mission invisible

Race, Religion, and News
at the Dawn of the 9/11 Era

Ross Perigoe and Mahmoud Eid

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Preface

ROSS PERIGOE

THE ISSUE OF RACISM has touched me personally. As a child in the mid-1950s, I accompanied my family on our annual drive from Canada down the eastern seaboard of the United States to Florida for our Christmas vacation. I was introduced to the visible and visceral sides of racism in the American South: "whites only" drinking fountains, segregated schools for black children who were my age, and segregated bathrooms in bus stations and hotels. My parents were unflinching in their insistence that I witness the injustice to which our fellow human beings were subjected by people whose skin colour was the same as mine. The civil rights movement in the United States became a regular topic at our dinner table in the late 1950s and 1960s even though we lived in an almost exclusively white neighbourhood in Toronto.

Having explored the issues of racism and representation in the early 1990s (Perigoe and Lazar 1992), I found myself returning to them after a series of books and articles by Canadian researchers rekindled my concern. The first was John Miller's (1998) *Yesterday's News: Why Canada's Newspapers Are Failing Us.* Miller, the former chair of journalism at Ryerson University in Toronto, fearlessly examined the state of journalism in Canada, and I found myself asking whether I too had become too comfortable within the establishment.

Miller's book was followed in quick succession by a series of reports and books by the York University cultural anthropology team of Frances Henry and Carol Tator (2000, 2002) and additional reports by these authors with

Winston Mattis (1998) and Winston Mattis and Tim Rees (2000). I began to question whether my own teaching approach in the journalism department at Concordia University contained racist ideology. My earlier studies convinced me that a form of "incognizant racism" (Heider 2000) and "everyday racism" (Essed 1991) existed in Canadian news accounts on television. Yet I had embraced the ideology of tolerance, diversity, and multiculturalism so completely that I questioned whether Henry and Tator's findings of racist rhetoric and discourse could be applied outside a black (or Aboriginal) versus white news story.

A third, seminal document was written by Karim H. Karim (2003) of Carleton University. In *Islamic Peril: Media and Global Violence,* Karim applied the work of Edward Said (1978) and his concept of Orientalism (the bipolar representation of Muslims as the "Other" and whites as "us") in a Canadian context. Each of these works aided me in approaching the current study. Miller (1998) gave me the perspective to be able to examine critically my own craft; Henry and Tator (2000) and Tator, Henry, and Mattis (1998) gave me the inspiration to focus on racist discourses; and Karim (2003) gave me the confidence to approach racist discourses regarding the Muslim communities inside and outside Canada. The research findings of these writers accompanied me to Australia, where, with the help of an International Student Scholarship from Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT), I began my studies of race, racism, and the media.

It was nearly midnight in Melbourne when my wife came to wake me up. She said that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. As I struggled to grasp what she was saying, I found myself wondering why she had chosen to wake me up the night before the most important day in my academic life. The following morning, September 12, 2001, I was scheduled to address my doctoral thesis committee at RMIT on my chosen topic: newspapers' representation of visible minorities. I had already had many sleepless nights worrying about my presentation. I had a topic (the racist representation of a community), a novel methodology (both content analysis and critical discourse analysis), but no event. With the presentation to the committee barely hours away, I resigned myself to another sleepless night.

As I swung my legs off the bed, I tried to make sense of what was happening. For the past several months, I had seen spray-painted graffiti on Melbourne's walls: "Remember S11." The reference was to battles between anarchists and Melbourne police one year earlier at the Asia Pacific Summit of the World Economic Forum. I wondered if somehow the two events

were connected. Whatever had happened in New York City, it was clear that my wife had thought it important enough to wake me. Her family lives there — many of them work in Manhattan. Her father, now retired, worked in the fur business just around the corner from Madison Square Garden and her cousin, in New York City's housing administration. I surmised that somehow a light private plane had wandered off its flight path and wondered how it could have hit such an obvious building as the World Trade Center.

It did not occur to me that it could have been a deliberate act or that the plane could have been an airliner with over 100 passengers on board. It did not occur to me that another plane was heading toward the other tower at that moment or that both towers would collapse. It did not occur to me that my thesis topic had just found its event.

My wife and I sat through the night transfixed and stunned as the second airliner plowed into the second tower, watching in disbelief as both towers collapsed. We did not know if any of her family was in the building at the time, so we spent anguished hours trying to reach her father's home. We watched — wanting to help — not knowing what to do — not even ready to ask "why?" or "who?"

When we finally reached my wife's family, we discovered that her cousin had been scheduled for a meeting at the World Trade Center that morning but that the meeting had been rescheduled to the day before. Her job suspended, she spent a month driving a van that shuttled workers to and from the site. None of our friends and relatives in New York had been killed or injured, but none would go untouched or unmoved by such an event. On our next visit to New York, we walked by a fire station; the names of dozens of fire fighters who had perished were written on a chalkboard at the front entrance to the building.

There are times in life when reality and theatre blend. This was one such time. As I made my presentation on racism and representation to my thesis committee, it became clear that the way in which the press treated this event would give enormous insight into how the people — whoever had committed this act — and their countrymen and -women would be represented.

I remember thinking about how the last bombing on American territory had been characterized early as the work of Islamic terrorists and how the perpetrator, Timothy McVeigh, a fundamentalist Christian, had been characterized as completely out of the mainstream of Christian believers. I was sure that the media would do their utmost to avoid taking

again the convenient path of blaming Muslims. It turned out that my prediction was true, at least initially, but ultimately and tragically false.

How journalists functioned in this highly charged and highly mediated period would preoccupy me for the next three and a half years. How Muslims were represented would be a significant factor in framing personal attitudes and national policies for years to come.

Being away from my home in the months immediately following the 9/11 attacks gave me several unexpected vantage points. First, it allowed me to distance myself from reporters and Montrealers themselves — people whom I knew and respected. The distance also afforded me an opportunity to examine my home country and city in crisis. I found that the best way to understand the crisis and confusion among Montrealers was to read the English-language daily newspaper to which I was accustomed, *The Gazette.* In this sense, like most Montrealers, I was using the newspaper for its mediating function — meaning making — but at a distance that allowed me to be more critical.

In conducting this analysis, any newspaper or group of newspapers in Canada could have been explored — and indeed nine Canadian newspapers and four news services were carried in the pages of *The Gazette* during the studied period, along with twenty non-Canadian newspapers and seven news services. All of them have been included in the evaluation. As I read *The Gazette*'s accounts, I found myself asking whether Henry and Tator's (2000) methods of analysis could be similarly applied, this time to Muslim communities. Were Muslims, not categorized as "different" by their skin colour, nevertheless being victimized like other minority groups? I hoped that the answer would be "no," but I feared that it might be "yes."

Introduction   **Mission Visible?**

Rationale

THE BROAD PURPOSE OF this book is to examine how media coverage of Muslim communities was imagined, constructed, negotiated, represented, and generalized after 9/11. The book questions whether the mission of journalists — to provide information on and context for the events of 9/11 — resulted in a misrepresentation of Muslim communities that made their diversity invisible and further led to the racialization of these communities as the homogeneous Other. The emphasis is on how news media ideologically construct an Orientalist and Islamophobic reading through discourse and rhetoric. By focusing on *The Gazette* at the dawn of a crisis, the analysis demonstrates how differing authority and non-authority voices, using ideologically formed racist patterns, helped to construct a racist interpretation of the new threat that the 9/11 attacks represented.

Drawing primarily from the works of Henry and Tator (2000, 2002), Karim (2003), van Dijk (1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1998, 1999a), and Said (1978), the objective is to focus on the intersections of discourse and rhetoric in *The Gazette* to examine representations that historically have been constituted and solidified through the ideology of racism.

This book does not single out individual journalists, editors, or managers at *The Gazette*, nor does it subjectively seek out findings that would vilify *The Gazette.* Many studies have shown that racism and white dominance are part of the very structural and ideological formations that inform

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the philosophy and organization of our daily newspapers in Canada (Ducharme 1986; Fleras 1995; Ginzberg 1987; Henry and Tator 2000, 2002; Henry, Tator, Mattis, and Rees 2000). Although evidence of both racism and anti-racism was sought in the interest of balance, the analysis revealed *The Gazette* to be informed by the same structural and ideological formations to which most Canadian media have been subject.

Nor does this book attempt to uncover a "conspiracy" in which journalists knowingly participated in an ideological construction to perpetuate the dominance of elites (e.g., Hall 1979). Instead, the inquiry attempts to outline complex and occasionally competing discourses that concurrently sustain a hegemonic interpretation and stereotype Muslims.

Finally, this book does not attempt to prove once again that the media in white-dominated societies help to reproduce racism. Scholarly journals and the experiences of minority groups have shown repeatedly that dominant media perpetuate prejudice against and stereotypes of minority groups (e.g., Fleras 1995). Instead, the approach here questions whether the undifferentiated reading of all textual production is similarly motivated and examines how different texts employ various rhetorical tactics and discursive themes to achieve their ends. It expands on the importance of racist rhetoric and discourse, fragmenting them into constituent parts that are then evaluated for their roles in ideological formation. The book argues that this mapping of racist ideology produces a complex pattern of rhetorical devices (images and metaphors such as the clash of civilizations, the Crusades, and Pearl Harbor), dramatic structures (through the creation of heroes and villains), and discursive themes (the Muslim as a treacherous barbarian — see, e.g., Gavrilos 2002; Naber 2000; Rosow 1990; Schechter 2003) to produce a coherent racist reading of events. The book demonstrates how different textual productions at the initial stages of a single news story generated a discourse that progressed from stunned disbelief and anger to a buildup to war against an unknown and "invisible" enemy.[1]

Why 9/11 and Canada?

The attacks of September 11, 2001, created a philosophical and cultural shockwave felt around the world. They changed foreign and domestic policies as well as defence and security policies. They focused attention on Islamic fundamentalism as the lightning rod for an East–West religious and military confrontation. Ultimately, they resulted in what President George W. Bush called "the first war of the 21st century" (Mackenzie 2001b),

known as the War on Terror. With campaigns conducted in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the War on Terror has resulted in over 4,400 US military deaths in Iraq alone, greatly outnumbering the victims of 9/11 (US military ... 2012). But the attacks also produced unprecedented security measures, yellow alerts, red alerts, videotaped messages from Osama bin Laden (Chossudovsky 2004), videotaped executions (Sly 2004), and prisoner detentions in Guantánamo Bay prison and other secret locales.

In Canada, the fears contributed to the passage of Bill C-36, Canada's Anti-Terrorism Act (Department of Justice 2001); the unlawful detention and torture of a Canadian citizen, Maher Arar, in a Syrian jail (CBC news ... 2007); and the denial of habeas corpus to a Canadian citizen, Adil Charkaoui, who sat in a Canadian jail for twenty months but was never put on trial. For white Canadians, 9/11 produced feelings of insecurity, vulnerability, and suspicion of "Arabs" in general. Being Muslim was often seen as being Arab, and diverse Muslim communities were glossed over as if they were an invisible characteristic of a monolithic Arab race. In a poll undertaken by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) three weeks after the attacks, over a third (37 percent) of Canadians polled reported that they had more negative feelings toward "Arabs" than previously, and 50 percent of Canadians polled said that they agreed with the statement, "given current circumstances, I think that it is acceptable that airline, police, and customs officials give special attention to individuals of Arabic origin," in essence condoning racial profiling. Nearly a year later, in August 2002, the percentage agreeing with the above statement had declined by only two points to 48 percent (September 11th ... 2002). Canadians did more than simply harbour negative feelings; they also acted on their anger. The number of reported attacks on Canadian Muslims in the year after the 9/11 attacks compared with the previous year increased sixteen-fold, from eleven to 173 (Helly 2004). By conducting important research on the texts produced at the dawn of 9/11 as such a significant event, the media's role can be better understood in terms of how it not only engenders hostility toward Muslim communities but also conflates religion with race, contributing to racialized portrayals of Muslim communities as invisible Others.

Two primary factors make an analysis of 9/11 particularly important. First, the attacks were highly mediated events. Since most people watched, read, and heard accounts of the attacks rather than being at the sites, the formation of understanding flowed from a commonly accessed source — news media. How the attacks were framed was uniquely the prerogative of the media, unlike other events in which personal experiences and opinions

factor into the equation. On this occasion, Canadians sat "glued to television sets at breakfast counters and taverns" (Solyom 2001) and consumed whatever was written in the newspapers to form an understanding that would fit with their previous ideologies.

Second, the unprecedented magnitude of the attacks and their unexpected nature required immediate contextualization. Coverage of the attacks resulted in rapidly mediated construction of how to interpret them. The great surprise afforded a unique opportunity to see daily journalism bereft of its veneers of detachment, objectivity, and neutrality (Hackett and Zhao 1998, 1). Journalists fell back on habitual methods of news gathering (Tuchman 1978) to rapidly make sense of the events. To make them meaningful, they called on the elite, on their friends, and on their own knowledge and biases to sort out their feelings and make sense of the attacks (Zelizer and Allan 2011). These contextualizations were blended with their own opinions, resulting in a discourse that portrayed Muslim communities as suspicious and represented hostile feelings toward them.

Why Racism?

Federal Policies and Laws

To be fair, over the past two decades, Canada has attempted to establish and entrench the rights of its minority citizens. This institutionalization began with adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as part of the Constitution Act of 1982. Section 2(b) guarantees "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of information" (Department of Justice 2004). The Charter was followed in 1988 by the Multiculturalism Act, whose preamble guarantees that "persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion or to use their own language" (Department of Justice 2012).

Fleras (1995) notes that the creation of a Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship in 1991 (since reorganized under the Ministry of Heritage) signalled a sincere commitment at the federal level to the protection of minority rights. The Criminal Code describes hate crimes as those advocating genocide (Article 318) or causing public incitement of hatred (Article 319) (Criminal Code … 2009). Yet Zolf (1996) notes that, though these legal precepts add to the ideology of an open society, neither the Charter of Rights and Freedoms nor the Multiculturalism Act was meant to be enforced. There are no penalties for law breakers and no legal

enforcement officers, so systemic racism is not seriously addressed in the country (Henry and Tator 2000; Mackey 1996), nor are groups who do not accept "the Canadian way" of doing things embraced within the Canadian approach to the protection of their rights (Fleras 2004, 433).[2]

Although the Canadian government has no mechanism to monitor the hiring practices and editorial contents of the print media, in broadcast media, with Section 3.1 (d) (iii) of the Broadcasting Act of 1991, the government legislated that, through both employment and programming, Canada's broadcasting system should reflect "the linguistic duality and multicultural and multiracial nature of Canadian society and the special place of aboriginal peoples within that society" (CRTC 2007). In terms of hiring practices, the federal government, through the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), has required broadcasters to increase visible minority hiring. However, progress among private broadcasters has been slow. Even by its own estimates, the federally funded CBC is composed of only 6.9 percent visible minorities[3] and another 1.4 percent Aboriginal peoples (CBC/Radio-Canada 2012, 11), well below the national population of 19.1 percent and 4.3 percent respectively for these groups (Statistics Canada 2013).

Canada, then, still has a long way to go in its treatment of minority groups, and this need extends beyond media practices. In April 2001, six months before the 9/11 attacks, the United Nations (UN) criticized the Canadian government for placing immigrants in detention centres for long periods of time before determining their fate (UN blames Canada … 2001). Shortly after this criticism, reports indicated the federal government's record of only 6 percent visible minority representation in the public service (May 2002),[4] a condition that Senator Donald Oliver described as indicative of "systemic racism." Oliver cautioned that in Canada progress is severely lacking in this area, for visible minorities' ability to "mak[e] a substantive and valuable contribution to Canada's public service has come to a virtual standstill … There is no inclination on the part of the government … to do anything about it" (Quotas aren't … 2004).

To its credit, however, the federal government did pledge to improve this record (May 2002) and has at least partially succeeded, for visible minorities now account for 12.6 percent of federal public service employees (Statistics Canada 2011). However, this is still well below the national visible minority population at 19.1 percent (Statistics Canada 2013). It is therefore no surprise that in a 2008 national survey on racism, discrimination, and multiculturalism, a majority of Canadians identified "lack of employment

opportunities" (64.4 percent), "isolation" (54.8 percent), and "lack of under-standing from mainstream" (54.1 percent) as the greatest challenges facing minority communities (United Nations … 2008). Oddly, the same survey also indicated that, in terms of Canada's multiculturalism policy, 63 percent of Canadians agreed with the statement "Canada's multicultural policy — which aims to foster an inclusive Canada built on inter-cultural under-standing and citizen participation — has been successful in pursuing this mandate" (11). This might indicate that Canadians' perceptions of multi-culturalism are somewhat inflated compared with the actual treatment of minorities. Canada needs to make much more progress, especially in terms of institutional constraints, to address such issues of racism if it is to be a truly multicultural society.

These institutional constraints, integrally linked to systemic racism, were found by the *Toronto Star* in 2002 regarding the Toronto Police Service. The *Toronto Star* conducted an exhaustive survey of Toronto police rec-ords to demonstrate that racial profiling of young black men in Toronto was common and that they were routinely incarcerated for longer periods of time than their white counterparts who had committed the same of-fences (Rankin et al. 2002).

As a result of 9/11, Parliament passed Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act, in 2002, which critics have described as "fundamentally misguided" (Booth 2001). Post-9/11, two cases have appeared in which Muslim men have been denied their legal rights. Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen arrested in the United States, was deported to Syria and tortured for a year, based on accusations of having contacts in al-Qaeda that were later proven to be false (CBC news … 2007). A federal judicial inquiry held that Arar had been wrongfully accused of being a terrorist by the RCMP. He reached a legal settlement (one of the largest in Canadian history) with the govern-ment of Canada and received a formal apology from Prime Minister Harper in 2007 (Harper apologizes … 2007). A second incident involved Adil Charkaoui, a Montreal man originally from Morocco who was im-prisoned in a Montreal jail for more than twenty months without charges being laid against him (Marowits 2005). In the Charkaoui case, the federal government used a security certificate under the Immigration Act that al-lows it to detain suspected terrorists indefinitely without either sharing with the accused evidence of guilt or conducting a trial (Charkaoui Free … 2005). In August 2009, the federal government withdrew the evidence that had led to Charkaoui's arrest (Friday 2009). Three more Canadian men, Muayyed Nureddin, Abdullah Almalki, and Ahmad Abou El Maati,

have also alleged that the government of Canada was complicit in their torture in Syria and Egypt and had their cases reviewed by a federal judicial inquiry, this time headed by former Supreme Court justice Frank Iacobucci (Ottawa calls … 2006). Although the inquiry condemned the government for its complicity, the government denied responsibility for their torture. The three men also sued the government and challenged Canada's right to withhold information that could pose a threat to national security. However, early in 2012, they lost the lawsuit (Torture victims lose … 2012).

These examples historicize the treatment of Canada's minority populations in recent years and demonstrate a long-standing double standard in Canada in which minority groups are treated, at best, with suspicion and hostility and, at worst, with systemic racism.

Canada and Racism before 9/11

Before examining the specifics of the 9/11 media coverage, it is necessary to situate Canada attitudinally regarding perceptions of multiculturalism, race, and Muslims before the attacks occurred. Two dominant themes appear as forms of naturalized racism in the history of Canada's relations with minority groups: tolerance and denial.

Mirchandani and Tastsoglou (2000, 49) describe tolerance as "a core feature of the Canadian national identity which is a source of both national pride and international recognition."[5] Karim (2002b) describes tolerance as deeply embedded in Canadian myth making, and a report by Decima Research[6] conducted before 9/11 indicated that tolerance was seen by Canadians as a characteristic that distinguishes the Canadian ethos from that of Americans (Canadian Council … 1995). The report also revealed that Canadians believed that there is less or a lot less racism in Canada than in the United States, and 68 percent of Canadians agreed or strongly agreed that "one of the best things about Canada is our acceptance of people from all races and backgrounds" (ibid.). Still, within the poll, latent racist opinions were revealed. For example, 72 percent thought that "different ethnic and racial groups should try to adapt to Canadian society" (ibid.). Fleras (2004, 429) notes that, unlike our American cousins, Canadians do not like to talk about race, "preferring instead to refract perceptions of alterity through the prism of ethnicity and culture." For Mackey (1999), Canada might appear to represent heterogeneity, but it does so with a white face. Despite this historical institutionalization of racism, there remains a steadfast belief in the myth of *tolerance* (not *acceptance* or *welcoming* or *inclusion*) of visible minorities in Canada. As Mirchandani and Tastsoglou (2000) note,

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tolerance establishes boundaries of acceptable behaviour among groups and thus perpetuates distinctions of difference. The term carries a negative connotation, as though one group must endure or "put up with" another because they have no choice. British Columbia's former lieutenant governor, David See-Chai Lam, noted that "tolerance is a slightly negative word … It's like saying, 'You smell, but I can hold my breath'" (cited in ibid., 49).

Although tolerance as a national myth and racist opinions not reflective of a truly multicultural society existed before 9/11, in the wake of the attacks both the image and the myth of tolerance in Canada were magnified, partly by denial. Helly (2004) reported that the Canadian Islamic Congress noted an almost sixteen-fold increase in reports of attacks on Muslims from just eleven in the year before the 9/11 attacks to a striking 173 attacks on Muslims in the year after the 9/11 attacks. In the United States, the number of reported anti-Muslim incidents increased by more than seventeen times from twenty-eight in 2000 to a striking 481 in 2001; they then dropped to 155 in 2002, though still remained quite high. Helly notes that these numbers are likely far less than the actual numbers of incidents that occurred, because victims of hate crimes rarely come forward with official complaints, and the reporting practices of various Canadian cities' police departments vary widely. Additionally, Helly cautions that, though the rates of hate crimes dropped after reaching their height in 2002, negative attitudes toward Muslims were held by 30-45 percent of Canadians.

However, reporting on the *same* numbers from the Canadian Islamic Congress in 2003, the *National Post* published an editorial claiming that the decrease in anti-Muslim hate crimes in the United States from 481 to 155 between 2001 and 2002 indicated that "North Americans [are] a pretty tolerant lot" and that the backlash against Muslims was a "figment of the media's imagination" (More tolerant … 2003). Making Canadians part of this supposedly good news, the article went on to claim that "the statistics show that Canada witnesses very few serious hate crimes of any description," yet no evidence was provided for this claim, and in fact it is contradicted by Helly's (2004) evidence of a sixteen-fold increase in anti-Muslim incidents between 2001 and 2002. The myth of tolerance and a discourse of denial are evident in the following passage from the same *National Post* editorial:

From the news many North Americans get, one can easily get the impression that anti-Muslim bigotry has become epidemic since

9/11. The CBC in particular seems to have interviewed just about every headscarf-clad woman in this country, attempting to secure some tale of woe. Yet the most recent data show North Americans are a pretty tolerant lot. In fact, it's hard to avoid the conclusion that the much-hyped "backlash" against Muslims and Arabs is a figment of the media's imagination. (More tolerant … 2003)

The *National Post*'s glossing over of an alarming increase in intolerance exhibited by anti-Muslim incidents in the post-9/11 environment is itself an example of intolerance by not acknowledging the problem and mini-mizing the issue in order to marginalize it. This editorial also addresses the second element referred to in the relationship between the white Canadian majority and minority groups: denial of inequitable treatment of minority groups. The editorial was titled "More tolerant than we realize," and in it-self the title is a form of denial of racism.

In a 2006 survey, 31 percent of Canadian Muslims polled claimed that they had had at least one negative experience based on their race, ethnicity, or religion (Soroka and Roberton 2010, 39). Such attitudes, coupled with systemic problems such as unequal access to jobs and racial profiling, create a disconnect between the perception of Canadian tolerance by Canadians and the news media on the one hand and the real scenario on the other, in part because of the media's representation (or lack thereof) and glossing over of Muslims as victims. The spike in the number of anti-Muslim incidents in 2001 attests to a backlash among Canadians against Muslims in Canada — who most likely had no complicity in the events of 9/11. These exam-ples of denial and tolerance are parts of the national imaginary. Together they minimize the gravity of any number of attacks on Muslims and erase the real history of racist attitudes in this country.

Quebec and Racism

The province of Quebec has a troubled past with respect to its minority populations as well. Anti-Semitism reared its head in the 1930s under the guidance of Quebec's first ardent nationalist, Abbé Lionel Groulx. His opinions, matching those of Germany's National Socialist (Nazi) Party, appeared in the French-language newspaper *Le Devoir* (Abley 2002a). The nationalist or sovereigntist fervour of the past forty years in Quebec has also led some, such as Margaret Cannon (1995), to express concerns over the relationship between racism and linguistic purity, which columnist Diane Francis calls "brown shirt" tactics (cited in Abley 2002a).

The link between linguistic purity and racism was evident in the remarks of Premier Jacques Parizeau when he lost the second Quebec referendum on sovereignty in 1995. Parizeau and other separatists blamed the loss on "money and the ethnic vote" (Bauch and Wilton 1995); essentially, he blamed unfair spending practices and the non-francophone ethnic communities in Quebec (Corse 1997). These ethnic communities were separated from the French majority by Parizeau along linguistic and cultural lines when he appealed to his followers after the defeat: "Let us talk about us — the 60 percent who voted in favor [of separation]. We will have our revenge, and we will have our own country" (cited in Farnsworth 1995). His use of the term "us" was offensive to those members of Quebec's population who, as journalist Clyde Farnsworth pointed out, "were not 'old-stock Quebecers,' but English Canadians or immigrants," such as Jews, Italians, Spanish, Haitians, and Muslims, "whose basic language is neither English nor French." Parizeau's statement seemed to imply that anyone not with "us" (the French Canadian majority) should be excluded from society, and it refocused the referendum debate from territorial to ethnic grounds for separation. These statements were considered so racist by members of his own party that he resigned the following day (Bauch and Wilton 1995).

Regrettably, there are many examples of racism in Quebec society, and anti-Semitism has been well documented in Quebec over the past two decades. The Jewish community in Montreal, one of the oldest in Canada, occupies a unique position in this setting, reflected in their high residential concentration, high institutionalization within the community, strong identity in terms of both religion and culture (Anctil 2011), and insulation from other communities (Weinfeld 2008). Such unique qualities are why some have referred to Montreal's Jewish community as a "third solitude" (ibid.), the first two being anglophones and francophones. Historically, however, Jewish communities in Quebec have experienced racism. For example, in 2002, one survey found that more than twice as many Quebecers per capita expressed racist sentiments toward Jews as Canadians in the rest of the country (Abley 2002b). Moreover, one year after 9/11, Quebec politician Yves Michaud "blasted Jews and immigrants for not understanding sovereignty" (Abley 2002c). More recently, there have been other examples of this anti-Semitism in Quebec: in 2004, a Jewish school library in Montreal was bombed by a young Lebanese immigrant (Weinfeld 2008); in 2008, a young Jewish student, Mendy Haouzi, was swarmed by a group of teens, had pennies thrown at him, and was physically assaulted (Banerjee 2008).

Although anti-Semitism is just one example of racism in Quebec, much of the recent data suggests that racism is just as present now as it was in the past decade. For example, a study on Canadian attitudes toward multiculturalism indicated that 74 percent of Quebecers opposed reasonable accommodation of minorities compared with 62 percent of all Canadians who opposed it (Soroka and Roberton 2010, 24). Even more interesting is that in a recent poll, among French Canadians specifically, only 30 percent agreed that they trust Muslims — far below the 57 percent of English speakers who said that they trust Muslims (Csillag 2012).

However, racism in Quebec goes far beyond changing attitudes and violent events. Systemic racism occurs not only at the federal level but also at the provincial level. In 2009, the Center for Research-Action on Race Relations reported dismal findings: Canadians in Quebec lack access to proper and fair tribunals to bring forth their complaints; even when complaints of racism are made, Quebecers typically must wait from three to five years for an investigation to occur; the Quebec Commission on Human Rights has not defined racism directly or been able to create policies for investigating and legally challenging racism in the public service or employment; and no clear policies exist for the collection of data related to race and racism, making investigation even more difficult. Furthermore, the report criticized Quebec's National Assembly for "a lack of public accountability and oversight" (3) and for failing to address repeated recommendations by the centre and other third parties. The report also criticized law enforcement in Quebec, claiming that police departments still resist or avoid formally recognizing the problem of racial profiling, despite its increasing prominence, and the police ethics commissioner, an independent provincial agency, has refused to clearly define and operationalize racial profiling, which would assist in investigating such complaints. Even worse, the report condemned Montreal, referring to systemic racism and the unilateral adoption of "policies that contribute to racialized citizens feeling unfairly harassed and profiled" (4). The report even suggested that public officials actively and knowingly engage in these activities: "Through its lawyers, [the city] has systematically utilised procedures that create undue delays … and that create costly obstacles for the complainants, the Human Rights Commission, and ultimately, the public" (4).

Systemic racism is also apparent in Quebec's public service employment. In 1981, after finding only a dismal 1.9 percent representation of visible minorities in the Quebec public service, the government set a goal of raising this statistic to a modest 9 percent (Center for … 2008). Over

thirty years later, it is doubtful that this goal has been met; the most recent data indicate that, though visible minorities accounted for 11.0 percent of Quebec's population in 2011 (Statistics Canada 2013), they only accounted for only 4.1 percent of the public sector as of 2008 (Center for … 2008).

This brief look at racism in Quebec has demonstrated that, though the myth of tolerance exists in government plans and reports, and in the minds of Quebecers, there is also a concurrent and institutionalized discourse of denial in the province. In 2008, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, mandated to address growing concern over and hostility toward the practice of "reasonable accommodation" of Quebec's cultural communities, found that 71.7 percent of French-speaking Quebecers thought that their society was *too tolerant* of practices of accommodation compared with 35.2 percent among the English and allophones (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). Thus, though Quebecers, like Canadians in general, like to think of themselves as tolerant of or "comfortable" (Pellerin 2003) with other races, the evidence suggests otherwise. Systemic racism, as well as the myth of tolerance and persistent denial, are just as prominent, if not more so, in Quebec.

Racial Tolerance and the Canadian Imaginary

It has been a long-held belief in Canada that Canadians are among the world's leaders in racial tolerance, moderation, and consensus building. Canadians look to our policy of accepting refugees, and to a history of relatively peaceful racial harmony, for evidence. Despite ongoing efforts by governments in Canada to portray the country as a tolerant, open society, history shows that Canada has long held an institutional belief in white superiority and the suppression of minority rights. This section briefly situates the Canadian imaginary in a historical context, which helps to frame how the ideology came into being and still shapes perceptions today.

The colonization of Canada has commonly been ideologically framed in history books as whites bringing civilization to an untamed wilderness. This perception of having discovered virgin wilderness allowed whites, both English and French, to colonize North America as if it were bereft of civilization and to place themselves in settlements as owners and custodians of the new land. Thus, the historicized ideology of the correctness of whites exploring and eventually owning new territories, and *civilizing* the new world, came at the expense of the Indigenous peoples and effectively ignored the contributions of Canadians such as black men, women, and children who worked as slaves in Canada until slavery was abolished in 1833; mixed-race (French and Indigenous peoples) Métis trappers; and

Chinese labourers who built much of the western portion of Canada's first national railway.

The gulf between Canadians' perceptions of tolerance and the reality of Canadian institutional racism and cultural practices is wide indeed. Different groups were racialized at different times throughout the past century. Jiwani (1993) notes that the Canadian government imposed a head tax of $100 on Chinese immigrants in 1900 and raised it to $500 in 1903; denied South Asians the right to vote in 1907 and Chinese that right in 1920; authorized imprisoning Japanese Canadian citizens in internment camps in 1942; and gave Aboriginal peoples the right to vote in federal elections only in 1960. Thus, the notion of tolerance is a socially constructed myth that Canadians hold about their identity, often ignored in the history books (exhibiting denial). The myth of tolerance is quickly revealed as such when one delves into the historical roots of Canadian ideology and Canada's treatment of its immigrants and minorities.

Why Muslims?

Visible Minorities and Muslims in Canada

A review of the 1961 census shows that Canadians of non-European origin, including Indigenous peoples, made up only 3.2 percent of the population (Li 1999a); by 1991, the figure had increased to 9.6 percent (Henry et al. 2000); by 2001, 13.4 percent of the population were visible minorities (Statistics Canada 2001b). The most recent data indicate that in 2011 visible minorities comprised 19.1 percent of the population (Statistics Canada 2013). Statistics Canada (2012) predicts that by 2031 visible minorities will make up 30.6 percent of Canada's population.

In terms of the Muslim population in Canada, Statistics Canada (2013) reports that by 2001, Muslims had become the largest religious population apart from Christians, both in Canada and in Quebec, accounting for 2.0 percent of the overall population. By 2012, the Muslim population in Canada had grown to 3.2 percent of the population. That number is expected to rise to 6.6 percent by 2030 (Lewis 2011).

Of course, this is not to say that this growth is not meeting with significant white resistance. In a meta-analysis of discrimination of Muslims in Canada since 9/11, Helly (2004) noted that hate crimes against Muslims increased dramatically in the year following 9/11, usually taking the form of insult rather than violence. Helly also pointed to the increase in racial profiling by police and central intelligence as well as inequitable access to

work for Muslims versus the rest of Canadians, findings that were confirmed in Quebec by a recent report to the United Nations that criticized Quebec's public institutions for their systemic racism and denial of the issues (Center for … 2009).

The contention surrounding visible minorities and reasonable accommodation was recognized in Quebec by the 2008 Bouchard-Taylor Commission, mandated to "formulate recommendations to the government to ensure that accommodation practices conform to the values of Quebec society as a pluralistic, democratic, egalitarian society" (Bouchard and Taylor 2008, 7). Many French Canadian Quebecers expressed anxiety over religious accommodation practices (e.g., allowing students or public sector employees to wear hijabs), especially for the many visible minorities present, in various provincial institutions, viewing such practices as a threat to Quebec's identity and culture (Let's move on … 2008). Although the report affirmed that, as the ruling majority, French Canadian Quebecers should have their collective identity protected, it also noted that the responsibility to integrate is not only that of immigrants and visible minorities but also that of society generally and the provincial government specifically. Importantly, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission therefore recommended that interculturalism be officially recognized by the National Assembly as a policy or statute. Although some of the thirty-seven recommendations sought to protect French Canadian culture and heritage in Quebec, many also intended to protect religious accommodation practices. These recommendations included that public servants, teachers, and health professionals be permitted to wear various religious symbols; that students be allowed to wear religious symbols at school, such as turbans, kippahs, and hijabs; that paid leave for religious holidays be encouraged; that interculturalism be integrated into teacher training programs; and that the government better understand and fight various forms of racism, discrimination, and hate crimes. Of much interest is one finding: "Muslims, and, in particular, Arab Muslims, are the group most affected by various forms of discrimination" (Bouchard and Taylor 2008, 83), which affected up to 25 percent of Quebecers in the three to five years leading up to the study.

Given the power of the media to frame the discussion, then, it becomes alarming when they begin to incite negative perceptions of Muslim communities (whether intentionally or not). For example, the Canadian edition of *Time* magazine for May 3, 2004, chose as its cover story "Islam and Canada: Are Muslims finding their political voice? Is the nation too lenient

toward the extremist fringe?" (Frank 2004). Inside, the headline read "Islam and Canada: Muslims are growing in numbers and political clout. But is the country too soft on Islam's radicals?" The increasing Muslim population in Canada has generated overt concern and hostility in the form of white resistance, as evidenced in these negative headlines. Clearly, such headlines are meant to generate doubt and worry about this trend and paint Muslims as "extremists." This is just one example of those in control of the medium attempting to impose their message onto the readership.

Thus, white resistance helps to frame Canada's relatively new but growing Muslim communities, rhetorically asking whether Canadians are not already treating Muslims too leniently, positioning white Canadians in opposition to Muslims, many of whom are Canadian citizens. This positioning has been exacerbated by the events of 9/11, the continuing War on Terror (the broader Western reaction to the events 9/11), and the media representations of Muslims as Others, opposed to Western culture (Said 1978). If elites in Canada — governments, in denying complicity in the racialized treatment of minorities, especially Muslims in recent years, and owners of the mass media, in making sure that their views about Muslims dominate debates — continue a discourse of denial and perpetuate the national myth of tolerance, then racism will only become further institutionalized and systemic. The events of 9/11 and their wake, the War on Terror, and the increasing salience of racism against Muslims because of their rapidly growing population in Canada make it imperative to examine the media's role in representing Muslims. Failure to do so would only make the academic community complicit in the discourse of denial that has entrenched racism within Canada's institutions.

Representations of Visible Minorities

The racialization of Canada's minority groups goes beyond ineffectual government policies and marketing strategies that exoticize but do not embrace their communities, and it goes beyond a simple denial of intolerance. Studies of Canada's newspapers indicate that they also participate in the ideological construction of white elite dominance, as alluded to in the *Time* magazine example. Studies conducted on the coverage of minority groups over the past twenty years found that many Canadian newspapers stereotyped minority groups. Ducharme (1986) found the portrayal of immigrants in the *Globe and Mail* to be both discriminatory and racist; Ginzberg (1987) found scapegoating and stereotyping of minorities in the *Toronto Sun*; Khaki and Prasad (1988) found stereotyping of Sikhs in Vancouver

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newspapers; and, nearly ten years later, Riggins (1997) noted stereotyping of the East Asian community through the "rhetoric of Othering" in the Canadian media. Fleras and Elliot (1999, 335) found that the stereotyping of immigrants showed them as "ignored, as irrelevant or infantilized as inferior." Henry and Tator (2000) showed that newspapers in Toronto and Saskatchewan were guilty of exaggeration/hyperbole concerning black and First Nations peoples. Henry and Tator (2002) also found that white dominance as a component of systemic racism is part of the structural and ideological formation that informs the philosophy and organization of daily newspapers in Canada. The issue of systemic racism in Canadian newspapers leads to a further inquiry into how this racialization applies to Muslims. Just as racism is a systemic issue within Canada's institutions, so too is it a structurally embedded barrier in journalism to the accurate and fair representation of Canada's peoples.

These studies focused on Canadian newspapers' representation of minority groups, yet few studies have explored in particular Muslims in Canada or the United States. This question is especially pertinent after 9/11, when greater emphasis has been placed on the religious and philosophical differences between majority white and minority Muslim populations.

The Representation of Muslims

Since 9/11, the media have directed considerable attention toward Muslim communities. Yet comparatively few studies on the representation of Muslims have appeared in the literature. The most sustained examination was undertaken by the Canadian Islamic Congress, which evaluated the media representation of Muslims from 1998 to 2003. According to this study, the *National Post*, the flagship of Postmedia's newspaper group (which includes *The Gazette*), was ranked as containing the highest amount of anti-Muslim rhetoric in each of the previous four years (Canadian Islamic Congress 2005). Henry and Tator (2000, 255) describe the *National Post* as "a highbrow, 'quality' newspaper catering to the nation's right-wing corporate and intellectual elite."

Studies in Canada indicate that the media apply ideological principles each time a news story surfaces, whether in reference to the right of women to wear the hijab (Todd 1998); the behaviour of journalists who adhere to the readings of events by community leaders (Ismael and Measor 2003); the stereotypical gendering of Muslim men and women (Jiwani 2004); or the production of what are termed "transnational Orientalist imaginaries" such as "Islamic fundamentalism" and "Islamic terrorism," as

Karim (2003, 68) puts it, "to generate readings that arouse fear, anger, and even a desire for vengeance."

The representation of Muslims in print also appears in the research literature in the United States. There, a variety of media have stereotyped Muslims, often depicting men as treacherous fakirs and women as sexually submissive. The work of Gavrilos (2002) and Naber (2000) on newspaper coverage and that of Shaheen (1984, 2001) on TV and movies situate "Arabs" (not, interestingly, Muslims) as being stereotyped, respectively, as patriotic, invisible, and sex crazed. Akram (2002, 62) discusses the media's depiction of "Arabs" as "demonic terrorists and religious fanatics." Although these works focus on "Arabs," it is important to understand how both "Arabs" and Muslim communities are portrayed in an effort to grasp ideological and racialized constructions that conflate them into one category.

In summary, then, white elite racism directed toward Muslims has been a dominant ideology in the media throughout North America. This ideology is problematic, for it encourages the racialization of Muslims by associating them with exoticized images such as the hijab and imagined concepts such as fundamentalism, terrorism, patriarchy, and misogyny. Although less literature exists on print media representations of Muslims, especially immediately after 9/11, it is essential to examine how ideologies affect portrayals and consequently perceptions of and reactions to the growing Muslim population in Canada. It is necessary to understand the processes by which they are portrayed in the media in order not only to understand *why* Canadians are less tolerant of Muslims as outsiders but also *how* they can begin to change these representations in order to create shared spaces where Canadians, regardless of race or religion, can fully participate in constructing multicultural society.

Why *The Gazette*?

Concentration of the Media

There has been a long-standing concern about the media's ability to influence opinions and establish ideological principles. When the media are dominated by a small number of players, the concern becomes even more acute. More than sixty years ago, concerns about the impact of media concentration and the resultant narrowing of opinion on freedom of the press appeared in the United States in the 1947 report of the Hutchins Commission:

> Incredibly, three reasons that the Hutchins commission gave for as-
> serting that freedom of the press was in danger still apply today: first,
> access to its pages by diverse and dispossessed groups has decreased
> even as its reach across society has increased; second, those few who
> control the press have not provided a service equal to the needs of
> our society; and third, the behavior and practice of the press are often
> condemned by society and, if this continues, society will have to
> regulate it. (Miller 1998, 181)

In Canada thirty-four years later, the Royal Commission on Newspapers
(Canada 1981, 217) noted a similar problem: "Freedom of the press means,
in itself, only that enormous influence without responsibility is conferred
on a handful of people." Today the trends do not seem to be any more
positive. Five news media giants in Canada (Postmedia Network currently
with thirteen daily newspapers, Quebecor with thirty-four, Torstar Cor-
poration with four, Power Corporation with seven, and The Woodbridge
Company with one) account for 84.3 percent of the daily circulation of
newspapers (Newspapers Canada 2011). The alarming trend toward concen-
tration of ownership has accelerated in the past decade across media plat-
forms with the *Toronto Star* picking up four southern Ontario dailies in 1998;
Quebecor buying the Sun newspaper chain in 1998 and the Videotron cable
and TV network in 2001; CanWest Global buying the Southam newspaper
chain in 2000; CanWest Global's newspaper division being purchased by
Postmedia in 2010; and Bell Canada buying CTV and merging with the
Globe and Mail to form Bell Globemedia in 2000 and then its purchase of
Astral Media in 2012. To get an idea of the magnitude of these companies'
holdings and their reach, consider Postmedia, formerly CanWest Global.
It has twenty-six community weekly newspapers; a national newspaper
based in Toronto; dailies in Calgary, Edmonton, Montreal, Ottawa, Regina,
Saskatoon, and Windsor; the only two dailies in Vancouver and Victoria; and
smaller dailies in Nanaimo and Port Alberni. Postmedia also runs Canada's
second private television network, over twenty-five cable specialty channels,
a multitude of radio stations, and a widely used Internet portal, Canada.
com. Of the five media conglomerates, Postmedia is currently the only
transnational media player, with holdings in Australia, Indonesia, New
Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom (CanWest Global ... 2008).

The trend toward concentration of ownership has reached global pro-
portions in the past decade, and its impact cannot be overstated. Mowlana
(1992) identifies three themes that transnational media have promoted as

they have become more concentrated: the support of global order, a shifting set of priorities from national to global concerns, and an emphasis on greater deregulation of media by nation-states. These supranational corporations have created, in essence, their own domestic policies, among them the reductionist notion that Muslim states are opposed to Western ideology and are therefore threats to global stability. Karim (2003, 177) makes the point that Northern-based transnational media have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and producing a "globally dominant media narrative."

The new owners of these media outlets paid huge sums for them in the period before the "dotcom" stock market crashed and media companies' values plummeted (Market crashes … n.d.). The new owners found themselves with a huge debt to banks and a need to increase the return on investment to pay down loans. McChesney (2002, 99) notes that owners, seeking greater profits, practise the false economy of "slashing" the number of overseas correspondents, thus reducing international political reporting: "Whereas Americans once tended to be misinformed about world politics, now they are uninformed." The same can be said for Canada, especially if the concentration of ownership continues.

"Slashing" has been evident in Canada, for example, in the November 2000 purchase of the Southam newspaper holdings by CanWest Global Communications Corporation at a cost of $3.1 billion, almost entirely financed by a floating of bonds at 9.5 percent (Interim report … 2002). This meant that interest costs of $330 million swallowed up more than half of the company's profits of $594 million, increasing the pressure to return huge profits to the owners but in turn producing a difficult working environment. The working environments produced by such financial constraints, limited resources, and time pressures were exemplified in a 2005 website titled CanWest Watch (CanWest watch n.d.), affiliated with the website Adbusters.org. Among the topics for employee chat rooms were Asper family bias, blatant censorship, budget cuts, protests, purges, resignations, and self-censorship. The former publisher of the *Ottawa Citizen,* Russell Mills, fired by CanWest because his newspaper ran a two-page summary of the scandal-ridden Chrétien government, summed up the situation at the Senate hearings on the media: "In Canada, freedom of expression ultimately belongs to the owners of the news media, not to the editors or journalists" (ibid.). As the number of owners of Canadian news media dwindles, the diversity of voices describing the news and even deciding on what is newsworthy also diminishes. With so few owners of the news media, especially

in Canada, one can assume that Canadians are likely not receiving an accurate representation of the diverse and multicultural voices in Canada. Of course, this problem applies directly to the current study: if only five companies own almost 85 percent of print news produced each day, then only five companies have the vast majority of the voice in Canada in terms of presenting news stories on Muslims. This is especially troubling because these elite voices represent the dominant white population and can therefore sustain social constructions of Others, such as Muslims, in their favour.

All of these factors — familiarity with power groups at the expense of the marginalized, management directives, and the newsgathering system — produce a newsgathering and news reporting system in which white elite discourse is privileged by journalists and results in the (re)production of ideology and hegemonic order. It is a process that Fallows (1996) says produces journalists who are more interested in reflecting the interests of the rich than those of the poor. The Royal Commission on Newspapers (1981) described journalists as unwilling to accept criticism even though they criticized all other segments of society, and Karim (2002a) says that journalists are unable or unwilling to represent alternative points of view. This is particularly troubling because, if alternative points of view are not presented, the dominant discourse will prevail, and there will be no room in the news media for diverse voices to create shared cultural spaces.

Picard (2000) notes that Canada has long since passed the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which indicates when the concentration of ownership is at a dangerous level. For example, in December 2002, CanWest Global, the owner of *The Gazette,* controlled seventeen daily newspapers and reached 94 percent of the Canadian viewing public with one of the two English-language national television networks, a highly used Internet portal called Canada.com, weekly newspapers, radio stations, and three independent television stations (L. Asper 2002). Nevertheless, the federal government has ignored calls for media ownership review boards since they were proposed by the Kent Commission in 1981. Heider (2000) recommends that ownership regulations should be designed to encourage minority group participation in owning media. Carey (2002) recommends that non-broadcast media companies should not own broadcast media companies in order to foster a wider choice of alternatives to the mainstream media. However optimistic these measures are, it is doubtful that they will come to fruition. As demonstrated, economic incentives generate strong motivations for those in power (who own the media) to apply immense pressure on governments to reduce and eventually remove government control.

Contextualization of the Locale

The province of Quebec offers a uniquely textured experience in Canadian history, containing the vestiges of both English and French colonial regimes. It has had a conflicted relationship between English and French language groups for centuries. This relationship in essence produced the modern political–linguistic setting that makes Quebec both uniquely situated in Canada and a worthy focus for researching topics such as the interactions between new and historical cultural communities and the ways in which social constructions of cultural and collective communities are mediated, and often promulgated, by others.

The conflicted nature of settlement in Quebec both confounded and shaped the process of codifying laws. Concerns about the French language and culture being threatened by an influx of English immigration were accentuated in 1839 with publication of the Durham Report, in which Lord Durham recommended linguistic and cultural assimilation of the French in Quebec by the ruling English elite (Lord Durham's Report n.d.). This recommendation was met with fierce resistance by francophones and resulted in mistrust of the English overlords. However, this setting, in which two ethnolinguistic communities were rivalling for their own place in Lower Canada, was a prominent factor in the development not only of Quebec's laws but also of its unique cultural communities. Through a detailed history of the arduous, bilingual, and diverse nature of this process, especially given early contentions between the French and English, Brian Young (1994) demonstrates how the development of private law in Quebec set it apart from the rest of Canada. Young shows that the protection of private law, inspired by the Napoleonic Civil Code, coupled with the strong protection of family relations (reflecting the prominence of religion and tradition for settlers), produced an "integral and original element of Canadian federalism," and he marvels that such a task could be accomplished in an emerging federal state (Canada) that "refused to be monolithic in its private law" (174).

Since the early 1960s, in an effort to protect French culture and identity from threats to their integrity, Quebec nationalism has been a central feature of the provincial political scene, and legislation has tended to favour the French language and culture over all others. Bill 22 was the first of a series of laws and amendments created along this line. The bill was created to strongly protect French language and culture, notably by naming French as the only official language in Quebec. This made French the primary, and often the only, language permitted for business in all public institutions; it

essentially restricted the use of English and any other language to the home. Attempts followed to balance language rights by easing restrictions on the use of other languages on commercial signs and relaxing restrictions on English schooling. However, as Charles Boberg (2010, 243) argues, ultimately, through these laws, Quebec "seeks to sustain the vitality of French partly by suppressing the public and institutional use of English." In fact, Boberg attributes the significant decline of English Canadians in Quebec to such language laws and notes that many of the province's historic anglophone communities have all but disappeared outside metropolitan areas.

Part of what makes Quebec unique is the peculiar way in which cultural communities have formed, especially in reaction to changing cultural and linguistic policies. As noted, before passage of the language laws in the 1970s, essentially there were two communities or solitudes: anglophones and francophones. They contended for recognition and for control over the issue of Quebec's independence. However, with the new legislation elevating and protecting French, and not recognizing English as an official language, the status of English in the province has since been diminished, almost to the point of being considered just another language in the allophone milieu (Boberg 2010). Adding to the changes affecting Quebec's cultural portrait, immigration dramatically rose by 66 percent from 2000 to 2010 and was essentially regionalized to Montreal (Ministère de l'Immigration ... 2011), certainly contributing to Quebec's 11.0 percent visible minority population in 2011 (Statistics Canada 2013). With higher levels of diversity and immigration than ever before, and with immigration increasing steadily, one can no longer say that there are simply two prominent cultural communities in Quebec. With these legal and demographic changes, nationalists (primarily francophones) and federalists (primarily anglophones) — traditionally in a battle to co-opt allophones for support for their own linguistic community's dominance — have been diverted by another source of tension. Increasingly, in metropolitan areas such as Montreal, English Canadians are outnumbered not only by francophones but also by allophones, meaning that anglophones should compete with other cultural communities to gain (or regain) their privileged status, occupying a unique position in Quebec society (Boberg 2010). Making the cultural and linguistic situation in Quebec even more perplexing, linguistic (English, French) and cultural communities (Italian, Jewish, Muslim) are not mutually exclusive, and many Quebecers belong to more than one group.

Understanding the specific cultural and linguistic setting during the time frame of this study (i.e., the weeks following the events of 9/11) is

essential in order to interpret findings accurately. Having discussed the political and historical reasons for the development of Quebec law and the creation of a unique linguistic climate, we can now explain why Montreal presents a distinct and rich setting for the current research. Montreal is recognized as North America's most European-like city. According to Statistics Canada (2001a), in 2001 (during the time frame of this current study), Montreal was composed of 12.1 percent English-speaking and 67.3 percent French-speaking citizens; a further 19.7 percent, as noted, were allophones whose mother tongue was neither English nor French. Significantly, since English Canadians in Montreal were outnumbered by allophones, they too can be said to have been another minority language community, a status that can have important implications for how they react to other cultural communities. This cultural and linguistic contest between the English and the French positions the allophone community between the two linguistic groups — so the allophone population's choice of language becomes a point of contestation between French and English communities.

Yet who was part of the third linguistic group, the allophones, in Montreal? Statistics Canada (2001a) reports that in 2001, apart from Catholic and Protestant religions, Muslims were the largest religious group in Montreal, numbering 100,185 and representing 3.0 percent of the city's population, followed by Jews at 2.6 percent, Buddhists at 1.1 percent, Hindus at 0.7 percent, and Sikhs at just 0.2 percent. Additionally, the allophone group is large, diverse, and quickly growing. The number of Muslims in Canada has risen to 940,000, and this number is expected to triple within twenty years.

All of these factors make Montreal unique in the country and an excellent vantage point from which to explore representations of Muslims as part of the allophone communities in the context of the English and French contest and amid the repositioning of the many allophone communities, many of them Muslim, whose mother tongue is neither English nor French.

In Montreal, the English media have tended to exoticize allophones. For example, in 2002, the English-language Montreal newspaper, *The Gazette*, attempted to woo them as readers by suggesting that the newspaper is sympathetic to their concerns. To appear more inclusive, the paper abandoned its previous slogan, "The English Language Daily," which might have been viewed as exclusionary to non-English-language readers, and adopted "*The Gazette is* Montreal." The slogan was accompanied by pictures

of visible minorities, each of them holding a copy of the paper. In each case, the masthead was changed to reflect the language of the person photographed. Although the tactic might have increased sales, it nevertheless emphasizes the difference between allophones and the rest of Montreal's English (white) readership and perpetuates a linguistic dichotomy by emphasizing that allophones should embrace English rather than French.

This contest is vital to both English and French communities. Which language allophones choose to converse in is seen as either buttressing French linguistic supremacy in Quebec if they choose French or undermining it if they choose English. Allophone children speak their mother tongue at home, take their schooling in French (a requirement of Bill 101, which followed just three years after Bill 22), and converse in English with their anglophone friends when they listen to English popular music and play video games on the Internet. Which language becomes dominant is of utmost importance to both English and French communities. In practice, allophones have learned both languages in addition to their mother tongue.

Given the size and growth of Muslim communities in Canada, and especially in Montreal, the need for a deeper understanding of these communities is becoming critical, especially in the context of the contestation between French and English languages and cultures, amid other localized clashes among increasingly diverse communities. Furthermore, this context helps to exacerbate the binary discourses of tolerance and denial. This pattern can be seen in the relationship between Muslim Quebecers and the larger Quebec community.

The Gazette

Montreal is one of the few cities in the world able to boast about four local daily newspapers — three French and one English.[7] *The Gazette*, the lone English-language daily based in Montreal, was established in 1778. As such, it is Canada's oldest continuously published folio-style daily newspaper. *The Gazette,* a morning publication like most of Canada's newspapers, prints 141,765 copies per weekday and 155,443 on Saturdays, making it the eighth largest newspaper in Canada in terms of circulation (*The Gazette*'s circulation 2011).

Recently, *The Gazette* claimed that it is the "dominant medium for reaching Montreal's large English market" (Our audience reach … 2012). Considering that anglophones accounted for 13.4 percent of the population (995,500) as of 2010 (Corbeil, Chavez, and Pereira 2010), it is fair to say

that a large proportion of the population reads *The Gazette* at least once a week, though a significant number of its readers are francophones and allophones. In 2002, just shortly after the time frame of this study, *The Gazette* claimed that over 80 percent of its readers relied exclusively on the paper for their printed daily news (*The Gazette* … 2002b). *The Gazette* also touted its own influence, claiming that it is read by many of Montreal's anglophone decision makers, including professionals, executives, politicians, and owners (ibid.). Such influence in Montreal generally, and especially among those in power, makes *The Gazette* an excellent choice to explore in depth its coverage of the events of 9/11.

The Gazette belongs to a number of news services, including The Canadian Press/La Presse Canadienne, Associated Press, Reuters, Agence France-Presse, and Bloomberg News. At the time of this study, its editorial offices and newsroom were located in downtown Montreal, near the Montreal Stock Exchange, City Hall, the provincial courts, and the convention center.[8] Its offices have since moved but remain in downtown Montreal.

Over the past two decades, *The Gazette* has occupied a series of ideological positions because of changes in ownership. The Fisher and Balfour families owned the newspaper for decades under the Southam Publications corporate banner. Then, in the 1990s, *The Gazette* and its sister publications were owned briefly by Conrad Black's Hollinger Inc. They were sold in 2000 to the Asper family. The Aspers own the majority of shares in their company, CanWest Global Communications. When they purchased the newspapers, Leonard Asper had aspirations of converging the television stations, their Internet portal Canada.com, and the newspaper holdings to become Canada's largest content provider. Those plans have not met with much success to this point. More recently, in 2010, when CanWest was sold to Postmedia, *The Gazette* therefore also fell under its ownership (About us … 2012).

During the past twenty years, then, *The Gazette* has swung editorially from the liberal laissez-faire management style of the Balfour and Fisher families at Southam, where editorial opinion was left to the discretion of each newspaper's publisher, to oversight by a passionately conservative owner in Conrad Black, and then back to a position of unqualified support of the Liberal Party of Canada with the Asper family. Ownership by the Asper family, particularly CEO Israel Asper, who voiced strong support for Israel in the Middle East, meant a new direction on the editorial page of *The Gazette.* Just over a week after the 9/11 attacks, then CanWest Global

director and son of Israel Asper, David Asper, used *The Gazette* as a platform to criticize Muslim leaders for what he claimed were attempts to "demonize" Western civilization. He denounced what he called the Middle East's "brutal dictatorships," "driven by fanatical Islamic objectives," for "brainwashing their children" (cited in Howes 2001). Little more than a year later, in October 2002, Israel Asper criticized the Canadian media for being pro-Palestinian in their reports on the Middle East.

This attitude did not diminish even after Israel Asper died in October 2003. The Canadian Islamic Congress conducted a study in 2005 of Canada's prominent newspapers, ranking *The Gazette* as the second and third worst newspaper in terms of the volume of anti-Muslim rhetoric and racist representations of Muslims appearing in its stories in all but one of the years between 1998 and 2003. This track record has also been noted by the CBC, which reported in September 2004 that CanWest newspapers (under which *The Gazette* operated) had been inserting terms such as "terrorist" into news copies discussing Palestinian hostility toward Israel — a violation of their contract with Reuters News Service (Newspapers accused ... 2004).

A month before 9/11, *The Gazette* dismissed its board of editorial contributors, among them Salam Elmenyawi, chairman of the Muslim Council of Montreal. Three months after 9/11, Elmenyawi was quoted by the *Globe and Mail* in describing his relationship with *The Gazette* as follows: "I suspect the Muslim approach and point of view is no longer welcome" (CanWest Global ... 2008). Although information on *The Gazette*'s employment practices is sparse, one study found in 1994 that, of roughly 200 newsroom employees, only five were non-white (Joynt 1995). It was not until 2002 that *The Gazette* hired its first Arabic-speaking journalist. She was dismissed a year later as part of budget cutbacks, despite *The Gazette*'s professed wish to reach a larger readership. Given that in 2000, just before the time frame of this study, research found that roughly 97 percent of Canadian journalists were white (Pritchard and Sauvageau 2000), it is likely that *The Gazette* was affected by the same systemic racism to which many other Canadian media were subject.

In summary, *The Gazette* appears to have been affected by ideological biases of the white elite, evidenced through the words of its owners, its misuse of the word *terrorist,* its exoticizing of minorities as a marketing strategy, and its poor employment record among the very group that it was trying to attract. *The Gazette,* therefore, is not only affected by systemic

racism within its ranks but also amplifies and perpetuates the dominant white elite voice by expressing the views of its owners in news content. *The Gazette* is thus an excellent source of media discourse to evaluate in terms of the representation of Muslims because of its unique situation between English and French contestation for allophones in Montreal and its role in exhibiting and maintaining the influence of white elite voices and the misrepresentations of and racist discourse around Muslims that have been exposed in other contexts by the literature.

Overview

Chapter 1, "Mission Recognition," contextualizes the topic by reviewing the impacts of 9/11. We discuss the event itself, outline the unique attributes of the print media in reporting on such events, and break down *The Gazette*'s coverage of 9/11 into three stages: Stunned in Grief, Justifications for War, and Readying for War. We then situate the methodology of our study — both content analysis and critical discourse analysis — within other studies that have employed it in order to provide a rationale for our evaluation of *The Gazette*'s coverage of Muslim communities post-9/11.

Chapter 2, "Mission Ambition," focuses on the news media's role in sustaining the hegemonic white elite discourse. We define whiteness, race, racism, and racialization, and we argue that these concepts are intricately linked to Orientalism (Said 1978), wherein consent is manufactured and reinforced through the news media. We then explore the limited literature on racist representations in Canada and argue that journalists have their own agendas, including racial profiling, racializing immigration, exaggeration by playing a numbers game to accentuate victimization of the West by "evildoers" (Muslims), and saving face by using condescending discourse and ridicule.

Chapter 3, "Mission Decision," delves deeper into exploring racism and the media. Here we define many of the key rhetorical terms and forms used in the study, tracking the use of rhetoric in describing the events of 9/11 over the three time periods identified and across formats (news, op-editorials, editorials, columns, and features). We examine the discourse of racism and anti-racism in *The Gazette*'s coverage, arguing that Orientalist discourse is traceable through all rhetorical forms and formats and over time.

Chapter 4, "Mission Oppression," explores the leaders' voices that highlight the Othering of Muslim communities. The first period, Stunned in

Grief, involved sentiments of an attack on civilization, the need for solidarity ("us" sticking together) in the face of evil ("them"), feelings of incredulity, and the war on America. The Justification for War period was marked by invoking Manichean concepts related to Christianity, justice, and the challenge of evil. Finally, the Readying for War phase was marked by discourses on war, heroes and villains, anger, and simplicity. A common Orientalist reading of events appears across all three of these time periods and is explored at length.

Chapter 5, "Mission Perception," explores in depth the "coping" discourse of white victims. Themes of shock and disbelief, denial, blamelessness, anger, safety, revenge, racial profiling, fear and moral panic, and acceptance are examined, as is the impact on Quebec. These feelings were portrayed as natural outcomes. No Muslim victims were interviewed, reinforcing the idea presented by white victims of 9/11 as a white story — as *their* story to define.

In Chapter 6, "Mission Opposition," we describe the marginalization and minimization of Muslim voices. Henry et al. (2000) note the irony of Canadians referring to four-fifths of the world's population as "minorities."[9] The danger is that journalists tend to group Arabs, Islamic fundamentalists, Muslims, and terrorists into a monolithic, terrifying whole (Said 1981), essentializing them as violent and resistant to change (Karim 1996). Indeed, this type of Oriental discourse is what we found. We then describe the Muslim voice as characterized by two stereotypical frameworks: the "bad" Muslim — treacherous, misogynistic, Eastern male Muslims — and the "good" Muslim — weak, victimized, disorganized politically, but hard-working.

Journalists' own words and opinions appeared so frequently that our analysis of them is broken into two chapters. Chapters 7, "Mission Position," and 8, "Mission Envision," show how journalists described, contextualized, and represented the positions of white victims, leaders, and Muslims. For the category of leaders, journalists' discourses demonstrated an embrasure of the ideology established by leaders and a strong reliance on the powerful metaphors used by them. In the case of white victims, journalists' words contributed to the naturalization of their fear and the acceptance of state-sponsored violence as reasonable. In the Muslim voices category, journalists' words focused not on Muslims as victims but on Muslims as victimizing others (women, the weak). Muslims were dehumanized by journalists' discourse about the economically or technologically "superior" West, and "bad" Muslims were typically focused on and addressed.

Chapter 9, "Mission Completion," examines journalism as a practice and contextualizes a summary of our findings within newsgathering practices. We argue that the discourse presented in *The Gazette* led to a racist interpretation of the attacks and failed to sensitize the community and advocate for the protection of Muslim communities in Montreal. This kind of discourse in the Canadian news media was one of the factors leading to unreported assaults on Muslims; denigration of voices of anti-racism; and, at the federal level, both the passage of Bill C-36 (the Anti-Terrorism Act) and the introduction of identity cards for all new immigrants.

In Chapter 10, "Mission Condition," we discuss our findings and ask whether *The Gazette* succeeded or failed in its democratic responsibilities to each of its constituents. We argue that *The Gazette* failed in its mission — to its readers, particularly to its Muslim community, and to itself. At best, it failed to fully inform readers from each constituency by providing accurate context and comprehensive story selection; at worst, it not only underrepresented Muslim communities but also misrepresented them.

Finally, in the Conclusion, "Mission Invisible!," we ask this question: what has been the result of the media's representations of Muslim communities? We argue that news coverage in *The Gazette* effectively made Muslim communities invisible by underrepresenting them, by racializing them based on religion rather than visible attributes, and by portraying them as a faceless and homogeneous minority. We discuss possibilities for remedying this racialization in the news stories in *The Gazette,* highlighting the need for diversity in hiring practices based not only on ethnic diversity but also on opinion diversity (in the voices used, in the stories portrayed, and among the journalists themselves). Finally, we offer recommendations for future research.

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