designs (Lijphart 1971). In many ways, the study of urban politics is a natural fit with such a design. Examining how city contexts vary can be an important strategy for studying multilevel governance processes by controlling for national, and, in the case of federations, the subunit level policies and other factors common to the country.

As this volume makes clear, a common structural force – globalization – is affecting cities in very different national and regional contexts. Furthermore, a fundamental idea underlying the literature on global cities is that the fates of cities that have been differently integrated into the global economy are disconnected to a certain extent from their national contexts. In our view, these empirically documented developments invite consideration of the other major option for comparative research designs – to select cases that are different or to employ the “most different systems design.” With this design, the researcher adopts the opposite strategy, choosing cases that are very different and that share similar values on dependent variables. In other words, in this design, cases are similar in some respects or have changed in similar ways despite their very different contexts. Furthermore, due to the very different contexts, the similarities stand out.

Although rarely employed in the discipline of urban political science, this design is the implicit organizing principle of some of the comparative interdisciplinary “world cities” research that employs small- \( n \) comparative rather than large- \( n \), statistical research designs. For instance, in her seminal work, *The Global City*, sociologist Sassen (1991) traces similar processes of change in three very different cities – New York, London, and Tokyo – to offer a theory of how globalization is changing major cities in the world. Although, like Sassen’s classic work, this early world city literature compares across continents, it notably neglected cities in the global South. To a certain extent, this gap is understandable, as one might argue that the most powerful world cities exist in the global North. However, many of the megacities, metropolitan places of ten million or more residents, exist in Asia – a reality that we can no longer overlook. World city researchers Neil Brenner and
Roger Keil note in their *Global Cities Reader* that, although studies on cities in the global South now exist, including this broader range of cities required abandoning the theoretical goal of identifying “a particular type of urban agglomeration under contemporary capitalism.” Rather, global city theory “is instead increasingly mobilized in order to decipher the globalization of urban development throughout the contemporary world system,” a development that will lead to a “more nuanced mapping of the global urban system” (Brenner and Keil 2006, 192).

The most fundamental contention of this volume is that cities are becoming not only the strategic sites of economic globalization but also the places where new challenges of ethnic relations emerge. We believe that in a world being transformed by global forces, examining ethnic relations in a variety of cities in the global North and South will yield generalizations about forces that contribute to ethnic harmony and conflict. As our framework implies, local contexts that reflect prevailing ethnic configurations and institutions play a crucial part in determining how globalizing pressures influence group relations. Understanding the place-specific impact of broadly encompassing macro-level forces like globalization necessarily requires us to take the distinctive demographic and institutional complexity of cities into careful consideration.

Notes
1 The estimated figure of international migrants in 2010 was 214 million, a figure that will increase to as many as 405 million by 2050 should current trends continue (IOM 2010, 3, 115).
2 Some countries, such as India, are among both the top ten most significant hosts of immigrants and produce the most significant numbers of emigrants (IOM 2010, 115, 117).
3 Intracontinental dynamics are particularly important to the African migration experience. As the International Organization for Migration (2010) notes: “With the exception of North Africa, intraregional migration represents the most common form of migration, accounting for almost three quarters of migration outflows from East, Central and West Africa” (IOM 2010, 127-28).
4 Acknowledging that it is impossible to summarize the multitude of forms that multicultural diversity takes, philosopher Will Kymlicka notes three general trends within democracies in the global North that characterize the approaches and goals of Western states to diversity. First, there has been a reversal of policies to assimilate indigenous peoples and a movement toward policies that embrace the idea that “indigenous peoples will exist into the indefinite future as distinct societies within the larger country, and that they must have the land claims, cultural rights, and self-government rights, needed to sustain themselves as distinct societies” (Kymlicka
2007, 67). The second trend concerns a similar recognition that substate “national groups” such as the Québécois in Canada, Catalans and Basques in Spain, and the Flemish in Belgium, will endure and, therefore, accommodation often occurs through multinational federalism and the official recognition of minority languages (ibid., 69). Finally, in traditional countries of immigration such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, there has been a trend toward the adoption of race neutral immigration policies and a greater level of religious diversity among immigrants. Furthermore, with this greater diversity has come a recognition that the state ought to accommodate difference although the extent to which this has been done varies. “Multicultural policies” have become widespread, although the extent to which countries and even jurisdictions within countries have adopted them varies substantially.

For instance, the City of Mississauga, Canada’s largest suburb located just west of the City of Toronto, has been unresponsive to immigrants even though its population is more than 50 percent foreign born (Good 2009).

As Sassen (2006, 7) points out, rates of poverty can increase nationally while more wealth is generated in particular cities. This implies that to understand the implications of globalization for countries, one must “unpack” them and examine place-specific development indicators within countries.

Works Cited