

LOCATING GLOBAL ORDER

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American Power and Canadian Security after 9/11

Edited by Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox



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Preface

BRUNO CHARBONNEAU AND WAYNE S. COX

This book began in the spring of 2007 when invitations were sent out to participate in a round-table discussion on Canadian security following 9/11. After the tragic events of 11 September 2001, claims about the rapidly changing nature of the international security environment and associated calls to wage war on “global terror,” to promote democracy, and to liberate Afghan women were prominent and very often taken for granted. After the March 2003 American invasion of Iraq, such claims and calls became more and more the target of criticism and subjected to academic and political debates. In Canada, these debates took what seemed like an unprecedented turn when the Canadian government decided to send troops to war in Afghanistan in February 2006. The debates, but also the practical difficulties, surrounding the Canadian mission in Afghanistan were signs to us that it was more than time to discuss, reassess, and re-evaluate Canada’s global policies and its role in the post-9/11 world order, notably in the context of arguments about American power, hegemony, and imperialism.

Hence, in March 2008, Bruno hosted a group session at Laurentian University (Sudbury, Ontario). The event brought together Canadian scholars of different disciplines (mostly political science but also from geography, sociology, and criminology), members of the Canadian Armed Forces, officials of the City of Greater Sudbury responsible for municipal security and emergency measures, and local members of the War Resisters and the

Against War and Occupation associations. The discussions focused on Canadian security, but broadly understood in order to include various issues and experiences: the war in Afghanistan, American power, practices of security within Canada, municipal aspects of security, gendered security, geographies of security, and the relationship between security and development. Although the focus on security never disappeared, what became more apparent as the discussions progressed was that all issues converged around the location and role of Canada within a global order largely defined by, but not limited to, American power. It seemed obvious that there was a need for a collected volume on Canada's role in the current global order, and despite individual examinations of different case studies and topics, many common threads tie them together. What became clearer in the following months as we edited, commented, and engaged with each chapter was that they all spoke of different experiences and location of political order, but that no single experience or location seemed to be greater than the other, or more important, and thus that they converged in a better and larger understanding of what is commonly referred to as global order. This is the final product of multiple perspectives and understandings of that order and the location of Canada and Canadians within it.

This book, of course, would not have been possible without the help and support of many people. First and foremost, we must acknowledge and be grateful for the financial support of Laurentian University – notably from the Research, Development and Creativity office and the dean of Social Sciences and Humanities – and of Queen's Centre for International Relations, which were crucial to the publication of our manuscript. We also want to thank all of our contributors, who fully engaged with our editorial comments and questions, always responded to our last-minute enquiries or demands, and thus fully contributed to make this collection better than the sum of its parts. Bruno is most grateful to his students and colleagues at Laurentian University who helped in one way or another, notably Daniel Mayer (a Laurentian University 2008 graduate, now studying law at McGill University), whose efforts and dedication made everything more manageable and efficient; Bob Segsworth of the Department of Political Science, whose unwavering support and friendship proved indispensable; and William Crumplin of the Department of Geography, whose organizational experience, help, and friendship were vital throughout. Wayne would like to thank Siobhan Byrne for her advice and support on our attempted trip to Sudbury, Kathleen Rühland for her editorial advice, and Bruno for his patience in dealing with a co-editor whose schedule and commitments over

the past two years have been frustrating, to say the least. It should also be mentioned that the true friendship and support of John Sjolander over the years have been on the minds and in the hearts of many of the contributors to this book throughout the process. We also want to acknowledge the financial support of the Security and Defence Forum at the Department of National Defence, Laurentian University, and the Greater City of Sudbury for the round-table phase of this project. Last but not least, we want to thank Emily Andrew and her team at UBC Press, notably Ann Macklem, for their work, patience, support, and help throughout.

LOCATING GLOBAL ORDER

Introduction

Locating Global Order

BRUNO CHARBONNEAU AND WAYNE S. COX

For many Americans and others around the world, the events of 11 September 2001 radically transformed the ways in which they viewed international politics. The tragic events brought home a realization that defining the key global players, finding a consensus over “national security” threats and issues, and searching for the ends and means of security policies are far more complex problems than they are in a world system composed mostly of self-interested state actors. For many, the international security environment had shifted fundamentally. Threats such as al-Qaeda had become ubiquitous and vaguely identified as a global terrorist network. Linked to the threat of global terrorism was the perception that past failures and mismanagement of (in)security and (under)development in various areas of the globe had contributed to terrorism. These sites were largely identified as problems of “failed and fragile” states that represented challenges to international stability. Such states could exacerbate the terrorist problem, some argued, and thus translate into more terrorist attacks on Western interests and populations. The events of 9/11 accelerated the trend of the 1990s toward more rigorous military missions of nation-, state-, and/or peace-building (Baranyi 2008), and the decline of Western contributions to United Nations operations (Bellamy and Williams 2009) – two trends that culminated in the forceful US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. For many others, however, especially for those in the “ungoverned spaces” of marginalized people, 9/11 did not signify as much or translate to any dramatic change of

global or local conditions. For many outside the United States and the developed West (and even for some inside it), the events of 9/11 were a symbolic marker of change rather than a tangible and radical transformation of the world itself. Certainly, the long-term structural and deep-rooted dynamics of contemporary political life had not changed overnight. Nevertheless, 9/11 provoked almost everywhere numerous academic and political debates about the present form of world order, as well as about the direction that this order should take in the future. For example, much was written on whether the United States should use its position as the sole global military superpower to establish an empire (or a neo-trusteeship international system) for the sake of order, stability, prosperity, and peace that can be shared by all (for example, Ferguson 2004; Ignatieff 2003).

Regardless of the specific form these debates took, the concept of political order itself was generally assumed to be organized as a hierarchy of power relations with actors such as the state and international institutions situated at the top, and individuals and social groups at the bottom. Within this mindset, a strong, powerful, and determined empire seemed like a reasonable solution, since it could *impose* order on those unreasonable, barbarian, and uncivilized people of the world who promote or tolerate the presence of terrorism. Even cosmopolitan views suggested that a benign worldwide state (of sort) could impose order, peace, and/or other ideals on all peoples. Put differently, whether it was the imperial state or the state writ large (world government) that was argued to be the solution to the post-9/11 era, the character and the location of the political were assumed to be known. Presumably, the location of contemporary political life was undisputable and thus marked the legitimate sites of political action. However, these simplistic and outdated views of politics, political life, and political order cannot, we suggest, capture fully the diffuse nature of relations within the post-9/11 world.

This book is designed to demonstrate and emphasize the increasing significance of uncertainties about the location of contemporary political life by engaging with the always double reciprocity between local and global practices. It interrogates the relationship between politics and location in order to problematize a range of powerful normative claims about where politics ought to be occurring, and about where contemporary global order is supposed to be found. Global order, we argue, is complex, multi-layered, and multi-faceted; often perceived to be highly centralized and hierarchical; always in the process of being imposed and reproduced; and always in the process of being contested, challenged, and negotiated. Global order is located

in diverse spaces, including traditional and accepted sites of governance (various state bureaucracies, national and international institutions and organizations, and so on) and, crucially but often forgotten or invisible, in a multitude of sometimes overlapping new spaces, unseen connections, and/or taken-for-granted everyday routines. For many within a post-9/11 world, the practices of social relations that witness the real consequences of changing sociopolitical circumstances are as often rooted in the local as they are rooted in the global. Both these seen and unseen local-global connections are at the centre of the book's chapters. The case-study chapters in this book are not simply the stories of those who are dominated by a centralized world order, but are included as the unfolding of the construction and workings of local/global order itself. As such, the politics of global order is not just the use of power over the governed or over ungoverned spaces and peoples of the world but, rather, the interrelationship between the two. As Samuel Kim (1984, 54-55) put it: "We should not deny the power of the global dominance system with its self-repairing and self-regenerating capacity, but we must avoid exaggerating the power of the strong and underplaying the power of the weak in contemporary global politics. Great historical transformations are often wrought by those dismissed as marginal and powerless." On the streets of Canada and the United States, there are many who have been profoundly affected by changes in our collective understanding(s) of what security is or what ought to be done about it. With regard to the war in Afghanistan, for instance, what should be done (or not) and what we should think about it have become serious questions for all to consider (or not). But these same people affected by such changes and on which global order is in the process of being imposed are a very part of our collective understanding of what security is, who it ought to be for, what we ought to do about it, and so on. As such, they are a very part of the construction and legitimization of that order – of collective understandings of security, democracy, and the location of political life. Whether you are a Muslim woman from Ontario, a Republican from New York, Sunni from Baghdad, or Pashtun from Kandahar, you can be and often are affected by changes in world order and national security policies. Your individual and/or collective decisions to be supportive, indifferent, or even hostile toward the post-9/11 global security order are a very part of that order itself. To explore where such decisions and actions are taking place is to explore the new ways in which understandings of global order, security, and political community are produced or reproduced.

The core objective of this book is to open the debate and sustain discussion about the significance of the relationship between politics and location,

notably in the specific Canadian context. Instead of taking the international system and the state for granted, we assume that the dynamics of the various relationships within local order *and* between local order(s) and global order are always contingent, negotiable, contested, and internationalized. In other words, neither the local nor the global is conceivable without the other. As editors, we would not presume to assign primacy to either. Furthermore, this book examines the relationship between politics and location as it is expressed in contemporary debates about security. Security is one of the key locations where lines are drawn and boundaries are established to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate political space and practice. Of course, one book cannot possibly provide a comprehensive account of the multiple dimensions and interpretations of global order or how different people and collective actors respond to it, build it, or (re)produce it. Specifically then, this book examines the location of Canadian politics of security within a global order built on and around the pre-eminence of American power, especially since the end of the Cold War and after 9/11. One of the core assumptions of many chapters is that Canadian security, however defined, can be understood only as a part of larger global and American projects. The American state is central to an increasingly integrated and globalized order, but global order is not exclusive to the American state. In this regard, the Canadian state has been an integral component of American and Western forms of power and order well before 9/11 (see R.W. Cox 2005). Canada is the case study used here in an attempt to locate global order in both time and space. What are the sociological and socio-political processes, practices, and routines of global order? How are they maintained, reformed, and transformed over time? Where are the local and global? Where are the state and civil society? Whose or what order is the Canadian state promoting and for what purpose? In short, how do the Canadian state and its citizens participate, both at home and abroad, in the construction, maintenance, reform, and transformation of a global order that is centred on, but not exclusive to, the American state? Global order, we argue, is produced and located in complex and multiple global-local dynamics. That is, global and local practices are co-constitutive of global order, and we cannot simply assume the relationship between politics and location. Let us first elaborate more on the latter.

Locations of Knowledge: State, Global(ization), Security

R.B.J. Walker (1993) has argued that the contemporary political imagination is largely limited by the twin concerns with the conditions of the possibilities

and necessities within, and with the conditions of possibilities and necessities outside, the sovereign state. These two discourses have worked historically “both individually and collectively, as a regulative idealization of what it means to act individually and collectively as modern subjects and modern subjectivities, under certain conditions and within certain limits” (R.B.J. Walker 2006, 65). Modern politics can thus be interpreted as the histories of crucial locations where lines are drawn between possibility and impossibility, universality and particularity, fragmentation and integration, normality and exceptionality, local and global. As one of the primary sites where such boundaries, borders, and limits are created, the distinction between domestic and international has served to reify the fallacy of the independent sovereign state-actor that seeks to survive and/or to promote its interests under conditions of international anarchy. This line articulates the limits and terms to legitimate political life, but it also identifies two distinctive places of political order: the local, where the state is conceived as central to political order, and the global, where the state manages its relations with other states avoiding or waging war in order to protect the local political order. Local political order is argued to be located exclusively within the physical borders of the sovereign state, to be clearly hierarchical, and to have its line of political illegitimacy marked by authoritarianism (or more recently, one could argue, by non-market-oriented and non-democratic regimes). Global political order is argued to be located outside the borders of the sovereign state, defined as anarchical, and with its line of illegitimacy found in imperialism (R.B.J. Walker 1993, 2006; for examples of the assumptions that Walker deconstructs in the international relations [IR] literature specifically, see Carr 1939/2001; Morgenthau 1973; Waltz 1979; Wendt 1999). Accordingly, post-9/11 political developments led many scholars, analysts, and others to make assertions about new modes of imperial or exceptional politics. Although they have been very helpful in understanding multiple aspects of the post-9/11 order, as R.B.J. Walker argues, the terms “international,” “imperial,” and “exceptional” are not completely persuasive on their own because an understanding of the dynamics of modern politics requires an acknowledgment that these broad concepts are mutually constitutive. For Walker, much of this literature on the international system is conceived “as a matter of fragmentation, of pluralism, of anarchy, of mere order, rather than as a matter of a very specific ordering of the relationship between fragmentation and integration, between pluralism and universalism.” In this context, the sovereign state is an idiosyncrasy, “a mere *polis*,” rather than a unique political ordering of the relationship between the

particular and the universal, between the local and the global (R.B.J. Walker 2006, 65-67).

The theoretical and philosophical problem that Walker identifies is in fact an assumption about, and a practical representation of, the centrality of the state in political affairs and in most analysis and judgment about politics. The opposition made between a local political order and a global political order is essential to disciplines such as international relations, international law, and comparative politics. The state represents the coin where domestic and foreign, local and global are distinguished. This is a form of state-centrism. The traditional understanding of state-centrism is of a perspective (usually associated with the realist school of IR) that focuses on the state as the dominant actor of world politics, conceives of world politics as the relationships between unitary and independent states, associates the state with a specific and limited territory, and construes power as a possession or attribute of unitary state-actors. It can be, however, and it is usually much more. State-centrism is also a philosophical position and a set of assumptions about where politics happens and ought to be occurring. It carries implicit normative claims about the centrality of the state in establishing the location of all legitimate forms of politics, authority, control, and community. As John Agnew puts it:

The dominant Westphalian model of state sovereignty in political geography and international relations theory, named after the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, deficient as it has long been for understanding the realities of politics, is even more inadequate today, not only for ignoring the hierarchy of states and sources of control and authority other than states, but also because of its mistaken emphasis on the geographical expression of that control and authority (under the ambiguous sign of "sovereignty") as invariably and inevitably territorial. (Agnew 2009, 10)

In other words, politics is not necessarily territorialized, contained within national borders, or of the exclusive domain of the state. Agnew argues that the exercise of power and authority is not inherently territorial or state-based. Contrary to theorists of globalization who argue that globalization is eroding state power and authority (or sovereignty), Agnew argues that state sovereignty takes multi-faceted, diverse, and evolving spatial forms that have been made only more complex by the processes of what is called globalization (Agnew 2009). Taking into account non-state actors as they affect the

state is insufficient because this still presumes the location of politics within the state.

The key point is that both an implicit and an explicit state-centrism translate into an undertheorized understanding of the meanings and effects of location on politics and of location on knowledge about politics. This has significant practical, policy, and theoretical consequences that underline the close connection between the production of knowledge and power. Conceptions of state and state security are intimately tied to conceptions of legitimate knowledge. Certainly, state-centric perspectives embody a particular set of assumptions about legitimate knowledge, not the least about where such legitimate knowledge comes from. In fact, knowledge itself is a function of its location, and it is modified as it circulates (Agnew 2007). Timothy Mitchell, for example, has argued that the elusiveness of the boundaries that separate the state from society should be explored as a clue to the nature of the state, and not as a need for sharper definitions. The appearance that the state is a separate thing from society is one of the important ways in which social and political order is maintained. That is, the state boundary does not mark the limit of political processes of regulation, but “is itself a product of these processes” (Mitchell 1991, 90). Mitchell does not argue that the state-society distinction should not be taken seriously. On the contrary, he argues, the state is largely an effect of “detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society. The essence of modern politics is not policies formed on one side of this division being applied to or shaped by the other, but the producing and reproducing of this line of difference” (95). Consequently, implicit claims about the location of world politics, political order, and security have important ontological effects.

Debates about security are significant expressions of how lines are drawn in modern political life. Indeed, it is constructive to reflect on the extent to which thinking about security generally, and Canadian security particularly, has come to depend on distinct categories of space, geography, and location. No matter how vague the concepts of state and security are, in fact partly because of the ambiguity, they work together to establish the legitimate location of security policy making. Security is a matter of the state (or of bureaucratic elites) for the protection of the state. As such, the state does not only claim its monopoly on the use of legitimate violence but its monopoly on the location and character of political activity. Security is premised

on a sharp distinction between inside and outside (R.B.J. Walker 1993), which allows us to think of security in terms of securing the Canadian territorial state against the outside, but also to describe Canadian security in terms of North American, northern Atlantic, or Western alliances and cooperation to guard against “global” threats. This flexibility in defining and redefining the inside and the outside is the matter of modern politics, but it is obscured by state-centrism. By identifying the state as the exclusive location of modern politics, a normative judgment is made as to where political activity (relating to security or other) can occur and ought to occur, and where it cannot occur.

Terms such as “global security,” “international stability,” “global terrorism,” and “global war on terror” have relocated the problem and politics of security. Since 9/11 in particular, but going back to at least the late 1980s, governments, their various security agencies, and most security experts and think tanks have periodically repeated that the globalization of threats requires the globalization of security – the global war on terror being only the quintessential example. Such statements have an explicit ideological role by offering a global-scale conception of problems and solutions and by depicting multiple experiences as universal. Hence, local preoccupations, problems, and solutions are conceived as of secondary importance. State, politics, and security are assumed to be located elsewhere, somewhere, in the “global” space. Such movements between national and global space of security mask the fragmentation and inequality on which traditional assumptions about location and politics are based and conceived. Such movements are reflected in knowledge practices that obscure the observable processes, routines, and practices of global order that are often found in a specific locale, in the day-to-day experiences of “ordinary” people, and in taken-as-given assumptions about the role and place of the local community in the world. This is not to argue that better and more coherent policies are not needed. They are, and badly so, but so are fundamental questions about the location and meaning of politics, democracy, and security.

What and Where Is Global Order?

The global order that leaders such as George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Stephen Harper, Tony Blair, Nicolas Sarkozy, and many traditions of academic and policy analysis usually present to the public is one defined implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) in self-interested terms. Global “order” is understood as ideally static. It is often synonymous with “international stability” and sometimes associated with ideas of progress, but it is always a

specific arrangement of theoretically equal, but practically unequal, sovereign states. For the most part, peace and prosperity are best kept within this order if it is not disturbed or changed. In short, global order is a thing to accept, favour, protect, and idealize. In policy terms, such order means promoting the status quo because it presents the given order as the natural order, thus limiting political discourse and possibilities. Many scholars have exposed the knowledge practices found in IR theory that participate in giving credence to such an understanding of the world. Discussing “the workings of theoretical discourse on the anarchy problematique,” Richard Ashley (1988, 228, emphasis in original) argues that it is “an arbitrary political construction that is always in the process of being imposed (229).” According to Ashley, the assumption about the anarchical nature of global order, however, must find the sovereign state as an essential, unquestioned, and indisputable ideological foundation of global order that implies an unproblematic hierarchical opposition between the local and global, despite that both the state and global order are “intrinsically contested, always ambiguous, never completed construct[s]” (231). So from this perspective, global order is something that must be *maintained*. The rhetoric of order and stability is invoked to legitimize and authorize the maintenance of existing conditions. The key objective of the policy makers and scholars who adopt this position is defensive and preventive. They work to defend and prevent against the breakdown of existing political processes and patterns, and they guard against disruption and rapid change. Marginal accommodations can be allowed, and sometimes are essential, but only to preserve the status quo. Global order is a world of states where war is inevitable, but where war must be avoided through the management of (in)stability.

Global order can also be understood as governance. Students and proponents of global governance embrace the view that global order can be *reformed*. Reformers seek a more efficient, coherent, and sometimes equitable management of world politics and the world economy. This second perspective does not seek to transform the states system. The legitimacy and authority of the Westphalian state model is not challenged but, rather, in need of reform in light of globalization, complex interdependence, and new technologies. Proposals are often limited to interstate social and political justice and economic well-being. Overall, reforms aim at greater international cooperation around the UN system and/or better international financial institutions. Crisis management capacity will be created or improved at the UN or through cooperation between UN and regional organizations such as the European Union in order to contain, prevent, and resolve conflicts, but

it will not challenge the existence and necessity of the state as the space for the legitimate political community (see the practice of peace- and state-building). The 2008-09 economic crisis will bring institutional reforms, but it will likely not bring down global capitalism anytime soon. The most ardent proponents of global governance might call for some form of cosmopolitanism or world government, but such pleas embody the traditional spatial imagery in a state writ large (world government) and do not question the capitalist foundations of the world economy.

Better policies and management, and greater coherence and cooperation are certainly needed, but for others they are not sufficient. A third perspective challenges the legitimacy and viability of global order and presents alternative visions to *transform* the Westphalian framework. Global problems such as nuclear proliferation, climate change, ecological disasters, global economic and food crises, war and conflict, and so on underline how the current global order does not meet minimal requirements of human decency and survival. Strong critiques of the ways in which existing institutions reproduce structures of violence, death, and injustice are voiced and lead to social movements for fundamental transformations in the political, economic, and cultural contemporary structures. The essence and location of political life is questioned, and new spaces for political activity are generated. While it is far from clear on what grounds transformation is possible or even thinkable, proponents of transformation interrogate the fundamental assumptions about the meanings of being human and political community. They raise destabilizing questions and dispute the clichés about politics, democracy, community, order, security, globality, locality, and so on.¹

In practice, these three perspectives of global order often overlap in local practices and reflect the daily dynamics of global order. In attempts and interactions to maintain, reform, and transform global order, we find the location of politics. The global-local nexus is complex and, more importantly, its lines are periodically redrawn. In this context of ever-contested and ever-changing conditions, the challenging questions about power and authority are located in the continuous interplay of the discourses that construe the lines and limits of political life, and of the individual and collective actions that put these boundaries into practice and/or create them through practice. The authorization of authority (the process by which one is given the authority to decide) is thus a crucial political moment about where and when to draw or to cross the line of political legitimacy. To distinguish between the local and the global is to make a claim about and for political authority, and about who decides the limitations of political life. Indeed, if we

assume that, first, “it is a central feature of modern political life that neither the sovereign state nor the system of sovereign states can exist without the other” (R.B.J. Walker 2006, 68) and second, that local-global dynamics are contingent, contested, and never-ending projects, we must also presume that it often proves very difficult to tell a priori *when* and especially *where* the politics of authorization of authority will take place.

Arguably then, an examination of local practices should be as important to IR scholarship as an examination of the practices of the “major actors” (states, international institutions, and so on). This is so because the construction and reproduction of power relations is often taken-for-granted in a state-centred assessment of “the world as it is.” In doing so, the statist analysis draws on the lines of political legitimacy, and that line does not allow for a serious examination of the local sources of legitimacy/dissidence to be considered. Global order is the sum total of a set of historically conditioned interrelationships within and between local communities, states, and the international system. The current global order is the end product of everything that has come before it, and its current configuration can change just as quickly and easily as changes have occurred to it in the past – if not sooner with the advent of globalization and its seeming ability to accelerate time and decompress space.

Our understanding of global order does not oppose the local to the global, does not find global order in a single actor, state, or institution, nor does it fix global order in time and space. It does not advocate, therefore, its maintenance, reform, or transformation. It does, however, problematize global order, meaning that it calls for historicizing the “processes of empowerment” and the “processes of marginalization”; how did we get here? Being in a constant state of flux, global order has to be located in a political *moment* and *place*. When and where its underlying hegemonic ideas and practices about the norms and rules of normal behaviour and relationships are accepted as legitimate and unquestionable, everyday practice is no longer a matter of politics and political order but only of rational technique, management, and problem-solving. When and where it is contested and faces the challenges of local order(s), actors, and their practices, we find politics – that is, attempts at maintaining, redefining, changing, or abolishing completely the norms and rules and the structures of power relations of the current global order. Global order is always negotiable, in the process of being en/forced, and thus, to appropriate Robert Cox’s popular formulation about theory, we can also say that global order is always “for someone and for some purpose” (R.W. Cox 1981, 128, emphasis in original). Global order

can only be partially defined, as it is always contested somewhere at some point in time, and thus always in the process of being (re)produced and imposed. Indeed, it is very often in the routine interaction of contestation to order and resistance to change that we observe the mechanisms, processes, and routines of order, power, and authority. We witness change, transformation, and/or reproduction when and where order is contested in one form or another. Nevertheless, as the events of 9/11 and their aftermath showed, both acquiescence and contestation can live together at the same time and in the same place. In fact, both can, and often do, feed off each other.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, for instance, the Bush administration used the terrorist attacks to call on all “real” American patriots to unite behind their government by quietly getting on with their day-to-day lives: by working, going to movies, spending time with their families, or by shopping. The delineation between those who accepted and those who did not accept this order was quite stark indeed. We were all told that you are either with “us,” or you are with the “terrorists.” Acts of contestation, both the reprehensible terrorist attacks and the open questioning of the policies of the American government by courageous Americans who were uncomfortable with the notion that they should hand their government a blank cheque in fighting the war on terror were helpful in strengthening this particular government and the ideologies it represented. Put another way, our starting point is that neither local order(s) nor global order can exist without the other: they are inextricably linked and ever evolving. We reject claims that there is a local political order that should be protected against an anarchic global political (dis)order. But how such lines and distinctions are established and enabled must also be studied. Instability and chaos may be out there, somewhere or elsewhere, but they can just as easily be in here too. In fact, the lines distinguishing local and global order are rarely where they are supposed to be.

This is not to argue that there are no conflict zones that can affect surrounding regions and beyond, nor that there are no threats to be found inside, but simply that the state-centric logic is the wrong starting point from which to think about conflict or order. Our starting point here is that global chaos and global order are, in large part, social constructions that have been assigned primacy to either the local or the global depending on a given scholar’s theoretical defaults. We view this as problematic in the sense that the dominant lenses, in IR at least, assume that chaos and instability come from the outside (or from the Other inside), and as such, most security analyses since 9/11 have been fixated on externalizing and demonizing

challenges to the status quo global order. This tendency makes it almost impossible to see both the local contributions to the construction of global order itself and, likewise, the effects that changes to global order have on local communities. So our starting point here is one that rejects the state-centric logic and its consequent inside/outside logic of most IR theorizing, and that believes global order is built out of both local and global conditions. Such a starting point has an enormous impact on our understanding of global politics because it means that global order is not necessarily located where we usually expect it to be. It is often in locally situated practices (wherever they are) that we find a significant place where necessary elements of state power and global order are produced and reproduced. These local orders can be distinguished according to the degree to which they accept and/or contest global order. As the chapters in this book demonstrate, it is often in global order that many local and national practices find political authority and legitimacy. But the reverse seems as true and as important: global order finds authority and legitimacy in local and national practices. The chapters that follow are designed specifically to display the extent to which such an understanding of how global order is constructed can influence research on security and foreign policy through the case of Canada and its role in global order.

Canada and Global Order

It seems almost intuitive that Canada's role within global order, especially in regard to issues of security, is inextricably linked to its relationship to the United States. This is mostly because of commonsense assumptions about shared interests and values that were construed and reinforced by joint experiences during the Second World War, increasing governmental cooperation and economic integration during the Cold War, and the perceived sole superpower status of the United States in the post-Cold War era, especially after 9/11. Although the United States is clearly a dominant state actor in world politics, the notions of its "actorness" and of its dominance are partially misleading. It is true that the American state has pre-eminent power and influence by comparison to other states in the international system, but the first notion oversimplifies the character of American power, which leads to the second notion that obscures how American power and influence are always in the process of being challenged and resisted. One would be hard-pressed to suggest that the insurgents in Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan, or other groups prone to the use of force do not present a challenge to American power. There are countless others within the United States itself, within

other Western liberal societies, and around the world who use whatever means are available to identify, politicize, and coordinate social and political challenges to American power and influence. If the world were one of black and white (of “us” or the “terrorists”), these groups would have no choice but to be sided with the terrorists. Outside the apex of Western power and societies, there are many more who are increasingly uncomfortable with the seemingly uncontested nature of American power and influence in world politics, a fact exacerbated by the often racial, religious, and civilizational nature of the public discourse about the “enemy” in the aftermath of 9/11. For instance, although many Muslims do not associate themselves or even sympathize with populous Western definitions of jihad, fundamentalism, or the use of terrorism, many are extremely uneasy about the use of stereotypes and profiling in the rhetoric about the current war on terror. This nervousness is shared by other non-Muslim groups that find themselves on the outside of the Western “we.” This, we argue, is highly problematic from the perspective of attempting to gain full insight into the social and political basis of power within global order. For the Canadian state at least, and for many Canadians, the role Canada plays within global order is clearly tied to its relationship with the United States, though it is not exclusive to this bilateral relationship. How individuals and groups within Canadian civil society experience the consequences of Canada-US security policies is a very part of the symbiotic relationships that make this order, and the power that sustains it. By virtue of Canada’s historically conditioned social and political interrelationships with American state and society, and by virtue of Canada’s geographic location, Canada’s role within global order is at least partly defined by our integration within American society *and* their integration within our own.

However, the concept of the state-actor is based on a form of anthropomorphism that establishes and enables the Canadian state as an “actor” and the American state as a dominant “player” within global order. The actor status awarded to the state gives it individual characteristics, qualities, needs, interests, and so on. It is largely a theoretical construct, but one based on significant political and social practices that have important ontological effects. For example, the practices of “national security” rely on the territorialized understanding of power, authority, community, and security. The state represents the spaces in which identity and social mobilization are assumed to happen, and where the preferred identity is most often the nation group. Social practice and social identity being thus territorialized, national security is largely based on an imagined geography that can be deployed

to authorize security practices that claim to protect the nation group. Put another way, the state-actor concept assumes, produces, and reproduces the common assumption of a symmetry between the space of authority, power, and politics (or sovereignty) and the space of collective identity. Physical, political, economic, and social spaces are understood to coincide naturally with state territory and state sovereignty (for instance Agnew 2009; Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Gregory 2004).

The increasing and globalized connections between Canadians and between Canadian and non-Canadian groups, actors, and various social forces are increasingly indicative of the uncertainties about the location of political life. The imagined geographies that underlie many of the assumptions of state-based national security policies are continuously challenged by the rising number of relationships and practices of sovereignty that transcend the territory of the state. In Canada, a key aspect of the imagined geography has been the notion of Canada as the site of a multicultural society. Multiculturalism reflects a partial truth about Canadian society, but it is also both a knowledge assertion claiming the existence and uniqueness of Canadian society (an exercise in nation-building) and an aspect of state policy. The ideal of multiculturalism serves the construction of a national identity, as it promotes universality of purpose over particularisms (regional, provincial, and other identities). As such, it has often been linked to the ideal and mythology of Canada as the benevolent internationalist power, Canada as the peacekeeper, and Canada as the good international citizen. Both narratives of multiculturalism and of internationalism work politically to produce and reinforce the spaces of security and the spaces of insecurity that justify the practices of national security. They serve many purposes and justify policy by bringing Canada's international "roles" into the day-to-day experiences of many groups and social forces. Hence, threats to the state can be construed as threats to the nation, where practices and practical representations of "national security" symbolize both the territorialized state authority and national identity. Many of the chapters in this book, however, attempt to bring these stories back into a discussion of Canada's role in global order, as these are stories that often rewrite or offer alternative views of Canadian foreign policy.

From a state-centric perspective, much has been written on the Canada-US relationship. For one, the economic relationship has long affected state policy, from the inception of the Canadian state itself in 1867 to the early-twentieth-century debates about reciprocity to resource and military production agreements during the Second World War, and so on, up to our

current position within NAFTA. For the most part, analysts, politicians, and citizens on both sides of the border have viewed the ever-growing economic interrelationship as a mutually beneficial one. Although somewhat less well known than the economic and social interrelationships, there have been parallel military and security arrangements, especially during and since the Second World War. For the most part, this too has been accepted as mutually beneficial within civil societies on both sides of the border. From the early period of Canadian confederation in the late nineteenth century, Canadian security concerns were tied mostly to those of Great Britain. However, by the early twentieth century, and especially by the mid-twentieth century, the notion of continental defence had become a reality for both Canadians and Americans. The need for defence cooperation was partly driven by the shared values of these two societies, both having found themselves heavily involved in largely European conflicts during the world wars (although for different reasons), and both having defined these conflicts in terms of a military struggle to protect shared ways of life. It seemed obvious during and after these two wars that political regimes built on the ideas of national socialism, fascism, and later the totalitarian version of socialism, presented real threats to liberal democracies. This forced politicians and citizens alike, combined with the advent of the technical ability of military forces to project their presence with great speed across oceans and continents, to think of Canadian and American security in unified terms. Defence cooperation during the Second World War simply made *common* sense, and the onset of the Cold War and the realization that the United States would assume a leadership position in the reconstruction of the post-1945 global security order meant that Canada would be integral to that effort.

It is almost ironic then that perhaps the most important role the Canadian state has carved out for itself within the post-Second World War global order has been about differentiating the Canadian role in world politics from that of the United States. The Canada-as-peacekeeper image that was built out of successive (mostly Liberal) governments has been a pillar of Canadian defence and security policy since the late 1950s. Although it is true that the Canadian military was one of the most significant and reliable contributors to UN (and other) peacekeeping missions around the world, these were missions that never required the lion's share of Canadian military resources. Peacekeeping and faith in internationalism have always been popular among Canadians, so much so that in the current era of peace-enforcing and war-fighting missions, Liberal and Conservative governments

have sought to paint all military and security missions in as much of an internationalist or peacekeeping light as possible. It is also true that the Canadian military has been well equipped to perform peacekeeping missions and has more expertise on how to successfully conduct these missions than perhaps any other state, but all through even the heyday of these peacekeeping roles, it was always but a fraction of Canadian military activities. During the Cold War, especially during the United States' Vietnam era, and even into the present, Canada-as-a-good-internationalist-state has been a means through which successive governments could claim to have found a niche for the effective use of military force, and it is a role that has placed the popular understanding of Canada as very different from that of the United States. Canadians could take pride in their identity and in belonging to a state that was well respected internationally as "selfless," making both state and community different from the "self-interested" American state. The internationalist mythology was also one that had great appeal to the various diasporas and ethnic minorities. In other words, Canadian internationalism was good for multiculturalism on the home front. The end of the Cold War brought an end to traditional peacekeeping, though the aspirations and myths of Canadian peacekeeping live on.

For the most part, however, Canadian defence and security policies since the end of the Second World War have been about defence integration within NATO and, more significantly, with the United States. From the early 1950s until the late 1980s, the majority of Canadian war-fighting military capabilities were positioned in Europe and under NATO command. These commitments involved a high degree of defence integration with NATO allies, the US military being the key player in this system. Meanwhile, the notion of continental defence in North America had become institutionalized since the Second World War, and this aspect of Canadian defence was further integrated with the creation of the Pinetree Line, DEW Line, and later NORAD systems of the 1950s. Integrated and shared naval responsibilities on both coasts complemented the air defence systems. By the early 1960s, the integrated command and control systems of the Canada-US defence system meant that, between NATO and NORAD, almost all Canadian national defence was integrated with that of the United States in some way. So effective was this defence integration (perhaps better described as a unified system) that during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, almost all Canadian defence systems were on full-readiness and poised for a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union even before the Canadian government

could meet and decide to place Canadian forces on alert, let alone decide to support the US government. Moreover, as these national defence systems became enmeshed into a single mega-system over the years, a common culture of militarism that held deep-rooted realist assumptions about the role of the state, military power, US hegemony, and the most effective role that the Canadian state should play within it, evolved within both the Canadian and American defence communities. This military subculture within both these civil societies shared an ideational worldview that increasingly thought of national security in continental geographic terms (see Charbonneau and Cox 2008).

The integration of continental and NATO defence systems did not end with the Cold War. The Canadian government continues to be one of the most important and reliable military allies of the United States. Part of this is driven by the very weapons systems that the Canadian military has acquired over time. During the early 1960s, Canadian fighter aircraft were designed to carry US nuclear missiles, and the BOMARC missile defence system in Canada was similarly designed to carry US nuclear warheads. Furthermore, Canadian destroyers and frigates are the only non-American naval ships designed to operate within US carrier and amphibious battle groups, and all Canadian warships are equipped with the same command and control communications systems of US vessels, meaning that Canadians are the only non-Americans regularly allowed to control US ships in combat. This has meant that at the level of operations and logistics, Canadian forces can operate seamlessly with American forces. During the first Gulf War, the NATO mission over Kosovo, Operation Apollo during the invasion of Afghanistan and the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, and now in Afghanistan, the fully integrated nature of these systems has proven useful in multilateral missions.

The political implications of such a degree of defence and security integration have become more significant within the post-9/11 world order. The defence of North America itself has never been a highly controversial issue for most Canadians. With the possible exceptions of cruise missiles in the 1980s and the recent debate over missile defence, cooperation with the United States in continental defence has been widely accepted as natural. This was reinforced by the graphic nature of the 9/11 attacks. The same is not true when it comes to peace-enforcing, US-led alliance-building outside UN or other multilateral frameworks, or bilateral Canadian-American missions. Before Canada's NATO ground mission in Afghanistan, the Canadian

naval role in the war on terror did not generate much debate so long as Canadians could be convinced that this mission was a direct response to 9/11. During Operation Apollo, Canadian naval deployments in the Gulf in support of the US-led mission in Afghanistan were generally deemed to be acceptable. However, as that mission also involved protection and support of American forces destined for Iraq, the political implications of support for such an operation became problematic. There was a realization among citizens and politicians alike that the close working relationship between Canadian and American military forces was not a non-political, natural endeavour (Charbonneau and Cox 2008).

The war in Afghanistan has brought the consequences of Canada-US defence cooperation into the public domain. Although both the Liberal and Conservative governments attempted to highlight the multilateral nature of the NATO effort there and further highlight the humanitarian aspects of the overall campaign, public support for the war has been tepid at best. This might be partly a result of Canadians having difficulty differentiating Canadian objectives in Afghanistan from American ones – some seeing an association between the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (partly because of the Bush administration's insistence that the invasion of Iraq was a second front on the war on terror) – and of many Canadians not seeing the loss of Canadian soldiers as anything other than the consequences of a war-fighting mission. These associations are in stark contrast to the humanitarian-peacekeeping mythology of Canada, a mythology that is still used by Canadian governments through their insistence that the mission in Afghanistan is largely about humanitarianism. If the image of Canada-as-international-peacekeeper was indeed built out of a desire to portray Canada as a selfless international citizen, then fighting an unpopular war with the United States can hardly be sold using the same logic.

An emphasis on state-state relations, while important, can offer only a partial and often biased picture of a larger and complex story. More often than not, state-centric methodologies render invisible or irrelevant local practices where state-centric assumptions about authority, politics, and security are legitimized, challenged, or redefined. The commonsense view of Canada-US defence and security cooperation *is* a political construction, meaning on the one hand that successive Canadian governments over the past fifty years or so have played into the complexities of Canadian civil society and morphed the concepts of internationalism into those of Canadian multiculturalism, and on the other hand that it is a political production in

that the state-sponsored worldview is resisted and challenged by various groups seeking to question or redefine the meanings of being Canadian, of Canadian democracy, of Canadian security, and so on. Critical social movements in Canada represent an amalgam of various groups, such as Muslim women's groups, retired soldiers, Jewish housewives, youth groups, anti-war protesters and war resisters, anti-poverty movements, ecological associations, feminist activists, anti-racism groups, gays and lesbians rights groups, and so on. These social movements, in all their variety and diversity, have been politicized in new ways, and they have created and opened new spaces for political activity. They have challenged and have worked directly or indirectly to define or redefine Canadian society, democracy, and security.² Among other things, it is these stories that this book attempts to integrate into a larger discussion of global order and the Canadian state. These groups, and the new alliances and interests between them, are the stories of both those who are affected by the new global security order on a day-to-day basis and of those who participate in the maintenance, reform, and/or transformation of global order.

Structure of the Book

The chapters that follow are divided into four sections. Each focuses on locating where and how the Canadian state and Canadian citizens promote or participate in the construction of global order. Obviously, given the nature of global order and local orders, each section is not intended to be a hermetically sealed unit. That is, it is only by taking into account all sections as a whole that we can locate global order and Canada's multiple roles in it. The book is also structured around case studies. A case-study approach comes with advantages and disadvantages. Case studies allow us to offer a wide range of themes and diversity. Each case can be explored in detail and offers important empirical material. Moreover, our case-study structure offers a variety of theoretical perspectives that focus on the local, the global, or on their connections, and it also offers numerous contending views about the need to maintain, reform, or transform global order. The case-study structure and the diversity in case studies should also sustain discussion rather than promote specific claims. The most important disadvantages, however, are the obvious absences. Some theoretical perspectives, some regions of the world (Asia in particular), some Canadian actors (provinces especially), and some issues are not presented or addressed. This is partly because of the nature of such a project as ours, partly because of hard

choices we had to make as editors. We can offer only apologies but find comfort in knowing that our readers can find other texts by making good use of our list of references.

Part 1, *American Power and the Location of Global Order*, focuses primarily on the role of the United States within global order. Interpretations of this are diverse and contested, and we do not want to suggest that the two chapters of this section cover it all.³ These chapters focus on the role of American security and militarism in structuring global order. In Chapter 1, “Hegemony, Militarism, and Identity: Locating the United States as the Global Power,” Dan O’Meara discusses the historical evolution of the militarized notion of security within, and projecting outward from, the United States. He argues that, historically, militarized understandings of security have long been a key component of American political culture. This American militarism has been a key part of the establishment of American hegemony in the sense that it has permeated the ways in which the United States has understood itself and the ways in which it has used its power to structure global order. More importantly, O’Meara argues that an analysis of such militarism “involves unpacking the ‘seats of power’ and the roles of ‘authoritative actors’ ... implicated in constructing the webs of meaning underlying such politically charged notions as national security, national identity, and national interest.” The militarized nature of American political culture “embodies a social project understood as an ongoing and highly politicized process of forging support for policies that entail the construction of a particular national identity and form of society, ones that foster some sets of interests over others, and that promote a particular form of global order.” As such, global order and world politics cannot be disconnected from the American state itself, nor from the legitimacy and inspiration it derives from its long internal association with militarism and security. In many ways, O’Meara presents theoretical themes that can be found in many of the remaining chapters in this collection.

In Chapter 2, “The Neoconservative Challenge to Realist Thinking in American Foreign Policy,” Alex Macleod follows with an examination of what the changes in emphasis on security and militarism in the post-9/11 world order have meant for the debates within the discipline of IR. Specifically, Macleod looks at the academic debates within realist theory to examine how they adapted to both the post-9/11 era and the neoconservative challenge. Macleod examines the neoconservative movement within IR theory with an eye to evaluating this movement’s worldview – both in terms of its

application as a matter of practice and as a theory of IR. This notion of Washington's neoconservatives as the practical representation of a particular worldview raises important questions about the relationship between theory and practice in IR, and forces us to consider just how realist or liberal their ideas are.

The remaining sections of this book present a series of case-related chapters divided into sections that use Canada and the changing nature of its security policies as the central case for an examination of the global-local relationship. The second section examines the specific case of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan in order to analyze the political dynamics of how and where Canada participates in the construction of world order, both locally and globally. The third section focuses on how local and national practices and discourses build and/or work with social assumptions and practices of political order and national security. Lastly, the fourth section discusses Canadian policies in Africa in order to analyze how global order is promoted and exported abroad. Given that Canada has found itself heavily involved in the NATO mission in Afghanistan, as well as its historically close security relationship with the United States and its legacy of internationalism, the war in Afghanistan, Canadian responses to 9/11, and the war on terror are common themes throughout this book.

Part 2, *Constructing Global Order at Home and Abroad – The Case of Canada's Mission in Afghanistan*, presents three chapters that examine significant theoretical and practical issues relating to the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. In Chapter 3, "Managing Life in Afghanistan: Canadian Tales of Peace, Security, and Development," Bruno Charbonneau and Geneviève Parent assess the war in Afghanistan in terms of both the role that Canada has played in the global order under US leadership and its consequences for those who experience this war first-hand – that is, the people of Afghanistan. They argue that Canada's peacekeeping role has always been part of a US-led world order but that it has also moved away from the traditional form of UN-mandated peacekeeping, with revealing effects. Although successive Canadian governments have continued to exploit the appeal of Canada's peacekeeper image, Canada has increasingly become an active player in more offensive military operations that are a major component of global order. Canada's traditional peacekeeping role, Charbonneau and Parent argue, has evolved into a much wider project encompassing attempts at democratization, economic development, and the rebuilding of "fragile states." However, given the particular consequences and the human toll in

Afghanistan, Canada's mission suggests that the mix of war-fighting and humanitarianism merged for the purposes of the management of Afghan life. In the name of international stability, Charbonneau and Parent argue, Canada's war in Afghanistan is an attempt to impose global order on Afghans.

In Chapter 4, "Rethinking the Security Imaginary: Canadian Security and the Case of Afghanistan," Kim Richard Nossal examines the shifts in Canada's foreign and security policies in terms of the debates about foreign policy within Canada. Nossal identifies the changes in Canadian foreign policy between 1993 and 2006 to suggest that the socialization process of hegemonic orders does not necessarily flow unidirectionally outward from the hegemon, as suggested by Dan O'Meara, and that in the case of Canada, political leaders were openly encouraging Canadians to rethink American assumptions about world politics and recast the Canadian role in world order based on uniquely Canadian values and assumptions. Nossal is quick to point out that much of this self-congratulatory constructing of Canada as a selfless rather than self-interested state actor was motivated by the domestic politics of the day, but he also emphasizes the differences within various Liberal governments. Regardless of these differences, however, the overall Canadian foreign and security policies were significantly at odds with the orthodox ways in which the United States conceptualized another country's role in world politics. Nossal then proceeds to an assessment of what this has meant for Canada's role within the NATO mission in Afghanistan in order to explain Canadians' tepid support for the war.

In Chapter 5, "Constructions of Nation, Constructions of War: Media Representations of Captain Nichola Goddard," Claire Turenne Sjolander and Kathryn Trevenen take a close look at a specific case. They examine the Canadian media representations of the combat death of Captain Nichola Goddard, killed in Afghanistan in May 2006. Their analysis of these media representations explores how manipulations of gender and the roles of women have been used to shape and limit the parameters of the public debate over Canada's mission in Afghanistan. Goddard was celebrated on the one hand as a gender-neutral soldier and on the other as a textbook peacekeeping soldier. Their analysis is based on more than 250 newspaper articles from major Canadian dailies in the period after Goddard's death. They argue that gender has been used to portray Canada's mission as a war-fighting mission that has underlying humanitarian objectives similar to the motivations of Canada's more traditional peacekeeping mythology. As such, Goddard has been celebrated as a war fighter in the traditionally masculine image, and

as having a compassionate feminine quality that has traditionally been associated with peacekeeping. This representation, they argue, has been sold to an increasingly skeptical Canadian public and has informed the public debates about the war in Afghanistan.

Part 3, *Constructing Global Order at Home: Conceptualizations and Practices of National Security*, examines Canadian security as it is construed and practised at home. The four chapters look at both the efforts to rearticulate and implement security policy in Canada and the effects these efforts have had on various elements of Canadian society. In Chapter 6, "Against National Security: From the Canadian War on Queers to the 'War on Terror,'" Gary Kinsman examines the historical consequences of Canadian practices of national security, as both a social practice and an ideological one. Unlike many scholars who highlight the exceptionalism of the post-9/11 era, Kinsman underlines the continuities of Canadian national security campaigns since the early days of the Cold War. He argues that national security campaigns work to exclude and marginalize the members of Canadian society who are identified as different and thus as possible national security threats to the established order. Through an examination of Canada's war against queers during the early Cold War period, its assault on anti-poverty and anti-globalization groups and other subversives, and its involvement in the recent war on terror, Kinsman argues that Canadian national security campaigns are gendered and Otherizing ways in which the Canadian state defines politically legitimate Canadian identities. As an ideology, national security works to transform into threats identities and communities that challenge the established order, as defined by the Canadian state. And yet, Kinsman argues, the historical record suggests that there are practical strategies for marginalized and repressed groups that have been effective. He calls on these strategies as a way in which queers and other marginalized and/or subversives might be able to resist the dangers that currently exist for them in an era of legal exceptionalism brought on by the war on terror.

Following this, in Chapter 7, "Framing Post-9/11 Security: Tales of State Securitization and of the Experiences of Muslim Communities," Siobhan Byrne looks at the case of Muslim communities in Canada since 9/11 using a feminist framework. She argues that although security policy in Canada since the 9/11 attacks has been devised to increase security for most citizens, the ways and means through which these policies have been put in place have worked to actually increase the insecurity of many other groups and citizens, leaving them more vulnerable to racial profiling, stereotyping,

and acts of intimidation. Byrne provides an analysis of changes in government policy and of media reports to establish how the war-on-terror script of identity construction has portrayed Muslim women as victims of tyrannical regimes and repressive social norms, and how this has been utilized in support of policies that further repress Muslims within Canada. She looks specifically at high-profile cases such as Project Thread and the Maher Arar case to display the extent to which the script of Muslim vilification has real impacts on the lives of Muslim Canadians. Byrne argues that these cases suggest the need to unpack our conceptual understanding of security in the post-9/11 era in order to see how security is both a concept and an operational idea that, if not effectively put into place, serves to systematize marginalization and repression. It is only through this unpacking, she argues, that we can begin to rearticulate security as both a concept and practice that can serve to increase peace and prosperity for all citizens.

In Chapter 8, “Re-Conceptions of National Security in the Age of Terrorism: Implications for Federal Policing in Canada,” Todd Hataley begins by looking at the changing roles of federal policing since 9/11. Hataley suggests that while US domestic security policy has been coordinated through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (for better or worse), the Canadian case is very different, and this comes with very different implications. Hataley suggests that multi-levels of policing in Canada have not been effectively coordinated in their efforts to identify and protect us from threats that emerge domestically, and that this is particularly troubling given that in a state such as Canada, 9/11 and other recent acts of terrorism suggest that the front lines of national security are increasingly found within sovereign states. Given the limited resources and the limited institutional framework for coordination among Canada’s various police forces, Canadian federal police forces and security-related agencies are often dependent on smaller and local police forces to identify, and report on, possible domestic threats. However, many of these smaller forces do not have effective training in place to prepare their officers for such tasks, and if any possible activity is identified, the information and communications systems that will assist in developing appropriate responses to these activities are simply not available.

In Chapter 9, “Biosecurity in Canada and Beyond: Invasions, Imperialisms, and Sovereignty,” Peter Stoett pushes the parameters of the difficulties associated with the local-global divide the furthest. He examines the inherently transnational nature of the global ecology through the concept of biosecurity. Stoett challenges the idea of externalizing environmental threats to

Canada by revealing that invasive species often find their way into Canada's ecology slowly and practically unnoticed, and that oftentimes these threats are more dangerous to Canadian economic and political well-being than are the traditional "foreign" threats found in security studies. As such, Stoett argues, there is a need to reconceptualize the concepts of security and threat beyond the local-global dichotomy, and Canada should develop appropriate multilateral frameworks through which it can play an effective role in devising policies that can deal with the problems of biodiversity, environmental protection, pollution control, and global warming. After providing a detailed assessment of key issue areas and problems associated with biosecurity, Stoett warns of the dire economic and political consequences of our continuance to define and develop security policies in traditional state, local and global narrow ways.

The final section, *Constructing Global Order Abroad: Canada's Policies in Africa*, is composed of three chapters that focus on Canadian foreign and security policy in Africa. They suggest clear linkages between distinctly Canadian values and traditions, and assumptions of global order and the way that Canada conducts itself internationally. In Chapter 10, "Canada, Africa, and 'New' Multilateralisms for Global Governance: Before and After the Harper Regime in Ottawa?" Timothy Shaw uses the case of Canada's interests in Africa to suggest that the past successes enjoyed by Canada as a respected player in multilateral forms of governance have been seriously eroded through the current government's emphasis on mostly military security missions that are primarily driven by a desire to preserve a close working relationship with the United States. Moreover, Canada's valued multilateral tradition is further eroded, or complicated, by the heterogeneous coalitions of state and non-state actors engaged in human development, rights, and security. His analysis of the diversity of global coalitions from the more successful (Kimberley Process, conflict diamonds) to the less successful (small arms and child soldiers) suggests that such global campaigns are really networking for human development, rights, and security. For Canada, such global coalitions represent both opportunity and increasing marginalization. The Kimberley and Ottawa processes showed that Canada can play a leadership role in the creation and management of successful multilateral global coalitions. This, he argues, has allowed Canada to be an effective player in dealing with issues of global security – a humanitarian role that many Canadians are most comfortable with. Although we may lament the impact today of American unilateralism on human security issues such as the International Criminal Court, Canada should already consider

both the interests and impacts of emerging economies such as China and India, and the emergence of larger and more effective “new” multilateralisms for global governance. Shaw concludes that these issues will be of increased significance in a globalizing world order and, thus, he suggests that Canada should use its respected position and expertise to foster successful multilateral forums for global governance.

In keeping with many of the themes presented by Timothy Shaw, in Chapter 11, “Mainstreaming Investment: Foreign and Security Policy Implications of Canadian Extractive Industries in Africa,” David Black and Malcolm Savage examine the specific case of Canadian extractive industries in Africa. They argue that there are significant social and political implications for human security in Africa that come from the activities of Canadian extractive industries. Many of these firms have been implicated either directly or indirectly in numerous conflicts throughout the African continent. The Canadian government and these firms are often in a position to promote change and greatly alter the security of individuals and parties directly involved in these conflicts. Black and Savage, however, highlight the inherent contradictions of Canadian policies toward Africa. On the one hand, Africa has traditionally been considered one of the key areas for Canadian humanitarian and developmental assistance. This has reinforced the idea of Canada as a nurturing and benevolent international citizen and has fit in well with the Canada-as-peacekeeper image that has remained a key pillar of how Canadians define themselves internationally. On the other hand, parts of the Canadian state have provided as much support as possible to promote the activities of Canadian extractive industries in Africa, and much of this activity has been either indirectly or directly linked to many of Africa’s most serious humanitarian crises. This contradiction, Black and Savage argue, needs to be fully understood if we are to effectively examine the roles the Canadian state can play in establishing and supporting the idea of corporate social responsibility. They do so by assessing Canada’s efforts thus far in this process and speculating on what this means for Canada’s role in fostering human security in Africa.

In Chapter 12, “Peace-building between Canadian Values and Local Knowledge: Some Lessons from Timbuktu,” Jonathan Sears examines the specialized role Canada can play in the management and longer-term resolution of conflict in Africa. Specifically, he looks at the peace process in Mali and the role Canada has played in this process. Sears suggests that the only effective and lasting peace is one in which participants in the conflict are brought into the conflict resolution stage and make a contribution to

proposed solutions. This, Sears argues, can be done only with international participation in the case of Africa, given the limited resources and expertise that many fragile African states face. Local knowledge brought together with the expertise and humanitarianism developed in Canadian foreign policy provides Canada with an opportunity to become an effective player in building peace and stability in Africa. Sears argues that this is in Canada's national security interests. He then proceeds to a detailed case study of the process in Mali in the 1990s by highlighting the need for local inclusiveness and the roles multilateral institutions and states such as Canada can play.

Finally, in "Conclusion: Relocating Global Order," we develop further the overall claims of the book. The chapter suggests how the book's contributions open an interesting range of research agendas. We discuss the theoretical and methodological consequences of bringing forward the issue of the relationship between location and politics. The question of location, we argue, highlights the importance of a politics of knowledge, of representations of the intellectual, and of scholars' social and political responsibilities and how they involve difficult matters of judgment.

The sum total of the chapters is presented in such a manner that the reader of the entire collection can see the interrelationships between how security in the post-9/11 global order conditions both the state and the local, and how the local and state condition global order. The earlier chapters, with their emphasis on the international, fit more squarely into the traditional domain of IR, but the book evolves in such a way as to transition itself into the more narrow focus of Canadian foreign policy, and finally into the case material that is often described as comparative politics. These disciplinary divisions, we argue, are arbitrary, and this book serves as a set of case studies to demonstrate how an effective understanding of broad concepts such as security and global order requires a variety of perspectives from a variety of disciplines.

NOTES

- 1 These three perspectives on global order are inspired by Samuel Kim's (1984, 61-68) "Contending Images of World Order."
- 2 For instance, Ann Denholm Crosby (2003) studied the ways in which the group Voice of Women has worked, since the early days of the Cold War, to redefine the meaning of Canadian security. Decades before the Canadian government appropriated the term, Voice of Women promoted the idea of human security to replace the Cold War, state-centred, and machoist views of security. Crosby argues, however,

that the Canadian government interpretation of human security since the 1990s has little resemblance to what Voice of Women promoted for many years.

- 3 On the various interpretations see, for instance, Agnew (2005); Bacevich (2002); Calleo (1987); Carroll (2006); Chomsky (1999); Enloe (1990); Ferguson (2004); Gill (1990); Gowan (1999); Harvey (2003, 2007); Hossein-Zadeh (2006); Johnson (2000, 2004, 2006); Kagan (2004); Kennedy (1988); Keohane (1984); McCormick (1989); Nau (1990); Nye (1991); Robinson (1996); Slotkin (1973); T. Smith (2007).

PART 1

AMERICAN POWER AND THE LOCATION
OF GLOBAL ORDER

1

Hegemony, Militarism, and Identity Locating the United States as the Global Power

DAN O'MEARA

Like the miniskirt, academic fashions come and go.

Seemingly oblivious to theoretical and ideological fault lines, notions of American hegemonic decline were all the rage in the late 1970s and the 1980s (D. Bell 1976; Kennedy 1988; McCormick 1989; Modelski 1978; Rosencrance 1976; Wallerstein 1984). As scholars probed the likely trajectory of global politics “after [US] hegemony” (Calleo 1987; Keohane 1984), a major Hollywood film – *Rising Sun* – echoed predictions of an unprepared America being overwhelmed by a calculating Japanese behemoth (Kearns 1992; Prestowitz 1988; Tolchin and Tolchin 1992). However, this declinism was increasingly challenged as the 1990s progressed (Gill 1990; Nau 1990). Globalization, the dotcom boom, and Asian financial woes seemed to validate claims that American soft power guaranteed decades of US predominance (Nye 1991). The Y2K hysteria notwithstanding, in 2000 the “received opinion” of the Davos global elite held that “no one else could ever catch up” with the United States (Buruma 2008, 127).

George W. Bush’s presidency changed all that. As the forty-third president left office, the United States was widely viewed in the terms that its second president described himself: “obnoxious, suspected and unpopular.”¹ Its belligerent unilateralism, inability to stem Iraqi and Afghani insurgencies, exploding external debt, permanent trade deficits, recurring financial crises, dependence on Asian banks, and insatiable thirst for oil and cheap Chinese manufactured goods all suggest that soft power alone will not suffice: “This

year in Davos, America's fall was on everybody's lips" (Buruma 2008, 126). A newly fashionable declinism focuses on the economic rise of China and India (Emmot 2008; Kagan 2008; Khanna 2008; Leonard 2008). Little in this latest literature on a "post-American world" (Zakaria 2008) explores the "paradox of unparalleled American [military] power and diminished American Hegemony" (McCormick 2005, 75). Such silence is unsurprising: most social science writings strikingly ignore the military's central role in US domestic and foreign politics (Boggs 2005, xxv-xxxvi).

Those texts that do examine contemporary American military power fall into two broad camps. The first reprises Russell Weigley's notion (1973) of an American way of war, one combining the sheer weight of numbers with technologically superior firepower in campaigns of attrition against a usually weaker enemy. Mostly published by American war colleges or associated think tanks, these authors grapple with how the United States might prevail in twenty-first-century armed conflicts.² Ranging from exultant triumphalism (Boot 2003; Cebrowski and Barnett 2003) to qualified pessimism (Gray 2005, 2006), they ignore all non-military practices that generate and sustain this American way of war. On the other hand, echoing yet another past debate, an array of critical texts probes the role of militarism and war in the "American empire."³ However, as I have argued elsewhere, these notions of American empire and imperialism function more as epithets than useful analytical categories:

"American empire" and "US imperialism" ... are concepts rather than ontological realities. Anchored in concrete but bygone historical conjunctures, forms of rule and resistance, cultural practices, and economic and state policies, such concepts reflect particular epistemological strategies whose contemporary validity can most charitably be described as questionable. Thus, whether conceived as "informal" or as decentred or "without an address," notions of American "empire" and US imperialism are, at best, little more than *weak historical analogies* which obfuscate more than they reveal. (O'Meara 2006, 28, emphasis in original)

This chapter explores the ways in which American military practices worked to fashion the post-1945 global hegemonic order. It highlights the role of warfare within long-standing continuities in US public culture, examines the place of militarism in evolving geographies of power, and locates key transition moments in the institutions of American militarism.

American Hegemony

Any discussion of hegemony in global politics must distinguish between three separate aspects. The first is the particular form of power wielded by the sets of social agents collectively known as the hegemon:

Hegemony is the enrollment of others in the exercise of your power by convincing, cajoling and coercing them to believe *that they should want what you want*. Though never complete and often resisted, it represents the binding together of people, objects and institutions around cultural norms and standards that emanate over time and space *from seats of power (that have discrete locations) occupied by authoritative actors*. (Agnew 2005, 1-2, emphasis added)

Among the elements making up hegemonic power, the most significant is the capacity to envelop other agents within an animating myth that frames the hegemon's own particular interests as embodying universal ones (Gramsci 1971, 57-58). Accepting the hegemon's leadership as the least costly means of achieving global stability, other agents come to embrace this animating myth as the only possible way of seeing the world. This underscores, second, the historical conditions, struggles, and alliances giving rise to and reproducing these forms of power and the hegemon's preponderance. Third, hegemonic power induces other agents to collaborate in a global hegemonic order that regulates relations between them and consolidates the interests underpinning the hegemon's power.

Described against the backdrop of collapsing British hegemony, conventional narratives explain the international instability and conflict from 1920 to 1939 in terms of America's refusal to pick up Britain's fallen baton. This misconceives how hegemony is established. Although the United States was indeed the "main pole of attraction for the labor, capital and entrepreneurial resources of the world-economy" (Arrighi 1993, 176) after the First World War, it was not yet a credible global military power. With America's force projection capabilities dwarfed by Britain and France, neither its political class nor broader society had developed a consensus on a global role.

Six factors condensed to alter this. Subsequent changes to any one factor had spillover effects on each of the others and on the US capacity to exercise hegemonic power. First, by 1945, the "systemic chaos" (Arrighi 1993, 151) in the global order had assumed calamitous proportions: two catastrophic wars in thirty years, the collapse of European land empires and imminent

disintegration of the colonial ones, the breakdown of the world market and financial system, and the tide of socialist and nationalist rebellion across Europe and the Third World. Leaders of the vanquished German and Japanese imperial projects and of the wilting European colonial ones all accepted the need for a new global order to reconstruct their economies and repulse the challenge to prevailing property relations.

There was, second, no alternative to American leadership. Their own economy in ruins, the Soviets and their force projection capabilities offered no threat to American dominance. Only its acquisition of nuclear weapons, and more particularly its development in the late 1950s of a ballistic missile capability, enabled Moscow to parody a competition for global power. Absent a countervailing power, the major states (except the USSR and China) acknowledged that embracing US-propagated norms and rules would be easier than pursuing autarky.

Third, the experience of the Second World War finally produced agreement among American elites over the need to exercise global leadership, the multilateral forms this should take, the threat they imagined they confronted, and the budgetary price leadership entailed. This new consensus was predicated both on transforming the employment-focused social alliance underlying President Roosevelt's New Deal into President Truman's "guns and butter" coalition organized around national security, *and* on revising long-standing notions of the role of the military in the American state.

This crucial latter point underscores the unique ways in which power is exercised in the United States. Until the 1940s, the federal government was relatively weak with respect to civil society:

The functionally and geographically divided character of the U.S. government [historically] made American society particularly open to reliance on the market as both model and metaphor. In its seeming passivity relative to society, American government has usually served, except during special periods such as the New Deal in the 1930s, to make possible or give public blessing to private initiatives. The terms public and private have taken on meanings in the United States different from those they had in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In particular, the scope of government action has been restricted to that of either constraining government itself or encouraging private enterprise, *except crucially in relation to "national security."* (Agnew 2005, 57-58, emphasis added)

Fourth, overwhelming American commercial, productive, technological, and financial preponderance enabled Washington to impose the Bretton Woods settlement on its Western allies, punish states that declined to conform, dictate the terms of the integration of emerging states into the global economic order, and oversee its later modifications as European and Japanese reconstruction tempered American primacy.

Fifth, as projected by Hollywood and television, an idealized image of the American way of life – oriented around sassy individualism and levels of consumption unparalleled elsewhere – offered an appealing animating myth of modernity, prosperity, and freedom to exhausted class-ridden western Europe and Japan. With their economies largely reconstructed on American terms, these societies absorbed ever-greater doses of American culture, particularly the cult of the consumer as the basis of social order.

Finally, this reconstruction of international capitalism was conditional on US force project preponderance (Leffler 1992, 15-19). NATO and the American nuclear umbrella provided the allies with multilateral forms of defence more extensive and cheaper than a return to *chacun pour soi*. The global network of US military bases injected significant investment into the host countries, while the presence over sixty years of thousands of American troops in western Europe and Asia had transformative economic and cultural effects on these societies. All of this combined to underwrite the American model of militarized Keynesianism, facilitate growing European economic cooperation, foster cultures of individual consumption, guarantee social control and elite stability in countries with powerful left-wing parties, and sanction states that strayed from the fold (Iran in 1953; Guatemala in 1954; Cuba, 1960; Brazil, 1964; Chile, 1973; and Portugal, 1976).

The vital military component of hegemony involves more than superior force projection capability. As the “imperial’ military educator” (Sokolsky 2002, 211), the hegemon propagates cultural practices that potential competitor states are obliged to emulate or counter (Arrighi 1993, 164). Socialized by the threat discourse of the hegemon’s *security imaginary*, both allies and rivals adopt complementary forms of strategic culture.⁴ Moreover, the hegemon’s model of force design has one of three effects on the armed forces of major and middle powers: (1) they are effectively integrated in the hegemon’s overall force structure and associated political economy (Britain and Canada); (2) they endeavour to retain some strategic independence while adopting a version of the hegemon’s model (France); or (3) they seek to counter the hegemon’s force design (Russia and China). Finally, norm

diffusion is promoted through military exchange programs and the education of allied officers in American military academies. These foster an international "fraternity of the uniform whose purpose is to influence, both collectively and individually, allied policies in directions favorable to the United States" (Sokolsky 2002, 222).

Under US hegemony, the rights and powers of sovereign states have been considerably curtailed (Arrighi 1993, 182). The principal effect has been the successful, if uneven, projection onto much of the planet of a marketplace society hinged on a particular view of state-market relations, and on individual consumption (Agnew 2005). Here I advance the thesis that an essential underlying condition of such hegemony has been *the ways in which a uniquely American form of militarism constitutes an integral part of the evolving cultural and economic practices that propagated, fashioned, and sustained this global hegemonic order*. This chapter examines the evolution of American militarism as a constituent element in a range of cultural practices that I term "Americanism." By the latter I understand a set of so-called authentic values, norms, standards, and representational practices that sustain the public culture and proscribe the limits of what positions, attitudes, and policies can legitimately be adopted in political life.⁵

Americanism and Militarism

Americanism sprang from the fissiparous character of US society and polity. The War of Independence was hardly the act of a unified people. As the thirteen colonies each "traveled its own road to independence" (W.A. Williams 1961/1973, 109), the social composition of each underlay its particular vision of the republic. Dominant elites defined their specific interests and identities in local rather than national terms. Given this local basis of identities, of federal representation and politics, and of the ceaseless culture wars since 1789, Americanism is fruitfully understood as an ongoing discursive strategy to forge an always fragile national identity (D. Campbell 1998). To hold this fragmented and fractious republic together, a narrative of Americanism emerged as a Manichean tale of good and evil, of them and us, of progress, truth, justice, and the American way. Americanism defines national identity, warrants some forms of action, and disqualifies others. Among its constituent elements are particular representations of warfare and an associated set of cultural practices.

I examine these latter elements through the concept of militarism. This term conventionally refers to two linked phenomena: the domination of

public life by a bureaucratized military apparatus and the subsequent ideology promoting the glorification and aggressive use of military force as the principal means by which the political elite should realize its objectives (Bacevich 2005; Hossein-Zadeh 2006, 26; Johnson 2004, 23-24). We conventionally distinguish militaristic societies (pre-1945 Germany and Japan, post-1948 United States) from less militaristic (pre-1945 United States) and non-militaristic ones (Switzerland). However, I use the term in a broader sense, taking “militarism” to comprise the myriad ways in which the specific security imaginary, strategic culture, force design, and military routines and practices of *any* state articulate with broader public and political cultures in the construction of an official national identity – and hence in the definition of and modes of pursuing so-called national interest(s).

Analyzing militarism so defined involves unpacking the “seats of power” and the roles of “authoritative actors” (Agnew 2005, 2) implicated in constructing the webs of meaning underlying such politically charged notions as national security, national identity, and national interest. “Militarism” embodies a social project understood as an ongoing and highly politicized process of forging support for policies that entail the construction of a particular national identity and form of society, ones that foster some sets of interests over others and that promote a particular form of global order.

American Militarism and the Meaning of War

Understanding the role of warfare in American history requires holding in mind a paradox. On the one hand, war and armies have been the “engine of change in North America for the past five centuries” (Anderson and Cayton 2005, xiv). They are “as important as geography, immigration, the growth of business, the separation of powers, the inventiveness of its people, or anything else that contributes strongly to its unique identity among the nations of the Earth” (Perret 1989, 562). Having fought 12 major wars and close to 120 minor ones since 1775, “no nation on Earth has had as much experience of war as the United States ... America’s wars have been like rungs on a ladder by which it rose to greatness” (558).

Although the United States is “a country made by war” (Perret 1989), suspicion of a standing military is deeply rooted in American society and has long been the bane of its generals (Upton 1905/1917, ix). Formalized in Washington’s farewell address, this anti-militarism was best expressed by the principal author of the constitution and fourth president, James Madison:

Of all the enemies of public liberty, war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from those proceed debts and taxes, and debts and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few. In war, too, the discretionary power of the Executive is extended; its influence in dealing out offices, honors, and emoluments is multiplied; and all the means of seducing the minds, are added to those of subduing the force, of the people ... No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare. (Madison 1795/1865, 491)

Millions of Americans remain wary of foreign military entanglements. Their political weight and ability to locate anti-militarism within core American values hobbled the United States in Vietnam. It put an end to conscription, significantly proscribes the range of politically feasible military policies, and is the main reason that, until Korea, all of America's wars were followed by wholesale reduction of its armed forces.

War and militarism are thus omnipresent in the public imagination, both as the engine of national greatness and as the main threat to the values proclaimed by the republic. Exploring how militarism constructs two key elements of Americanism – national identity and geographies of power – the chapter concludes with a discussion of the evolving institutions of American militarism.

Militarism and Identity

The United States was founded in and forged by war. A particular view of when and how it engages in war is anchored in three of its foundation myths. The first, *American exceptionalism*, is “a rags to riches story that focuses on the luck and pluck and not on the stealing and killing entailed in becoming a continental and then a global empire” (Costigliola and Paterson 2004, 12). Exceptionalism holds that “Americans do not fight, therefore, except to fulfill a solemn obligation to defend their own – or others’ – liberty” (Anderson and Cayton 2005, xiii). This was always ambiguous, however. The revolution waged war on empire and tyranny even while the Founding Fathers agreed that they were writing “a constitution to form a great [American] empire” (W.A. Williams 1961/1973, 116). This tension created by warfare being ostensibly conducted against tyranny while deliberately extending American *imperium* and *dominium* has persisted ever since. Even America's most nakedly imperialist wars – the 1775 and 1812 invasions of Canada, Andrew Jackson's wars of annexation in the southeast,

the seizure of half of Mexico in 1846-48, the 1898 grab of Spanish colonies – were all said to have freed the oppressed and expanded the realm of liberty (Anderson and Cayton 2005, 160-273, 317-60). George W. Bush repeated this refrain ad nauseum.

Many American historians see this ambiguous belief in war fought in the name of freedom in order to extend American dominium as the corollary to a second founding myth, *American universalism* (Anderson and Cayton 2005; Carroll 2006; W.A. Williams 1959/1984). This holds that “the ideal of America is the hope of mankind ... the light [that] shines in the darkness” (Bush 2002b). Rooted equally in seventeenth-century puritanism (Stephanson 1996, 3-27) and Locke’s notion of natural man (W.A. Williams 1961/1973, 250), universalism complements a third foundation myth: America’s *manifest destiny* to spread liberty, private property, and the pursuit of individual happiness (Fousek 2000, 5). In the words of President Woodrow Wilson, “Providence and ... divine destiny” have decreed that “we are chosen and prominently chosen to show the way to the nations of the world how they shall walk in the paths of liberty” (Wilson Center n.d.).

Yet, “the Force” of such universalism has a “Dark Side.” Those who resist universalism and manifest destiny oppose both humanity and the logic of providence/history. They are necessarily, as George W. Bush frequently asserted, “the enemies of freedom.” Contest the American definition of freedom as consisting of free markets, property rights, and the rule of law, query the right of the United States to impose its own rules on humanity, and you are no longer a Lockean natural man – thus absolving the United States of the obligation to treat you as such. In 1902, General Robert Hughes justified torturing Filipinos fighting American occupation on the grounds that “these people are not civilized.” Senator Henry Cabot Lodge blamed American “cruelties” on “the war that was waged by the Filipinos themselves, a semi-civilized people, with all the characteristics of Asiatics, with the Asiatic indifference to life, with the Asiatic treachery and the Asiatic cruelty, all tintured and increased by three hundred years of subjection to Spain” (quoted in Kramer 2008, 42-43). Yesterday Filipinos, today “Islamic fundamentalist terrorists” passing through the Phoenix program and Operation Condor; Abu Ghraib is very far from an exception.

These foundation myths themselves rest on a five-step rhetorical elision around difference. First, difference is transformed not just into Otherness but a form of *unbeing* (“these people are not civilized”). Second, such alienated Otherness is securitized as a threat to America and its so-called universal values. Third, since the United States is good, free, brave, and progressive,

this menacing alienated Otherness morphs into the incarnation of evil. It threatens not just American interests but humanity, civilization, and progress. Evil cannot be rendered "good." It can only be rooted out, usually through military action, with the United States in the vanguard of "the Great Cosmic Battle between Good and Evil" (Rediehs 2002, 71). Fourth, such evil, threatening, and alienated Otherness is profoundly racialized. This has a dual aspect. On the one hand, the threatening Other is represented in exaggerated racist stereotypes. On the other hand, those "other" races that ally themselves with the United States are depicted as "good," "loyal," and "plucky." A fundamental trope of the American western (the good Indian versus the bad), this distinction between the faithful and the evil Other is today expressed in distinctions between peaceful Islamic "moderates" bravely resisting evil fundamentalist "fanatics."

Finally, the racialized Other can achieve redemption through embracing American superiority and leadership. Days after Pearl Harbor, the influential *Life* magazine instructed Americans on "how to Tell Japs from Chinese," contrasting the "lighter facial bones" of the former with "squat Mongoloid ... flat, blob nose ... Japs [who] show [the] humorless intensity of ruthless mystics."⁶ A decade later, during the Korean War, these stereotypes were reversed. The Japanese (no longer "Japs") were now loyal allies in a mortal struggle against suddenly "bestial" and evil "Chinks" (no longer Chinese). Japanese culture became exotic and unthreatening difference, while Chinese culture was suddenly fundamentally suspect and threatening. While Hollywood filmed cross-racial love stories between Americans and alluring (and passive) Japanese women, the Chinese were depicted as ugly, conniving, devoid of humanity, and profoundly menacing.⁷

Americanism assumes that "other people cannot *really* solve their problems and improve their lives unless they go about it in the same way as the United States" (W.A. Williams 1959/1984, 13, emphasis in original). From Jefferson's campaigns against "Barbary Pirates" (Naylor 2006) to the invasion of Iraq, war against an alienated, threatening, racialized Other has been represented as being waged on behalf of universal values and human progress. Defending America's brutal war of occupation in the Philippines, President Theodore Roosevelt asserted in 1903 that "our armies do more than bring peace, do more than bring order. They bring freedom ... The warfare that has extended the boundaries of civilization at the expense of barbarism and savagery has been for centuries one of the most potent factors in the progress of humanity" (quoted in Kramer 2008, 43). A century later, George W. Bush insisted that

the United States must defend liberty and justice *because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere* ... America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity; the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property ... The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the *path to progress* are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. (Bush 2002a, 1-3, emphasis added)

Americanism also embodies a particular narrative of American wars. Drawing on and supplementing Englehardt's analysis (1995, 16-65), I suggest that six tropes underpin this recurring "American war story."

The first is a tale of *victory and vindication*. Until Vietnam, the story of American arms tells of seamless success against aggressors. Battlefields defeats (the War of 1812, Kasserine Pass) become object lessons in an army of free citizens learning to vanquish professional soldiers. Vindicating exceptionalism, universalism, and manifest destiny, this narrative reflects the justice of America's cause; the superiority of its endeavour, know-how, and enterprise; and the courage, prowess, and ultimate magnanimity of its citizen-warriors.

A second trope recounts the *captivity* of white women (Englehardt 1995, 23-28). First appearing in 1682, over five hundred such accounts were published in the nineteenth century, and they became a staple of the twentieth-century western. Here masculinity and state power commingle in an imperative to protect the weak (white women, never Native Americans); to defend (colonized) territory, property, and (white) personal freedom; and to uphold male authority. Most crucially, captivity narratives "instantly turned the invader into the invaded and created the foundation myth for any act of retribution that might follow" (23).

Third, from Fennimore Cooper's Huron lurking in the forest to massacre Anglo-Americans marching in the open, the trope of the *ambush* of white settlers by cowardly, cruel, and hidden savages constantly reoccurs in the American war story. This provided

extraordinary evidence of the enemy's treacherous behavior. While all ambushes involved deceit, none was more heinous than the "sneak attack," that surprise assault on a peaceful, unsuspecting people. Pearl Harbor stood at the end of a long line of sneak attacks that helped explain any success a

nonwhite enemy might have against American forces ... In their hearts, *they* desired our total annihilation. (Englehardt 1995, 39, emphasis in original)

The explosion that sank *The Maine*; Pearl Harbor; Filipino or Viet Cong guerillas who “refused to stand and fight like men”; 9/11; and suicide bombers all exemplify the “cowardice” of those who ambush Americans. Cowardice is quintessentially “un-masculine”: the discourse of cowardice exhorts the United States to “heroism,” to “fight back with military force lest we became the [emasculated] cowards” (Egan 2002, 55).

Since the United States supposedly wages only defensive war, the ambush trope proves the inhumanity (the “unbeing”) of a racialized Other, further legitimizing a ferocious military response in, fourth, a ritualized *spectacle of slaughter*:

This slaughter was meant to be seen. It gave Western/non-Western power relations – and the colonized world that followed from them – a sense of the foreordained. Only when it was reversed, as with the massacre of British general Charles Gordon’s forces at Khartoum or George Armstrong Custer’s at the Little Big Horn, was it denounced as a horror and an outrage to humanity. Otherwise the sight of such carnage and the production of such casualty figures were considered in the nature of things, visible evidence of a hierarchical order, racially (later, genetically) coded into humanity ...

All these murderous battles ... only reinforced the irrational quality of the Other. To oppose the foregone conclusion of such war seemed so lacking in sanity that a resistant enemy leader was often considered quite mad ... The enemy’s incomprehensible infamy and deceit ... ingrained them in the [American] national memory as proof of the righteousness of subsequent acts of vengeance. (Englehardt 1995, 37-39)

A fifth trope depicts the *frontier* as a racialized and gendered zone of confrontation between civilization and barbarism, backwardness and progress, order and disorder. Here the hunter/warrior/vigilante tames the wilderness, pushes back the savages, secures such “liberated” space, dispenses rough frontier justice (McCarthy 2002, 128), and imposes the rule of law in strictly masculine terms. Often abandoned by a cowardly (international) community, despite his wish for a peaceful life, the hunter/warrior/vigilante is often obliged to act alone to wreak terrible and righteous vengeance on “evil doers” so as to establish law and order for an ungrateful community. His necessarily violent labours make possible the work

of a second agent of civilization and progress: the settler/businessman who transforms the now-liberated domain into a flourishing and regulated part of the market economy (Slotkin 1992, 51-87).

The final trope running through the American war story is a *fetishism of weapons technology*. From the bowie knife, through the Colt 45, Springfield rifle, Winchester repeating rifle, Gatling gun, “precision” bombing, and the atom bomb to “smart” weapons and the revolution in military affairs, superior weapons technology is depicted as permitting often ambushed and allegedly outnumbered Americans to focus overwhelming firepower and obliterate their enemies.

Each of these tropes leads to “regeneration through violence” (Slotkin 1973, 1992). Embodying a singular un-Clausewitzian notion of war – one focused on killing and eradicating enemies rather than achieving political objectives⁸ – they are discursively reproduced through a uniquely American relationship with the past: “As many have noted, our national memory is meager ... the fifties and even Vietnam seem as remote as the Peloponnesian war ... we don’t respect our history as Europeans do ... Our talent is for living in the present ... the past itself is suspect: arthritic as well as old” (Sayre 1978, 5). From the Puritans seeking to inscribe the Kingdom of God in the New World, white Americans have constructed a peculiarly forgetful and wishful narrative of origins. Occluding the unpleasant, the seamy, and the violent, this “bowdlerized fairy tale” (Englehardt 1995, 20) forges a linear account of progress and chosen-ness. Expressed in the common American put-down “You’re history, buddy,” the past disappears into irrelevance. The present and future become a blank slate on which Americanism writes scripts of progress and inclusion. Such “social organization of forgetting” (Kinsman 2005b) discursively affirms and reproduces “authentic” red-blooded American values while simultaneously excluding as un-American the history and values of significant sectors of society, particularly those of black and Native Americans.

Colin Gray (2006, 42) argues that the “culturally ignorant” American way of war frequently induces “self-inflicted damage caused by a failure to understand the enemy of the day.” I suggest that such self-inflicted damage grows less out of a failure to understand the Other than a prior inability to comprehend how Americanism imagines the United States *itself*. The Declaration of Independence trumpets the supposedly self-evident truths that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.” Yet, the constitution enshrined slavery among these “rights,” directing that slaves be counted as comprising three-fifths of

a person. Of the four presidents carved as gargantuan icons into Mount Rushmore, Washington and Jefferson were large-scale slave owners. Lincoln did reluctantly free some of the slaves, all the while suspending habeas corpus, imprisoning politicians and newspaper editors, ignoring Supreme Court judgments, and arguing that black Americans be resettled in Africa. Theodore Roosevelt was an unabashed imperialist whose paeans to vigour, virility, warfare, and superior "Anglo-Saxon blood" would not have been out of place in 1930s Germany (Roosevelt 1923; Slotkin 1992, 29-62).

A society that treats its past this cavalierly is ill-equipped to assess the truth claims of those empowered to command its mythology. And when such truth claims – the "yellow peril," the "Communist threat," the domino theory, or "Iraq has weapons of mass destruction" – invoke national survival, peering through the rose-tinted spectacles of Americanism, the blind eyes of cultural ignorance and paranoia see only what they are instructed to see.

American Militarism and Evolving Geographies of Power

The foundation mythology represented America as pristine space. Before colonization, wrote a historian in 1834, "the whole territory was an unproductive waste ... Its only inhabitants were a few scattered tribes of feeble barbarians ... In the view of civilization the immense domain was a solitude" (quoted in Englehardt 1995, 21-22). Territorial expansion was triply implicated in the founding and growth of the republic. The 1756-63 Franco-British war for empire led directly to the American Revolution. With territorial expansion inscribed in the mercantilist ethos of northern nabobs (W.A. Williams 1961/1973, 77-148), it was likewise "imperative for Virginia's elite," grown prosperous, like other Southern gentry, from a plantation economy that rapidly depleted the soil, that "Virginia had to grow or die" (Anderson and Cayton 2005, 109). Finally, the promise of a vast, open "west" was *the* crucial safety valve in the acute eighteenth- and nineteenth-century class conflicts. Exemplified in Horace Greeley's exhortation "Go west, young man!" migration and the prospect of wealth in "virgin" territory were key ingredients in America's ideological glue. The frontier carried a double promise: that every red-blooded American might strike it rich and that he was free to move where he pleased ("she" would tag along as his faithful helpmeet).

From the outset, the values and economic practices of Americanism constructed an infinitely elastic sense of internal (sovereign) space. This represented the "external" space of the Other as wild and anarchic, obliging

Americans to tame and domesticate it. From the seventeenth century to the 1890 Battle of Wounded Knee, the seizure of Native American land was the *sine qua non* of American geography.

Expansion and expropriation were accompanied by securitization, by the demonization of the barbarous Other as existential threat to the American Self. As war became the principal means of enlarging the republic, “a special ferocity accompanied the push ‘westward’ and gave a particularly savage quality to warfare, even among Europeans in North America” (Englehardt 1995, 25; see also Anderson and Cayton 2005, 206-46). Americans learned to make war through mass slaughter. The Other was not simply to be defeated and his lands seized; his very mode of life was to be eradicated. “Universal” American values were mapped onto the lands west of the Appalachians via war, annexation, and cultural genocide.

Such elastic geography facilitated a profound distancing of warfare from (white) American society. As the frontier was pushed westward and then beyond the continent, the Other receded ever further from the daily consciousness of “ordinary” (white) Americans. With the exceptions of the War of 1812 and the Civil War, most American wars until the First World War resembled Frederick the Great’s definition of a perfect war – one that occurs without the population being aware of it (Holsti 1990, 708). And as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan show, most daily life in the United States proceeds under the illusion that no war is taking place.

Superior technology ever further removes American warfighters from bloody contact with the body of the Other. This characteristic fetish of high-tech war obfuscates the often indiscriminate slaughter inflicted by American arms. The performance of “Nintendo warfare” by precision-guided munitions, combined with the Pentagon newspeak of “collateral damage” and tight restrictions on which images may be disseminated by the “great hegemonizing power of media culture” (Boggs 2005, xiv), all further distance Americans from butchery committed in their name. The corollary to such distancing of war is the belief in the inviolability of American space and persons. Alone among the major powers, the United States has no folk memory of invasion and occupation (or, as in Britain, a national narrative of narrowly averting such threats). This helps explain the depths of rage, fear, and paranoia elicited by Pearl Harbor and the attacks of 9/11. That the United States should rain fire, death, and havoc on Native American villages, on German and Japanese cities, on Korean and Vietnamese hamlets, and on Iraq and Afghanistan seems part of the natural order. Yet, such

things are not supposed to happen to history's "good guys" in their pristine American space. Only evil, cowardly, and barbarous people could commit such outrages against the home of the free and the land of the brave.

Americanism's elastic geography was famously summed up by Frederick Jackson Turner (1893/2003). His frontier thesis held that, by obliging settlers to adapt to new conditions, the frontier was *the* source of exceptionalism, vitality, and freedom. Generating a mercantilist "bonanza economy" (Slotkin 1992, 30), it was the foundation of America's wealth. Since the 1890 US Census declared the frontier "closed," American exceptionalism and wealth should be preserved through expansion overseas. Echoing Turner, a circle of Republican Party bluebloods advocated vigorous and martial imperialism as "an extension of centuries of frontier expansionism" (Adas 2005, 160). The most influential of these, Theodore Roosevelt was an early theorist of both naval power (1882) and the frontier tradition (1889-96/2004). As assistant naval secretary and later as president, Roosevelt oversaw the construction of a powerful navy as the engine of expansion. During his time in high office from 1897 to 1909, the United States annexed Hawaii and seized the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and Wake Island; fought "a bloody colonial war of subjugation" in the Philippines (Stephanson 1996, 75); dispatched marines to Beijing to quell the Boxer Rebellion; and engineered Panamanian secession from Colombia to secure the construction of a canal under US extraterritorial sovereignty.

Yet, these policies provoked fierce domestic opposition. A range of social forces claimed that such imperialism was un-American. The solution was Secretary of State John Hay's 1899 "Open Door Notes." Originally intended to cajole the great powers into allowing American interests into the Chinese ports and territory under their control, Hay's notes sought "to open the world to American enterprise" (Bacevich 2002, 31). Promoting American expansion based not on the seizure of foreign lands but, rather, on motherhood values of equality, freedom, and fairness, the Open Door required only that the world accept that state sovereignty no longer entailed control over national economic space. Winning virtually unanimous support from former anti-imperialists, Hay's policy helped fashion a new domestic consensus just when industrialization and immigration were provoking sharp social and labour conflict. Entering the pantheon of Americanism, the Open Door has been the watchword in US foreign policy ever since. Globalization, and the reorganized topography of power it represents, is its ultimate product.

If war has been the principal instrument to enlarge elastic American space, the projection of force, the conquests, annexations, territorial expansion, and extension of American enterprise have all been predicated on an equally vital aspect of American geography – what Chalmers Johnson (2004, 151-85) terms the “empire of [military] bases.” From the days of rival British and French forts in the Ohio valley, a growing network of bases was essential to pushing back the frontier and absorbing Native American and Mexican land. Providing the pegs around which the elastic frontiers of American space were stretched, military bases furnished – if I may mix my metaphors – the jumping-off points for further expansion. The annexation of Hawaii and conquest of Spanish territory in 1898 extended this triptych of bases, frontier, and American space beyond the continent. Then enjoying a “large degree of self-sufficiency” in all key raw materials (G.O. Smith 1926, 116), America’s turn-of-the-nineteenth-century imperialism was driven by the need for external markets (W.A. Williams 1961/1973, 27-57).

This would soon change. The navy converted to oil in 1911, and the mechanization of the 1914-18 battlefields made oil the essential strategic commodity. American oil consumption doubled from 1911 to 1918 and quadrupled from 1919 to 1929 (Yergin 1992, 194-209). Although the United States was still the largest producer, Britain, France, and the Netherlands initially excluded American companies from vast new oil fields under their control. As “the face of America was changed by a vast invasion of automobiles,” government circles were gripped by “a virtual obsession” with imminent oil depletion. A new sense of strategic vulnerability was reinforced by a growing dependence on rubber and other raw materials lying largely within the European colonial empires (Collings 1924).

Although new domestic oil fields soon ended fears of oil depletion, the collapse of the gold standard and the trade bilateralism and autarky of the 1930s provoked concern that the Open Door was insufficient to secure vital raw materials and essential markets (Yergin 1992, 269). Drawing on fashionable geopolitical theory, a new elite consensus emerged in the late 1930s over the need to prevent potentially hostile states (especially Japan) from dominating trade routes and controlling the oil fields, raw materials, infrastructure, and skilled manpower of European colonial powers (Leffler 1992, 9-15). A key 1940 Council on Foreign Relations study proposed the “enlargement of the United States’ economic domain” and expansion of the armed forces to secure military supremacy “within the non-German world” (Shoup and Minter 1977, 128-30). The elastic was stretched accordingly in

September 1940 when, in return for fifty obsolete destroyers, the United States acquired eight western hemisphere bases from a desperate and bankrupt Britain. Within five years, America had military bases on every continent, enjoying “unrivalled military control of the world’s landmasses, sea lanes and air spaces” (Boggs 2005, 4) – and of global energy sources and raw materials.

Fearing that “regimented economies” would become “the pattern of the next century,” President Truman asserted in 1947 that free enterprise “could survive in America only if it becomes a world system ... the whole world should adopt the American system” (quoted in Fleming 1961, 436). As the United States imposed Western economic interdependence and the dismantling of colonial empires (Gardner 1993; Pollard 1985, 247-49), its global network of military bases fixed a new frontier between (now-Americanized) civilization and (Communist) barbarism. Securing the increasingly deterritorialized international economic space fashioned by US policies, they opened the door for its oil interests, corporations, and arms manufacturers to expand their markets and secure privileged global access to energy, raw materials, labour, and finance. NATO enlargement after 1990 continued this logic, one pushed further by the extension of the “empire of bases” post-9/11. The war against Iraq represents a conscious effort to remap the Middle East and extend the internal space of globalization.

At first glance, 9/11 seems to have provoked scant change in US overseas basing strategy. Pentagon data for September 2001 lists 6,425 US military “locations” in thirty-eight foreign countries (see Table 1.1). Fifteen key Cold War allies accounted for 473 of the 492 large, medium, and small US overseas military locations (including all of the large and medium ones), and for all but 27 of its 243 “other” overseas locations. Further, they made up 97.8 percent of the US\$117.7 billion total plant replacement value (PRV) for all listed overseas locations.⁹ Five years later, these fifteen Cold War basing countries still accounted for 505 of the 544 large, medium, and small overseas sites (and all the large and medium ones), for all but 38 of its 278 “other” overseas sites, and for 97.3 percent of PRV.

These Pentagon data omit known bases in Bosnia, Kosovo, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Djibouti, and elsewhere.¹⁰ Nonetheless, even the apparently minimal changes shown by these data point to significant post-9/11 modifications to American basing strategy. Although the number of declared military “locations” or “sites” declined by almost one-fifth between September 2001 and September 2006 (from 6,425 to 5,311), the number and percentage of such sites located in

foreign countries rose slightly, from 735 (or 12.3 percent of the total) in thirty-eight countries to 820 (15.4 percent) in thirty-nine countries. Total plant replacement value of overseas military sites increased from US\$117.7 billion to \$126.3 billion, and US military personnel serving overseas jumped from 254,788 to 412,910 (United States, DOD 2002b, 2007b).

Although the Pentagon struggles with bureaucratic inertia (and associated sets of interests), two trends seem clear. The first is a “seismic shift in the center of gravity of American military capabilities from the western and eastern fringes of Eurasia to its central and southern reaches, and to adjacent areas of Africa and the Middle East” (Klare 2005). This reflects, second, a stress on facilities enabling rapid-force deployment and long-range force projection. The introduction of high-capacity C-17 transport aircraft during this period reduced reliance on European staging and refuelling bases, permitting the rationalization and reinforcement of strategic force projection capabilities. Several Cold War bases were closed. The army lost twenty-five overseas bases, while the number of large overseas air force bases rose from five to eight, the total number of navy sites almost tripled, and the Marine Corps acquired three new medium bases.

These changes embody a new binary geography of “disconnectedness” and “ideological reterritorialization”; the “Pentagon’s new map” divides the globe into a “functioning core” and a “non-integrating gap,” with the latter as the key site of US military intervention (Barnett 2004).¹¹ This literally maps “the true sources of mass violence and terrorism within the global community, so as to facilitate, at first, their containment through diplomatic and military means, but ultimately, their eradication through economic and social integration” (Barnett 2004). Like eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Native Americans, those Others whose cultural or economic practices do not accord with the “universal” values of Americanism are demonized as un-beings, securitized as a threat and source of contagion. The “empire of bases” delineates the new frontier between civilization and barbarism, “order” and “disorder” (T.L. Friedman 2003, ix-x). The Other’s territory is targeted for potential military action until his Otherness can be obliterated through incorporation into marketplace society and the universal paradise of the individual consumer.

The Institutions of American Militarism and Politics in the American State

Having stressed continuities in American militarism, it is necessary to grasp the discontinuities and moments of qualitative change. This section sketches key transitions in the evolution of four interlinked elements of American

TABLE 1.1

Declared US military "sites" overseas

Country ranked by 2006 PRV ^a (2001 rank)	Number of US "locations"												PRV US\$m
	Army			Navy			Air Force			Marine Corps			
	Total L,M,S ^b	# of L/M	# of M/S	Total L,M,S	# of L/M	# of M/S	Total L,M,S	# of L/M	# of M/S	Total L,M,S	# of L/M	# of M/S	
1 Germany	197	0/5	-	-	-	28	2/0	-	-	-	62	287	42,685.8
(2)	220	1/3	-	-	-	32	1/1	-	-	-	73	325	37,670.9
2 Japan	14	0/1	35	1/2	19	3/0	21	1/3	38	127	36,765.5		
(1)	14	0/1	11	4/2	21	2/0	2	1/0	25	73	40,268.5		
3 South Korea	60	0/3	5	-	11	1/1	1	-	28	105	13,814.5		
(3)	64	0/2	1	-	12	1/1	-	-	24	101	11,441.8		
4 Italy	12	-	21	0/1	16	0/1	-	-	40	89	6,312.6		
(5)	12	-	5	-	11	-	-	-	23	51	4,213.9		
5 United Kingdom	6	-	2	-	20	1/1	-	-	29	57	5,947.4		
(4)	1	-	2	-	21	1/1	-	-	31	55	4,942.6		
6 Iceland	-	-	8	1/0	-	-	-	-	3	11	2,700.5		
(6)	-	-	1	1/0	-	-	-	-	-	1	3,292.5		
7 Diego Garcia	-	-	1	1/0	-	-	-	-	-	1	2,541.2		
(9)	-	-	1	1/0	-	-	-	-	-	1	1,917.8		
8 Greenland	-	-	-	-	1	1/0	-	-	-	1	2,436.8		
(7)	-	-	-	-	1	1/0	-	-	-	1	2,418.3		

9	Marshall Islands (10)	September 2006	-	-	-	-	1	1/0	-	-	-	1	2,436.8
		September 2001	1	1/0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1,911.3
10	Cuba-Guantanamo (8)	September 2006	-	-	1	1/0	-	-	-	-	-	1	2,037.5
		September 2001	-	-	2	1/0	-	-	-	-	-	2	2,012.6
11	Spain (11)	September 2006	-	-	1	0/1	1	-	-	-	3	5	1,962.3
		September 2001	-	-	2	0/1	1	-	-	-	3	6	1,598.6
12	Turkey (12)	September 2006	-	-	-	-	8	0/1	-	-	11	19	1,421.5
		September 2001	-	-	-	-	9	0/1	-	-	10	19	1,265.3
13	Portugal (13)	September 2006	-	-	-	-	9	0/1	-	-	12	21	1,168.1
		September 2001	-	-	-	-	8	0/1	-	-	13	21	990.8
14	Belgium (15)	September 2006	7	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	9	18	646.1
		September 2001	8	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	10	20	568.0
15	Baharain (20)	September 2006	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	3	8	502.6
		September 2001	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	245.5
16	Qatar (no rank)	September 2006	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	384.7
		September 2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
17	Netherlands (14)	September 2006	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	10	378.4
		September 2001	7	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	5	13	691.4
18	Bahamas (17)	September 2006	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	6	358.7
		September 2001	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	314.0
19	St. Helena (18)	September 2006	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	347.9
		September 2001	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	304.1

▲

◀ TABLE 1.1

		Number of US "Locations"												PRV US\$m
		Army		Navy		Air Force		Marine Corps		Other		Total		
		Total L,M,S ^b L/M	# of L,M,S L/M	Total L,M,S L/M	# of L,M,S L/M	Total L,M,S L/M	# of L,M,S L/M	Total L,M,S L/M	# of L,M,S L/M					
Country ranked by 2006 PRV ^a (2001 rank)														
20	Australia (16)	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	4	331.4	
	September 2006	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	4	343.2	
	September 2001	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	4	343.2	
21	Greece (22)	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	7	313.6	
	September 2006	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	7	313.6	
	September 2001	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	203.2	
22	Luxemburg (19)	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	269.0	
	September 2006	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	269.0	
	September 2001	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	286.3	
23	Ecuador (no rank)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	181.9	
	September 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	181.9	
	September 2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
24	Singapore (21)	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	2	4	177.5	
	September 2006	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	2	4	177.5	
	September 2001	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	2	244.0	
25	Denmark (24)	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	2	109.6	
	September 2006	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	2	109.6	
	September 2001	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	2	3	121.1	
26	Antigua (26)	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	94.2	
	September 2006	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	94.2	
	September 2001	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	101.2	
27	Oman (27)	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	-	-	1	4	78.2	
	September 2006	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	-	-	1	4	78.2	
	September 2001	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	-	-	-	3	49.7	
28	Egypt (28)	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	49.4	
	September 2006	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	49.4	
	September 2001	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	29.7	

29	United Arab Emirates (33)	September 2006	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	47.4
		September 2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	8.0
30	Netherlands Antilles (no rank)	September 2006	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	46.1
		September 2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
31	Kenya (no rank)	September 2006	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	24.8
		September 2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
32	Columbia (31)	September 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	6	20.1
		September 2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	13.8
33	Indonesia (32)	September 2006	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	12.3
		September 2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	8.2
34	Peru (30)	September 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	9.7
		September 2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	17.2
35	Norway (29)	September 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	6.8
		September 2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	7	26.4
36	Hong Kong (34)	September 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	4.5
		September 2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	6.0
37	Aruba (no rank)	September 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1.6
		September 2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
38	Kuwait (no rank)	September 2006	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	0.9
		September 2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
39	Canada (38)	September 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	0.0
		September 2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	0.0

▲

◀ TABLE 1.1

Country ranked by 2006 PRV ^a (2001 rank)	Number of US "locations"														PRV US\$m							
	Army			Navy			Air Force			Marine Corps			Other	Total								
	Total L,M,S ^b	# of L/M	Total L,M,S	Total L,M,S	# of L/M	Total L,M,S	Total L,M,S	# of L/M	Total L,M,S	Total L,M,S	# of L/M	Total L,M,S										
No rank - Honduras (23)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				
No rank - New Zealand (37)	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	122.4			
No rank - France (25)	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n/a			
No rank - Venezuela (35)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	110.4			
No rank - Austria (36)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4			
Totals	305	1/9	90	4/4	125	8/5	22	1/3	278	820	126,350.4	330	2/6	32	7/3	128	6/6	2	1/0	243	735	117,764.8

a PRV = plant replacement value

b L = large, M = medium, S = small

Source: Calculated from United States, DOD (2002a, 17-27; 2007a, 77-96).

militarism: threat discourse, strategic culture, force design, and civil-military relations.

For most of its history, the United States faced no external threat. Until the 1940s, the omnipresent fear of the Other focused on representations of domestic threat and contagion (Rogin 1988, 4-32). Despite the central role of warfare in expanding the republic's domain, America's armed forces developed no threat discourse capable of rallying popular support for high defence spending. Except during the Civil War, US strategic culture and force design rested on an insignificant standing army and negligible intelligence-gathering capabilities. So ingrained was the suspicion of standing armies that victory in each major war was followed by wholesale demobilization, reducing the army essentially to a frontier police. Moreover, with the exception of the failed war of 1812-15, America's nineteenth-century wars were waged against societies with an insignificant industrial base. When the United States finally involved itself in European wars in 1917 and 1941, its forces initially found themselves operating military technology dramatically inferior to those of foe and ally alike (Perret 1989, 322, 357).

In the final decades of the nineteenth century, widely circulated writings by two military strategists launched a debate over the need to modernize and enlarge America's armed forces. Major General Emery Upton (1905/1917, vii-xv) argued that excessive civilian control of the military left the country chronically unprepared for war. He proposed revising civil-military relations along Prussian lines: a strong standing army led by professional officers, with minimal civilian interference. However, the extreme unlikelihood of an attack on continental America made it virtually impossible to build support for expanding the army, and Upton's writings began to have a real impact only in the second decade of the twentieth century.

Immediately more significant was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan's *The influence of sea power on history, 1660-1873* (1890/1957). This located the key to global power in a battle fleet's mastery of the sea and capacity to control maritime choke points. Mahan argued that the United States should acquire a modern navy to develop its commerce, control the Caribbean, and construct a canal across Central America. *Sea power* became "the canonical reference work for the growing naval world community, providing ample historical justification for the vigorous expansion of navies that was already under way" (Stephanson 1996, 84). It furnished the rationale for the 1890 Navy Act, which ended a tradition of passive coastal defence. Within fifteen years, the US Navy was the world's third largest. In the process, "another big business lobby had been created" (Perret 1989, 274-75), one whose

interests depended on the maintenance of a big navy (275). The future was being born.

However, this change in force design was confined to the navy. As late as 1939, the army was only the world's nineteenth largest, with little independent offensive capability. Its army air corps had but eight hundred – largely obsolete – combat aircraft. A crash expansion program and vast industrial conversion initiative were launched in January 1939. Within fifteen months, the army had grown from 185,000 to 1.6 million men (Perret 1989, 354-60), and by May 1945 the renamed US Army Air Forces was the world's largest, with over 41,000 combat aircraft and 2.3 million men (USAF n.d.). American military expenditure skyrocketed from 17.5 percent of the federal budget in 1940 to 89.4 percent by 1945, or from just 1.6 percent to 37.1 percent of GDP. As the war shattered all other major economies, measured in constant 1940 dollars, American GDP jumped from US\$101.4 billion to \$173.5 billion from 1940 to 1945. Unemployment fell from 14.6 percent to just 1.9 percent of the labour force (Tassava n.d., Tables 1 and 3): "The Depression was over. The national defense program had ended it" (Perret 1989, 358).

The transformation of America's armed forces into the world's most technologically sophisticated moved scientific and technological innovation to the forefront of the economy and popular imagination. Full employment, deep labour shortages, and a no-strike pledge by the AFL (American Federation of Labor) and CIO (Congress of Industrial Organization) closed a ten-year cycle of social instability and labour unrest. Despite government efforts to restrict wage increases, "incomes rose for virtually all Americans – whites and blacks, men and women, skilled and unskilled" (Schumann 2003; see also Tassava n.d.). Predicated on massive military expenditure and ever-expanding defence commitments, planned and organized by the federal government, this new prosperity provided a key ideological foundation for the social alliance underpinning the Cold War military Keynesianism and the rapid expansion of American consumer demand that followed. It likewise cast in stone what President Eisenhower would later famously label as the military-industrial complex. Maintaining technology-driven military spending became the key to the profitability of a very significant proportion of American business. The knock-on effects went far beyond firms involved in supplying and equipping the armed forces: America's business class and society at large had become "addicted to military spending" (Hosseini-Zadeh 2006, 15-16).

Businessmen and generals were determined that the end of hostilities should not end the bonanza. But such hopes seemed dashed as GDP shrank by 0.36 percent in 1946 (Tassava n.d., Table 7). Amid fears of a depression, the CIO launched “the greatest wage offensive in U.S. history with more than five million workers engaged in strikes across America” (REAP n.d.). To stave off the downturn, President Truman slashed military spending by almost 90 percent between 1945 and 1948 (Tassava n.d., Table 7), crippling key high-tech industries. Military aircraft had accounted for \$45 billion of the \$183 billion spent on war production (Tassava n.d.). However, the value of all airframes produced plummeted from \$16.7 billion in 1944 to just \$0.671 billion in 1947, or from 96,000 to just 1,800 military aircraft (Yergin 1977, 342). Demobilization devastated the soon-to-be-independent US Air Force. Within fifteen months, its combat-ready bomber groups were sliced from 218 to fewer than 10. The unsurprising result was a powerful lobby of aircraft manufacturers and generals demanding massive rearmament. The first-ever secretary of the air force, fervent advocate of strategic air power and ardent Cold War warrior W. Stuart Symington, was the president of a company making bomber gun turrets. He “understood better than most that the American aircraft industry would not survive without a fresh infusion of military orders” (Carroll 2006, 109).

The Second World War transformed civil-military relations. For four years, the military had driven national policy, moving from bit players to the lead actors in Washington bureaucratic politics. After the lean 1920s and 1930s, generals and admirals had grown accustomed to massive budgets and vast bureaucratic power and influence. Henceforth, the Pentagon would wield its now immense prestige and resources to retain its preponderant role. Pearl Harbor provided the rallying cry. That “sneak attack” seemed utterly to vindicate Emory Upton: in a world of nasty dictators, the good guys had been woefully unprepared to defend themselves because of a lack of vigilance and perfidious/idealistic politicians unwilling to finance a strong military. Now parodying Poe’s raven, the military endless croaked “Nevermore,”¹² insisting that victory had not ended the threat. New enemies would have to be found, or fabricated.

The political balance within the US armed forces had also shifted. The air forces’ bombing campaigns were depicted as having played *the* crucial role in defeating Germany and Japan. Emerging as the quintessentially American way of war, bombing embodied US technological superiority, delivered “shock and awe,” and distanced the spectacle of slaughter to mere “collateral

damage,” allegedly reducing American casualties. Having vaporized Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the air force monopolized the world’s most fearsome weapon and strenuously promoted air power as America’s strategic priority. This produced “a bitter half-decade struggle” (Yergin 1977, 201) between air force and navy. Pulling out all stops to regain its position on the strategic cutting edge, the navy’s projects to develop supercarriers and its own strategic bomber capability were sabotaged by the air force in a vicious “bureaucratic bloodletting” (203). Some historians see this bureaucratic war as a key catalyst of the Cold War (Carroll 2006, 102-60; Yergin 1977, 201-20, 336-65).

The bureaucratic power and standing of the military (and particularly the air force) within the American state was transformed, together with the political culture and budgetary logic of that state (Rothkopf 2005, 4-107). Military spending rose by 44.4 percent in 1949 (Tassava n.d., Table 7) – with over half (and 15 percent of the total budget) “related to aviation” (Yergin 1977, 343) – and more than tripled from 1950 to 1953 (Hosseini-Zadeh 2006, 76). The military-industrial complex was off and running. Within fifty years, the once tiny Department of Defense had morphed into “the largest company in the world, with more than 3 million employees ... [and] an annual budget of a quarter of a trillion dollars” (Carter and Perry 1999, 191-92).

Seen in Washington as “a veritable revolution in international relations,”¹³ the new global doctrine of national security broke with traditional, purely continental defence. The idea of national security “both described a new relationship between the United States and the rest of the world” (Yergin 1977, 195) and prescribed the policies to be followed. It postulated

the interrelatedness of so many different political economic and military factors that developments halfway around the globe are seen to have automatic and direct impact on America’s core interests. Virtually every development in the world is perceived to be potentially crucial. An adverse turn of events anywhere endangers the United States. Problems in foreign relations are viewed as urgent and immediate threats. *Thus, desirable foreign policy goals are translated into issues of national survival, and the range of threats becomes limitless.* (Yergin 1977, 195-96, emphasis added)

Establishing the primacy of national security required dissolving anti-military sentiment and overcoming war fatigue. When President Truman enquired whether the Republican Congress would approve his vastly increased military budget, Republican senator Arthur Vandenberg advised him to “scare the hell out of them” (Stone 2004, 326).

National security doctrine produced crucial modifications in the American security imaginary. The first was an exponential increase in “the paranoid style in American politics” (Hofstadter 1965). The military and the intelligence services now depicted any questioning of their budgets, bureaucratic fiefdoms, and political clout as threatening national survival. Soviet capabilities and intentions were consciously distorted and the Communist “threat” vastly inflated (Leffler 1992, 130-38; Yergin 1977, 336-65). Reds were said to be hiding under beds throughout the United States, a cancer eating away at the body politic, Armageddon poised to happen. Threat could never be expunged; it could only be deterred via a ruthless Otherization of even those Americans who challenged the paranoid definition of America and “its” values. “Un-Americanism” and “appeasement” became, and remain, the most deadly accusations in the American lexicon.

The new gospel of national security generated its own high priests, mandarins, and Inquisition: a new “expertocracy” claiming exclusive knowledge of mortal existential threats said to confront America – all requiring repressive powers, massive military preparedness, expanding budgets, and bureaucratic fiefdoms. Chief among these were functionaries of an array of new intelligence services established following the 1947 National Security Act: the CIA, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. This national security priesthood and mandarinat extended far beyond the military and the intelligence agencies. Beginning with the air force’s transformation of Douglas Aircraft’s research and development branch into the RAND Corporation, a vast web of think tanks, research centres, academics, journalists, and other “experts” joined the minor priesthood, all preaching the national security gospel, scrutinizing the purity of the faithful, and disciplining skeptics and unbelievers. As the American power elite abandoned “any real image of peace” (Mills 1956, 184), the academic discipline of International Relations emerged as an integral element of this military-intellectual complex (Robin 2001), one heavily subsidized by the high priests of the cult. The advent of “realist” international relations theory provided “scientific” rationalization for the rupture with traditional isolationism and suspicion of the military. With war now decreed to be inevitable, those who advocated peace became utopians/idealists/appeasers. Only ever-expanding preparation for war could preserve the republic.

The hitherto relatively weak federal government was transformed into a vast surveillance state, ceaselessly probing the furthest reaches of the planet, plumbing the most private household secrets (Staples 1997). National security (and a radically policed set of approved values enshrined in

Americanism) was now grafted onto the perennial squabbles for turf of localized US politics as the supreme “real American” value and ultimate ideological warrant to legitimize or discredit any actor, sanctify or silence any debate. To be labelled soft on national security was to be painted as un-American, and politically dead and unemployable.

The national security state brought American militarism full circle. Vindicating all of James Madison’s warnings, it generalized the belligerent expansionism first exemplified in President Madison’s war of 1812. Inscribed in the norms and practices of Americanism and US capitalism since 1775, militarism is more than the simple product of a postwar military-industrial complex, a permanent war economy, or a reaction to Vietnam. It will not depart with George W. Bush nor abate under President Barack Obama’s ardent advocacy of Americanism.

Conclusion

Disputing the notion that “Americans in our own time have fallen prey to militarism” since Vietnam (Bacevich 2005, 2), I have advanced two principal arguments: that militarism has *always* lain at the heart of American identity and notions of space, and that understanding such militarism is essential to grasping the particular forms of US hegemonic power and the global order it has fashioned.

Huge upsurges in military spending after 1948 and during the 1980s were crucial to propping up aggregate demand in periods of economic downturn (Hossein-Zadeh 2006, 8-9) and in forging new social alliances that undermined and then destroyed the global left. This, in turn, facilitated globalization and the consequent vast increase in global inequality. Some have argued that, through its very success, US hegemony “has made itself increasingly redundant” (Agnew 2005, 32). As its relative economic and political position weakens, the United States increasingly turns to military might to impose its rules. Real US military spending is estimated to have exceeded US\$700 billion or 48 percent of the world total in 2007 (CACNP 2008), being “more than the next 46 highest spending countries in the world combined” (Global Issues 2008).¹⁴ Since the 1980s, the United States has maintained its expanding military presence through growing indebtedness. Even before the financial crisis, its projected 2007 budget deficit was \$427 billion, while the deficit for the month of February 2008 *alone* reached a then record \$175.56 billion (roughly equal to the budget supplement to finance the wars against Iraq and Afghanistan).¹⁵ By March 2008, total external US debt stood at just under \$13.8 trillion (United States, DOT 2008).

Although no other major state has yet challenged America's central position, "the declining hegemon" no longer has "the financial means necessary to solve [global] system-level problems that require system-level solutions" (Arrighi and Silver 1999, 278). Moreover, America's ability to finance its wars and expanding global military commitments depends on the willingness of China and Japan to purchase US Treasury securities.¹⁶

Since the Second World War, the United States has enjoyed a virtual monopoly in defining the parameters of international security discourse and practice. It largely imposed its post-9/11 global war on terror agenda on both friend and foe. However, the refusal of all but one of its principal allies to participate in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, and the reluctance of most NATO countries to commit their troops to combat in Afghanistan, suggest that America's ideological hegemony over "international security" is weaker than at any point since 1945.

Collectively referred to as "blowback" (Johnson 2000), localized forms of armed resistance to globalization and American dominance have exploded since 1989. Largely taking the form of terrorist attacks, these pose no serious challenge to global capitalism. However, they *do* highlight glaring structural problems in US militarism. American hegemony and the cult of individual consumption have transformed citizens into consumers. Significantly less likely to challenge relations of power and privilege than are citizens, consumers are equally less willing to die in the name of "their" state – particularly in distant countries that patently pose scant threat to their personal security and ability to consume. Manipulating a post-9/11 climate of fear, crying wolf over weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and lying over alleged links between Iraq and al-Qaeda, the Bush administration was briefly able to rally a new national security coalition. In the medium-term, however, these tactics have sapped the domestic consensus and eroded the manpower necessary for the expanding military commitments. Its growing dependence on Asian bankers aside, America's ability to wage war is further limited by factors similar to those forcing Napoleon's retreat from Moscow: the refusal of the enemy (Vietnamese, Somali, or Iraqi) to "recognize" their own defeat, and the unwillingness of young American males to risk their lives in wars whose rationale escapes them.

Mired in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, while simultaneously retooling to confront future strategic challenges, the US Army is deeply overstretched. Acute personnel shortages have led to significant modifications in deployment and recruitment practices (United States Army 2008). In 2006, 8,330 so-called moral waivers were granted to previously undesirable volunteers

with criminal convictions or charges. Retention bonuses to encourage re-enlistment increased almost ninefold from 2003 to 2006 (Coll 2008, 21). Between 2003 and 2008, almost 43,000 troops were deployed to Iraq “after being deemed ‘medically undeployable’” (Harper’s Index 2008). The army increasingly relies on foreign nationals lured by the promise of a green card should they survive military service. This creeping mercenarization is reflected in the pervasive privatization of a vast array of logistical, intelligence, and actual warfighting activities (Singer 2005).

The American way of war seems chronically incapable of transcending a purely military mentality in order to develop the appropriate *political* strategies necessary to prevail in the kinds of blowback conflicts provoked by American hegemony:

The military still does not understand that victory on the battlefield does not equate with political victory. American strategic culture has many impressive features, but lacks a meaningful dialectical relationship and better balance between political and military demands. Strategic culture and military thinking cannot defer to technology or a professional understanding based on RMA, now mutating into Network-Centric Warfare. (Lock-Pullan 2006, 394)

Such incapacity grows out of more than mere strategic culture and bureaucratic inertia favouring conventional forms of warfare. This chronic inability to grasp the political nettle of emerging contemporary forms of warfare is deeply rooted in a form of militarism that shaped the very notion of what “America” is, and what “Americanism” stands for.

NOTES

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- 1 John Adams, quoted in Lepore (2008, 90).
- 2 See Boot (2003); Cebrowski and Barnett (2003); Echevarria (2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006); Gray (2005, 2006); Jager (2007); Kaplan (2007); Lock-Pullan (2006); Mahnken (2003); Record (2006).
- 3 See Anderson and Cayton (2005); Bacevich (2005); Boggs (2002, 2005); Carroll (2006); Grondin (2007); Hossein-Zadeh (2006); Johnson (2004, 2006).
- 4 A security imaginary is “a structure of well-established meanings and social relations out of which representations of the world of international relations are created ... The

security imaginary of a state provides what might be called the cultural raw materials out of which representations of states, of relations among states and of the international system are created" (Weldes 1999, 10). A security imaginary thus provides a definition of Self in relation to a particular depiction of the external world. It specifies which "Others" inhabit that external world; represents the relationship of Other to Self; lays out the conditions, contexts, and cultural mechanisms under which the Other becomes represented as threat to Self; and specifies the broad parameters of how to "defend" Self against such a menacing Other. Analysis of the security imaginary of any state must grapple with the cultural representations and practices through which difference becomes securitized *and* institutionalized as threat.

- 5 Public culture is "the arena in which social and political conflict is played out and in which consensus is forged, manufactured, and maintained, or not. It is the place where all segments of the society either speak to each other or fail to speak to each other – where they must content if they wish to advance their own interests and values or to influence the direction of the larger society. It is a 'place' that exists in print, on the airways, and in the meeting hall" (Fousek 2000, ix) and, no doubt, also now in cyberspace. *Political* culture, on the other hand, refers to the narrower sets of values and practices associated with the predominant political institutions. Political culture is subordinate to, and largely shaped by, public culture.
- 6 *Life*, 22 December 1941. Reproduced on MIT Asian American Studies homepage, <http://web.mit.edu>.
- 7 Examples of the former include *The Teahouse of the August Moon* (1956), *Sayonara* (1957), and *The Geisha Boy* (1958). Examples of the latter include *The Manchurian Candidate* (1962); see Jackson and González (2006).
- 8 See Colin Gray's analysis (2005, 2006) of "the American way of war" as apolitical, a-strategic, a-historic, culturally ignorant, aggressive and offensive, technology dependent, and firepower-focused.
- 9 "Large" sites had a plant replacement value (PRV) of US\$1.5 billion-plus in 2001 and \$1.64 billion-plus in 2006; "medium" sites a PRV of \$800 million to \$1.5 billion in 2001 and \$0.875-1.64 billion in 2006; and "small" sites a PRV of between \$10 and \$800 million in 2001 and \$10 and \$875 million in 2006. Including such vital installations as "unmanned navigational aids or strategic missile emplacements" (Johnson 2004, 154), "other" sites had a PRV of less than US\$10 million.
- 10 These data also exclude newer categories of military sites linked to the so-called global war on terror. Consisting of "logistical facilities (an airstrip or port complex) plus weapons stockpiles," what are known as "forward operation sites" or "forward operating locations" house "a small permanent crew of US military technicians but no large combat units." Similarly, so-called "cooperative security locations" have no permanent US presence but are "maintained by military contractors and host-country personnel." These bare-bones facilities allow American forces to "hop in and out of them in times of crisis while avoiding the impression of establishing a permanent – and provocative – presence" (Volman 2006; see also Ral 2008). Among countries reported to have provided such facilities are Algeria, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Mali, Namibia, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia. Chalmers Johnson (2004, 153-55) claims that the United States also has secret military sites in Israel.

- 11 See <http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/images>.
- 12 Edgar Allen Poe, "The Raven," <http://www.heise.de>.
- 13 Joseph E. Johnson, chief of the State Department's Division of International Security Affairs, quoted in Yergin (1977, 195).
- 14 Although Department of Defense spending was just short of US\$530 billion (United States, OMB 2008), this excludes wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; nuclear weapons storage, testing, research, and development; the Coast Guard; Homeland Security; weapons grants to allies; interest payments on borrowing to fund previous military spending; and veterans services and retirees payments.
- 15 "U.S. budget deficit hits record \$176 billion," *National Post*, 12 March 2008, <http://www.nationalpost.com>.
- 16 Because of declining Japanese exposure, the share of such securities held by Japan, China, and Hong Kong fell from 51 percent to 44 from January 2007 to April 2008 (United States, DOT 2007).