Transnational Identities and Practices in Canada

Edited by Vic Satzewich and Lloyd Wong

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UBCPress · Vancouver · Toronto

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15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06   5 4 3 2 1

Printed in Canada on ancient-forest-free paper (100% post-consumer recycled) that is processed chlorine- and acid-free, with vegetable-based inks.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Transnational identities and practices in Canada / edited by Vic Satzewich and Lloyd Wong.

Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-7748-1283-2
ISBN-10: 0-7748-1283-4

1. Transnationalism – Social aspects – Canada. 2. Transnationalism – Political aspects – Canada. 3. Ethnicity – Canada. 4. Immigrants – Canada. 5. Ethnic groups – Canada. 6. Multiculturalism – Canada. I. Satzewich, Vic, 1961- II. Wong, Lloyd L. (Lloyd Lee), 1950-

FC104.T74 2006   305.8’00971   C2006-900497-8

Canadä

UBC Press gratefully acknowledges the financial support for our publishing program of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP), and of the Canada Council for the Arts, and the British Columbia Arts Council.

This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Aid to Scholarly Publications Programme, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

UBC Press
The University of British Columbia
2029 West Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
604-822-5959 / Fax: 604-822-6083
www.ubcpress.ca

This book is dedicated to:

"The guys," again, Linda, Lucy, and Jack
– Vic Satzewich

Colleen, Leanne, Curtis, and Jasmine, and in memory of my parents, Lee and Mavis Wong
– Lloyd Wong

Contents

Figures and Tables / ix

Preface and Acknowledgments / xi

Introduction: The Meaning and Significance of Transnationalism / 1
Lloyd Wong and Vic Satzewich

Part 1: Transnationalism in Historical and Political Perspective

1 The Politics of Transnationalism: Comparative Perspectives / 18
Sarah V. Wayland

2 Transnationalism and the Age of Mass Migration, 1880s to 1920s / 35
Christiane Harzig and Dirk Hoerder

3 Unmaking a Transnational Community: Japanese Canadian Families in Wartime Canada / 52
Pamela Sugiman

Part 2: Contemporary Patterns

4 Characteristics of Immigrant Transnationalism in Vancouver / 71
Daniel Hiebert and David Ley

5 Transnational Urbanism: Toronto at a Crossroads / 91
Valerie Preston, Audrey Kobayashi, and Myer Siemiatycki

6 Contentious Politics and Transnationalism from Below: The Case of Ethnic and Racialized Minorities in Quebec / 111
Micheline Labelle, François Rocher, and Ann-Marie Field

7 The Caribbean Community in Canada: Transnational Connections and Transformations / 130
Alan B. Simmons and Dwaine E. Plaza

8 The Maple-Neem Nexus: Transnational Links of South Asian Canadians / 150
Dhiru Patel

9 The Invisible Transnationals? Americans in Canada / 164
Kim Matthews and Vic Satzewich

10 Latin American Transnationalism in Canada: Does It Exist, What Forms Does It Take, and Where Is It Going? / 180
Luin Goldring

11 The New "In-Between" Peoples: Southern-European Transnationalism / 202
Luis L.M. Aguiar

12 Whose Transnationalism? Canada, "Clash of Civilizations" Discourse, and Arab and Muslim Canadians / 216
Sedef Arat-Koc

13 Chinese Transnationalism: Class and Capital Flows / 241
Lloyd Wong and Connie Ho

14 Raising the Iron Curtain: Transnationalism and the Croatian Diaspora since the Collapse of 1989 / 261
Daphne Winland

15 Canadian Jewry and Transnationalism: Israel, Anti-Semitism, and the Jewish Diaspora / 278
Stuart Schoenfeld, William Shaffir, and Morton Weinfeld

Conclusion: Directions for Future Research / 296
Vic Satzewich and Lloyd Wong

References / 299

Contributors / 327

Index / 333

Figures and Tables

Figures

5.1 Immigrant arrivals from Hong Kong to Toronto / 95

8.1 Multidimensional transnational relationships / 153

8.2 South Asian Canadians' contact with family in Canada, countries of origin, and other countries / 155

Tables

4.1 Enumeration of transnational activities among Vancouver residents / 76

4.2 Respondents engaged in transnational activities by level of educational attainment / 79

4.3 Respondents engaged in transnational activities by 2001 household income / 79

4.4 Respondents engaged in transnational activities by period of landing / 81

4.5 Respondents engaged in transnational activities by selected immigration class / 81

4.6 Respondents engaged in transnational activities by ethnic origin / 83

4.7 Respondents engaged in transnational activities by interview language / 83

4.8 Respondents engaged in transnational activities by home language / 85

4.9 Respondents engaged in transnational activities by citizenship status / 85

4.10 Respondents engaged in transnational activities by identification as Canadian / 87

5.1 Hong Kong immigrants by location within the Toronto Census metropolitan area, 2001 / 98

5.2 Civic participation in Toronto by Hong Kong immigrants / 101

10.1 Frequency of contact with family in the country of origin or ancestry, for the population with such family, Canada, 2002 / 188

10.2 Period of entry to Canada by country of birth for Latin American immigrants (pre-1961 to 2001) and rate of change between 1981-90 and 1991-2001 / 196

13.1 Chinese immigrants to Canada: Sum and mean money in possession, 1986-2002 / 253

13.2 Chinese immigrants to Canada: Sum and mean money in possession by class, 1986-2002 / 255

13.3 Chinese immigrants: Source and sums of the flow of capital into Canada after arrival / 256

13.4 Chinese immigrants and business immigrants: Capital in flow, *in situ,* and elsewhere at time of arrival in Canada / 257

Preface and Acknowledgments

For much of the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s in Canada, research in the area of immigrant and ethnic-group settlement focused on issues of economic integration, social inequality, language maintenance, ethnic-identity retention, maintenance and change, and racism, prejudice, and discrimination. If there was a gap in the literature on immigrant and “race”/ethnic relations, it was arguably most noticeable in the area of transnationalism. In other words, even though immigrant and ethnic relations were among the most researched areas of Canadian social life, there was a real silence within the academic literature both on the extent to which immigrants and members of ethnic groups maintain ties with their real and imagined homelands and on the personal, cultural, and institutional meanings and consequences associated with these ties.

This book answers a call made in the late 1990s by Daphne Winland in her article “‘Our Home and Native Land’? Canadian Ethnic Scholarship and the Challenge of Transnationalism,” in the *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* (1998). Canadian ethnic research and scholarship has traditionally analyzed groups, and intergroup relations, within the Canadian context and within the Canadian nation-state. This boundedness, as Winland pointed out, left little conceptual space for notions of transnationalism. She proposed a shift in analytical focus and discourse for Canadian ethnic studies that would put greater emphasis on transnationalism and its role in producing cultural practices and identities among immigrant and ethnic communities in Canada.

It has become clear that in a globalizing world individuals and institutions increasingly have multiple linkages and interactions that span the borders of nation-states. Although it is widely recognized that immigrants never completely sever ties with their families and homelands, the consensus among academic commentators is that the past twenty years have seen the emergence of quantitatively more and qualitatively different kinds of transnational linkages. At both the personal and institutional levels, these linkages are increasingly facilitated by advances in communications and transportation technology. Such changes in immigrants' lives have been met with a growing academic interest in the many facets of transnationalism, including transnational identities, social networks, family relationships, and migration as well as transnationalism within political, social-movement, religious, media, and economic institutional spheres.

This book analyzes existing transnational communities in Canada and the associated transnational identities and practices of individuals within these communities. It consists of an integrated collection of chapters on selected transnational communities written by some of Canada's most astute social scientists and historians. This is the first collection in Canada to present a comprehensive and interdisciplinary examination of transnationalism. We hope readers will enjoy the chapters as much as we have enjoyed working with the authors and bringing the collection together.

We are deeply indebted to the authors, who not only produced finely crafted pieces of work, but also graciously accepted editorial advice, met deadlines, and responded in a timely way to hurried e-mails. Emily Andrew, senior acquisitions editor at UBC Press, was enthusiastic about this project from the start. She helped us to stay on track, kept us well informed about the publication process, and was simply a pleasure to work with. As well, we would like to acknowledge Darcy Cullen, who oversaw the editing and production of the book, and Robert Lewis, who was responsible for copy editing the manuscript.

We also want to thank the anonymous referees who evaluated and commented on each of the chapters and on the manuscript as a whole. We appreciate their critical yet supportive and helpful comments. We also want to thank the departments of sociology at the University of Calgary and McMaster University for providing supportive environments in which to do research.

Vic Satzewich and Lloyd Wong

Transnational Identities and Practices in Canada

Introduction: The Meaning and Significance of Transnationalism

Lloyd Wong and Vic Satzewich

In a recent comparison with Britain, France, and Germany, the United States is described as "the foremost transnational nation" and as the country that "has gone the farthest in the development of a pluralistic community of citizens" (Munch 2001, 48, 57). If Canada were included in this comparison, there are reasons to expect that the ranking would change. On a yearly basis, the United States admits about four times as many immigrants as Canada, but few countries match Canada in the number of immigrants that they admit on a per capita basis. Further, Canada has displayed a long-lasting commitment to the principles of multiculturalism, which may have a role to play in fuelling transnationalism.

At the level of public policy, multiculturalism was institutionalized in Canada in 1971 as a form of corporate pluralism (Gordon 1981). Under this policy, cultural differences were encouraged and protected by the state, while ideologies of cultural assimilation and Anglo conformity for immigrants and ethnic minorities were officially rejected. Over the past three decades, as the Canadian policy on multiculturalism has evolved (Fleras and Elliott 2002, 62-68), there has been greater emphasis on encouraging immigrants to engage in transnational social practices and to develop transnational social identities. From one perspective, transnational practices and identities can be viewed as the logical extension of multiculturalism. However, transnationalism can also be viewed as challenging forms of multiculturalism that are bounded by the nation-state. For example, for the past ten years, the Canadian government has advanced the notion of "civic multiculturalism" with the goal of creating a sense of belonging and attachment to Canada among immigrants (68). Yet for some of these immigrants, transnational practices, like obtaining dual citizenship and becoming involved in the politics of their homelands, would suggest a sense of belonging and attachment that extends beyond Canadian borders and that thus poses a challenge to the present form of multicultural policy.

Given transnationalism's significance for the immigrant generation and given that its practices both extend and challenge multiculturalism, researchers in Canada have good cause to take transnationalism seriously.

Fortunately, they have done so. The aim of this book is to present the current state of research on transnationalism in Canada by bringing together a group of scholars working from a variety of perspectives. Canadian scholars have been at the forefront of research on immigrant settlement and community formation, and an ever-growing body of literature now frames issues in terms of the concept of transnationalism. A cross-section of this literature is brought together in this single volume.

The importance of this undertaking is underlined by four factors. First, transnational practices are an enduring aspect of the lives of immigrants and longer-settled members of ethnic communities. Although transnationalism is not a new phenomenon, modern communications and transportation technologies enable individuals and groups to engage in increasingly frequent and significant transnational practices.

Second, many different individuals, groups, practices, and identities have been described as transnational. Thus there is a need to establish the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical bases for the use of this concept in Canada. Like diaspora, transnationalism is an extraordinarily elastic concept that has been stretched to cover a range of activities and individuals. Sociologist Floya Anthias (1998) argues that the concept of diaspora is now so popular in academic circles that it is becoming a "mantra." Historian Donald Akenson (1995) also suggests that the concept of diaspora is akin to a massive linguistic weed that threatens to take over the discourse about migration and settlement in Canada. Both observations can arguably be applied to the concept of transnationalism.

Third, further debate and research about the meaning and significance of transnationalism are clearly warranted. Although the chapters in this volume are not "comparative" in the strict sense of the term, the diversity of groups, practices, and identities treated in the book may serve as a springboard for thinking more comparatively about transnationalism.

Fourth, transnationalism is a global phenomenon marked by local distinctions. Whether the transnational practices of immigrants and ethnic communities in Canada differ from those of immigrants in other countries is a question of interest. This volume makes comparisons of transnational experience possible by providing insights into the particulars of "Canadian-based" transnational practices and identities.

Conceptual Issues

Two recent developments attest to the growing importance of assessing the phenomenon of transnationalism. During the past decade, research funding has increasingly supported studies on transnationalism. At the same time, there has been a flourish of themed special issues on transnationalism in major academic journals, including "Transnational Migration: International Perspectives" (2003), in *International Migration Review;* "Transnational Communities" (1999) and "Transnational Edges" (2003), in *Ethnic and Racial Studies;* "New Research and Theory on Immigrant Transnationalism" (2001), in *Global Networks;* and "Transnationalism and Identity" (2001), in the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*.

Over the years, the transnational perspective has evolved conceptually both in Europe and the United States. The following discussion frames some of these developments in the context of the wider literature on immigration and ethnicity, lends weight to the transnational perspective, and assesses these developments vis-à-vis Canadian literature and research.

Conceptualizing the Transnational Perspective

In the early 1990s the work of cultural anthropologists Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Christina Szanton Blanc set the stage for theorizing migration using a transnational perspective. This perspective conceptualized many contemporary immigrants not as "uprooted" or as having completely left behind their "old" countries but as maintaining multiple links and networks with their homelands (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Szanton Blanc 1995, 48).

Scholars in other fields also began arguing for a transnational perspective. The early 1990s saw the launch of *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies,* which features writings about diasporas, transnationalism, or both by scholars from a variety of disciplines. The transnational perspective emerged in the mid-1990s as a challenge to the more traditional understanding of immigration, which implicitly or explicitly assumes that immigrants leave behind their countries of origin upon entering a new country.

Canada has been slow to adopt a transnational perspective. Not until the late 1990s and early 2000s was transnationalism incorporated into analyzing ethnicity, international migration, and immigrant settlement (Winland 1998; Knight 2002). Only recently did Knight (2002) echo the call made a decade ago by American cultural anthropologists for a new theorization of international migration that considers transnational community formation. Although critics have pointed out that some of the early American proponents of transnationalism exaggerated its scope (Portes 2001, 182), they nevertheless recognize its importance to reformulating existing notions about migration and about how immigrants adapt to and are incorporated into their adopted country.

Transnationalism as a Mode of Adaptation

The conceptualization of transnationalism as a mode of adaptation is best exemplified by the work of Alejandro Portes and colleagues (1999, 221, 228), who identify three types of transnationalism (economic, political, and socio-cultural) along two levels of institutionalization (high and low). They argue that transnationalism is a form of immigrant adaptation that differs from assimilation. Transnationalism is one possible outcome grounded in the personal and family decisions made in a complicated process of adaptation, and it often depends on the availability of cultural resources (Portes 1999, 464-65).

Since transnationalism is associated with the processes of global capitalism, it is viewed by Portes and colleagues (1999, 227-28) as a potential form of individual and group resistance to dominant structures, which they term "transnationalism from below." An example is the adoption of transnational practices by immigrant entrepreneurs as an alternative to, or an escape from, low-wage labour, a choice that is perhaps also an expression of resistance and liberation. However, Portes (1999, 471) does not regard "transnationalism from below" as completely delinked from the process of assimilation but suggests that it "can act as an effective antidote to the tendency towards downward assimilation" and have positive effects on the second generation. Notably, discourse on transnationalism as a mode of adaptation has recently been extended to analyses of second-generation immigrants in the United States (Levitt and Waters 2002); immigrants' work and livelihoods (Sørensen and Olwig 2002); immigrants' religions, specifically Buddhism (McLellan 1999) and Islam (Mandaville 2001); and immigrants in the context of urbanism (Smith 2001).

Like transnationalism in the United States, transnationalism in Canada can arguably be perceived as a form of immigrant adaptation. However, the crucial difference may lie in the existence and prevalence of corporate pluralism in Canada and in Canada's official rejection of full assimilation. As mentioned earlier, transnationalism in Canada may be conceptualized as an extension of multiculturalism beyond national borders and thus as having a cross-border spatial dimension. Vertovec (2001a, 18) has suggested that multiculturalism depends on a public recognition of communal and cultural rights within a nation-state and that transnationalism extends this recognition to communal and cultural rights of affiliation outside of the nation-state. In legal terms, the logical outcome of this is dual or multiple nationality and citizenship. Canada has allowed immigrants to retain dual citizenship since 1977, but its implications are not entirely clear. One view suggests that multiple citizenship "devalues" Canadian citizenship and hinders immigrant adaptation. Conversely, another view suggests that it facilitates the incorporation of new immigrants who would otherwise fail to naturalize and who would thus remain socially marginalized.

Transnationalism as Social Space

The conceptualization of transnationalism as social space is partly a result of the contributions of geographers who have emphasized the importance of socially constructed notions of time and space. For example, Pries (2001, 23) describes transnational social spaces as "pluri-local frames of reference which structure everyday practices, social positions, biographical employment projects and human identities, and simultaneously exist above and beyond the social contests of national societies." Perhaps a simpler description is offered by Faist (2000a, 2), who refers to the "ties and the unfolding strong and dense circular flows of persons, goods, ideas, and symbols within a migration system." For Faist (203) transnational social spaces take three basic forms: transnational kinship groups, transnational circuits, and transnational communities. These transnational social spaces are particular types of transnational morphologies that involve the notion of space. Geographically narrower variants of this notion of transnational social space include the terms "contact zones" and "borderland cultures" as well as Sassen's (2003, 265, 271) recent theorization of "analytic borderlands" and "cross-border spatialities." These are related to Bhabha's (1994) notion of "third space" as it applies to one's identity formation and consciousness.

The notion of transnational social space is also linked to immigrant and ethnic adaptation. In the case of Canada, this social space can also be thought of as an extension of ethnic pluralism beyond national borders.

Transnational Communities and Diasporas

Another important conceptual problem is how to distinguish between diasporas and transnational communities. While the term "diaspora" is more contested, the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. However, they are not synonymous.

In the 1980s Connor (1986, 16) defined "diaspora" as "that segment of a people living outside the homeland." Since then, several more elaborate definitions have emerged. Cohen (1996, 1997) draws upon the classical tradition to expand the definition of diaspora to include not just people involuntarily dispersed from an original homeland, but also those displaced through community expansion due to trade, the search for work, and empire building. Although Cohen posits nine common features of a diaspora, he argues that no one diaspora will manifest all features (see also Satzewich 2002). Following Cohen's definition, Van Hear (1998, 6) conceptualizes diasporas as populations that satisfy three minimal criteria: (1) the population is dispersed from a homeland to two or more other territories; (2) the presence abroad is enduring, although exile is not necessarily permanent, with those in the diaspora possibly moving between homeland and new host; and (3) there is some kind of exchange – social, economic, political, or cultural – between or among spatially separated populations.

There is considerable overlap between the concepts of transnationalism and diaspora, with one often being used as an adjective to describe the other. Yet the concepts of transnationalism and transnational communities are broader and more inclusive than those of diaspora and diasporic communities. Diaspora may be appropriately conceptualized as a concomitant of transnationalism (Braziel and Mannur 2003, 7-8). Diaspora can also be conceptualized as a form of transnational organization related specifically to country of origin and society of settlement (Wahlbeck 2002, 221). Thus transnational communities encompass diasporas, but not all transnational communities are diasporas. This book utilizes the more general term "transnational communities," as not all of the cases examined fit the more narrow definitions of "diaspora."

Level of Analysis

The analysis of transnationalism is conducted at the middle range, or meso-level, of theory. Kivisto (2001, 560) notes that one advantage of this level of theory is that it is capable of shaping concrete research agendas. Vertovec's (1999, 448-55) effort to disentangle the concept of transnationalism may be useful as a basic framework for potential areas of research. He conceptualizes transnationalism as (1) a social morphology, (2) a type of consciousness, (3) a mode of cultural reproduction, (4) an avenue of capital, (5) a site of political engagement, and (6) a (re)construction of "place," or locality. Each chapter in this volume touches upon one or more of these conceptualizations.

Research Issues and Questions

Methodological Issues

The study of transnationalism raises questions about which methodologies best facilitate data gathering. From the previous discussion of the various conceptualizations of transnationalism, it is clear that theory determines the appropriate methods to be used by researchers. These methods, whether initially qualitative or quantitative, are likely to become increasingly more mixed and sophisticated. Distinctive methodological challenges face those seeking to operationalize and signify complex concepts such as transnational social fields and social spaces, avenues of capital, cross-border spatialities, transnational circuits, and multiple identities and citizenships.

Transnational ethnographies, which bring transnationalism alive by documenting the daily experiences of individuals and communities, have been prominent over the past decade and will probably continue to generate rich data. But ethnographic case studies are now slowly being supplemented by large-scale quantitative data sets generated from survey research. There are several recent examples. Portes and colleagues (2002) use a data set with a sample size of 1,200 respondents in order to assess transnational entrepreneurship among three immigrant groups. In searching for the correlates and predictors of transnationalism, both Rumbaut (2002) and Kasinitz and colleagues (2002) also use large-scale quantitative data sets to analyze transnationalism, language, identity, and notions of imagined communities among the children of immigrants. In Chapter 4 Hiebert and Ley base their assessment of transnationalism in Vancouver on data from a survey of hundreds of respondents. Although large-scale social surveys and quantitative data are not likely to increase understanding of the everyday lives of immigrants and others engaged in transnational practices, they will nevertheless help to answer fundamental questions about the extent of transnationalism, including its intensity, breadth, and spread.

Another methodological strategy that will engender more consideration is longitudinal research. The examination of the longevity of transnationalism over time and across generations is an important area of development, as pointed out by Portes and colleagues (2002, 294).

Global Perspectives

Nearly 20 percent of Canada's population is comprised of immigrants, and one of the defining features of the country is its policy of multiculturalism. These two factors identify Canada as a probable site of considerable transnational practices and perhaps even of qualitatively unique forms of transnationalism. At the same time, it is clear that immigrants and members of ethnic communities elsewhere manage to engage in transnational practices and to develop transnational identities even when they constitute relatively small proportions of the population and even without the encouragement of a policy of multiculturalism.

This raises questions about the role that host societies and larger global forces play in shaping transnational practices and identities. In other words, is transnationalism a "global" phenomenon that has emerged independently of specific local forces and circumstances? Or do national political cultures, traditions, and policies help to explain particular trajectories of transnational identities and practices?

Another factor in placing transnationalism in a global perspective is whether certain groups are more likely to engage in transnational practices than others. Much of the American literature on transnationalism focuses on individuals and groups from Latin America and the Caribbean. There are undoubtedly good reasons for this focus, but transnational practices and identities are not confined to immigrants and ethnic groups from these regions of the world. Arguably, a process of minoritization in the United States structures the transnational practices of the former groups. Yet groups that are comparatively privileged and that are not subject to racial or other forms of exclusion also engage in transnational practices. As a result, it is important to broaden the lens of transnationalism to include individuals and groups that are comparatively more privileged. This applies not just to class-related privileges, but also to privileges associated with ethnicity, gender, and skin colour.

Historical Perspective

Historians quite rightly relish pointing out that transnational practices are not a new phenomenon. Since the beginning of the latest phase of mass migration in the late nineteenth century, many individuals and groups have maintained political, social, and economic relationships with their homelands. Individuals and groups were engaged in transnational practices long before the rise of the World Bank, e-mail, and Air Canada. However, that immigrants have "always" engaged in transnational practices and developed transnational identities does not necessarily mean that there is nothing new about the phenomenon. Certainly, others have pointed out that new information and transportation technologies provide new opportunities for individuals and groups to engage in transnational practices. However, the new meanings imparted to transnational practices by these new technologies remain subject to empirical study and interpretation, making it necessary to put contemporary transnational practices into a broader historical and comparative perspective.

A historical perspective is also important because it takes into account changes in how countries like Canada have tolerated, promoted, and punished immigrants who maintain real and imagined transnational connections. It is necessary to determine how and why the concept of dual citizenship gained legitimacy as well as why some groups who maintained ties to their homelands – or who were believed to have maintained ties to their real or imagined homelands – were treated harshly by the Canadian state. Policies and practices designed to control enemy aliens during the First World War and efforts to deport Japanese Canadians after the Second World War can arguably be cast in terms of the attempted unmaking of transnational communities. Canadian officials were worried that some groups might use their real or imagined transnational identities to undermine national security. No doubt, racialization also played a role in efforts to unmake communities.

In the latter decades of the 1900s, many people believed that the "problem" of enemy aliens was a thing of the past, that national and international human-rights norms would prevent states from targeting groups with real or imagined transnational ties. Now, however, the situation is not so clear. The dramatic terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington, DC, launched in part by foreign nationals residing in the United States, changed the circumstances. The perception now is that certain individuals, particularly among certain immigrant groups, constitute "enemies within." Today certain groups who maintain multiple transnational ties and identities are subject to forms of surveillance and control that only a few years ago one might have reasonably thought to be part of distant Canadian history. Thus the question arises of the extent to which "race" feeds into social anxieties about enemies within and efforts to unmake transnational communities.

Transnational Social Fields and Social Spaces

As Portes and colleagues (1999) point out, the concept of transnationalism is elastic. Within scholarly research, it has been used to describe a wide range of practices, activities, and identities. Thus the authors of the chapters in this volume have been encouraged, if appropriate, to offer their own definitions of transnational social spaces and/or social fields. Some of the questions and issues in need of consideration include the following:

- Should individuals, immigrant and ethnic groups, or government policies be the focus of analysis?
- To what extent should transnationalism be defined as an "immigrant" phenomenon rather than as a phenomenon affecting a wider ethnic group?
- What criteria should be used to classify activities or identities as "transnational"?
- What are the categories of transnationalism?
- Do traditional categorizations of transnational activities (e.g., economic, political, socio-cultural) make sense in the Canadian context?

Although the term "social field" has been more popular in anthropological literature, the term "social space" has recently emerged to include not only geographical contexts, but also social-structural and institutional contexts.

Transnationalism and Gender

Even though gender is considered crucial to understanding transnationalism, many gender-related topics remain underresearched and undertheorized (Pessar and Mahler 2003, 812). Women account for approximately one-half of all immigrants to Canada and, in certain cases, are clustered in particular immigration programs or occupations. For example, Filipino women make up a large proportion of those in the Live-In Care Giver Program and of those who come to Canada as mail-order brides. These cases raise the possibility that the national identities of both young and old Canadian citizens will be transformed by the transnational practices of these immigrant women.

In many cases, women's relationships to their cultures of origin are often stronger than those of men, particularly when they leave children or aging parents with the intention to support them from abroad. In the case of female domestics in Britain, the flow of remittances has been along gendered networks (mothers, sisters, daughters) with little involvement of men (Vertovec 2000).

As Pessar and Mahler (2003, 818) suggest, women's practices across transnational spaces can be usefully analyzed within a framework of gendered geographies of power. Thus understanding how gendered relationships of work are negotiated is of particular importance in the transnational context. Furthermore, where the state entails a hegemonic gender regime, gender and the state need to be analyzed simultaneously. Goldring's (2001) work on gender in US-Mexican transnational spaces is one of the few studies that accomplishes this kind of analysis, but more research is needed.

Transnationalism "from Above" and "from Below": Issues of Class, Hegemony, Resistance, and Mobility

Class differences are implied in the terms "transnationalism from above" and "transnationalism from below." Transnationalism from above involves the capitalist class and international elites, whose activities are mediated at the macrolevel by multinational corporations and other supranational organizations (Sklair 2001). Transnationalism from below involves non-elites, or ordinary people, whose macro- and microlevel activities generate multiple and counterhegemonic forces. Their activities are micro in the sense that they are grounded in daily life and practice and include the development of cultural hybridity, multipositional identities, and the transnational business practices of migrant entrepreneurs (Mahler 1998, 67; Guarnizo and Smith 1998, 5).

In some respects, economic transnationalism may provide an alternative to stagnant, low-wage, menial labour. One practical significance of this type of economic transnationalism is that it can also be a form of resistance and liberation. Another example of transnationalism from below, which also constitutes a form of resistance, is the involvement of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in transnational advocacy networks (Appadurai 2003, 16-17). Guarnizo and Smith (1998, 5) point out that the political influence of working-class movements has waned as a result of advances in global capitalism. In this context, the conduct of new social actors, such as transnational immigrant entrepreneurs who are neither self-consciously resistant nor very political, becomes invested with oppositional possibilities. Their entrepreneurship may amount to an expression of popular resistance. These transnational actors may try to recapture a lost sense of belonging by recreating imagined communities and engaging in a process of subaltern identity formation that produces narratives of belonging, struggle, resistance, or escape. This grass-roots economic transnationalism relies on the skills and social capital of individuals. Portes and colleagues (1999, 230) speculate that in time transnational activities may become the normative path of adaptation chosen by groups seeking to escape the fate of cheap labour.

Casting transnationalism in a dichotomous framework based on a distinction between practices from above and practices from below may be problematic because there is always ambiguity. For example, are the practices of modestly middle-class Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs from Hong Kong who established small transnational businesses in Canada in the mid-1990s examples of transnationalism from above or from below? Their practices are certainly not generated from below in the same sense as those of NGOs engaged in transnational advocacy networks, nor are they generated from above in the same sense as those of a hypermobile transnational capitalist class. Further, while the conduct of a transnational capitalist class is clearly consistent with the notion of transnationalism from above, the practices of other kinds of international migrants who may be considered part of a transnational working class (such as agricultural workers, domestics, and information-technology workers) do not fit easily into a framework based on a dichotomy between transnationalism from above and from below.

Class inflects, if not haunts, the formation of the categories of nationality, diaspora, race, gender, and sexuality (Braziel and Mannur 2003, 5). As a result, it also complicates, perhaps in constructive ways, the intersections of other axes of power in transnational communities, suggesting the importance of the political economies of the regions in which transnational communities are anchored. This gives rise to the question of whether transnational activities and transnational social spaces reproduce or transform established relationships of power and privilege. One part of the answer lies in the literature on transnationalism as a site of political engagement (Vertovec 1999; Sheffer 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003).

Hybrid Identities, Citizenship, and the Role of the State

Through their transnational practices, transmigrants are likely to experience both economic and ethnic stratification. This raises the issue of the impact of transnationalism on ethnic identities, an area in which, as Anderson (2001) suggests, postmodernist conceptualizations are particularly useful. Transnational and diasporic subjects experience dual or multiple identities characterized by hybridity. These hybrid identities are grouped with other identity categories and severed from essentialized, nativist identities associated with constructions of the nation, or homeland (Braziel and Mannur 2003, 5). Given that transnationalism involves deterritorialized networks connecting several societies, there are differences in the terms and the intensity of transmigrants' identification with their homelands as well as in the degree of hybridity found among transmigrants.

Regardless of these differences, the transmigrant is subject to a deterritorialization of social identity. This delinking of identity from place (in favour of space) creates possibilities for new theoretical developments. At the same time, there must be continued recognition of the importance of place, or at least geographic contextualization in transnational discourse (Mitchell 1997).

The notion of deterritorialization can relativize or decentre a local "place" or territory rather than exclude or negate it. The terms "translocalities" and "multilocationality" have emerged to indicate the local embeddedness, or "rootedness," of transnational processes; in other words, they refer to culturally heterogeneous places that are largely divorced from their national contexts and that straddle formal political borders (Hyndman 1997, 153). Thus transnational identity formation shows that identity is not singular but plural and always evolving. Although deterritorialized and hybrid social identities provide a challenge for nation-states, this challenge is usually confronted via policies of state citizenship that attempt to forge the identities of a state's members. Of most interest are research questions that concern the kinds of identities that emerge when subnational, hybrid social identities are confronted by what may be two or more hegemonic state-sanctioned constructions of identity. Are governments' attempts to shape the identities of transmigrant populations succeeding? Or will transnationalism lead to more encompassing postnational forms of identification?

Multiple citizenship is really the institutionalization of people's already existent transnational ties. In the mid-1990s the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration Canada recommended that Canadians who hold dual citizenship should accord precedence to their Canadian citizenship. Moreover, it also recommended that a condition of obtaining Canadian citizenship should be the acknowledgment of this principle by immigrants who seek citizenship via naturalization (Labelle and Midy 1999, 219).

The Canadian state reluctantly continues to allow for dual and multiple citizenship. Why is there reluctance, and does dual citizenship present a challenge to the state? The assumption is that dual citizenship means greater ambivalence, divergence, and perhaps opposition to Canada and that it encumbers immigrant adaptation and integration. Although it is counterintuitive to think that multiple citizenship actually enhances integration, recent work in the United States suggests this possibility. Spiro (1999, 7) maintains that dual nationality may help to facilitate the cultural and political incorporation of new immigrants who would otherwise fail to naturalize and who would remain politically and culturally isolated.

The debate on the effects of hybrid identities and multiple citizenship gives rise to many research questions, including the following: (1) How does Canadian citizenship policy influence transnational hybrid identities? (2) Do transnational hybrid identities translate into citizenship building and more civic participation? (3) Is there a move toward more global forms of citizenship within transnational communities?

Outline of the Book

The chapters in this book address many of the conceptual and research issues noted above. Sarah V. Wayland begins with a well-theorized analysis of transnationalism's political dimensions and the practices of transnational actors in the context of the changing role of states in an era of globalization. By examining cases from a number of countries, she demonstrates the fluidity of national political cultures, traditions, and policies as well as their importance in shaping transnational identities and practices. She also suggests, albeit tentatively (because there is little available data), that participation in transnational political networks may in fact facilitate social incorporation and political participation in Canada.

In Chapter 2 Christiane Harzig and Dirk Hoerder provide a historical and comparative perspective that questions the newness of transnationalism while also providing a critical analysis of the historical development of the concept. Focusing on the period from the 1880s to the 1920s, they examine the transnational experiences of new Canadians and compare these to the experiences of American immigrants. They argue that although there are similarities between immigrants in the United States and Canada, a number of factors make Canada unique. The absence of a specifically "Canadian" citizenship until 1947, the existence of the French-English divide, and the provision of few social services in Canada before the Second World War afforded immigrants the opportunity and space to develop and maintain transnational identities.

Chapter 3, by Pamela Sugiman, examines a little-studied nuance of transnationalism. She illustrates how the Canadian state's racist perception of imagined transnationalism among Japanese Canadians led to the attempted unmaking of the Japanese Canadian transnational community during and after the Second World War. She also examines how state efforts to unmake this particular transnational community through a policy of repatriation and deportation were understood, negotiated, and contested within families.

The next three chapters cover transnationalism in Canada's largest cities, where the majority of immigrants have settled. Chapter 4, by Daniel Hiebert and David Ley, provides an overview of language, transmigration, socioeconomic status, and citizenship among immigrants in Vancouver. Based on empirical survey data, their analysis shows that transnationalism among immigrants may be an alternative to social and economic integration rather than a mode of economic integration. That is, their evidence suggests that immigrants' transnational practices tend to be associated with "weak" connections to Canada. Valerie Preston, Audrey Kobayashi, and Myer Siemiatycki take a different tack in their analysis of Toronto in Chapter 5. Using the case of immigrants from Hong Kong, they examine how the social geography and transnational landscape of the city is associated with, and consequently shapes, contemporary transnational migration. They argue that even though individuals in the Chinese Canadian community maintain a variety of transnational connections with China, they are "integrated" into Toronto in a number of important ways. Nevertheless, their efforts to transform the city's built landscape as a means of claiming their rights to city space have met with difficulties. In Chapter 6 Micheline Labelle, François Rocher, and Ann-Marie Field focus on the Province of Quebec and, more specifically, on Montreal to explore the transnational politics of ethnic and racialized minorities in terms of "transnationalism from below." Utilizing data derived from interviews with ethnic leaders, this chapter documents these leaders' claims, their "repertoire of actions," and their transnational practices, participation in transnational networks, and understanding of "transnational citizenship."

The remaining chapters are case studies of transnational communities or transregionalism. In Chapter 7 Alan B. Simmons and Dwaine E. Plaza examine the transnational connections and transformations of the Caribbean community using a structural social-inequality framework. They show that members of the Caribbean community in Canada maintain relatively deep relationships with their respective homelands. They also argue that issues of power and inequality are crucial to understanding the complex relationships that are maintained with the Caribbean; though immigration policy provides opportunities for immigrants to maintain transnational ties with the Caribbean, an "outward gaze" is also promoted by racism and discrimination. Further, they note the importance of examining differences in transnational identities and practices within ethnic communities and the tensions to which these differences give rise. In Chapter 8, on South Asian transnational links, Dhiru Patel examines global networks within sociocultural contexts, such as the family. He ends his chapter by noting several key policy questions that pertain not only to South Asian transnationalism, but also to transnational communities more generally. Chapter 9, by Kim Matthews and Vic Satzewich, analyzes the presence of Americans in Canada in terms of whether they are "invisible transnationals." By examining three issues within this generally understudied group – American dual citizenship, Democrats abroad and Republicans abroad, and Americans in Canada avoiding military service in US-led wars – they suggest that a transnational perspective is in fact highly relevant to an analysis of this relatively privileged, yet socially invisible, immigrant population.

In Chapter 10 Luin Goldring poses several questions about Latin Americans' transnationalism in Canada in light of their growing numbers and the relative recentness of their immigration to the country. Her analysis looks at the ample research on Latin American transnationalism in the United States to theorize possible trajectories in Canada while at the same time providing some preliminary secondary Canadian data. Chapter 11, by Luis L.M. Aguiar, provides a critical analysis of the transnational perspective and its applicability to southern Europeans (Italians, Greeks, and Portuguese) in

Canada. Their cases are interesting because there is now very little new migration to Canada from these three countries and because emigration from some of the communities was so extensive in the 1950s and 1960s that there are few relatives left with whom to maintain transnational ties and relationships. He also argues that although forms of transnationalism are encouraged at the political level by the three countries of origin, immigrants from these countries display ambivalence and uncertainty about the wisdom of becoming too involved in "homeland" politics.

In Chapter 12 Sedef Arat-Koc's assessment of Arab and Muslim Canadians also offers a critical take on transnationalism. Arat-Koc examines how the transnationalism of these communities has come under siege since the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001 and how this process has been furthered by the dominant transnationalisms of the Canadian state and "ordinary Canadians." She ends her chapter with suggestions for alternative transnationalisms. Chapter 13, by Lloyd Wong and Connie Ho, conceptualizes Chinese transnationalism as an avenue of capital and shows that it is associated not only with capitalists, but also with working and middle classes. Using secondary data, they demonstrate the extent of the flow of capital from China to Canada between the late 1800s and the present and discuss its implications for popular perceptions of Chinese commitment and allegiance to Canada.

In Chapter 14 Daphne Winland examines the Croatian diaspora in Canada since the collapse of the Yugoslav federation and its members' complex relationships to the homeland. Her chapter highlights the conceptualization of transnationalism as a site of political engagement and as the reconstruction of "place." She examines the various factors, strategies, and negotiations affecting Croats' identity formation and how this relates to the politics of visibility and representation. The final chapter, by Stuart Schoenfeld, William Shaffir, and Morton Weinfeld, examines Canadian Jewry and transnationalism. The authors show that Canadian Jews are a modern diaspora by providing case studies of (1) those who leave for Israel but eventually return to Canada, (2) Israelis in Toronto, and (3) South African Jews in Toronto. They argue that Jews have had to deal with allegations of transnational, dual loyalties for some time. They also argue that though many traditional anti-Semitic measures are declining in Canada, there are reasons to be concerned about a new wave of transnational, globalized anti-Semitism that mixes anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish sentiment.

Part 1

Transnationalism in Historical and Political Perspective

1

The Politics of Transnationalism: Comparative Perspectives

Sarah V. Wayland

As addressed in this volume, transnationalism usually refers to the experiences of individuals whose identities and relations span national borders. Researchers focus on persons, mostly migrants, whose lives subsume two or more languages and cultures and who have frequent contact with ethnic kindred ("coethnics") in other locations. Transnationalism involves the creation of new identities that incorporate cultural references from both the place of origin and the place of residence. Political scientists, however, define "transnationalism" differently: they use the term in reference to the practices of organizations or institutions that operate below the level of the state but whose activities transcend national borders. In the 1970s transnationalism was associated mostly with economic relations, especially between transnational corporations (e.g., Keohane and Nye 1971). By the late 1990s the concept had been extended to the practices of nongovernmental organizations and "transnational advocacy networks" united by shared values, a common discourse, and extensive information exchange among like-minded activist organizations (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

In this chapter, I focus on the political dimensions of transnationalism, particularly as exercised by transnational ethnic actors. Transnational ethnic actors are transnational in both senses of the word outlined above: (1) they have a common identity that spans state borders, and (2) they engage in substate relations by forming political networks across state boundaries to influence policies. The term "political" usually describes matters that concern the state or its government, government policies, or public affairs generally. In the context of immigration, where persons may not have formal citizenship, "political" must be broadly defined. It refers not only to party politics and policy making, but also to informal dimensions of politics, such as fundraising, organizing, and lobbying efforts around political causes. Political transnationalism, then, consists of various types of "direct cross-border participation in the politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees" as well as their indirect involvement via either political institutions of the receiving state or international organizations (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, 762). Thus political transnationalism involves an interchange of ideas, issues, and conflicts between individuals, groups, and political entities in two or more countries.

Involvement in homeland politics is often referred to as diaspora politics. "Diaspora" refers to a particular type of transnational political community that has been dispersed from its homeland and whose members permanently reside in one or more "host" countries as well as possess a collective, sometimes idealized, myth of the homeland and a will to return (Sheffer 2003). Not all transnational political actors constitute diasporas, but I do refer to diasporas in this chapter where appropriate.

The chapter is constructed as follows. First, I situate contemporary interest in political transnationalism and diaspora politics within the context of globalization and the changing role that it entails for states. Second, I present a conceptual overview of the three principal sets of factors that influence the levels and characteristics of political transnationalism: policies and practices in immigrant and refugee receiving states, policies and practices in sending states, and characteristics of migrants, refugees, and ethnic communities themselves. I show how different variables within these three areas interact to produce specific forms of political transnationalism. Next, I briefly highlight research results on the prevalence of transnationalism among immigrant and ethnic communities. In the concluding section, I look at the relationship between political transnationalism and the political socialization of immigrants and refugees, including implications for social cohesion in receiving states. Throughout the chapter, I emphasize that political transnationalism is shaped by context-specific variables and that empirical research on this phenomenon is still in its infancy. As a result, it is particularly difficult to make generalizations about political transnationalism.

Transnationalism, Globalization, and States

The rise of scholarly interest in transnationalism has accompanied growing attention to globalization. Both phenomena illustrate the declining importance of territory as a source of identity and power. And both point to the importance of social networks. Under conditions of globalization, persons are said to experience "complex connectivity ... the rapidly developing and ever-densening network of interconnections and interdependences that characterize modern social life" (Tomlinson 1999, 2). Globalization theorists such as Castells (1996, 359) argue that as territories become less important and networks become more salient, power is no longer concentrated in institutions, organizations, and mass media but "is diffused in global networks of wealth, power, information, and images, which circulate and transmute in a system of variable geometry and dematerialized geography."

Some researchers of transnationalism have argued that social relations are being transformed by globalization to such an extent that the nation-state is becoming an outmoded political formation (Appadurai 1996; Sassen 1998). Scholars of this postnationalist vein argue that territorial sovereignty is declining and that nations are no longer confined by spatial boundaries (Appadurai 1996, 160-61). Waters (1995, 136) asserts that the possibility may arise that "ethnicities are not tied to any specific territory or polity." Nations are said to be "unbound," and they now operate with fewer constraints than ever before (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994). Postnationalist approaches emphasize the rise of transnationalism concurrent with the decline of states.

However, most scholarship in this area recognizes the continuing importance of states: people are not deterritorialized but live their lives on earth, in states, and in communities. A growing interdisciplinary literature situates transnationalism within states and localities (e.g., Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Koopmans and Statham 2000, 2003). In this view, sending and receiving states, regions, and localities influence the creation and perpetuation of transnational social spaces. Grass-roots activities are influenced by and carried out within larger policy contexts at the supranational, national, and subnational levels. Within these contexts, persons and groups become transnational political actors. This interplay between state and nonstate actors occurs in a number of ways: when migrants are influenced by policies and practices of the receiving states, when migrants are influenced by policies and practices of the sending states, and when migrants' contexts and circumstances influence their transnational practices. These are elaborated upon in the following sections.

Receiving States

Policies and practices of receiving states (sometimes referred to as "host states" or "host countries") influence the nature and extent of mobilization by migrants, refugees, and the ethnic minority groups formed by their descendants. States play a key role in regulating access to national territories and shaping regulations that affect immigrants and refugees. Ethnic identity is mediated through host-state institutions, practices, and traditions. Opportunities in liberal democracies are different from those in other types of states, and there are even differences between liberal democracies, which have various conceptions of citizenship and ethnic belonging. Answers to the following types of questions help to elucidate the contexts in which political transnationalism exists: Is the state a democracy? To what extent are human rights and civil liberties upheld? Does the electoral system make any provisions for ethnic minority parties, such as reserving seats in the legislature for ethnic minorities? Other factors include the citizenship and incorporation policies and models of the receiving state. Is citizenship difficult to obtain? Is the state highly assimilationist, or does it make provisions for cultural pluralism? The answers to these questions comprise the state's political-opportunity structure – that is, the context that either encourages or discourages groups to make demands on the state (Tarrow 1998; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Several variables that potentially impact the nature and extent of political transnationalism are discussed below.

Political Systems

Political systems in the country of origin can impact transnationalism in several ways. Authoritarian states in general prohibit freedom of expression and suppress the identities of ethnic minorities. As a result, ethnic minorities of immigrant origin may lack the means to be involved in homeland politics. Over time, they may be unable to retain their ethnic identities. On the other hand, living under conditions of repression may heighten the sense of group identity and keep the ideal of the homeland alive. Such a transnational orientation passed down through the generations is in keeping with the traditional understanding of a diaspora. The prototypical diaspora, the Jews, kept Jewish identity alive for centuries even in the absence of a homeland to which they could return. Other examples include Kurds and Armenians.

Conversely, democratic states are characterized by openness. The presence of civil rights in receiving states, such as freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, facilitates the maintenance of ethnic identities and transnational ties. Even in states that do not institutionally support cultural pluralism (discussed below), ethnic groups are guaranteed a minimal level of freedoms. Immigrants and refugees and their descendants can meet regularly, educate the broader public about their place of origin, and lobby politicians around various issues of concern. Moreover, living in a democratic space allows groups to accumulate the resources necessary for mobilization, including financial resources. Yet it may also be hypothesized that in democracies, transnational political ties will eventually decline. If ethnic minorities have access to the political system and do not suffer discrimination in their new place of residence, they may embrace the host country wholeheartedly – at the expense of any transnational sentiments. This may especially be true if they come to rely on the welfare state for resources more than than they do on their own ethnic communities.

Within democratic systems, different electoral systems may also impact the maintenance of ethnic identities over time. Proportional representation and mixed electoral systems tend to have a stronger presence of smaller political parties, including ethnic parties (Tossutti 2002). Ethnic representation may alleviate the impetus for transnational politics, although little research on this relationship exists.

Citizenship Policies

Another set of policies and practices relevant to transnational ties is that of citizenship. Via citizenship policies, states control who becomes a member of the polity. States use diverse criteria to control membership, but generally the differences between states' policies are based on the ways that jus soli and jus sanguinis principles are combined to determine the transmission, attribution, and acquisition of citizenship (Brubaker 1992; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001). According to a strict definition, jus soli grants citizenship to all persons born in the national territory. Thus the children of immigrants have an automatic right to citizenship. Jus sanguinis, on the other hand, restricts citizenship to those descended from earlier citizens. Thus the descendants of immigrants would have no claim to citizenship. Most citizenship regimes fall somewhere between these two extremes but favour one model more than the other. Among the democracies of western Europe and North America, citizenship favouring jus soli models is found in the traditional immigrant-receiving states of Canada, the United States, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Jus sanguinis is predominant in Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, and Japan.

States also control access to citizenship through application procedures such as residency requirements, necessary paperwork, and the application fees involved. In Canada, for example, one can apply for citizenship after only three years as a permanent resident ("landed immigrant"). The citizenship process costs only $100, but the previous step of obtaining permanent residency status includes a fee of at least $475 for the principal applicant. On top of this, since 1995 every adult immigrant accepted as a permanent resident has been required to pay a $975 "right of permanent residence" fee. In this way, Canada's fee structure discourages applications for permanent residency while at the same time encouraging permanent residents to apply for citizenship.

Although citizenship regimes determine who has access to the polity, their impact on transnational relations is less clear. Some scholars have hypothesized that exclusion from the polity of residence will spur the maintenance of a transnational orientation and that easy acquisition of citizenship will reduce transnationalism. However, a recent survey of political transnationalism among Latin American immigrants to the United States found that acquiring American citizenship did not affect transnationalism (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003, 1229). Indeed, the authors argued, possessing an American passport enabled former migrants to travel back and forth to their homelands more easily, thereby facilitating the maintenance of transnational linkages.

A related factor is the rise of dual citizenship, as more and more receiving states allow new citizens to retain their existing nationalities as well. An analysis of Canadian Census samples from the period 1981 to 1996 revealed that levels of dual citizenship increased rapidly (Bloemraad 2004). Bloemraad showed that dual citizenship is more likely to be acquired by persons with higher mobility and higher education levels, but she noted that only 16 percent of adult immigrants identified as dual citizens. This study supports the view that transnationalism in the form of dual citizenship is on the rise but remains largely limited to an educated elite. However, dual citizenship is an incomplete indicator of transnationalism: its acquisition points to identities that span borders, but it does not imply the existence of any actual transnational networks.

Models of Minority Incorporation

As with formal citizenship, preferences vary from state to state concerning the extent to which newcomers and ethnic minorities should conform to the dominant culture. These preferences influence migrants' perceptions of belonging within a state and may influence transnational orientation as well. Models of minority incorporation may be divided into three ideal types (Castles and Miller 1998, 244-50; Castles 2002, 1154-57). *Assimilationist* societies encourage minorities to subordinate or abandon communal identities in favour of adopting the language, values, and behaviours of the dominant group. Until at least the 1960s, assimilationism was prevalent in the "classic" immigrant-receiving states of Australia, Canada, and the United States. France is another example of an assimilationist state. France has liberal access to citizenship by European standards but recognizes persons only as individuals, not as members of cultural groups. In a *differential exclusion,* or segregation, model, society is segmented according to skin colour, language, religion, or national origin. Migrants are integrated into certain parts of society, such as the labour market and the welfare system, but they are excluded from others, namely, political forums. European countries that recruited "guest workers" but offered them little possibility of obtaining citizenship were considered exclusionist. Germany, especially, received much international criticism in this regard, although it did liberalize access to citizenship somewhat in 2000. Today, exclusionary models can be found in Japan and the Persian Gulf states.

Under both assimilation and differential exclusion models, immigration does not significantly change the dominant culture of the receiving society. Advocates of *cultural pluralism,* on the other hand, view heterogeneity and the expression of different cultures as compatible with national unity and identity. In this spirit (or having recognized that assimilation was becoming less prevalent), countries such as Australia, Canada, and Sweden have introduced official policies of multiculturalism. In some cases, such as Canada and the Netherlands, states may even stimulate cultural pluralism through the funding of ethnic organizations or ethnic or religious media. Individuals are allowed to retain their group identities in the public sphere, including in schools, the military, and the media. This may extend to special rights and exemptions for members of some cultural groups. In some receiving states, for example, Muslim girls are excused from participation in coeducational physical-education classes. In Britain, turbaned Sikhs are exempt from laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets.

These models of incorporation influence the claims that ethnic minorities make on their state of residence. How these models impact transnational mobilization is, however, not clear. Some scholars have hypothesized that a more negative context of reception facilitates the maintenance of strong transnational ties (Smith 1998; Portes 1999). Downward occupational mobility and expectations of return to the sending state have also been posited as factors increasing political transnationalism (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003, 1217-18). However, in this volume Wong and Satzewich hypothesize that multiculturalism can be conducive to the formation of transnational social spaces insofar as ethnic and religious organizations are supported by the state. Faist (2000b, 199-200) and Castles (2002, 1161) assert that both discrimination and multiculturalism can contribute to the formation of transnational communities. Other research in this area has argued that modes of minority incorporation may not impact transnational politics to the same extent that they impact immigrants' domestic political activity. According to Østergaard-Nielsen (2001, 264), inclusive and exclusive states alike view political transnationalism as impeding political incorporation. Few states favour any transnational political practices by their residents. Moreover, she points out, homeland-oriented political organizations are not solely dependent on the receiving state: they can draw resources from outside the receiving state, such as from sister organizations in other states.

One of the few comparative studies in this area was conducted by European scholars Koopmans and Statham (2003). In their research on Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, they asked how forms of transnational political activism were influenced by the specific citizenship and integration regimes of the receiving states. Based on a content analysis of major newspapers in their three case-study states, they found that the public mobilization of migrants and ethnic minorities was much more likely to include a transnational dimension in Germany than in Britain or the Netherlands. In the latter two countries, the authors reasoned, ethnic organizations are better incorporated into the policy process, so migrants focus more on issues of integration. In Germany, on the other hand, migrants may focus more on homeland politics because they have no input on policy decisions in the host state (224-29).

The work of Koopmans and Statham provides evidence that citizenship laws and models of minority incorporation do influence transnationalism. Their research provides support for the hypothesis that, even in an era of globalization, states continue to shape the issues around which their residents mobilize. However, a comprehensive understanding of the claims that migrants make about experiences in their homelands and in receiving states cannot focus on the latter alone. The authors themselves recognize the potential importance both of homeland influences and of migrant groups' own characteristics. It is to these other sets of factors that I now turn.

Sending States

The second major set of factors influencing migrants' mobilization relates to the sending state, or "home state." The policies and practices of sending states that are important in this regard roughly parallel those that matter in the receiving states, namely, political systems and citizenship laws. In addition, "outreach" by states to citizens and ethnic kindred living abroad, including electoral provisions and the practices of political parties, may be important. Each of these is examined below.

Political Systems

As above, these include whether the regime is democratic or authoritarian and the extent of democratic freedoms. The level of civil conflict may also be an important factor. If a state has significant ethnic and religious cleavages, these often contribute to the formation of transnational social spaces because minorities in the diaspora are eager to keep tabs on homeland politics. This is especially true when states are young and in the process of nation building (Faist 2000b, 199).

Citizenship Laws

As discussed above, citizenship regimes determine who is a member of the polity and who is not. Some states seek to retain ties to their expatriates by allowing for dual citizenship and by conferring citizenship on the descendants of citizens living abroad. Historically, countries of emigration tended to base nationality primarily on ancestral lineage (jus sanguinis). This understanding of citizenship encouraged emigrants to retain their nationality and to transmit it to their children, thereby facilitating closer ties with their homeland. This can also become the basis for a "law of return" aimed at reintegrating former emigrants. For example, Germany's ethnic conception of citizenship meant that "ethnic Germans," or *Ausseidler,* could apply for German citizenship even if they could not speak German and had never visited Germany. The 3.5 million Ausseidler who are living in Germany come from eastern central Europe, namely, Poland, Romania, and the former Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the Ausseidler policy has become increasingly restrictive, requiring applicants to pass a language test and to prove that they face discrimination as Germans in their homeland (Klekowski and Ohliger 1997). Israel has an even more extensive citizenship policy. The 1951 Israeli Law of Return grants every Jew in the world an automatic right to citizenship. This law is the concrete expression of the Zionist vision of the "ingathering of exiles." Thus, in addition to the estimated 10 to 15 percent of Israelis who live abroad – mainly in the United States – millions of other persons around the world have a claim to Israeli citizenship. That there are more Jews in the United States than in Israel has a potential bearing on Israeli politics. In brief, by granting citizenship to persons living abroad, citizenship laws may encourage transnational politics.

About half the countries in the world now recognize dual citizenship (Vertovec 1999, 455). From the sending country's perspective, dual citizenship is good for business: it keeps remittances flowing in, increases interest in development projects, and is thought to foster investment from citizens who have accumulated wealth overseas. The extent to which dual citizenship provisions are related to financial considerations is revealed upon closer examination of India's policy on dual citizenship. Enacted in 2003, India's policy is limited to Indians living in the world's wealthiest places: the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, eleven western-European countries, and Singapore! Dual citizens can own real estate and engage in business transactions without special permits, but they cannot vote in India or run for public office (Lakshmi 2003).

The number of dual and multiple citizens in the world is not known. Although such citizens no doubt comprise a small minority, their numbers are growing, suggesting their potential significance to future political relations (Castles 2002, 1162). Dual and multiple citizens are the most visible sign that political communities can have overlapping memberships.

Electoral Provisions

Some countries, such as the United States, allow overseas citizens to vote in elections by absentee ballot. In its first postcommunist election in November 1990, Poland allowed citizens abroad to vote at Polish embassies and consulates (Koslowski 2005, 13). In Croatia ethnic Croats were allowed to vote in the 1990 and 1992 Croatian elections from abroad even if they did not hold citizenship in Yugoslavia (1990) or Croatia (1992) (Wayland 2003, 8). Since 1995 in Croatia 10 percent of the seats in Parliament have been reserved for the diaspora. Attempts to eliminate this representation, including a review by the centre-left government elected in 2000, caused an outcry from expatriate Croatians (Winland 2002, 699). In Israel, on the other hand, voting can occur only on Israeli soil (with the exception of voting by Israeli diplomats and members of the merchant marines). Most Israelis believe that expatriates, who do not experience the security risks of living in contested lands, should not play a crucial role in elections. Thus the estimated 300,000 to 500,000 Israeli citizens who live in the United States are hindered from participating in Israeli politics. However, the diaspora is not without resources. Every time there is a national election, charter planes bring thousands of Israeli citizens back to Israel to vote. In a country where a party can be given a seat in the Legislature with only 1.5 percent of the vote, it is possible that the diaspora can impact election outcomes.

Political Parties

Political parties provide another avenue for transnational participation. Sometimes expatriates return to stand as candidates for election. This was particularly prevalent after the fall of communism in central and eastern Europe. For example, Polish-born Canadian Stanislaw Tyminski ran for the presidency of Poland in 1990 and actually received more votes than the sitting prime minister, thereby prompting his resignation. (Lech Walesa, however, won the election.) In July 1992 Serbian-born American citizen Milan Panic was elected prime minister of Yugoslavia (Koslowski 2005, 13). Lithuanian president Valdus Adamkus lived most of his life in the United States before returning to run for office in 1998. In 1999 retired University of Montreal professor Vaira Vike-Freiberga became president of Latvia. In addition, people also make campaign contributions to political parties in their homelands. In Croatia newly formed political parties sent emissaries to the United States, Canada, and Australia to raise funds from the diaspora – even before noncommunist political parties were legalized. The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) raised the vast majority of its funds, at least US$4 million, primarily in Canada. Ottawa businessman Gojko Susak was a major fundraiser and was rewarded for his efforts by being appointed defence minister after Croatia achieved independence in 1991 (Wayland 2003, 68).

The increased interest among sending states in maintaining transnational identities indicates the extent to which states continue to define identity and pursue their own interests, even beyond their borders. Some states send money, teachers, and clergy abroad to work with their expatriate citizens. Or they sponsor visits so that migrant youth can return "home" for summer camps. Likewise, political parties and ethnic and religious organizations in the sending states have various means of reaching out to citizens and coethnics overseas. These variables in the sending states – political system, citizenship laws, electoral provisions, and political parties – influence the next important variable in political transnationalism: the set of factors shaped by the migrants themselves.

Context and Circumstances of Migrants

This final contributor to political transnationalism relates to the particulars of migrants and refugees themselves. Of primary interest are the conditions of departure, the context of arrival, and characteristics of the individuals and the ethnic community. Did a person migrate to escape conditions of persecution or ethnic war? Is he or she a skilled worker, a dependant, a refugee, or an undocumented migrant? Is the migrant male or female, old or young, well educated or not? Is there a concentration of migrants within a particular city or neighbourhood, or are they widely dispersed? Is the immigrant population new or well established?

Conditions of Departure

Certain conditions of departure, such as repression of an ethnic or political group, can contribute to strong transnational political orientation, particularly if family members are left behind. Some studies of Latin Americans in the United States have found that political refugees have taken a more active stance on issues affecting their home country than have economic migrants (Landolt, Autler, and Baires 1999; Portes 1999, 465). Landolt (forthcoming) found that strong support for the partisan left in El Salvador helped to unite the Salvadoran population in Toronto during the 1980s. In the wake of the 1992 peace accord that ended the civil war, Salvadoran organizations and political mobilizing by Salvadorans in Toronto declined dramatically.

There are also cases where conditions in the sending state are such that expatriates seek independence for their ethnic kindred in the homeland or the overthrow of the current regime. Some of the most politicized migrant groups worldwide have suffered some degree of repression in their homelands. Diasporic communities advocating self-determination in the homeland include Kashmiris, Sikhs, and Sri Lankan Tamils (Ellis and Khan 1998; Tatla 1999; Wayland 2004).

Context of Arrival

As a result of institutional and contextual differences across settlement locations, immigrant populations from the same sending country may experience different processes of incorporation and thus develop different transnational orientations. In one of the few comparative studies in this area, Landolt (forthcoming) compared Salvadorans in Toronto and Los Angeles. She found a "distinct institutional landscape" in each locale "that facilitates some and hinders other modes of transnational and incorporationist practices." These distinct landscapes were the product of each city's respective labour-market conditions, political culture, and immigration history.

Other factors that might be important, and that beg for more empirical research, include the geographical concentration of the immigrant community, the chronology of arrival, and how long the ethnic community has had a presence in the receiving state. Did members arrive in quick succession, or did migration occur over the span of several decades? Did they settle in proximity to one another? Has the community had enough time to get established in the receiving state by sending children through the school system and establishing businesses and media outlets?

Individual and Group Characteristics

These include the status of the immigrants and refugees, their age, sex, race, and level of education. Does the community have its own organizations and places of worship? How strong are social networks within the immigrant community?

How these factors combine to influence mobilization by migrants and their descendants is addressed in several recent empirical studies. Cheran (forthcoming) points to networks of more than three hundred voluntary associations of Tamils in Canada, formed on the basis of people's home villages in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka or on the basis of the high schools that they attended in the region. These networks have been mobilized to aid in relief, reconstruction, and development efforts in the conflict zones of Sri Lanka. Moreover, they act almost completely independently from any state structures. In their study of Salvadorans, Colombians, and Dominicans living in the United States, Guarnizo and colleagues (2003, 1232) found that the presence of social networks facilitated transnational ties.

They also found that involvement in transnational politics increased significantly during adulthood and then declined as persons became elderly (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003, 1229). Their survey data indicated that the transnational activists were predominantly married men and that one's likelihood to engage in transnational politics increased with education level. In brief, Guarnizo and his collaborators found that the profile of persons most likely to engage in political transnationalism is associated with being well connected, well established, educated, and male. Although based on a limited sample, this finding contradicts earlier speculation that persons resort to transnational activism as a reaction to marginalization in the receiving state.

In sum, migrants to a particular country generally face the same set of institutions in the receiving society. Yet the extent and characteristics of domestic and transnational political activism vary widely among ethnic communities. These differences are rooted in factors pertaining to the particular circumstances of each community. The studies cited above give us glimpses into why these circumstances matter, but these findings hold true only for limited samples. Obviously, more comparative research in this area is needed before further conclusions can be drawn.

Putting the Pieces Together: Toward a Conceptual Framework

Above I presented three sets of factors that may influence the types, directions, and extent of political transnationalism: policies and practices in receiving states, policies and practices in sending states, and the context and circumstances of migrants themselves. Any comprehensive analysis of political transnationalism must recognize the interplay between these sets of factors. No single factor in the sending or receiving state produces transnationalism. Moreover, some combinations seem more conducive to transnationalism than others. A particular combination that is seen in much of the literature on diaspora politics and political transnationalism involves migrants who leave a situation of persecution for a democratic state that guarantees civil liberties. In such situations, migrants have strong grievances and are able to take advantage of newfound freedoms to publish, organize, and accumulate financial resources to an extent that was impossible in the homeland. In some countries of settlement, public funding even supports various forms of ethnic media and organization. As a result, "migrants and their descendants can then mobilize in the host country to publicize their cause as well as to lobby decision-makers to obtain additional political rights for their co-ethnics in the sending country" (Wayland 2004, 417).

Take the case of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. In the wake of anti-Tamil riots in 1983, many Tamils were accepted as political refugees in Britain, Canada, Australia, and other states. Since then, they have become a very mobilized diasporic community, lobbying for an independent homeland, sending relief aid to their homeland, and sending financial contributions to the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Wayland 2004). A Tamil refugee from Sri Lanka expressed the following sentiments about living in Canada: "Here you could practise democracy [more] than [in] our country. You could raise your voice according to whatever you think. You could tell your opinion whatever good for the community or the country. You don't need to be scared to tell your opinion even though the government ruling party doesn't like your idea" (personal interview 2000).

Another example is Germany, home to an estimated half-million Kurds who hold Turkish passports (Lyon and Uçarer 2001). Many Kurds in Turkey would like their own separate state, but they are constrained from mobilizing in Turkey. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which was formed in 1978 in Turkey, used acts of violence against Turkish authorities to draw attention to its separatist claims. In Germany, by comparison, it was able to operate in the open and to mobilize within the Kurdish community, which had already been there for three decades. The PKK organized large public demonstrations, disrupted traffic, and attacked and vandalized Turkish businesses and associations in Germany to draw attention to the Kurdish cause.

These diasporic communities can better mobilize in the receiving states than in their homelands, yet their actions are constrained by policies of the receiving states. In the most extreme case, states may ban certain ethnic organizations deemed to be a security threat or to be affiliated with terrorist activity, thereby prohibiting them from organizing or fundraising in that state. In the United States, there is a ban on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, which has spearheaded the insurgency for a separate Tamil state on the island of Sri Lanka. Canada has imposed a partial ban on LTTE-related activity. Between 1993 and 1998, Germany banned the PKK and its affiliate organizations under provisions used to restrict terrorist organizations.

Another way that various sets of factors combine to produce specific configurations of transnationalism concerns the foreign policies of the receiving state concerning its dealings with the sending state. National interests in the receiving state can influence transnationalism. During the Cold War, the United States encouraged anticommunist mobilization among its immigrants from eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. More recently, Cuban American lobbyists were important players in the passage of the Helms Burton law that sought to increase Cuba's economic isolation (Shain 1999, 73-77). Sometimes a receiving state's priorities put a damper on transnationalism. The United States has discouraged Arab Americans from supporting the Palestinian cause within Israel and the occupied territories because such activities conflict with American foreign policy goals in the Middle East (92-131). These examples highlight how ethnic minority policies can become intertwined with foreign-policy considerations. Domestic politics become globalized, while at the same time global politics may influence domestic policies.

The foregoing illustrates how differences in the political systems of sending and receiving states affect the political opportunities open to migrant communities. It also shows that foreign policy interests of receiving states can influence the extent to which migrants and ethnic communities are able to mobilize around transnational concerns. These are just two examples of how different sets of factors interact to produce various types of political transnationalism. Other influences not addressed here include the role of civil-society organizations in sending and receiving states and the importance of locality and translocal experiences.

How Widespread Is Transnational Political Activity, and Is It Limited to the "First Generation"?

A major criticism of scholarship on transnationalism is that most research has been based on case studies of those who engage in transnational activities. By failing to study those who do not participate in transnational affairs, researchers may give the impression that transnationalism is more widespread than it really is. What proportion of an immigrant community is involved in transnational politics, and how much does this vary according to ethnicity, place of origin, and country or community of residence? What motivates political transmigrants, and what characteristics do they share in common?

Just as many citizens do not engage in domestic politics or consider themselves politically active, so, too, is it probable that only a minority of migrants and their descendants engage in transnational politics. The little empirical research that has been conducted in this area suggests that much depends on the definition of political transnationalism. A smaller percentage is involved in electoral politics, whereas more people are active around issues that can loosely be construed as political. In their survey of more than a thousand adult Dominicans, Colombians, and Salvadorans living in the United States, Guarnizo and colleagues (2003, 1227) found that as many as one-third of the sample engaged in transnational politics when the definition was extended to include membership in hometown civic associations, financial contributions to civic projects in the homeland, and regular membership in charity organizations aimed at the homeland.

Smaller groups of hardcore transnationals may be supplemented by larger contingencies of "softer" transnationalists during certain situations, such as a crucial election or a national disaster in the homeland. This may unite some immigrant communities, but others experience internal cleavages in response to developments in the homeland. Kelly's (forthcoming) research on Filipinos living in Canada found that they were deeply divided over the dictatorial rule of Ferdinand Marcos during the 1970s and '80s. Some remained loyal to Marcos to the end, while a broad range of other Filipinos formed an anti-Marcos coalition. In the early 1980s, with tensions high between the anti-Marcos activists and the Philippine consulate in Toronto, each organized rival events for the annual Philippine Independence Day celebrations.

Can transnational identities be passed down over generations, or do they decline among those who never lived in the "homeland"? People probably feel their primary allegiance to the society in which they are socialized. But some studies have documented transnational political activism among the descendants of immigrants, although it is likely to be "less frequent and more selective in scope" (Levitt 2003, 184). One need only look to the numerous ethno-national student associations present on Canadian university campuses for evidence of persistent transnational identities. Some of these associations are directly engaged in homeland issues.

Other persons "rediscover" their ethnic identities as they get older. In her interviews with migrants and their descendants in the Boston area, Levitt (2003) found some Irish Americans who did not become transnational activists until they reached middle age. Once again, there is no single answer to the question of who engages in transnational politics and when. What we can say is that interest in transnationalism can wax and wane over the course of one's life and that patterns may differ among ethnic groups as well as among individuals within the same ethnic group. There is not necessarily any linear path that transnationalism follows. According to Levitt (2003, 184), “migrants put together a constellation of strategies at different stages of their lives and combine these with host-country integration strategies. The resulting configurations produce different mixes of upward and downward mobility in both contexts.”

Conclusion: Domestic Implications of Transnational Politics

Linear assimilation theory predicts that, over time, migrants assimilate into the society of the receiving state (Gordon 1964). In doing so, they cease to identify with their society of origin and to be involved in homeland politics. Recent research on transnationalism challenges this perspective and points in a different direction. Political transnationalism does not occur at the expense of mobilization around domestic political issues. Domestic and transnational activism are not mutually exclusive.

In fact, there is some evidence that – far from destroying social cohesion in receiving states – interest in homeland issues can actually positively contribute to one’s integration into the receiving society. This was the conclusion reached by Karpathakis (1999) in her study of Greek immigrants in New York City. She found that their mobilization over Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974 actually facilitated their incorporation into the American political system. Similarly, in a challenge to the view that American foreign policy has been damaged by ethnic lobbying, Shain (1999) argues that ethnic groups are in fact good for democracy. First, he says, they can influence American policies toward their homelands only if they demonstrate how the policies will disseminate American values and ideals abroad, namely, democracy, pluralism, and respect for human rights. Second, he argues, ethnic mobilization around foreign policy benefits American civic culture because it reinforces values of democracy and pluralism among ethnic groups in the United States.

In general, transnational ethnic actors who wish to influence the foreign policies of the countries in which they live must learn how to negotiate the political landscapes of their countries, cities, or communities of residence. This includes learning how to lobby elected officials through telephoning and letter-writing campaigns, how to frame their demands in the language of human rights and democratic ideals, how to obtain permits for marches, and how to form associations to send relief aid and initiate development projects. So, even while ethnic actors may be focused on the homeland, they are building social and political capital that they can use in the long term to become active participants in their host societies.

This chapter has provided an overview of our knowledge of political transnationalism, adressing the sets of factors that contribute to its forms and prevalence, how these factors interact with each other and with other variables, and how widespread transnationalism is. This overview has been supported by a discussion of various research results, some of which contradict each other. Almost all the research, however, shows that transnationalism is clearly influenced by specific national contexts and circumstances. In the introductory chapter, the editors of this volume ask: "Do national political cultures, traditions, and policies help to explain particular trajectories of transnational identities and practices?" After reading this chapter, the answer should be clear.

Canada is home to millions of persons with ties to other parts of the world. Many of them engage in some aspect of political transnationalism, including assistance with relief and rehabilitation efforts in war-torn areas, contributions to political campaigns in other countries, and support for independence movements in the homeland. In its most extreme mode, transnationalism assumes the form of terrorist activity, such as the 1985 bombing of Air India flight 182 allegedly by Sikhs demanding the creation of a separate state in India's Punjab region. Examples of political transnationalism abound in Canada, but social-scientific research lags behind. If, as stated above, national contexts and cultures influence the extent and nature of transnationalism, it is imperative to go beyond the existing body of research that focuses predominantly on the United States and – to a lesser extent – the European context. As shown in this chapter, scholars have an excellent base of hypotheses on which to build Canadian, and ultimately comparative, research.