
Panoptic Dreams

Sean P. Hier

Panoptic Dreams
Streetscape Video Surveillance
in Canada



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For Mary Elizabeth

Contents

Figures and Tables / ix

Preface / xi

Acknowledgments / xix

Acronyms / xxi

Part 1: Streetscape Monitoring Programs in Canada

1 Introduction / 1

2 Establishing Streetscape Monitoring Programs / 14

Part 2: The Rise of Streetscape Monitoring Programs

3 Monitoring Programs in French Canada / 31

4 Sudbury's Lions Eye in the Sky / 67

5 Kelowna and the Constitutional Debate about Public-Area Video Surveillance / 89

6 London's Downtown Camera Project / 108

Part 3: The Spread of Streetscape Monitoring Programs

7 The Expansion of Streetscape Monitoring Programs / 133

8 Thwarted Efforts to Establish Streetscape Monitoring Programs / 159

9 Thunder Bay's Eye on the Street / 179

10 Panoptic Dreams: Arguments, Implications, and Recommendations / 201

Appendices / 225

Notes / 264

References / 279

Index / 288

Figures and Tables

Figures

- 1 Public-area surveillance camera, City of Sherbrooke, Quebec / 39
- 2 Streetscape surveillance camera, City of Sherbrooke, Quebec / 39
- 3 Public-area surveillance camera signage, City of Sudbury, Ontario / 70
- 4 Streetscape surveillance camera, City of Sudbury, Ontario / 73
- 5 Streetscape surveillance camera, City of Sudbury, Ontario / 76
- 6 Streetscape surveillance camera signage, City of Sudbury, Ontario / 80
- 7 Streetscape surveillance camera, City of Kelowna, British Columbia / 104
- 8 Streetscape surveillance camera, City of London, Ontario / 120
- 9 Streetscape surveillance camera, City of London, Ontario / 121
- 10 Streetscape surveillance camera, City of London, Ontario / 121
- 11 Streetscape surveillance camera signage, City of London, Ontario / 122
- 12 Streetscape surveillance camera signage, City of London, Ontario / 127
- 13 Streetscape surveillance camera monitoring station, City of Hamilton / 143
- 14 Streetscape surveillance camera signage, City of Hamilton, Ontario / 144
- 15 Streetscape surveillance camera, City of Windsor, Ontario / 153
- 16 Streetscape surveillance camera signage, City of Windsor, Ontario / 153
- 17 Streetscape surveillance camera signage, City of Thunder Bay, Ontario / 187
- 18 Streetscape surveillance camera, City of Thunder Bay, Ontario / 188
- 19 Public-area surveillance camera, City of Thunder Bay, Ontario / 188

Tables

- 1 Lions Video Monitoring Advisory Committee public survey responses, 2004 / 85
- 2 CCTV camera effectiveness, phase 1, City of Hamilton, Ontario / 145
- 3 CCTV camera effectiveness, phase 2, City of Hamilton, Ontario / 146

Preface

In the early twenty-first century, the information and privacy commissioner of Canada, George Radwanski, started to argue that privacy, if not the defining issue of the next decade, is nevertheless an issue whose time for consideration has come (2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d). Commissioner Radwanski's declaration partially captured the state of privacy protection legislation and advocacy work concerning public-area closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance in Canada. Throughout the 1990s, privacy advocates and civil libertarians became increasingly interested in developing a privacy protection policy framework for public-area video surveillance. Several legal cases and legislative investigations at the federal and provincial levels occurred from 1991 to 2004; the information and privacy commissioner of Quebec, Jennifer Stoddart, held public hearings on video surveillance in 2003; the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC), along with provincial Offices of Information and Privacy Commissioners (OIPCs), adopted standardized guidelines or minimal rules to encourage best practices in public-area video surveillance conducted by public bodies and law enforcement agencies by 2006; and Commissioner Radwanski launched a constitutional challenge to general video surveillance practices in public places in 2002.

Judged against the history of privacy protection legislation and advocacy in Canada and elsewhere, the current state of privacy protection concerning public-area video surveillance in Canada is remarkable. In a relatively short span of time, significant advances were made in institutionalizing CCTV surveillance privacy protection measures as information and privacy commissioners across the country struggled to adapt to rapid developments in imaging technologies in particular and the proliferation of new information and communication technologies in general. Although considerable amounts of time and effort were devoted to developing a standardized public-area CCTV surveillance privacy protection framework across the country, the

privacy policy sector has been unable to standardize the ways that public-area streetscape CCTV surveillance systems are established (see Chapters 1 and 2 for an explanation of public-area streetscapes).

The privacy policy sector is composed of a group of individuals who are formally or institutionally affiliated with civil liberties organizations and information and privacy protection agencies. The privacy policy sector has enacted a number of laws, codes, guidelines, conventions, tactics, and practices to *regulate* the ways in which personal information is gathered and processed by public and private bodies and law enforcement agencies. In terms of regulating how video surveillance systems are established and administered, the provincial OIPCs constitute the primary institution responsible for ensuring compliance with provincial laws and privacy protection guidelines or minimal rule protocols.

The inability of the privacy policy sector to standardize how public-area streetscape monitoring programs are established – which is reinforced by a pragmatic approach adopted by Canada's privacy policy sector to encouraging voluntary compliance with a general set of privacy protection guidelines – has inadvertently contributed to the consolidation of two patterns or trends: not only has a diverse group of people staged various forms of resistance to monitoring initiatives, but also a range of different monitoring systems has been designed based on several different arguments and tactics. The ways that monitoring systems are designed pose implications for how they are used on a daily basis and whether they will realize their intended goals and objectives. Understanding the complexity of factors that inform how monitoring systems are established, therefore, is an important first step toward developing a comprehensive knowledge about streetscape video surveillance in Canada.

Although the number of streetscape monitoring programs in Canada has continued to grow since the early 1990s, few studies, academic or otherwise, have been presented to explain how monitoring systems are developed and how they are used (or where and why they are used). The dearth of information on streetscape monitoring not only limits academic understandings of policing, surveillance, and crime control strategies in Canada but also limits the extent to which members of the privacy policy sector as well as proponents and opponents of monitoring initiatives in specific Canadian cities can engage in informed dialogue and debate about the merits, limitations, and organizational designs of monitoring systems. With some of Canada's largest cities now running monitoring systems (Toronto, Calgary, Winnipeg, Halifax), empirically informed comparative data are long overdue.

Admittedly, publishing a book about Canadian streetscape CCTV surveillance in 2010 might be perceived by certain observers as a curious investment of time and labour. Compared with some of the cities of other countries, the number of Canadian cities that use CCTV surveillance cameras to survey

streetscapes is not large, and CCTV surveillance cameras have proliferated in areas where members of the public frequently interact (grocery stores, gas stations, the workplace, public transit). Even public opinion polls, ranging from polling conducted by regional business improvement associations to academic institutions, consistently reveal a high level of support for camera-based surveillance. Considering the expanding number of privacy protection concerns that appear in most daily newspapers, an in-depth study of a few surveillance cameras on a few city streets in a few Canadian cities might seem decidedly passé.

Yet it is because streetscape CCTV surveillance in Canada is still in its infancy that the information and argumentation informing this book matter. Before his exit from public office, Commissioner Radwanski became fond of arguing that emerging CCTV surveillance initiatives in cities such as Vancouver, Kelowna, Hamilton, and Toronto represent the thin edge of the wedge that will irrevocably change our whole notion of rights and freedoms in Canada (2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d). When Interim Privacy Commissioner Robert Marleau withdrew Commissioner Radwanski's appeal in 2003 (see Chapter 5), existing monitoring programs expanded, and new ones appeared across the country. With no indication in sight that streetscape monitoring programs will decrease in number or size, it is important to introduce comprehensive, empirically informed discussion and debate.

An early qualification is necessary. The intention of this book is neither to discourage nor to encourage streetscape monitoring programs in Canada. Informed by seven years of study, including hundreds of interviews and analyses of thousands of documents, the book explains how streetscape monitoring systems have been developed in Canada. Part of the explanation involves a critique of the privacy protection framework developed by Canada's privacy policy sector. Another part of the explanation involves assessing the governance structures that have inconsistently diffused across Canadian cities to influence the design of specific monitoring programs. A third part of the explanation involves examining claims-making activities and the social construction and contestation of crime, fear of crime, and social problems in various cities. The book offers no single explanation for why streetscape monitoring programs are adopted or rejected, and it offers no single recommendation for how city stakeholders and members of the privacy policy sector should act or respond to streetscape monitoring proposals. Based on the empirical findings of the study, a number of ideal and pragmatic recommendations are presented in Chapter 10, but the interpretation of findings avoids arguments about the inherent evils or the unqualified benefits of streetscape surveillance cameras.

Panoptic Dreams analyzes the main components of the rise of monitoring programs in Canada between 1981 and 2005. There are two main parts to the rise of streetscape monitoring. The first part concerns the grand narrative

of establishing monitoring programs across the country. The grand narrative is composed of several individuals, forces, desires, events, dynamics, claims, activities, and interactions, with a particular focus on the emergence and uneven diffusion of governance structures that influence the design and implementation of monitoring systems. Integral to the grand narrative of how monitoring programs have been established is a set of patterns or trends influenced by formal privacy protection policies and informal municipal promotional tactics and designs. The second part concerns the local or regional stories that inform or underscore the grand narrative. The regional stories, which also involve a dynamic set of individuals and activities, begin in Drummondville, Quebec (see Chapter 3), and end in Thunder Bay, Ontario (see Chapter 9). Taken together, regional developments between 1981 and 2005 contributed to increasing standardization of the ways that monitoring programs were implemented across the country, and they continue to influence how programs are implemented today.

Given that the aim of the book is to document empirically and assess analytically the rise and diffusion of streetscape monitoring programs in the context of emerging governance structures formed within and beyond the privacy policy sector, an equal amount of analytical attention is not granted to every city discussed in the book. Rather, the aim is to account for the main developments in designing and implementing monitoring programs as they relate to the formation of privacy policy and organizational protocols. Design and implementation processes in some cities, consequently, are presented in their own chapters; processes in other cities are presented together in a single chapter.

Who should read *Panoptic Dreams*? The information presented throughout the book will appeal to anyone interested in surveillance, crime control, and the social construction of social problems, but the arguments were prepared with three audiences in mind: academics, privacy advocates, and citizens and stakeholders in cities running a surveillance program or thinking about introducing one. The material presented in the following pages is important, first, for academic and professional researchers because of the theoretical, conceptual, empirical, and policy insights developed in Chapters 1, 2, and 10 and illustrated in Chapters 3 to 9. However, the book is especially relevant for criminologists and sociologists, not least because a considerable amount of discussion is currently taking place about the professional status and public influence of criminological and sociological research activities. The debate is robust in the criminology literature. The growing consensus seems to be that criminologists and, necessarily, professional criminological knowledge exercise an insufficient degree of influence on public policy debates about crime and social disorder. The irony of the decline of practically useful criminological knowledge is that criminologists are experiencing difficulty communicating with policy makers at the very moment that

everyday life is saturated with “crime talk” (Chancer and McLaughlin 2007; see also Simon 2007).

At least two reasons have been offered to explain the decline of publicly influential criminology. The first reason is the alleged absence of convincing, scientifically informed evidence. Austin (2003, 558) wastes no time sugar-coating what he sees as the problem: “Despite the annual publication of hundreds of peer-refereed articles and text books ... most studies being produced by criminologists are so flawed that they are essentially useless.” While I am not ready to endorse wholeheartedly Austin’s methodological remedy for this state of affairs – that is, to embrace an unadulterated conception of science and the experimental design – his wider point is a good one: there is something decidedly troubling about the difficulties that criminologists experience in disseminating criminological research findings to policy makers, police, politicians, and the public (see, too, Haggerty 2004 and Mathews 2009).

The second reason offered to explain the dearth of evidence that can be translated into policy discussion and planning is a perceived ideological bias in criminological research. According to this argument, a large number of criminologists has narrowed their specializations and oriented their arguments toward likeminded criminologists. It is more common to find ideologically charged debates and disagreements among criminologists, so the argument goes, than it is to find practically applicable research findings. The consequence has been a growing tendency among academic criminologists to maintain the intellectual boundaries of criminology at the expense of producing politically influential research.

Luckily for me, I am not a criminologist (at least not by formal training)! But the debates being staged among criminologists about the applicability of scholarly research activities are mirrored in the global debate about public sociology (see Burawoy 2004). Without wishing to delve into a long and nuanced analysis of disciplinary utility, I will say simply that academic researchers, be they sociologists, criminologists, or practitioners of some other disciplinary persuasion, are recognizing the limitations of abstract and inward-focused argumentation and analysis. This book was prepared with the intention of developing a relevant set of analyses that will satisfy academic curiosity and contribute to policy discussions and operational design protocols nationally, provincially, and regionally. In other words, the book is not only for academic researchers but also for members of the privacy policy sector and concerned citizens/stakeholders – be they advocates or opponents of monitoring initiatives – in specific Canadian cities.

The second audience of the book, then, is composed of policy makers, privacy advocates, and civil libertarians. The book is an explicit study of neither activism nor public policy, yet privacy protection advocacy and CCTV policy figure prominently in the analyses. Some of the interviews

informing the findings were conducted with members of the privacy policy sector; it is clear that there is limited knowledge among members of the privacy policy sector about the empirical scope of monitoring practices and the nuances of how monitoring systems are designed and maintained. A brief overview of the scope of Canadian streetscape monitoring programs (other than the ones analyzed in the book) is presented in Appendix A, and detailed analyses of the dynamics of establishing specific monitoring initiatives are presented in Chapters 3 to 9. In addition to the rich empirical data presented throughout the book, Chapter 10 provides certain insights into some of the challenges facing privacy protection in the context of an institutionalized pragmatic policy orientation to public-area video surveillance.

The third audience for the book is composed of the general public, especially stakeholders and concerned citizens in cities running or considering a monitoring program. A characteristic shared by interviewees in the study – ranging from civil libertarians to concerned citizens – is a lack of understanding about the scope, structure, and utility of streetscape CCTV surveillance systems. The book is written in an accessible style to appeal to readers beyond a narrow academic audience, and it offers a candid examination of how streetscape video surveillance systems have been established in Canada. The research findings are important for cities and communities considering streetscape systems because, under certain conditions, CCTV surveillance programs might be able to contribute to the reduction of crime and other activities deemed undesirable by city representatives. Too often, however, unfounded or dubious claims about CCTV surveillance are made in the process of developing and promoting systems (e.g., that CCTV systems are always abused by people in positions of power, that such systems always reduce crime rates, that other cities have realized indisputable successes with CCTV systems). The book provides a set of empirical and comparative findings that proponents and opponents of streetscape CCTV surveillance alike can draw on to develop a more complete understanding of relevant issues and concerns.

Finally, an explanation of the title of the book is necessary. A considerable amount of surveillance theory generally, and theory about CCTV surveillance particularly, has reproduced some variation on the exercise of panoptic power (see Hier, Walby, and Greenberg 2006). Briefly, the panopticon is an eighteenth-century organizational design composed of a centralized inspection lodge that enables inspectors to watch over workers, prisoners, patients, and other persons of interest. The idea is that, because the people who are placed under surveillance cannot verify when they are being watched (the inspection lodge is protected by blinds and lighting), they develop strategies of self-discipline and control. That is, equipped with the knowledge that we could be under surveillance at any time, we regulate our own actions and

behaviors to accord with the normative expectations of inspectors. As Foucault (1979) explained, the power of the panoptic function is such that inspectors do not even need to be in the tower: the physical/architectural design as a visible expression of power ensures the disciplinary effect.

The book is presented under the title *Panoptic Dreams* because, although advocates of streetscape monitoring programs across the country share the dream of a panoptic system of surveillance and disciplinary social control, the reality is that streetscape monitoring does not always produce its desired effects. The title is not intended to be a form of academic rhetoric or subtle political gerrymandering; rather, it is meant to signify the large gap that exists between claims making and promotional rhetoric, on the one hand, and the reality of what CCTV systems can do, on the other. The book focuses on the former rather than on the latter, with a special interest in documenting the shifting rationalizations for maintaining systems once in place and the implications that organizational design processes pose for applications and uses. Most proponents of streetscape monitoring systems are initially motivated by the dream of panoptic disciplinary power, and they aspire to develop surveillance systems to prevent crime and social disorder. Yet in city after city, the initial dream of enacting a preventative system of discipline and social control quickly gives way to shifting rationalizations for CCTV surveillance as a policing mechanism to detect criminal activity after the fact and to make people feel safer on city streets.

Beyond matters pertaining to the disciplinary potential of CCTV surveillance systems, the panoptic metaphor – alongside its popular cousin, Big Brother – also tends to suggest consensual efforts among powerful societal interests to establish mechanisms of surveillance. Rather than a seamless process of coalition building and structural collaboration among powerful societal interests, however, the story of streetscape monitoring programs in Canada is filled with conflict, negotiation, compromise, and adjustment. To be blunt, there is no homogeneous “them” that surveys, or aspires to watch over, a homogeneous “us.” The mythical Big Brother figure that saturates political commentary on public-area CCTV surveillance is in actuality composed of a group of concerned citizens, politicians, police officers, and businesspeople who devote large amounts of their time to addressing crime, fear of crime, vandalism, and violence. Proponents of streetscape monitoring programs are not, of course, all the same: some have personal interests that are motivated by consumer interests, profitability, and the possibility of lower insurance premiums, but many more are motivated by a different set of interests that is less inwardly focused. Throughout the book, it becomes clear that there is no singular interest that propels monitoring initiatives, nor is there a linear path that CCTV advocates follow to design and introduce monitoring programs.

The book is presented in three parts spanning ten chapters. Part 1 is composed of two chapters that introduce the arguments and explain the methods used to enact the history of streetscape monitoring in Canada (Chapter 1); and that conceptualize public-area streetscape CCTV surveillance (Chapter 2). Part 2 presents four chapters that examine streetscape monitoring practices and privacy protection protocols in the province of Quebec and the rise of streetscape monitoring in four French and three Anglo-Canadian cities with the intention of illustrating the ways that monitoring programs have diffused based on formal and informal policy influences. The three substantive chapters comprising the majority of Part 3 examine successful and unsuccessful monitoring initiatives. The final chapter in Part 3 revisits some of the empirical, theoretical, conceptual, and political findings and presents a set of ideal and pragmatic regulatory recommendations oriented toward maximizing progressive trends in the diffusion process. The final chapter also presents responses to five critical public interest questions based on recurrent issues and dilemmas that emerged in interviews over the course of the investigation.

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Acronyms

7/7	7 July 2005 bus and subway bombings in London, England
9/11	11 September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington
Access Act	Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information (Quebec)
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
BCCLA	British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
BIA(s)	business improvement association(s)
BMOB	Bank of Montreal Building (Sudbury, Ontario)
CACP	Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police
CAI	Commission d'accès à l'information
CAU	Crime Analysis Unit (London, Ontario, Police Service)
CAUSE	Citizens' Advisory Committee for Urban Safety Enhancement (Vancouver)
CCAPS	Community, Contract and Aboriginal Policing Services
CCBA	City Centre Business Association (Windsor, Ontario)
CCCS	Coordinating Committee for Community Safety (London, Ontario)
CCRTF	City Centre Revitalization Task Force (Windsor, Ontario)
CCSERT	City Centre Security Enhancement Resource Team (Windsor, Ontario)
CCTV	closed-circuit television
CEDCSC	City's Economic Development and Community Services Committee (Brockville, Ontario)
<i>C.O.P.P.</i>	<i>Challenging Our Patrol Priorities</i> (Hamilton Police Service)
CP Rail	Canadian Pacific Rail
CPSA	Community and Protective Services Committee (London, Ontario)
CPTED	crime prevention through environmental design
CSA	Canadian Standards Association

DERA	Downtown Eastside Residents Association (Vancouver, British Columbia)
DKA	Downtown Kelowna Association
DSCAC	Downtown Surveillance Camera Advisory Committee (London, Ontario)
DSSC	Downtown Safety and Security Committee (Metro Centre, Sudbury, Ontario)
DTES	Downtown Eastside (Vancouver, British Columbia)
ETSSC	Eye on the Street Steering Committee (Thunder Bay, Ontario)
FASE	Friends Against Senseless Endings (London, Ontario)
FIPPA	Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act
FOI	freedom of information
HDBIA	Hamilton Downtown Business Improvement Association
HPS	Hamilton Police Service
HWPSB	Hamilton-Wentworth Police Services Board
IVBIA	International Village Business Improvement Association (Hamilton, Ontario)
LDBA	London Downtown Business Association
LPS	London Police Service (Ontario)
LPSB	London Police Service Board (Ontario)
LVMAC	Lions Video Monitoring Advisory Committee (Sudbury, Ontario)
MADD	Mothers Against Drunk Driving
MFIPPA	Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act
NCPB	National Contract Policing Branch
NSWP	Neighbourhood Safety Watch Program (Vancouver)
NW	Neighbourhood Watch (London, Ontario)
OIPC(s)	Offices of the Information and Privacy Commissioner(s) (provincial)
OPC	Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Canada
OPP	Ontario Provincial Police
PDBIA	Peterborough Downtown Business Improvement Association (Ontario)
PIPEDA	Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
QANGO	quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization
QMI	Quality Management Institute
Quebec Act	Act Respecting Access to Public Documents and the Protection of Personal Privacy

RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SARA	Scanning, Analysis, Research, and Action (committee in Windsor, Ontario)
SCAN	Surveillance Camera Awareness Network
SCC	Safe Community Coalition (Brockville, Ontario)
SQ	Sûreté du Québec
SSHRC	Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
STCC	Stop the Cameras Coalition (Peterborough, Ontario)
SPVM	Service de police de la Ville de Montréal
TAVIS	Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy
V2010-ISU	Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit
VPB	Vancouver Police Board (British Columbia)
VPD	Vancouver Police Department (British Columbia)
VMAC	Video Monitoring Advisory Committee (Sudbury, Ontario)
WPS	Windsor Police Service (Ontario)

Part 1

Streetscape Monitoring Programs in Canada

1

Introduction

Since the 1960s, public-area CCTV surveillance monitoring systems have been used around the world to address crime, fear of crime, and perceptions of social disorder. Interest in CCTV surveillance cameras to monitor city streets and public transit has been especially strong in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on Washington and New York and the 7/7 bus and subway bombings in London. Drawing support from broader trends in the intensification of surveillance in everyday life (see, e.g., Ball and Webster 2003), the international proliferation of claims about the global terrorist threat not only brought into clear view the extent to which routine public activities were monitored by CCTV surveillance cameras before 9/11 but also provided a set of political opportunities for those wishing to expand the scope of CCTV surveillance in public areas after 9/11.

As international awareness of, and support for, CCTV surveillance increased after 9/11, software and hardware developers boosted their efforts to improve the quality and capabilities of video surveillance camera networks. The combination of technological advancement, declining costs, changing perceptions of policing and public space, and the heightened global security environment provided proponents of CCTV surveillance with a greater number of resources in promoting the utility of video surveillance systems and in downplaying (or in some cases trivializing) the importance of civil liberties and personal privacy. This was true for proponents of CCTV surveillance in large urban centres and in small rural communities alike. The 7/7 attacks further increased international interest in public-area CCTV surveillance, based on the indispensable role attributed to CCTV surveillance cameras in identifying the bombers. After 7/7, the international press consistently reported on Britain as the CCTV surveillance capital of the world. It is important to recognize, however, that public-area CCTV surveillance systems have also been established in cities across Europe and in the United States, South Africa, China, Japan, the Middle East, India, Pakistan, Australia,

New Zealand, and Brazil (Norris, McCahill, and Wood 2004; see also Kanashiro 2008).

Canadian cities have not been impervious to global trends in establishing public-area CCTV surveillance systems. Over the past thirty years, proponents of CCTV surveillance in several Canadian cities have introduced monitoring programs to survey public areas such as city streets, municipal parks, pedestrian tunnel passages, and public transit. This book focuses on processes involved in establishing public-area streetscape CCTV surveillance monitoring programs in Canada, including the governance structures and privacy protection policy frameworks that accompanied the expansion of monitoring initiatives, between 1981 and 2005.

Public-area streetscapes encompass the entire area between buildings located on opposing sides of city streets. Elements of the streetscape include sidewalks, landscapes, utilities, roads, businesses, residential properties, rest areas, bus stops, vehicles, vendors, pedestrians, and cyclists. There are currently at least twenty-two Canadian cities running CCTV monitoring programs designed to survey public-area streetscapes. Most of the programs are located in the provinces of Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec (see Appendix A). Compared to some other countries, the number of Canadian cities where CCTV surveillance cameras are used to monitor streetscapes is small. Canada is notable, however, for the number of cities where proposals for streetscape CCTV surveillance systems have been rejected – whether based on public and government discussion and debate, the mobilization of formal protest groups, informal networks of community resistance, short- and long-term funding concerns, or the enactment and execution of privacy laws and policy frameworks.¹ The events of 9/11 and 7/7 continue to influence dialogue and debate about, and justification for, the continuation and expansion of CCTV surveillance systems across the country. But efforts to develop monitoring programs have hitherto demonstrated that neither increasingly available monitoring technologies nor claims about the global terrorist threat guarantee the success of promotional efforts.

Several sociological and criminological investigations of CCTV surveillance in public areas were published in the past fifteen years. The majority of studies investigated CCTV monitoring programs in the United Kingdom (e.g., Webster 2009, 2004; Fussey 2007; Waples and Gill 2006; Gill and Spriggs 2005; Goold 2004; McCahill 2002; Coleman and Sim 2000; Norris and Armstrong 1999; Ditton and Short 1999; Fyfe and Bannister 1998, 1996). Research studies from the United Kingdom yield important insights into the promotion, implementation, applications, and effects of CCTV surveillance, but surveillance systems, and the responses that they elicit, occur differently across sociopolitical and cultural contexts (Hier et al. 2007).

Unlike the United Kingdom, for example, where the Home Office's City Challenge Competitions (1994-99), Crime Reduction Partnership CCTV

Initiative (1999-2003), and crime reduction funding programs entailed investing several billion pounds to support well over 100,000 public-area CCTV surveillance systems (Norris, McCahill, and Wood 2004; Mackay 2003), neither the federal nor the provincial governments in Canada have developed comparable initiatives for establishing public-area monitoring systems generally and streetscape monitoring systems particularly.² The absence of a government policy initiative to encourage monitoring programs in Canadian cities, combined with a set of structural, legislative, pragmatic, and historical challenges encountered by federal and provincial information and privacy commissioners (Bennett 2003), distinguishes Canadian monitoring programs in several respects. In contrast to the United Kingdom, where the central government's CCTV surveillance policy initiative entailed joint-funding schemes between the Home Office and community safety partnership networks (i.e., businesspeople, city councillors, police officers, media personnel) that contributed to the standardization of promotional, planning, and implementation processes (Coleman 2006; Coleman and Sim 2000; see also Webster 2004), Canadian systems have exhibited greater variation. Community partnership networks have been instrumental in setting up several Canadian programs, particularly concerning aspects of funding and the acquisition of monitoring equipment. But grassroots citizen groups, community organizations, and ordinary citizens have also played important roles in mobilizing public and government support for streetscape systems.

The Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) and the provincial Offices of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (OIPCs) offer a basic set of standardized quasi-legal guidelines for the use of public-area video surveillance. The guidelines consist of principles or key issues to assist federal, provincial, and municipal institutions and law enforcement agencies in deciding whether the collection of personal information by means of video surveillance is justified and, if so, how to build privacy protection into monitoring programs. The OPC's *Guidelines for the Use of Video Surveillance of Public Places by Police and Law Enforcement Agencies*³ is a synthesis of OIPC's guidelines that were adopted early in the twenty-first century; it applies to public and private organizations and police and law enforcement agencies (e.g., the Royal Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP]) under federal jurisdiction. The guideline protocols offered by the OIPCs apply to legal institutions (e.g., police, city administration) governed by provincial and municipal privacy protection legislation; their primary purpose is to ensure compliance with standard provincial and municipal legislation.⁴ The principles informing the federal and provincial guidelines include provisions for determining the necessity of video surveillance as a last resort and the importance of conducting privacy impact assessments prior to commencing monitoring activities; public consultations and the legality of monitoring practices; collection of personal information, the formation of

surveillance policies, and design and implementation concerns; and matters pertaining to the access, use, disclosure, auditing, and disposal of surveillance records.⁵

The harmonization of a Canada-wide privacy protection framework on the use of video surveillance by public and private bodies and law enforcement agencies can be traced to privacy protection advocacy work that began in Quebec in 1991. In concert with the Ligue des droits et libertés, the Commission d'accès à l'information (CAI) ruled on the legality of the Sherbrooke Police Service (i.e., a public body) using video surveillance cameras to collect personal information about private citizens in Sherbrooke (see Chapter 3). Within a decade, the CAI's continuing initiative to promote best practices in the design and deployment of public-area CCTV systems, combined with an emergent "privacy pragmatism"⁶ policy orientation promoted by the OIPCs of Ontario (Cavoukian 1998) and British Columbia (Flaherty 1998) in the late 1990s,⁷ contributed to the formal adoption of guidelines applying to the use of surveillance cameras by provincial/municipal institutions in British Columbia (2000), Alberta (2001), Ontario (2001), and Quebec (2002).

Although the privacy protection guidelines have been addressed to some extent in most cities that developed streetscape monitoring programs between 2001 and 2005 (and to an extent in cities that established systems prior to 2001), the design and implementation process remains inconsistent. Canadian streetscape initiatives exhibit considerable variation in terms of the value placed on public consultation and how public consultation is defined; the role of city council endorsement, which is commonly linked to the creation of an auditing or oversight committee, to data-sharing agreements, and to multilateral decision making and responsibility-sharing arrangements; privacy impact assessments and what they entail; the importance attributed to signage; regularity and consistency in monitoring practices and information handling and disposal; and the type of information that informs needs assessment.

One reason why the design of monitoring programs remains inconsistent in the context of a Canada-wide privacy protection framework is that the principles informing the guidelines are neither as clear nor as comprehensive as they could be, leaving them open to multiple interpretations and adaptations. They are vague because OIPCs developed a pragmatic set of principles to be used in diverse communities facing different challenges and concerns. A second reason why the process is inconsistent is that compliance with both the content and the spirit of the guidelines is more voluntary than compulsory. A third, historical reason has to do with the ways that OIPCs have responded to specific monitoring initiatives, to the outcome of and public understanding pertaining to the OPC's effort to challenge the constitutional standing of public-area video surveillance in 2002-3 (see Chapter 5), and to the failure to foster or reinforce a cumulative, empirically informed

policy framework capable of standardizing processes of establishing systems across Canadian cities. Finally, a fourth, supplementary reason concerns the legislative role of information and privacy commissioners in the country more generally. Canadian privacy legislation does not clearly specify the multiple regulatory, advisory, and educational roles that information and privacy commissioners play in privacy protection. In practice, privacy protection agencies as quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations (QANGOs) tend to be proactive rather than reactive and strive to educate rather than regulate (Bennett 2003). Combined with the proliferation of privacy concerns in the twenty-first century (e.g., database security, no-fly lists, identity theft), and the competing demands placed on time and resources, information and privacy commissioners' harmonized privacy protection framework has hitherto failed to standardize how streetscape CCTV surveillance programs are established.

The pragmatic policy framework pertaining to public-area CCTV surveillance in Canada has exercised two discernible influences on the process of establishing streetscape programs in specific cities. First, it has partially enabled people from diverse social locations to stage various forms of resistance to monitoring initiatives. In some cities, people occupying positions of power (e.g., city councillors) have used particular interpretations of privacy protection guidelines and associated legislation to encourage the pragmatic formation of auditing systems, oversight committees, operational manuals, codes of practice, data-sharing agreements, and funding formulas; different interpretations by people in positions of power have been articulated to encourage city officials to opt out of administrative, oversight, and funding responsibilities. In other cities, privacy protection organizations and protest coalitions have directly challenged proposals to install surveillance cameras on city streets. Instances of resistance to streetscape monitoring initiatives, inside and outside city administrations, are significant because they call into question the efficiency, or at least the cultural specificity, that is typically attributed to community safety partnership networks in the promotion and implementation of monitoring programs (see Chapter 2).

The second influence concerns the way that the Canada-wide pragmatic privacy protection policy orientation, in conjunction with a wide range of situational factors at the regional, national, and global levels, has partially enabled proponents of streetscape systems to adopt several approaches to establishing monitoring programs. Despite idiosyncratic variability across Canadian cities (see Chapters 3-9), there has been a general diffusion of streetscape systems (Walby 2006). This diffusion entails the transmission of information about monitoring programs (e.g., funding, ownership, benefits, and effectiveness) through sources such as media reporting, CCTV promotional materials, police statistics, and program spokespersons to CCTV advocates in cities that potentially emulate part or all of existing systems.

Although the diffusion of streetscape monitoring programs has taken place regionally, provincially, nationally, and globally, the diffusion process is neither singular nor consistent. At least three key dimensions in the diffusion of streetscape monitoring programs can be identified. First, there is an ideational diffusion of monitoring programs that usually entails the dissemination of claims about the importance, effectiveness, and benefits of streetscape video surveillance. The ideational diffusion often takes place through news media reporting, but it also takes place through national and regional business improvement association meetings, local and international police association meetings, word of mouth, and, in the case of CCTV advocacy in Sudbury, concerted efforts to promote streetscape monitoring by distributing a range of promotional materials (see Chapter 4).

Second, there is an administrative diffusion that entails the transmission of operational protocols such as data-handling rules and codes of practice and organizational design structures such as oversight committees and auditing committees. The administrative diffusion does not easily graft onto the ideational diffusion of monitoring initiatives, and the data presented throughout the book demonstrate that the administrative design of monitoring systems has been influenced as much by the organizational structures of existing monitoring programs, not all of which were informed by formal policy provisions, as it has by formal privacy protection advocacy and legislation. This is to suggest not that formal policy protection measures are inconsequential for how monitoring systems are planned and promoted, but that they have not been the sole or even the primary influence on system design.

Third, there is a diffusion of the privacy policy framework that was enacted by the privacy policy sector. Formal privacy protection policy was itself a product of diffusion among privacy protection agencies at the federal and provincial levels, and it has diffused inconsistently with administrative structures to influence how systems are designed, for better and for worse. In some cities, the content and the spirit of the recommendations forwarded by the OIPCs have been used to refine operational protocol and organizational design by building privacy protection measures into monitoring systems. The latter refinements usually happen when city administrators become involved in multilateral decision-making and responsibility-sharing models introduced into planning processes. In other cities, however, the recommendations have been selectively used to reinforce operational protocol and organizational design already in place.

Hence, the uneven ideational and administrative diffusion of streetscape monitoring programs has intersected with the uneven policy diffusion to foster progressive and negative trends in how monitoring programs are established in Canada. On the one hand, certain progressive trends in

establishing systems have emerged, whereby increased importance has been granted to consulting members of the public, submitting formal proposals to city councillors, and developing operational guidelines and codes of practice/terms of reference based on municipal and provincial legislation. On the other hand, however, certain negative trends have emerged, whereby proponents have selectively and uncritically drawn from privacy protection measures and existing governance structures in other cities to promote monitoring initiatives and appease OIPCs and dissenters (they also sometimes ignore developments in other monitoring systems altogether). The progressive and negative trends in the diffusion of monitoring systems across the country are not mutually exclusive, and they have been predominantly retroactive rather than proactive: proponents of monitoring programs have not always been ideationally inspired by existing Canadian systems (thereby encouraging a more consistent and cumulative administrative diffusion of monitoring systems); rather, efforts to establish monitoring programs have often entailed seeking out existing systems either to bolster rhetorical promotional support or to respond to various forms of resistance. In other words, what appears to be the ideational and administrative diffusion of streetscape monitoring programs across Canadian cities sometimes has more to do with efforts to consolidate already-existing promotional processes that diffused ideationally from non-Canadian regions (see Chapter 10 for a fuller discussion of the diffusion process).

The flexibility characterizing design and implementation processes matters. A small but growing body of international research examines how effective camera systems are at reducing crime rates, but more fundamental factors such as resource allocation, planning, composition of stakeholders, initial and ongoing funding, and system management also influence the degree to which expectations of monitoring systems will ultimately be realized. Proponents of Canadian streetscape CCTV systems enjoy considerable freedom in determining how monitoring programs are formed as well as the kinds of systems that are adopted and the specific administrative characteristics. This flexibility enables diverse and, at times, unpredictable reactions to monitoring initiatives, inside and outside local governments/city administrations, and it fosters opportunities for journalists, government representatives, businesspeople, privacy advocates, and other Canadians to adopt many influential positions on streetscape CCTV surveillance initiatives.

Beyond the general observation that Canadian monitoring initiatives have diffused from national and global sources, therefore, it is necessary to examine the nuances of how diffusion takes place, what exactly diffuses, inconsistencies in the diffusion process, and how privacy protection policies interact with the governance structures of specific programs. It is also necessary to examine how the organizational and operational structures of existing

monitoring programs intersect with a range of local or regional factors (e.g., claims-making activities, funding availability, local personalities, revitalization activities, policing budgets, crime publicity, protest groups, media coverage, city involvement, CCTV effectiveness studies, the extent to which privacy commissioners and civil libertarians become involved) to articulate the importance and the dangers of streetscape video surveillance.

The aim of this book is threefold. Based on a Canada-wide investigation of public-area streetscape monitoring programs, its first aim is empirical: to understand the processes involved in designing, planning, and implementing streetscape CCTV surveillance programs in Canadian cities. By examining information on cities that have either implemented systems or attempted to implement them, the book provides analyses of the dynamics involved in establishing monitoring programs in Canadian cities of varying sizes and demographic characteristics, city- and coalition-based resistance to initiatives to establish monitoring programs, and the factors involved in rejecting or defeating proposals to install surveillance cameras to monitor city streetscapes. A comparison of thirteen cities with different histories and experiences enables a description of the complexity of relations involved in planning, promoting, and introducing monitoring programs.

The second aim of the book is to contribute a theoretical understanding of establishing streetscape CCTV surveillance programs. Over the past decade, a standard set of arguments has emerged to explain how public-area CCTV surveillance systems generally are developed. Indicative of so-called late-modern crime control strategies (Garland 2001), the basic argument is that international trends toward preventative crime control strategies have transpired, whereby older patterns of addressing the social dimensions of crime (e.g., poverty) have given way to situational controls and risk-based strategies to reduce opportunities for crime to happen. The intensification of surveillance in everyday life after 9/11 and 7/7 surely supports these general arguments. What is potentially problematic about this framework, however, is that it has been explained in the context of neoliberal managerial forces, prioritizing cost-effective, prudent business and community partnership networks in the *consensual* promotion and implementation of streetscape CCTV surveillance practices. Shared material interests, so the argument goes, bring together businesspeople, politicians, police, and journalists, who collectively lay claim to risks and dangers of public areas and city streetscapes and who, without difficulty, convince members of the public and other stakeholders that surveillance cameras are vital to ensuring public security and personal safety (see Chapter 2).

There is no reason to deny that material interests figure strongly in the process of establishing Canadian monitoring programs. The information presented in this book indicates, however, that a less essentialist and more comprehensive framework needs to be formulated to explain the diversity

of interests in, and the inconsistent outcomes of, efforts to establish monitoring systems. By relying on managerial strategies as a point to begin analysis, regardless of how accurately the managerial framework explains CCTV surveillance programs in certain cities inside and outside Canada, we run the risk of overlooking the diversity of responses to streetscape CCTV surveillance initiatives in Canadian cities.

The third aim of the book is to develop a stronger set of resources capable of informing how monitoring initiatives are designed. Based on systematic and comparative empirical analyses, the findings are used to reflect critically on CCTV surveillance policy and design structure and to explore a number of arguments that will help academics, privacy advocates, and community-based interests to assess the strengths and weaknesses of establishing streetscape monitoring systems (see Chapter 10). The overall purpose of the book is not to encourage an either/or position on streetscape CCTV surveillance – that is, city representatives either should or should not establish monitoring programs – but to examine the different aspects of establishing monitoring systems that may be seen as progressive or negative, depending on where individuals are situated in the debate. The primary aim of strengthening understanding of streetscape monitoring programs is to foster a well-informed dialogue about the implications of, and different dimensions involved in, introducing monitoring programs to survey city streetscapes and to identify aspects of good practice in streetscape CCTV surveillance planning, promotion, design, and implementation.

The Study

Data for this study were gathered during a six-year investigation of how Canadian streetscape CCTV surveillance programs have been established (2003-9).⁸ The process of establishing streetscape CCTV surveillance programs is conceptualized in two interrelated ways: first, in terms of the multidimensional decision-making and planning processes involved in efforts to develop specific monitoring programs, regardless of whether or not they are implemented; second, in terms of the general policy, promotional, and governance dynamics observed across Canada between 1981 and 2005. In certain cities where programs were introduced prior to 2005, operational issues as they pertain to design processes are also addressed.

The study was serendipitously set in motion when the Hamilton Police Service announced its intention to develop a CCTV surveillance system to monitor downtown streetscapes in Hamilton, Ontario. Early in 2002, the *Hamilton Spectator* reported that the Hamilton Police Service intended to install five CCTV surveillance cameras to survey downtown streetscapes. The initiative emerged in the context of a downtown revitalization campaign that played out in the local press as well as a publicized robbery involving an athlete competing in the Canadian Figure Skating Championships (see

Chapter 7). In April 2002, members of the Hamilton Police Service initiated a series of public forums to gather feedback on what they described as a CCTV surveillance proposal. Incidentally, the consultations took place after five cameras and eight monitors had already been acquired. I attended several of the forums and soon developed an interest in monitoring programs and practices.

The study began with two simple research questions: Where are public-area streetscape CCTV surveillance monitoring programs located in Canada? How are public-area streetscape CCTV surveillance monitoring programs developed? These initial questions were posed because, after consulting the international research literature, I discovered that the rapid expansion of video surveillance in some other countries was not taking place in Canada. It also seemed likely that community partnership initiatives to install surveillance cameras on city streets – in the absence of standardized state funding and legitimization – would attract considerable public outcry. It followed that there must be certain promotional dynamics involved in convincing members of the Canadian public (including police officers, politicians, businesspeople, and community representatives) that installing surveillance cameras to survey city streetscapes is a legitimate and necessary crime control measure.

After a cursory investigation of Canadian cities that were running monitoring programs, it became apparent that streetscape CCTV initiatives were neither always driven by police and government nor always met with public approval. Members of the research team⁹ came across the case of London, Ontario, for example, where a citizens' group formed in response to the murder of a young person and lent symbolic support for the establishment of London's Downtown Camera Project (see Chapter 6). We also became aware of the streetscape CCTV system in Sudbury, Ontario, where surveillance cameras were installed to survey city streets without clear evidence of public consultation or engagement (see Chapter 4). We learned that a streetscape CCTV surveillance proposal was rejected in Brockville, Ontario, after a critical editorial campaign staged by local journalists helped to articulate a short-lived episode of civic resistance (see Chapter 8). And we discovered that a group called Stop the Cameras Coalition was instrumental in resisting plans to install streetscape cameras in downtown Peterborough, Ontario (see Chapter 8). Clearly, the unproblematic community partnership relationships theorized among police, politicians, members of the public, and the press in the CCTV literature did not uniformly apply to streetscape CCTV surveillance programs in Canada.

Prior to investigating the complexity of responses to streetscape CCTV surveillance initiatives, our first task was primarily empirical and demographic: to find out where streetscape surveillance programs were running in Canada, where they were being considered, and where proposals had

been defeated or rejected. The scope of streetscape CCTV surveillance programs was initially determined through comprehensive print media searches, Internet searches, and a questionnaire distributed to some Canadian police forces.¹⁰ When members of the research team entered the field and began to conduct interviews (see below), streetscape initiatives were also discovered through a snowballing effect, whereby the existence of programs was conveyed through word of mouth. The study revealed at least twenty-two Canadian cities where streetscape CCTV monitoring programs were operating and dozens of cities where proponents of monitoring programs had either started to develop plans for public-area streetscape CCTV surveillance or, in some instances, where proposals to install surveillance cameras on city streets were rejected.

The primary data-gathering method involved semi-structured interviews in cities where streetscape CCTV proposals or programs had been initiated. Interviewees were initially identified through available documents as well as contacts made via telephone with police, representatives at city halls, and members of community organizations. The purpose of the interviews was to create a social history of how streetscape CCTV surveillance programs in Canada are established. Because no study of the development of Canadian monitoring programs existed, an oral history of monitoring systems was developed to supplement the limited number of documents that could be obtained via the Internet. The interviewing process, in turn, contributed to the collection of a large set of reports, proposals, organizational communications, and operating guidelines.

In each city investigated, as many people as possible were interviewed to develop the most reliable set of findings as well as to produce a set of findings that would enable cross-checks and verification of claims and evidence. In practice, this meant seeking out interviews with representatives of community organizations, shelters, police, politicians, mayors, program managers, businesspeople, lawyers, and privacy advocates. Flexibility in the interview selection process proved valuable: although almost all interviewees identified crime reduction as the main reason for supporting streetscape CCTV surveillance initiatives, there is considerable diversity in patterns of identifying which social problems require attention and what proponents of monitoring systems expect of CCTV surveillance.

Police, for example, primarily but not exclusively promote or endorse CCTV as a tool to assist in detection and investigation after a crime has occurred (and to provide evidence for court proceedings), although they often speak publicly about CCTV as a crime prevention tool. Conversely, members of business communities tend to support CCTV surveillance systems for purposes of crime prevention, as they are generally more interested in preventing damage to property than they are in policing damage to property after it has occurred (although, in discussions with business representatives,

there was often a conflation between understandings of crime prevention and prosecution). And city councillors generally tend to support CCTV surveillance as a means to enhance the quality of downtown areas, which often means seeking to regulate panhandling, vagrancy, loitering, youth, nuisance, and potential vandals. While typical police, business, and council interests overlap in several respects (and intersect with industry interests), the general differences are important to keep in mind because they figure into processes of planning and funding monitoring systems.

The interviews, which numbered more than 300 and spanned more than forty cities, involved a combination of telephone and in-person semi-structured sessions.¹¹ Interviews ranged from fifteen minutes to three hours. All interviews were recorded, and key interviews were transcribed. The study began with the assumption that in-person interviews would be the most effective way to generate data, and we decided to visit every city running a monitoring program. We also reasoned that on-site visits would facilitate a familiarity with communities, streetscapes, local cultures, cameras, monitoring stations, and interviewees that could not be realized over the telephone. In the process of setting up in-person interviews, however, we discovered that several people were willing and eager to talk on the spot. We also discovered that telephone interviews revealed information about the history of monitoring initiatives that was equally as useful as information from in-person meetings and that they helped us to focus our time and efforts better by strengthening our understanding of key actors, events, factors, and interests prior to travelling to cities. In some instances, initial telephone interviews were sufficient to develop the social history of monitoring initiatives, while others required follow-up and in-person meetings with members of the research team.

Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured interview schedule. A standard set of questions pertaining to the origin of efforts to install monitoring programs, details of proposed or actual systems, privacy concerns, operational guidelines, regulation, and funding was used. The physical sites where in-person interviews were held ranged from alleyways in the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver to boardrooms, pubs, personal residences, and, in more than one instance, “on the go,” talking while walking down city streets (and under surveillance cameras). Telephone interviews were conducted with people in their homes, in their offices, and, in more than one instance, in their automobiles.

In addition to interviews and analyses of available documents, we conducted analyses of the Canadian print media, the partial results of which appear in Greenberg and Hier (2009). And a large amount of material was gathered through freedom of information (FOI) requests directed at a number of agencies and organizations: the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Canada, the Department of Justice, Transport Canada,

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the RCMP, and several municipal police forces and city administrations. The FOI requests produced thousands of pages of documents, ranging from municipal operational protocols to internal memoranda in federal government agencies.

The initial intention of the study was to present findings on every Canadian city that initiated efforts to develop streetscape CCTV surveillance monitoring programs. By the end of the primary data-gathering stage, however, it became clear that an empirically based, comprehensive portrait would be overwhelming to readers. Rather than sacrificing depth for breadth, the book examines the foundations of establishing CCTV surveillance programs in Canada. That is, it presents information to explain the main developments in establishing streetscape monitoring that form not only the bases for the ideational and administrative diffusion of monitoring programs across the country but also the privacy protection policy framework that developed in response to monitoring systems.

Most researchers are aware that the decision to leave the field and start preparing results is never easy. After years of intensive but partitioned interviewing, as well as full print media analyses and primary and secondary data collection and analyses, a sufficient amount of information had been collected to offer a useful and original assessment of establishing monitoring systems across the country. What follows is a set of findings that comprise the first comprehensive effort to understand and explain Canadian public-area streetscape CCTV surveillance monitoring programs.

2

Establishing Streetscape Monitoring Programs

Over the past decade, a small group of sociologists and criminologists started to examine the dynamics involved in promoting public-area CCTV surveillance systems. Investigations into what is commonly referred to as open-street, high-street, city-centre, and urban video surveillance systems led to many progressive insights that supplemented earlier investigations into the applications and effects of CCTV surveillance monitoring practices. What has been missing from the literature on the ways that monitoring programs are established, however, is a clear conceptual explanation for what public-area, and specifically public-area streetscape, CCTV surveillance systems actually are.

The first portion of this chapter explains CCTV surveillance and conceptualizes public-area CCTV surveillance systems. To provide some context for the empirical analyses presented in Chapters 3 to 9, special, albeit brief, attention is also granted to the use of video surveillance cameras by Canadian police forces in the 1970s and 1980s. Next, public-area CCTV surveillance and private-area CCTV surveillance are differentiated, and public-area streetscape CCTV surveillance monitoring programs are conceptualized. The focus is on monitoring programs designed to survey public-area streetscapes to differentiate formal streetscape monitoring programs, regardless of who operates or assumes ownership of them, from private applications of CCTV surveillance in public places. Examples of the latter include owners of private businesses who focus their cameras on public-area streetscapes, private citizens who use cell-phone cameras to capture images of public-area streetscapes, and security personnel working for private security firms who use surveillance technologies (e.g., camera phones) to record public-area streetscape activities.

The second portion of the chapter reviews the main explanatory frameworks that have been developed to account for how public-area streetscape CCTV monitoring programs are established. Reminiscent of trends in the surveillance literature generally (see Haggerty 2006), the most influential

explanations for public-area CCTV surveillance have reproduced variations on the logic of panoptical power. That is, analysts have reproduced variations on the argument that CCTV surveillance monitoring programs represent an asymmetrical power relationship, whereby privileged members of society impose systems of surveillance on the general population for purposes of furthering their own material agendas and interests. There is some empirical justification for this argument, but a less essentialist framework that can account for the complexity of interests and relations involved in establishing Canadian streetscape monitoring programs is developed.

Conceptualizing CCTV Surveillance

CCTV surveillance refers to the use of closed-circuit television systems for the purpose of surveying a wide range of human and non-human phenomena. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, CCTV surveillance has been primarily associated with crime control in popular discourse. The applications of CCTV surveillance, however, range from wildlife research to surgery.

Technologically, CCTV systems differ from broadcast video, whereby video images and audio tracks are converted into signals and transmitted on an open-circuit system (e.g., traditional television). In CCTV systems, signals from a video source – a camera – are transmitted by direct connection through coaxial or fibre optic cables to receiving equipment (e.g., recorders, television screens, computer monitors) to create a closed circuit that is not easily accessible from outside the system (Matchett 2003). More recently, point-to-point wireless links have granted outside users easier access to monitoring networks. Although encrypted wireless systems are not theoretically closed-circuit systems, neither are they readily accessible to any interested party.

Surveillance by means of analogue and, to a lesser extent, digital CCTV was widespread in a variety of social locations by the close of the twentieth century. Yet it was not until the 1960s that images from a camera could be captured without requiring chemical processing. As early as 1956, Ampex introduced the Ampex VRX-1000, the first commercially available videotape recorder. It was priced at approximately \$50,000 US, which effectively restricted its use to mass-media institutions. Close to a decade later, Sony produced more affordable reel-to-reel home technologies, and in the 1970s Sony's Betamax squared off against JVC's Video Home System (VHS) in the so-called format wars. As the 1970s came to a close, home videotape recorders gained mass-market appeal, and in the early 1980s digital video appeared on the market. Technological advancement, in other words, combined with growing market demand, facilitated the expanding applications of imaging technologies.

The potential benefits of newly emerging video surveillance technologies were not lost on Canadian police forces. Caught up in the intensification of

policing technologies and bureaucratic expansion throughout the 1960s and 1970s, police across the country utilized video technologies. In 1973, for example, police officers in London, Ontario, used a CCTV camera to monitor a hotel room believed to be a common gaming house. In the late 1970s, Vancouver police started to videotape impaired drivers taking sobriety tests – based on earlier practices in Vernon, British Columbia. In 1980, the police in Calgary used a video camera to record an accused murderer’s re-enactment of a crime scene (Metheson 1986). Beginning in 1983, the police in Ontario used video surveillance equipment in public washrooms to apprehend gay men cruising in so-called tearooms (Walby 2009). Cameras were used for general crowd surveillance by police forces in the late 1980s. And as video surveillance became increasingly popular, Canadian police forces used video cameras for a growing number of reasons, including lineups, eyewitness testimony, witness interviews, crime scenes, confessions, and cell-block surveillance (Metheson 1986).

What is notable about instances of police applications of video surveillance technologies throughout the 1970s and 1980s is that they entailed targeted, non-continuous surveillance practices. Whether overt or covert in nature, monitoring practices were temporary, event-specific, and primarily conducted in private (hotels) or semi-private (police headquarters) spaces. As technological developments enabled more effective surveillance practices in the 1980s, and as costs associated with monitoring equipment declined and the video surveillance industry expanded, the role of CCTV surveillance systems in policing practices changed. Caught up in wider transformations in policing that took place with advances in, and the incorporation of, information and communication technologies generally (see Haggerty and Ericson 1997), police use of video surveillance technologies quickly became routine rather than atypical (e.g., traffic lights, photo radar, patrol cars, interrogation rooms). Nevertheless, the culture of policing influences police applications of surveillance technologies as much as surveillance technologies influence the culture of policing (Manning 1992), and there is no reason to believe that police will adopt CCTV surveillance systems simply because monitoring technologies are available.

By the early 1990s, the use of camera-based surveillance technologies extended far beyond the institution of policing. Reminiscent of international trends in the use of visual surveillance technologies in public and private spaces, Canadians arguably normalized the ubiquitous gaze of CCTV cameras with the proliferation of camera technologies in airports, hospitals, shopping malls, corner stores, grocery stores, schools, government buildings, and, more recently, buses and trains. Of course, current camera-based surveillance practices are not limited to public and commercial spaces, and their applications are far greater than policing and security. Cell-phone cameras, spy cameras, wireless baby cameras, and Internet cameras are among the expanding variety

of technologies available for use by ordinary citizens in the course of their daily affairs. Rear-view car cameras, residential home cameras, miniature covert cameras, and even personal mobile wearable computer cameras are growing in popularity. While surveillance camera technologies are still used primarily in the private commercial sector (Goold 2004), accompanying growing trends in private-sector, personal, and police camera surveillance use have been public-area CCTV surveillance networks.

Public-Area CCTV Surveillance

What is public-area CCTV surveillance? Although the terms “public” and “private” are widely and uncritically used in common parlance and academic research, their meanings are neither given nor static. Because the meanings of, and the boundaries drawn between, public and private change across time and space, it is necessary to understand the general notions of publicity and privacy as multi-faceted, protean, and variable.

In a generic sense, the term “public area” denotes open democratic spaces where people, irrespective of their identities or ascribed characteristics, are able to come together to meet, interact, associate, organize, or be left alone to pursue their individual or collective interests in a manner that is relatively unregulated or unrestricted. Public areas are relatively unregulated or unrestricted because most Canadians, for example, have come to rely on their constitutional rights to be able to gather, associate, interact, or otherwise enter into publicly designated areas independent of excessive intrusion by state agents, private interests, or other citizens, but they do not extend this expectation to unlimited freedoms to act or present themselves in any manner that they wish (e.g., nude sunbathing on a public sidewalk). In one sense, then, public areas are determined by the degree to which a person is able to gain access to certain spatial zones in the relative absence of interference by individuals or groups seeking to lay a proprietary claim to public space.

Although public areas are physical places – and most sociologists and criminologists refer to the physical dimension when they discuss public-area surveillance – that is not all they are. Public areas are also symbolically meaningful democratic spaces, domains, or spheres where associational life and sociability happen. In a world where public spaces (in the physical sense) are increasingly being replaced with publicly and privately funded roadways, shopping malls, and housing projects, and where the colonization of public space by private interests (e.g., the proliferation of billboards) has become commonplace, the symbolic value and emotive significance of public areas as physical meeting places and locations of democratic interactivity have heightened. When government agencies, for example, act in the collective, public interest to preserve the physical and socio-symbolic dimensions of publicly designated areas, and when activists lobby the government to protect public spaces, a third – political – dimension of public

areas is invoked. Here the government is understood to act on behalf of the public good, holding back private economic interests and market forces (some of which might be state driven). The preservation of the public interest as a political entity is, in this regard, oriented toward utilitarian ends that are spatial and symbolic in character.

It follows that the meaning of public areas is influenced by interrelated assumptions about physical, symbolic, and politically contestable space. This tripartite notion of public areas is presupposed by an understanding of, or implies a concomitant set of contrasting notions about, private areas. Like public areas, private areas are composed of physical locations, symbolically meaningful spaces of interaction (some of which relate to hermeneutic personal space around the body), and political struggles. In contrast to public areas, which are defined by normative ideals of democratic interaction and relative openness, private areas are characterized by normative restrictions and limited access, and they are conditioned by proprietary rights and claims to ownership. Whether by virtue of ownership or standards that are mutually (and symbolically) recognized and respected, private areas are relatively restricted spaces to which only a certain number of people are generally permitted access (and for which only a certain number of people set the rules of access). Private areas are relatively regulated in that they are based on standards of exclusion, but people are not entirely free to do what they wish in private areas (e.g., when development projects on private property contravene public zoning bylaws).

What becomes clear from the conceptual distinction between public and private areas is that the notions of public and private, although often understood in terms of idealized or fixed spaces of physicality, sociability, and politicization, blur into one another and intersect in multiple and sometimes conflicting ways. Not only are the meanings of public and private areas contextual, then, but they are also interactive and mutually constitutive. For example, members of the Canadian public regularly enter and use public parks, yet they expect to enjoy a certain degree of personal privacy in these public areas. It is not unreasonable to speculate that young lovers enjoying a picnic in a public park would feel that their privacy was compromised if a stranger sat a few yards away from their blanket and stared at them or took their picture.

To offer a more contextual example, residents in cities across Canada often support private businesses who fund CCTV surveillance cameras to monitor publicly designated areas from remote public or private locations (and, more often than not, monitoring stations in Canada are not accessible to members of the public). Sometimes, privately funded cameras purchased with the intention to monitor publicly designated areas are mounted on buildings owned by private businesses (spaces, moreover, that are sometimes rented with public funds). Interestingly, the common explanation for why citizens

support privately funded cameras to monitor public areas is to protect their right to move in public spaces without excessive intrusion on their personal privacy and their right to be left alone in public (e.g., by excessive and, perhaps, aggressive panhandlers). To extend the example further, privately funded cameras on public streets sometimes have the technological capability to gaze into private residences and public offices – that is, into public and private spaces where it is conceivable that internal public or private cameras watch over employees and clients. The latter applications of CCTV surveillance could be understood as an affront to one's personal expectations of privacy or public interest, depending on the context and scale of surveillance.

Suffice it to say that common-sense understandings of public and private areas, while seemingly straightforward, are complicated. We live in a world of hybridized public and private areas and associations whose substance and meaning are constantly changing (Sheller and Urry 2003). The hybridity of public-private space makes it difficult to define in absolute or fixed terms what public areas are. On a theoretical level, one of the most fundamental distinctions that can be made between public and private conditions pertains to one's inner self/body versus the outer bodily space of the social and physical world (Madanipour 2003). On a practical level, however, assumptions about social, spatial, and symbolic fixity that are required to maintain an absolute distinction between public and private areas fail to recognize fully that the private citizen, her images, and her information enter public and private areas in complex and multi-faceted ways. Such assumptions also fail to recognize fully that intersections of what is normatively understood by public and private areas manifest in multi-faceted symbolic and material ways and that they pose implications for expectations pertaining to individuals' rights to be left alone physically, socially, symbolically, and informationally.

Given the explanatory difficulties associated with adopting an absolute position on conditions of privacy, their protective measures, and their concomitant states of publicity, a useful starting point to conceptualize public-area CCTV surveillance programs is to examine the articulated intentions of monitoring practices and systems rather than their specific applications to supposedly static public domains. Examining articulated intentions implies the need to develop an understanding of the various interpretations, claims, and values attributed to public areas and how they figure into planning, designing, and deciding whether or not to implement a CCTV surveillance system to monitor certain spatial locations. Most proponents of public-area CCTV monitoring programs agree on the physical or spatial parameters to be surveyed. What they fail to agree on is the degree of privacy that should be afforded in public spaces, how best to maximize citizens' democratic freedom to interact in a relatively unrestricted manner, the extent

to which problems exist in these spaces, and the degree to which surveillance cameras will reduce alleged problems.

We are left, therefore, with two primary dimensions informing popular understandings of public areas – the spatial and the symbolic – and it is at the intersection of these normative dimensions that public areas become politically contestable. It is also at the political intersection of the spatial and symbolic dimensions of public areas where the analyses of establishing public-area streetscape CCTV surveillance programs commence. Because the significance of public-area streetscapes is not simply logically given on the basis of demarcating parameters of physical space, but also symbolically negotiated through shared meanings, it is important to understand how public-area streetscapes, their characteristics, and their supposed dangers are constructed or defined prior to being recognized as spatial locations that require the implementation of a CCTV surveillance monitoring program. Youth vagrancy, panhandling, and what are commonly identified as anti-social behaviours, for example, do not become problematic phenomena linked to certain physical spaces on the basis of their inherently defiant character. Rather, certain activities, their perpetrators, and the geographies where they transpire acquire particular meanings and, in the case of public areas, reputations through sociocultural processes of claims making, typification, and definitional struggle. As the information presented in this book demonstrates, a considerable amount of public-area streetscape CCTV surveillance promotional and decision-making activity in Canada involves normatively and ideologically charged claims about the problematic status of youth, homeless people, and public intoxication in certain spatial zones as well as the utility of video surveillance camera networks, practices, and images to deal with them.

By focusing the analyses on CCTV surveillance programs that survey, or articulate the primary intention of surveying, public-area streetscapes, monitoring of other public areas such as parks, parking lots, and public buildings where citizens commonly interact under the gaze of surveillance cameras is placed in the background of analysis. There are several reasons why the focus is on public-area streetscape CCTV surveillance programs. First, there are simply far too many CCTV surveillance practices in public areas (e.g., parks, schools, government buildings, municipal parking garages) to analyze and present in a coherent, concise, and sociologically convincing manner. Second, public-area streetscapes and their immediate surroundings are commonly attributed with diverse meanings and significance. Public-area streetscapes can be spaces of democratic interaction, and this possibility makes efforts to regulate certain forms of sociability (loitering), while encouraging others (shopping), significant. Public-area streetscapes also serve as people's homes and, in some instances, places of refuge. Third, public-area streetscapes are often necessary arteries of movement to gain access to essential services

such as health care, banking, groceries, and education. In other words, a person can often avoid a public park or a public parking lot, but it is more difficult to avoid certain city streetscapes where essential services are offered. And fourth, by foregrounding streetscapes as public areas targeted for CCTV surveillance, insights can be gleaned into the ways that different spatial locations are imbued with normative meanings, reified in local policy, operational, or community discourse, and acted on through techniques of spatial regulation. That is, how public spaces in the physical sense take on symbolic meanings as dangerous locations through politicized claims-making activities can be explained. The analyses also show how proponents of CCTV surveillance seek to act on certain physical spaces and some of the people who use them, partially based on symbolically constructed images or moral geographies that emerge in the decision-making and planning stages.

Establishing Streetscape Monitoring Programs¹

Three general approaches characterize research on public-area streetscape CCTV surveillance. The most common approach seeks to understand the application and effects of camera monitoring practices. Whereas a relatively small set of researchers measures the effects of camera monitoring practices on crime rates and the displacement of crime (e.g., Waples and Gill 2006; Gill and Spriggs 2005; Welsh and Farrington 2005, 2004a, 2004b, 2003; Gill 2003), a larger set of researchers theorizes CCTV surveillance as a means to extend disciplinary forms of crime prevention and social control (e.g., Ditton and Short 1999; Fyfe and Bannister 1998, 1996; Davis 1990; see also Garland 2001 and Reeve 1998).

As Hier et al. (2007) (see also Hier, Walby, and Greenberg 2006 and Hier 2004) explain, the metaphor of the panopticon has been especially appealing to researchers interested in the disciplinary effects of public-area streetscape CCTV surveillance. The panopticon is an architectural design proposed by Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century to facilitate the supervision of prisoners from a central location. The idea of the panoptic prison consisted of an inspection tower surrounded by a semi-circular structure that housed inmates in separate cells. Each cell was to be made available to the unidirectional gaze of the inspectors, and the utility of panoptic supervision was based on assumptions of uncertainty. Prisoners would not be aware of when inspectors were watching, and a state of uncertainty induced by the visible and unverifiable expression of power ensured the normalization of discipline and self-control. The panopticon, in other words, was an expression of power that simultaneously totalized and individualized the population.

The physical character of public-area streetscape CCTV surveillance understandably invites comparisons to panoptic supervision. CCTV surveillance is regularly understood to involve a small group of people whose presence is inferred but unverifiable by those under the gaze of surveillance cameras.

A small group of inspectors, so the argument goes, watch over a larger group of people in an asymmetrical relation of power and social control. One of the most prominent arguments against the use of the panoptic metaphor, however, is that streetscape CCTV surveillance does not function as a mechanism to maintain a state of complete societal visualization. Investigations of daily CCTV control-room applications in the United Kingdom, for example, have concluded that CCTV surveillance operators tend to focus attention on certain individuals and groups (youth, homeless persons, black men) by using visual cues (clothing) to infer a person's moral character and whether his presence in a particular public place (a shopping area) is normatively appropriate (Goold 2004; Norris and Armstrong 1999; see also McCahill 2002 and Williams and Johnstone 2000). Whether moralized targeting practices are a feature of streetscape monitoring activities in Canadian cities is an empirical question necessitating detailed ethnographic analyses of control-room activities and organizational structures. Suffice it to say, however, that streetscape CCTV surveillance promotional efforts in Canada have tended to single out specific populations as problematic.

Whereas ethnographic research has documented some of the routine daily *applications* and *effects* of CCTV monitoring programs, a second line of inquiry has sought to understand and explain the processes involved in *establishing* streetscape CCTV monitoring systems (e.g., Hier et al. 2007; Hier, Walby, and Greenberg 2006; Goold 2004; Hier 2004). One of the most influential arguments pertaining to establishment processes was developed by Coleman and Sim (2000), who argue that the promotion of streetscape CCTV in Liverpool involved the social construction of moral visions oriented toward recasting and promoting the city as a safe place to do business (see also Coleman 2006, 2005, 2003a, 2003b). Drawing on media coverage and interviews with local business and government officials, Coleman and Sim explain how the establishment of Liverpool's CCTV network involved members of the City Centre Business Partnership constructing and promoting definitions of urban risk that would resonate with the public and reverberate in new crime control policies.

Coleman and Sim (2000, 626) conceptualize Liverpool's CCTV surveillance program in terms of neoliberal patterns of consumption and leisure to argue that the city's monitoring program was predicated on business interests of "attracting capital and people of the right sort." This sequence of processes, they continue, functioned as social-ordering strategies that sorted responsibilized and prudent individual consumers from undesirable outsiders, the latter necessitating containment, control, and ultimately symbolic expurgation from the imaginary boundaries of the city. They maintain that local elites, acting in unison, capitalized on effective coalition building and *a priori* privileged media access. This enabled the elites, say Coleman and Sim,

to construct visions of urban renewal involving the marginalization of undesirable individuals whose images and identities could not be reconciled with the new, consumer-friendly, post-industrial Liverpool. Coleman and Sim conclude that a “consensual world-view” (636) pertaining to the implementation of Liverpool’s CCTV program was consolidated on the basis of what amounted to structural-cultural advantage in the primary definition or preferred framing of urban risk and moral turpitude. Coleman and Sim’s (2000) analysis offers an important step forward in the CCTV surveillance literature for at least two reasons. First, it effectively displaces the panoptic paradigm by exploring the discursive processes through which streetscape CCTV initiatives are consolidated. They provide a valuable case study concerned with the material and ideological dimensions of establishing streetscape CCTV programs, and they shift analytical attention away from the technological effects or applications of CCTV surveillance to prioritize the human interactions involved in establishing monitoring programs. Second, their interview data illustrate that business/elite interests occupy an important position in establishing and maintaining CCTV surveillance programs. Not only does this address consumerism as a significant dimension of streetscape camera surveillance systems, but it also suggests that monitoring programs are often tied to material relations and interests.

Notwithstanding these important and progressive insights, however, Coleman and Sim’s (2000) framework is also problematic for at least three inter-related empirical, theoretical, and political reasons. First, by focusing attention on how local elite partnerships are constructed on the basis of ideological and material interests, they neglect the identities and possible roles played by people who do not occupy so-called elite social positions in CCTV surveillance promotion. Following Norris and Armstrong (1999), they contend that CCTV surveillance entails the exercise of power with “a number of dimensions” (624). Yet on the basis of their methodological strategies (interviews with official sources exclusively), they attend overwhelmingly to how the new business elite collaborate with police and political officials to further their material interests at the expense of undesirable others. The promotion of streetscape CCTV programs, however, sometimes involves the participation of ordinary people (e.g., members of citizens’ initiative groups) whose interests and goals may or may not be consistent with the interests and goals of official institutional actors.

Second, on a theoretical level, the validity of Coleman and Sim’s (2000) analysis remains contingent on a leap of faith concerning the extent to which a single (consumer) subject position was constituted in light of what may conceivably have been perceived by members of the public as the erosion of personal privacy and an infringement on the right to enjoy the unobstructed use of public space (Hier 2004). By relying on the explanatory

purchase of the claims-making activities of primary definers, they invest power in the specific ideological contents of elite/media discourses. Not only does this reproduce the same kind of subject determinism found in asymmetrical conceptions of the exercise of panoptic power, but it also ignores the significance of possible counter-discourses, acts of resistance, and ultimately the potential failure of responsibilization strategies to consolidate and maintain high levels of public consent.

And third, politically, Coleman and Sim pursue a line of inquiry that essentially limits neoliberalism to an instrumental, materialist project devoted to the expansion of capitalist relations through the promotion of consumerist ideology. As they argue,

The cameras were therefore crucial to ... the “social construction of suspicion” – a process that was increasingly left to emergent “primary definers” from the private sector. This involved an instrumental drive that *prioritized profit and loss* underpinned by the construction of a preferred and particular moral order built on the politics of inclusionary respectability and exclusionary otherness. (Coleman and Sim 2000, 629; emphasis added)

Agents and agencies of the neo-liberal state are constructing the boundaries and possibilities of the new urban frontier while simultaneously engaging in a project of social control that will have far-reaching consequences for how we understand the meanings of public space, social justice, and the parameters of state power. (Coleman 2003a, 12; emphasis added)

While they acknowledge that the production of moral visions is central to neoliberal projects, the moral dimensions of neoliberalism are reduced to epiphenomena of private capital. In contrast to more complex formulations that conceptualize neoliberalism as entailing ongoing processes with contingent outcomes (e.g., Hall 1988), Coleman and Sim conceptualize neoliberalism generally, and CCTV surveillance specifically, as part of a coherent state strategy aimed at re-establishing (or consolidating) the conditions for sustained capitalist accumulation.

The Problematics of Establishing Streetscape Monitoring Programs

Similar to many other public policy issues, streetscape CCTV surveillance becomes invested with social meaning and significance through the many ways that social problems and their perceived surveillance solutions are constructed, understood, contested, and modified through claims and counter-claims. The role of mainstream news and popular media is of marked importance. Media outlets construct and purvey the images that embody and represent perceived social problems (e.g., crime, anti-social behaviour,

nuisance, terrorism), and images of social problems signify social disorder or threat through the constitution of certain subject positions (e.g., street thugs, terrorists). These representational processes involve the mediation of a narrow range of images used to justify or rationalize the institutionalization and, at times, intensification of streetscape CCTV systems. They also specify how socially constructed problems become recognizable and actionable through the limits and modalities of media framing.

Prior to, and contemporaneous with, the production of rationalizing and legitimizing discourses in news media, however, images or typifications of social problems requiring CCTV surveillance solutions also result from definitional struggles among groups of people with different interests and goals. Although diverse groups of people may seek to influence or interpret public policy and/or public opinion on CCTV surveillance in some way, they are not all driven by material or instrumental objectives, and they do not all enjoy institutional positions of power and influence. Theoretical arguments pertaining to structural or cultural advantage as the independent variable in mediated definitional struggle are, consequently, insufficient to explain the dynamics of framing contests over social problems and CCTV policy solutions.

To formulate a sufficient framework to explain how Canadian streetscape monitoring programs are designed, it is important to attend to the varied alliances, rationalities, techniques, and antagonisms that characterize the promotion and implementation of monitoring systems in the context of the diffusion of governance structures and privacy protection frameworks (see Chapter 1). Developing certain streetscape monitoring systems involves the primary definitions of business partners, who identify specific segments of the population (e.g., panhandlers, prostitutes, loiterers) or specific spatial areas as problems requiring extraordinary attention and policing. But police, politicians, and ordinary citizens also attempt to establish monitoring systems using similar techniques of problematization that cannot be explained in terms of business and material interests. Moreover, attempts to establish monitoring programs are as much about enabling citizens to go about their lives free from real or imagined threats in public areas as they are about managing the population to serve certain materialist ends. This is not to suggest that attempts to enact monitoring programs are always benign; rather, there are many reasons involved in the promotion of monitoring systems, not all of which can be reduced to business interests and the pursuit of profitability.

One of the main challenges of investigating the ways that streetscape CCTV surveillance systems are promoted and implemented is to explain how knowledge about social problems is produced in different cities across the country. Knowledge about social problems not only includes ideas about

criminality and other undesirable behaviour in public spaces but also entails a wide range of associations (people, geographies, activities, events, news production, bureaucratic structures) that figures into the promotion and contestation of streetscape CCTV systems – within and beyond the privacy policy sector. Knowledge, in this regard, is conceptualized broadly to entail systems of thought as well as systems of action.

Another challenge of the investigation is to explain how streetscape CCTV surveillance is negotiated as a viable response to knowledge about social problems. The problematics of establishing public-area streetscape CCTV surveillance monitoring systems involve “assorted attempts at the calculated administration of diverse aspects of conduct through countless, often competing, local tactics of education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and encouragement” (Rose and Miller 1992, 175). This analytical strategy requires an examination of the programs, documents, claims, myths, images, people, formal policies, informal governance structures, geographies, activities, moral justifications, and forms of evidence that embody and give effect to streetscape monitoring ambitions.

The chapters to follow describe configurations of persons, policies, structures, legislation, organizations, and events that comprise attempts to establish streetscape CCTV surveillance monitoring systems, and they examine the many ways that diverse groups of people attempt to make streetscape CCTV surveillance operable through systems of thought and action. By foregrounding the construction or negotiation of social problems and their perceived surveillance solutions, however, the argument is not that the production of cultural meaning is only about semiosis – that is, the intersubjective production of meaning (Jessop 2004). To be sure, semiosis plays a constitutive role in the production of social order, but processes of signification articulate with economic, political, legislative, and material forces that cannot be reduced to semiosis. It is a sociological truism that human meaning is socially constructed and discursively transmitted; it is also a sociological truism that processes of signification are embedded in material practices that are not reducible to discourse.

On the one hand, therefore, analyzing streetscape monitoring programs requires attending to the ways in which they are enacted as a viable response to perceived social problems. Especially salient in promotional activities are the ways that monitoring initiatives are indexed to the mediation of local, national, and global episodes that function primarily as warning signals for future crime risks. Signal crimes are typically unexpected and often violent events that become the focus of intensified attention because they serve as a proxy for engaging more nebulous popular fears and concerns (Innes 2004, 2001). Not only are signal crimes a main component of promotional efforts, but they are also often used to interpret the significance of, and sometimes

to challenge, privacy protection principles, organizational safeguards, and existing governance structures.

On the other hand, it is necessary to focus on the politics of contention or resistance to CCTV promotional efforts. Especially salient in resistance activities are the ways that streetscape monitoring initiatives are indexed to the mediation of national and global episodes that function as signalling events and operate in a similar manner to signal crimes; they articulate some of the problems with streetscape monitoring systems, whether ethical, financial, or practical. The main national signal event in the history of public-area CCTV surveillance promotion was Commissioner Radwanski's Charter challenge in Kelowna (see Chapter 5). But global signalling events, such as the publication of the infamous Home Office report (see Chapter 8), also exercise an important influence on promotion and design processes, and they comprise part of the diffusion of surveillance policy and monitoring programs. Data are presented on pragmatic forms of resistance (e.g., use of privacy protection guidelines) as well as more direct forms of resistance (e.g., protest coalitions) to streetscape CCTV surveillance initiatives – not to examine how various people seek to liberate individuals who are targeted by CCTV surveillance programs from the oppressive power of camera networks but to better understand struggles against the government of individualization (Foucault 1982, 212). Put differently, the focus is on how various forms of resistance to streetscape CCTV initiatives represent struggles over knowledge about social problems and proposed surveillance solutions. They are not struggles, in other words, staged by one group of people against other groups who lay claim to problems and the merits of surveillance solutions.

Finally, the social construction and contestation of social problems and their perceived CCTV surveillance solutions take place in the cultural and structural context of antecedent governance structures – developed inside and outside the privacy policy sector – that accompanied the early ideational and administrative diffusion of streetscape monitoring programs across the country. That is, promotion and design processes in specific Canadian cities (particularly after 1996) were shaped by a set of heterogeneous influences that diffused unevenly and inconsistently to enable a variety of promotional and planning processes. As outlined in Chapter 1, the voluntary nature of compliance characterizing CCTV surveillance privacy protection guidelines adopted by the privacy policy sector has partially contributed to a variety of responses to social problems and their perceived CCTV surveillance solutions. But other influences, especially the promotional claims pertaining to the administrative design of Sudbury's monitoring program, have also strongly contributed to the development and dissemination of operational structures through networks of governance (see Chapter 10). Combined with a set of contingencies in the form of time- and space-specific national and

regional signal crimes and events that contribute to the reinforcement, re-configuration, and interruption of the tripartite diffusion of streetscape monitoring programs across the country, processes of establishing Canadian monitoring systems are aptly characterized as an assemblage of factors that cannot be reduced to any single interest or intention.