
The Paradoxes of Peacebuilding Post-9/11



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Edited by Stephen Baranyi

**The Paradoxes of Peacebuilding
Post-9/11**



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*To all those who persist in working for sustainable peace
rather than
being captivated by the latest newsworthy crisis*

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Preface

Roy Culpeper and Brazão Mazula

Shortly after the tragic events of 11 September 2001, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) convened a dialogue with partners to reflect on where the enterprise of postwar peacebuilding was heading. At a pivotal meeting in late 2002, many partners, especially from the South, expressed profound concerns about the enduring gaps between the dreams of liberation and transformation associated with peacebuilding in societies like El Salvador, Palestine, and South Africa, and the grim realities of fragile peace, violence, and enduring injustice on the ground. Others, particularly from the North, worried about the possibility that the enterprises of peacebuilding, and of protecting those most vulnerable to grave human rights violations, were being subordinated to geopolitical interests, as seemed to be happening in Afghanistan.

The What Kind of Peace Is Possible (WKOP) project grew out of that initial dialogue. It was a novel attempt to create space (particularly) for Southern researchers and practitioners to put their stamp on mostly Northern debates. It was an attempt to help Southern analysts ground their arguments in solid research and in an ongoing dialogue with stakeholders – especially women, the poor, and excluded identity groups – whose voices were often sidelined by conventional assessments of peacebuilding. WKOP also aimed to influence peacebuilding practices in each society and, modestly, at the UN. Finally, it aimed to do all this through partnerships between six Southern civil society institutions and three Northern research centres – all listed in the section on Contributors.

This book brings together some of the outputs from this collective effort. The introduction sets out the issues and situates them within broader debates. Nine case studies examine particular experiences in depth. A concluding chapter compares the cases and synthesizes key conclusions. Each of these texts was submitted to extensive peer review through the WKOP project. Most were validated in the author's own society.

It has been a challenge, a pleasure, and an honour to be associated with the WKOP project for three years. For an organization like the Centre for the Study of Democracy and Development (CEDE) in Mozambique, the project required tremendous effort at every step, from the design stage through policy engagement and the delivery of final outputs. Yet the WKOP project enabled us to deepen our research at the nexus of peacebuilding and local development, reach out to new actors at the national level and in several municipalities, and share our experiences in important international forums. As part of the collective monitoring and evaluation process, other Southern partners also remarked that this collaboration helped them to broaden their research – for example, on the gender dimensions of peacebuilding – and strengthen their ability to feed evidence-based conclusions into policy processes. For the North-South Institute (NSI), coordinating such an ambitious undertaking also brought many challenges, including that of providing sufficient support for Southern institutes while delivering on many other responsibilities. WKOP has also been a profound learning experience for NSI, since it has influenced both the content of our analyses and our way of working with partners.

As chief executives of our respective centres, each of us has only been able to modestly engage with this project. This gives us a privileged position from which to view its results, some of which are captured in this book. From our standpoint as insider-outsiders, three outcomes of this complex process are especially noteworthy.

First, the combined results of these case studies and the overarching pieces underscore the urgency of addressing two major trends in contemporary international affairs. The first is the enduring gap between short-term peacebuilding measures and the long-term changes required to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict. This trend is at the core of the new UN Peacebuilding Commission's mandate. The second is the drift away from relatively successful multilateral peacebuilding based on negotiated agreements towards more unilateral but far less successful stabilization operations, as in Iraq today. This second trend is not receiving the attention it deserves, including in Canada, where the current government seems bent on justifying errors in countries like Afghanistan. This book is a sober reminder about the long-term consequences of stabilization operations.

Second, the case studies shed light on the nuances and possibilities inherent in particular experiences. The studies on Guatemala and Mozambique challenge mainstream assessments of peacebuilding in those countries by arguing that, while peacebuilding has been relatively successful, it remains fragile, though it could be deepened through greater creativity and pressure on the part of specific local, national, and international actors. The study on Haiti offers an original interpretation in that it shows how even an

unpromising stabilization operation can be turned around through a combination of principled leadership and political inclusion. The two studies on the Palestinian Territories, including an original study on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), provide new insight into the missed opportunities for change presented by the election of Hamas in January 2006. Their pessimistic conclusions about current Israeli stabilization efforts are perhaps less original, but no less important, in practical terms.

Third, the chapters in this book are only some of the outputs from the WKOP project. In each country partners also produced policy briefs with action-oriented recommendations for key actors, particularly at the national level. We invite readers to look at those policy briefs on the North-South Institute's website. In most countries partners also worked with the media to generate broader public debate on these issues. In some contexts recommendations were picked up by governments and, more often, by civil society coalitions. Even in Sri Lanka, partners can take some credit for keeping recommendations for deeper institutional reforms on the public agenda at a time when most actors were understandably focused on preventing renewed warfare. This is entirely consistent with the main conclusion of the WKOP project – namely, that without profound reforms over longer time frames, supported by broader national constituencies, peace is unlikely to be sustained. Building those constituencies is clearly a challenge everywhere.

We trust that some readers will find the inspiration, and concrete ideas, needed to nurture such constituencies for sustainable peacebuilding in their own society and beyond. And we hope that others might begin to understand why neither peace nor stability can be imposed from the outside through the barrel of a gun.

Acknowledgments

All edited books are a collective endeavour, but this one involved a large number of colleagues who deserve acknowledgment. I thank all the authors for their perseverance in conducting original research, writing, editing, and adhering to a common framework, despite the difficult conditions most faced in their respective societies. Thanks are due to our institutional partners in each country and to the numerous practitioners whose input made the research so rich. Warm thanks go to my North-South Institute colleagues, particularly Kristiana Powell, Jennifer Salahub, Lois Ross, Diane Guevremont, Ann Weston, and Roy Culpeper, for their support over the life of the WKOP project.

Our funders – the International Development Research Centre, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Ford Foundation, and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation – deserve credit for their unflagging support. I am especially grateful for the engagement of IDRC colleague Pamela Scholey, who bridged the gap that usually separates funders from researchers by co-authoring a chapter in this book.

Thanks to Emily Andrew, other UBC Press colleagues, and three anonymous reviewers for their generous contributions to this publication. While the authors accept primary responsibility for any remaining omissions or errors, we are grateful to all those who put their energies into making this work possible.

Acronyms

ADERAM	Asosyasyon pou Develòpman Ekonomik Rivyè Blanch [Association for Rivière Blanche Economic Development] (Haiti)
ANBP	Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme
ANN	Alianza Nueva Nación [New Nation Alliance] (Guatemala)
ASECs	Assemblées de la section communale [communal section assemblies] (Haiti)
CASECs	Conseil d'administration des sections communales [communal section administrative councils] (Haiti)
CCI	Cadre de coopération intérimaire [Interim Cooperation Framework] (Haiti)
CDC	community development council (Afghanistan)
CEDE	Centro de Estudios de Democracia e Desenvolvimento [Centre for the Study of Democracy and Development] (Mozambique)
CEP	Conseil électorale provisoire [Provisionary Electoral Council] (Haiti)
CFA	ceasefire agreement (Sri Lanka)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CNG	Conseil national de gouvernement [National Council of Government] (Haiti)
COCODES	Consejo Comunitario de Desarrollo [Community Develop- ment Council] (Guatemala)
CODEDES	Consejo Departamental de Desarrollo [Departmental Development Council] (Guatemala)
COMUDES	Consejo Comunitario de Desarrollo [Municipal Development Council] (Guatemala)

CONADES	Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo [National Development Council] (Guatemala)
COREDES	Consejo Regional de Desarrollo [Regional Development Council] (Guatemala)
CSOs	civil society organizations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
ECHA	Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)
EGP	Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres [Guerrilla Army of the Poor] (Guatemala)
FADH	Forces armées d'Haïti (Haitian Armed Forces)
FAR	Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes [Rebel Armed Forces] (Guatemala)
FCA	Fondo de Compensación Municipal [Municipal Compensation Fund] (Mozambique)
FGT	Fundación Guillermo Toriello [Guillermo Toriello Foundation] (Guatemala)
FLACSO	Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin-American Faculty of Social Sciences)
FMLM	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (El Salvador)
Fps	facilitating partners (Afghanistan)
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique [Mozambican Liberation Front]
FRG	Guatemalan Republican Front (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco)
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICRW	International Center for Research on Women
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IFIs	international financial institutions
IPA	International Peace Academy
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
ISGA	Interim Self-Governing Authority (Sri Lanka)
JVP	Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna [Sinhalese nationalist party] (Sri Lanka)
LICUS	Low-Income Countries under Stress (World Bank initiative)
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [Tamil Tigers] (Sri Lanka)

MAE	Ministério de Administração Estatal [Ministry of State Administration] (Mozambique)
MICAH	Mission internationale civile d'appuien Haïti [International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti]
MINUGUA	Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala [United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala]
MINUSTAH	Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation de Haïti [United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti]
MRRD	Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (Afghanistan)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSI	North-South Institute
NSP	National Solidarity Program (Afghanistan)
OAS	Organization of American States
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)
OPL	Organisation politique Lavalas (Haiti)
ORPA	Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas [Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms] (Guatemala)
PA	Palestinian Authority
PA	People's Alliance party (Sri Lanka)
PACs	Patrullas de autodefensa civil [civil defense patrols] (Guatemala)
PAN	Plan por el Adelantamiento Nacional [National Advancement Party] (Guatemala)
PARPA	Plano de Acção para a Redução de Pobreza Absoluta [Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty] (Mozambique)
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission (UN)
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PGT	Partido Guatemalteco de los Trabajadores [Guatemalan Communist Party]
PIJ	Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PMA	policía militar ambulante [mobile military police] (Guatemala)
PPD	Participacion y Democracia (Program for Participation and Democracy)

PRSP	poverty reduction strategy paper
PRTs	provincial reconstruction teams (Afghanistan)
PSR	Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
PSS	Palestinian security sector
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana [Mozambican National Resistance]
R2P	responsibility to protect
SAP	structural adjustment program
SEPAZ	Secretaría de la Paz [Peace Secretariat] (Guatemala)
SIRHN	Subcommittee for Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (Sri Lanka)
TNA	Tamil National Alliance (Sri Lanka)
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNF	United National Front (Sri Lanka)
UNFAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Association
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UPFA	United People's Freedom Alliance (Sri Lanka)
URNG	Unidad Nacional Revolucionaria Guatemalteca [Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity]
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAT	value-added tax
WKOP	What Kind of Peace Is Possible

The Paradoxes of Peacebuilding Post-9/11

1

Introduction: What Kind of Peace Is Possible in the Post-9/11 Era?

Stephen Baranyi

What change will peace bring us? What is to be expected from this peace?

– John Paul Lederach, 1999 echoing stakeholder voices

Women's perspectives tend to privilege the notion of a "just" peace, as defined from the perspective of the discriminated and disempowered.

– Rita Manchanda, 2001

If people are denied the fruits of peace – such as shelter, education, health care and employment – sustainable peace will be much harder to achieve.

– Jan Egeland, 2004

In September 2005, diplomats met in a special general assembly of the United Nations (UN) to review the implementation of the Millennium Declaration. On matters related to rebuilding societies after wars, speakers stressed the need for increased investment in peacebuilding and enhanced UN capacities to coordinate such efforts. Some states stressed the importance of renewing efforts to transform the attitudes and institutions that generate armed violence. Others drew the links between sustainable peacebuilding, respect for human rights, equitable development, and the prevention of armed conflicts.

In the end, member states and UN officials agreed to establish a peacebuilding commission to coordinate international efforts overall and in priority countries. They agreed to establish a voluntary fund for peacebuilding to stabilize financing for such efforts and a peacebuilding support office in the UN Secretariat. Though the outcome document also included general statements on conflict prevention and the responsibility to protect (R2P), it

avoided making any operational connections between those issues and new UN mechanisms to enhance postwar peacebuilding.

The broad support for the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission and related mechanisms reflected the recognition that it is in most states' interest to strengthen international efforts to rebuild societies damaged by war. It represented a qualified vote of confidence for UN leadership in this domain, and it was a clear reminder that UN agencies must work better with others – including host governments and civil society organizations, regional bodies, and international financial institutions – to secure peace. But this and the much more cautious reaction to R2P also reflected widespread disquiet about controversial unilateral military interventions, particularly in Iraq, and dissatisfaction with the international community's inability to consolidate peace in societies as diverse as Haiti and the Palestinian Occupied Territories.

Is it true that many postwar peacebuilding efforts are failing to deliver on the goal of sustainable peace? Why is it so difficult to parlay short-term measures – like the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants – into the longer-term transformations required to sustain peace and prevent war? Has the trend towards international military intervention affected the sustainability of peacebuilding efforts? What combination of local, national, and international strategies can bridge enduring peacebuilding deficits? In brief, what kind of peace is possible in the post-9/11 era?

These are the questions that a group of researcher-practitioners has been grappling with since 2003 in the What Kind of Peace is Possible (WKOP) project. Through WKOP we have conducted research and engaged stakeholders in dialogue on the difficulties/possibilities for sustainable peacebuilding in six contexts. Guatemalan and Mozambican partners have led this work in their countries, two cases in which relative success can already be observed over the long term. Haitian partners led the work in a country where failed peacebuilding spawned a new international intervention in 2004, the outcomes of which are still uncertain. Afghan, Palestinian, and Sri Lankan partners led this work in their countries/territories, where quite distinct peace efforts have all but collapsed. Norwegian partners led original research on DDR in Afghanistan and Guatemala, while a Palestinian-Canadian duo conducted similar research in the Palestinian Territories.

This book focuses on three aspects of postwar peacebuilding: DDR, democratic governance, and economic development. Many other aspects – from infrastructure rehabilitation to truth and justice – are also important, but we selected these dimensions because they seem central to the end goal of sustainability. For reasons that will be explained in this chapter, our research has also focused on peacebuilding at the national and local levels, with a particular concern for national agency and social inclusion.

This chapter is a revised version of the paper that guided the group's case studies. It reviews global policy debates on peacebuilding and related issues, such as fragile states. It delves into debates on the democratic governance and economic dimensions of peacebuilding, and it glances at the literature on DDR. It previews the nine case studies in *The Paradoxes of Peacebuilding Post-9/11* and highlights a set of propositions that informed our research. The chapter ends by suggesting that, despite the fallout from 11 September 2001, there may, in some contexts, still be significant space for sustainable peacebuilding. National and international stakeholders committed to sustainable peace could form more effective coalitions to push for deeper changes in those societies. This somewhat open-ended introduction should be read in tandem with the concluding chapter, which ends on a more sober note regarding what kind of peace is possible post-9/11.

Peacebuilding since 1989

Drawing on distinctions made by analysts of UN peace operations, we divide the evolution of peacebuilding since the end of the Cold War into three types: “second-generation” multidimensional peacebuilding tied mostly to negotiated peace agreements in the early 1990s; more robust but still multilateral “third-generation” peace operations that increased in the late 1990s; and more forceful, sometimes unilateral, “fourth-generation” interventions since 9/11.¹ These generations have overlapped, several types coexist today, and movement from one to another has not necessarily yielded better outcomes. Before exploring this last observation in more depth, let us elaborate on the trend itself.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War generated much optimism about the possibilities for resolving wars that had been fuelled by the East-West rivalry. Against that backdrop, from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s a series of ambitious peace operations were carried out in Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mozambique, Cambodia, Angola, Guatemala, and Bosnia. Despite their differences, these operations had certain common characteristics. Most derived their mandates from internationally mediated negotiations between national parties. Peace agreements were verified by multilateral peacekeeping and civilian observer missions. They involved coordinated reconstruction encompassing the DDR of ex-combatants, the voluntary resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, demining, institutional reforms to promote human rights and democratic governance, and (sometimes) truth and reconciliation processes. In keeping with the triumph of the West in the great contest of the Cold War, peacebuilding also included macroeconomic and fiscal reforms to establish a market-oriented environment conducive to reconstruction.

The policy rationale underpinning this first type of post-Cold War peace operations – dubbed “second-generation peace operations” because their

multidimensional mandates and capabilities went far beyond classical Cold War UN peacekeeping – was codified in key multilateral documents such as the UN Secretary-General's 1992 *Agenda for Peace* and the 1997 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) *Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation*. Scholars such as Roland Paris (1997, 2004) have convincingly argued that this rationale could be described as “liberal peacebuilding” because it rested on classical liberal assumptions about the benefits of multi-party democracy, free markets, and international cooperation as solutions to problems of violent conflict.

Although the UN and the Northern donors grouped in the DAC assumed that the international community had key roles to play in peace processes, they recognized that these processes would only be successful if they were owned by national actors over the long run. While this approach tended to focus on the challenge of “bridging the relief-to-development” gap in the initial postwar years, there was a belief that peace could only be sustained through a transformation of the institutions and attitudes that had fuelled war. It was acknowledged that peace could only be consolidated through reforms to the markets, political, security, and other institutions, as well as the worldviews of key actors in war-torn societies.

Despite the apparent successes of this type of post-Cold War peace operations, by the mid-1990s there was an emerging belief that negotiated solutions might not be possible in some contexts and that military intervention may be required. The establishment of a safe haven for Kurds in Northern Iraq and the 1994 intervention in Haiti were precursors to this trend. In turn, the failure of national authorities and the international community to protect civilians from massive human rights violations in Bosnia and Rwanda spurred a profound rethinking of what is required to protect people and to promote peace. By the time violence escalated in East Timor and Kosovo in early 1999, some governments and multilateral organizations were ready to deploy forces to protect civilians. Those efforts were dubbed “third-generation peace operations,” or “peace enforcement operations,” because they involved the use of force in ways that departed significantly from the classical UN peacekeeping norm of consent. The tools of liberal peacebuilding were used to reactivate the economy and to nurture democratic institutions, with the difference that state-like entities were also being built in Timor-Leste and Kosovo.

The US-led invasion of Afghanistan, shortly after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, was an extension of this trend towards forceful intervention, but it was distinct in several respects. That intervention was justified on the grounds of self-defence. Moreover, it was only endorsed by the UN Security Council and justified on humanitarian grounds after the fact. The US-led intervention in Iraq two years later was initially justified as pre-emptive self-defence

and was never fully sanctioned by the UN Security Council. In Afghanistan the invading forces allowed the UN and the new national authorities to lead in rebuilding the country and forging longer-term governance arrangements. In Iraq the occupying powers remained in almost complete control of public life until their partial handover to the Interim Government in June 2004. One could characterize the interventions in Afghanistan and, especially, in Iraq as a new phase of much more forceful, unilateral military interventions and attempts to build peace under conditions of continued warfare. One could use the label “fourth-generation peace operations” to characterize these experiences, though the occupation of Iraq should probably not be associated with the concept of peace at all. These new operations coexist with efforts that belong to earlier phases – such as the UN Mission in Sudan (which fits the second-generation mould) and the African Union Mission in Sudan (which fits the third-generation model).

In sum, since 1989 there has been an increase in the use of force, external leadership, and unilateralism, and a decrease in negotiated peace processes, national ownership, and multilateralism in peacebuilding efforts. It is tempting for those concerned about fourth-generation interventions to look back on the 1990s as the golden age of peacebuilding. Yet it is important to develop a less romantic view of second-generation operations. Three patterns are important in this regard. First, many of those operations brought wars to an end but some did not secure even that minimal aim: for example, Angola returned to war despite major peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts. Second, even cases in which wars have been terminated, it has proven difficult to implement the reforms many see as necessary for sustainable peacebuilding. Third, negotiated peacekeeping and peacebuilding did not provide answers to the challenge of protection from massive human rights violations. The preview of peacebuilding in Palestine illustrates the limitations of second-generation efforts (see Box 1).²

Parallel to the evolution of peacebuilding in practice, several literatures emerged that analyzed those experiences. In the mid-1990s, several comparative studies concluded that what distinguished cases of successful war termination (like El Salvador) from cases of failure (like Angola) was the level of international engagement as well as the presence or absence of “spoilers” – namely, powerful actors opposed to peacebuilding on the ground (e.g., Hampson 1996). These studies were followed by larger quantitative and comparative studies. One of the most comprehensive studies, coordinated by the International Peace Academy (IPA), concluded that two basic categories of factors shape outcomes: (1) characteristics of the implementation environment on the ground, especially the character of spoilers, spoils, and the policies of neighbouring states; and (2) the approaches of international actors (namely, their strategies, resource commitments, and incentives, particularly their security interests). The IPA study suggested that the

Box 1

Peacebuilding in the Palestinian Territories

The 1993 and 1995 Oslo Peace Accords initially brought significant peace dividends to Palestinians and Israelis:

- Israel withdrew from parts of the occupied territories and Palestinians curtailed their attacks on Israeli targets.
- The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) returned to establish the Palestinian Authority, including holding elections for the Legislative Council.
- The economy grew at an average of 5 percent per year (1995-2000).

Yet flaws in the accords and in their implementation sowed the seeds of failure:

- The executive branch and the PLO old guard maintained control over power, resisted demands for accountability to the Legislative Council and the judiciary, and put off demands to incorporate opposition movements through local elections.
- The interim nature of the peace agreements, and their tendency to privilege the short-term security priorities of Israel and the PLO old guard, converged to undermine human rights and democratic development over the longer term.
- The international community was unable to deploy peacekeepers due to opposition by the government of Israel and US support for that position.
- This was the background to the second Intifada in 2000. Renewed violence and reoccupation drove the economy into recession, narrowed democratic spaces, and fuelled the popularity of Hamas and other nationalist forces.

The phased local elections that began in December 2004, and the first free and fair Legislative Council elections in January 2006, brought Hamas into democratic politics. The unilateral Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip and initial signals by the Olmert government also suggested that there might be new hope for peace.

According to the case study by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research: "Little progress is possible without solid international intervention. Yet successful Palestinian peacebuilding is more likely a mission impossible for the international community of the Cold War and post 9/11 era."

likelihood of success – defined in terms of war termination – was greatest where an enabling environment on the ground converged with the vital security interests of external actors and led the latter to commit significant military and financial assets to peace operations. This research also led the authors to conclude that international actors should give priority to measures like DDR and security sector reform in the short run and, secondarily, to human rights protection and reconciliation, if they want to lay foundations for lasting peace (Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002).

These studies have made enormous contributions to our understanding of peacebuilding. They have unpacked the interplay between certain conditions on the ground and international engagement with regard to shaping degrees of success or failure. They have yielded pointed policy recommendations for international actors.

Yet there are striking limits to this literature. First, it rests on short-term, minimalist criteria for success – namely, war termination that outlasts the departure of most international actors and the holding of one or two elections. This raises the question of whether these benchmarks are satisfactory to national stakeholders and whether they are sufficient to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict over the long run. Second, this literature tends to paint a simplistic picture of national actors. It enriches our understanding of spoilers and their reliance on spoils like diamonds, but it provides few insights into the strategies of national actors on the other sides of the equation: the reformist politicians, socially conscious businesspersons, or community-based organizations crucial to the construction of peace in certain contexts. Third, by downplaying the positive agency of national actors, this literature sheds little light on policy options for national forces or the transnational alliances that could foster durable peace. Finally, this literature is dominated by Northern scholars. This does not invalidate its intellectual merits, but it does raise questions of perspective, of whether analysts living closer to the front lines might provide fresh insights into issues like the agency of national actors and criteria for assessing peacebuilding over the long run.

Other literatures are beginning to fill these gaps. A strand of thinking rooted in Johan Galtung's seminal distinction between "positive and negative peace" suggests that peace processes that do not address the deep causes of conflict will often lead to the recurrence of violence over the long run. John Paul Lederach, for example, has cogently argued that the ultimate goal of peacebuilding should be "sustainable reconciliation" – namely, broadly based, self-regenerating social processes that address the proximate and underlying causes of enmity. Time is a crucial dimension: peacebuilding should link action on immediate priorities (like ceasefires and DDR) with action on institutional change during the first decade and with longer-term

structural and attitudinal transformation over the course of one or more generations. The prospects for building sustainable reconciliation are also enhanced by linking the engagement of top-level leaders such as political authorities, middle-level leaders such as religious officials, and grassroots-level institutions represented by community leaders. It is by linking these levels of society through “peace infrastructures” that the recurrence of violent conflict can be prevented. This requires integrated approaches: “a multiplicity of roles ... multiple levels of activity ... diverse strategies and approaches, each with a distinctive contribution to make” (Lederach 1997, 152; see also Rupesinghe 1995; Galtung 1969).

A literature review by Alejandro Bendaña has documented Southern contributions to this line of thought. It notes the work of African analysts such as Laurie Nathan (2001) and Yash Tandon (1999), who have cogently argued that international peacebuilding efforts have paid too little attention to the structural causes of violence within African societies or to the international drivers of conflict, such as trade liberalization and market-oriented structural adjustment. Similarly, in 2000 a group of prominent Central American analysts concluded that crucial reforms – particularly in the realms of economic, social, and agrarian policy – tended to drop off peacebuilding agendas due to the convergence of national elites’ and international agencies’ other priorities. South Asian analysts, such as Jayadeva Uyangoda, have also made compelling arguments about the need for more attention to the structural underpinnings of and solutions to armed violence (Bendaña 2003; Saldomando 2002; Uyangoda and Perera 2003).

Bendaña stresses the coincidence between these perspectives and feminist approaches, given the latter’s emphasis on just peace and social transformation. A seminal study by the International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) confirms that there have been dramatic advances at the interface of gender and peace work (Strickland and Duvvury 2003). After decades of activism and scholarship on the experiences of women as victims of war and agents of peace, many Northern governments and multi-lateral agencies began to enshrine commitments to gender mainstreaming in their peacebuilding and conflict prevention policies in the late 1990s. This culminated in the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on women, peace, and security in 2000, committing the UN and member states to implementing gender-sensitive approaches to peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and conflict prevention. Reports on its implementation have concluded that much has been done to follow up on UNSCR 1325. This includes increased participation by women in official peace negotiations and implementation processes; the adoption of new international norms; enhanced gender training for peace observers; and the prosecution of those guilty of rights violations against women in certain countries.

Much remains to be done to implement the agenda of resolution 1325. Yet, as noted by ICRW, there has been even less movement on the broader agenda of transformation. That agenda includes addressing power, its unequal distribution across social divides, and the consequences of these imbalances for peace. It includes transforming national political institutions to enable women and men to negotiate their interests in peaceful ways based on respect for universal human rights. It includes contesting the prevalence of masculine identities that emphasize domination and working to replace them with identities more open to negotiation. Yet, despite solid arguments by feminist activists that sustainable peace also requires a more permanent transformation of social norms around violence, gender, and power, this broader agenda has received little attention in intergovernmental forums and in most peace processes.

This may be partly due to the fact that this broader agenda raises questions about what is possible and how one might forge transformative coalitions in concrete situations. Indeed, a striking pattern in this literature is the poverty of debate between minimalists (who prioritize measures to secure war termination) and maximalists (who argue that deeper transformations are necessary to consolidate peace and to prevent the recurrence of war). Minimalists tend to downplay long-term challenges, while maximalists have not looked carefully enough at the obstacles facing the broader agenda of transformation (or even at the concrete options available for advancing that agenda in different contexts).

One aim of the WKOP project has been to bridge these perspectives and to prod the peacebuilding community to move beyond unproductive min/max dichotomies. The preview of the case study on Guatemala provides a glimpse into the possibilities of bridging polar perspectives in this debate (see Box 2).³ The propositions presented at the end of this chapter offer a set of conceptual bridges between minimalist and maximalist views.

Conflict Prevention, R2P, and Fragile States

From the mid-1990s onward, three new streams of policy thinking emerged, drawing on but also challenging the international discourse on postwar peacebuilding. Starting with the Carnegie Commission's seminal report on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict, influential international actors began to advocate a "shift from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention." The rationale behind this effort was that the international community could not afford to wait for massive human rights violations or wars to exact their toll before engaging in peacemaking and peacebuilding. In order to save lives and to use scarce resources more efficiently, diplomacy (or "operational prevention") and reforms (or "structural prevention") should be initiated before conflicts escalate into massive violence (Carnegie Commission 1997).

Box 2

The “Relative Success” of Peacebuilding in Guatemala

Peacebuilding has brought enormous benefits to this Central American country since the final peace accords were signed in December 1996. These include:

- War termination and the demobilization of about 25,000 ex-armed forces and 1,000 guerrilla ex-combatants.
- A consolidation of democratic electoral processes and new laws to decrease the exclusion of indigenous peoples.
- Advances in decentralization through revived development councils.

Yet key peace accord commitments have not been implemented:

- Successive legislatures have failed to pass peace accord laws in key areas (e.g., fiscal reform and the regularization of indigenous peoples’ lands).
- Minimal tax reforms were not implemented, and public expenditures have not been redistributed from security to social priorities such as health and education.
- Decentralization remains limited in practice. Increased participation by women and indigenous peoples has not yet led to their influence on major local decisions.

This mixed record is due to a number of factors:

- The peace accords and their partial implementation were due to the converging strategies of reformist elites in government, guerrilla leaders, civil society organizations (CSOs), and the international community led by the UN. It was also due to the temporary disorganization of domestic conservative networks.
- The latter – elements in Congress and the judiciary, parts of the domestic corporate sector, and former members of the civil defence patrols – regrouped to resist the implementation of the more far-reaching peace-building commitments.

The peace process could still lead to sustainable peace if the government follows up on its legislation codifying key peace commitments by:

- Renewing efforts to raise taxation levels and generate the national resources needed to finance pending commitments in areas like rural development.
- Supporting efforts by development councils to contribute to peacebuilding by nurturing their capacities for participatory engagement in public policy at both local and national levels.

Development councils and CSOs could formulate clearer strategies to secure the implementation of pending peace accords. The international community could continue supporting agents of change in the government, the councils, and the CSOs who contribute to these measures and to the agenda of sustainable peacebuilding.

This new thinking was reflected in the 1997 OECD DAC Guidelines and even more so in its 2001 Supplement, but it was also codified in key multilateral statements, such as the Miyazaki Initiative of the G8, the United Nations Millennium Declaration, and the UN Secretary-General's (2001) *Prevention of Armed Conflict*. These all contained commitments to adopt diplomatic and other measures to prevent the escalation of conflicts into wars. Some also advocated the use of multilaterally sanctioned force, where necessary, to protect vulnerable populations from grave human rights violations. All reiterated commitments to rebuild societies after wars, to address the structural underpinnings of conflict, and, thereby, to prevent the recurrence of armed violence.

These commitments were followed up with practical measures to strengthen the early warning and preventive diplomacy capacities of multilateral institutions and to mainstream conflict prevention in the programming of official development agencies (Schnabel and Carment 2004). The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) brought together many of the NGOs and other civil society actors that also took up this banner (GPPAC 2005).

From the outset, work on conflict prevention was intimately linked to debates on humanitarian intervention. That debate has ancient roots, but it was revived by the tragedies in Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s. Widespread frustration over the inability of the UN, regional organizations, and great powers to protect victims from genocide and ethnic cleansing led some to call for the development of new international norms and capacities for humanitarian intervention. In 1999, important precedents were set when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and when Australia led a multinational force to stop another genocide in East Timor. The peacebuilding efforts that followed these interventions are quintessential "third-generation" peace operations.

The international divisions over intervention in Kosovo reflected the enduring difficulties of instituting new norms and protection capacities through the UN. In response, the Canadian government and other actors convened

the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to bridge the gulf between those advocating humanitarian intervention and those defending the sanctity of state sovereignty. In late 2001, the ICISS released *The Responsibility to Protect* report, recognizing that sovereignty includes the responsibility of states to protect their citizens from massive human rights violations such as genocide and ethnic cleansing. When states fail to live up to this duty, the international community has a responsibility to protect populations at risk. R2P includes the responsibility to react militarily, in a proportionate manner, when all other options have been exhausted. It includes the obligation to seek and obtain authorization by the UN Security Council to demonstrate “right intention” and reasonable prospects of success. R2P also encompasses the responsibility to help rebuild societies affected by war in ways that address the causes of conflict as well as the responsibility to prevent the escalation of conflict into armed violence. Indeed, “Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect” (ICISS 2001, xi).

The ICISS report suffered from being released shortly after the 11 September 2001 tragedy. As a result, its recommendations were ignored by decision makers in the United States as they became consumed with the counterattack against al Qaeda and its Afghan hosts, with the broader “War on Terror,” and with the hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. After the occupation of Iraq, many other governments and publics became even more suspicious of any doctrine that could be used to justify ill-conceived Northern-led military interventions. This unfortunate historical link is one reason why it has been so difficult to obtain broad support for R2P in the UN.⁴

While 9/11 and its aftermath overshadowed the R2P effort, the role that the Afghan state played in harbouring al Qaeda galvanized international interest in the phenomena of failed/weak/fragile or crisis states. That shift was driven by events in the United States. A year after 9/11, the Bush administration tabled a national security strategy identifying failed states as a major security threat. It outlined a strategy to combat terrorism and the emergence of power vacuums that could be exploited by transnational terrorist networks. The document framed regime change and nation building as essential complements to the doctrine of pre-emptive defence (President of the United States 2002). Since then, the Bush administration has taken many initiatives to address the problem of failed states both in particular countries and globally.

Official development assistance (ODA) agencies were already grappling with problems of state fragility when this cause was taken up by the Bush administration. ODA debates were driven by peacebuilding and conflict prevention units concerned about their agencies’ apparent embrace of the aid effectiveness agenda. Indeed, the drive to enhance ODA and debt relief

for countries that showed the will and capacity to use resources effectively – the so-called “good performers” on the development stage – raised profound questions about what to do with the “poor performers.” Throughout the 1990s, peacebuilding units had advocated that donors should not simply cut ODA or increase their humanitarian aid in countries drifting towards collapse. They had championed the view that “working around conflict” was morally and politically undesirable since it could fuel humanitarian crises, aggravate governance challenges, and spur the regionalization of conflicts (Uvin 2002). Renewed interest in fragile states provided fresh justifications for investing in poor performers despite the logic of aid effectiveness.

Since 9/11, development agencies have elaborated on this rationale through the OECD Development Assistance Committee Fragile States Group and the World Bank’s Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) initiative. Through the DAC, they have drafted “Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States,” stipulating that donors should share and fine-tune ongoing analysis in such contexts, maintain activities in support of the poor (e.g., social service delivery), promote change by supporting reformers inside and outside the state, strengthen donor coordination, and promote policy coherence (OECD DAC/DCD 2005; see also World Bank 2002). These principles are being tested in several fragile states, including Haiti.

These processes have been informed by a stream of analyses that emerged in the mid-1990s (major contributors include Gross 1996; Mallaby 2002; Rotberg 2002; Ignatieff 2003; and Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur 2005). This literature unpacked the continuum of state failure, ranging from “failed states” that are unable to provide the most basic public goods to most of their citizens to “capable states” that provide these services and more to their citizens. It suggested that many states in the developing world fall between these extremes and may be termed “fragile” states. The literature catalogued the causes of failure, from the legacy of colonialism to the impacts of the Cold War, the poor policy choices of some developing country governments, inequitable financial regimes, and so on. It identified international policy options ranging from preventive diplomacy to developmental approaches. Many of these analyses converged around the need to promote better governance – or state building – in fragile states. For some, this means focusing on establishing the rule of law and democratic governance; for others, it should also include promoting socioeconomic reforms to help ensure the basic rights of citizens to adequate livelihoods, public health, and so on.

Post-intervention stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, Haiti, and Iraq are testing grounds for fourth-generation peace operations and approaches in fragile states. One problem is that the strategic interests of major Western powers – and not R2P criteria like massive human rights violations – drove decisions to intervene in these cases. Another is that initial peacebuilding efforts have been marred by ongoing warfare. Iraq is the high-profile case in

this regard, yet peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Haiti is also compromised by continued violence, de facto collaboration with paramilitary leaders responsible for past human rights violations, and the difficulties of consolidating democratic and participatory development processes (ICG 2004b). The preview of the study on Haiti (see Box 3) illustrates the complexities of fourth-generation peacebuilding today.⁵

In sum, the debates on conflict prevention, R2P, and state fragility have usefully broadened international agendas beyond postwar peacebuilding to address issues of human rights violations, conflict, and vulnerability at earlier stages. The most visionary policy prescriptions, such as the ICISS and UN High-Level Panel reports, advocate an integrated approach to these problems, from immediate diplomatic responses to the carefully circumscribed use of force and longer-term support for governance and socioeconomic reforms. Some policy prescriptions place considerable emphasis on strengthening national change agents. The events of 9/11 have certainly pushed issues of state fragility up the international agenda in a way that proponents of R2P can only envy.

Yet, in practice, these discourses have three major flaws that are related to the challenges of sustainable peacebuilding. First, there has been uneven follow-up on the comprehensive agenda, particularly on R2P and fragile states. Champions of R2P, such as the Government of Canada, have focused on advancing norms to govern the use of force and only began to reconnect this with the prevention and rebuilding pillars after much (difficult) dialogue with NGOs. Some Western governments' practical responses also betray a bias towards military intervention and much less interest in programming for long-term conflict prevention and sustainable peacebuilding (except perhaps on a narrow range of governance initiatives). Sustaining senior officials' interest in less fashionable aspects of prevention and peacebuilding – such as reforms to promote the inclusion of the poor and gender equality – is proving to be difficult in the new “whole-of-government” environment. The United States is clearly the extreme case here, but others (such as Canada) are also falling into these patterns in disturbing ways.⁶

Second, the complex links between R2P, the discourse on fragile states, and the selective use of force by Western powers have deeply undermined Western credibility. The unilateral intervention against Iraq and the use of the failed state label to describe a repressive but hardly weak state (dismantled by external intervention) has had a negative impact on the R2P and fragile states debates. The West's unwillingness or inability to respond adequately to the resurgence of massive violence in Israel and Palestine has also undermined its credibility. The Canadian government's justification for the 2004 intervention in Haiti, without open debate from an R2P perspective, has also damaged the R2P campaign – particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean.

*Box 3***Haiti: Peacebuilding in a Fragile State**

The first peacebuilding effort in Haiti began in 1994, with the return of the elected president through an international military intervention. The return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the support he enjoyed opened the door to many reforms, including:

- The dismantling of the Haitian armed forces and the establishment of a national civilian police.
- The establishment of a multiparty political system and the widening of spaces for the free expression of different political options.
- The reduction of tariffs and the privatization of many public enterprises.
- Efforts to promote decentralized local development.

Yet a decade later, the state, its social supports, and international backing had all but evaporated. The failures of peacebuilding included:

- The subordination of state institutions – such as the Electoral Council, the judiciary, and the police – to the goal of keeping President Aristide in power.
- The near collapse of the economy due to the contradictory mix of market-oriented and populist reforms that failed either to generate growth or to reduce poverty.
- A profound fiscal crisis and the withdrawal of most external financial assistance.
- The resurgence of widespread human rights violations.

In February 2004, the United States, France, and Canada coordinated a military intervention that sealed President Aristide's removal from power. The Multilateral Intervention Force was soon replaced by the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Since then, the situation has been characterized by ambiguous trends:

- The elaboration of an interim cooperation framework and its partial implementation with the inflow of sizeable international assistance.
- Attempts to reform security agencies in the context of escalating violence, crime, and human rights violations, particularly in late 2004.
- Attempts to revive promising local development efforts across the country.
- National and local elections in early 2006, bringing to office a reformist president and considerable diversity in the National Assembly and in the municipalities.

Time will tell whether Haitians and the international community use this opening to forge a more consensual approach to peacebuilding and to democratic development.

Third, even more than postwar peacebuilding, these debates are dominated by Northern officials and analysts. The number of sophisticated Southern interlocutors on conflict prevention and R2P has grown in recent years, particularly in Africa (given the urgency of these issues on that continent). Yet, especially on fragile states, debates and policy initiatives are still driven by Northern governments and are informed by North-based analysts. As with the work on peacebuilding, this does not invalidate these discourses, but it does raise questions about what Southern interlocutors might contribute to these debates (e.g., with regard to understanding the possibilities for positive Southern agency in counteracting very real problems, such as genocide and different states of fragility).

Democratic Governance and Its Local Dimensions

From the outset of the post-Cold War years, there was a widespread belief that democratic governance was a key component of peacebuilding. In some war-affected societies, this was driven by opposition parties that had fought for access to state power or for a new social compact between elites and other citizens (Wood 2001). In others, this was driven by actors who viewed multiparty parliamentary systems, independent electoral commissions, and judiciaries and human rights ombudspersons as essential for the peaceful management of differences (Reilly, Harris, and Lund 1998). International commitments to nurture democratic institutions were codified in policy statements by the UN, the OECD DAC, and key regional organizations. Numerous official and NGO cooperation programs were initiated in this domain. Other aspects of governance, such as accountability and transparency, also received considerable attention, especially from the international financial institutions. Yet democratic governance has continued to move up international agendas in recent years, fuelled in ambiguous ways by post-9/11 preoccupations with the War on Terror.

These trends have also connected with a growing interest in democratic governance at the local level. Local democratization is seen by some as being critical to the success of peacebuilding since local participation and accountability seem essential if a culture of peace is to take root beyond capital cities. However, experience suggests that local democratization can not only bring gains but also aggravate conflicts. Enabling national policies and programs are crucial to maximizing peacebuilding benefits. Enabling initiatives include devolving decision-making authority and taxation powers to back up the decentralization of responsibilities for the delivery of public goods. Building the capacity of local institutions to manage services, nurture participation, resolve local conflicts, and negotiate relations with higher authorities is also essential. Programming in this area requires ongoing conflict-sensitive analysis of local actors, needs, and contexts (Bush 2004; Suhrke and Strand 2005).

A rich literature that assesses the results of democratization efforts in post-war contexts is beginning to accumulate. In his seminal work on this issue, Paris (1997, 2004) cogently argues that the hasty promotion of elections and superficial institutional changes can actually destabilize fragile peace processes, particularly when combined with economic liberalization. At the sectoral level, an eight-country study by the Netherlands Institute for International Relations concluded that international democracy assistance tends to cluster around a limited menu of electoral and human rights assistance, that short-term projects tend to proliferate at the expense of institution building, and that, despite a growth of governance assistance budgets, international funding falls dramatically short of what is required for long-term democratic development. The preference for technical assistance projects has also prevented donors from addressing political obstacles at the national level (de Zeeuw 2004).

Other studies have looked at these dynamics at the local level. Based on a comparison of experiences in Bosnia, the Palestinian Occupied Territories, and the Philippines, Kenneth Bush stresses the importance of local champions, institutional capacities (including the capacity to engage civil society organizations), supportive national policies (such as real fiscal decentralization), and international assistance for local democratization to take root in postwar contexts. Above all, he emphasizes the importance of having realistic time frames because peacebuilding “takes a long, long time” (Bush 2004, 24).

Focusing on the politics of local peacebuilding, Woodward (2002b, 22) recently concluded that, “in all cases for which there are field studies, decentralization programs were donor-driven.” Donors often have conflicting agendas – ranging from limiting the power of the state to reducing public expenditures to broadening democratic participation. National and local stakeholders also have mixed motives for supporting or resisting decentralization. Some national leaders use decentralization to undercut the political bases of their rivals, while others use it and privatization to accumulate state assets at bargain-basement prices. Some national leaders will resist decentralization because they fear the collapse of the unitary state or the loss of power (and revenues) to local rivals. The level to which power and funds are decentralized is often contested.

Carrie Manning (2003) offers a framework for thinking about local-level peacebuilding that emphasizes the importance of the state across national territories, beyond the capital; the interaction of different levels of government, and different stakeholders, through these levels; and the “myriad negotiations” that shape peace on the ground. Within this framework, Manning divides challenges to local peacebuilding into two categories. Centrally driven obstacles include national leaders who try to recoup ground lost in peace negotiations by treating local spaces as reserve domains of power (e.g.,

extreme nationalist Serb parties in Bosnia); vague peace agreements; major actors who want to control territory in order to extract resources and make money (e.g., UNITA in Angola). Locally generated obstacles include local officials who stand to lose office, revenues, or impunity from reforms (this in contexts where there are often few livelihood alternatives). Yet, borrowing an insight from the recent scholarship on federalism, Manning concludes that the need to negotiate peacebuilding among actors at different levels also opens up important possibilities to foster more sustainable peace outcomes.

In Sri Lanka a group of researchers recently explored how devolution could open spaces for advancing rights and self-determination at the local level. They conclude that this would require further devolution of mandates and resources to local-level administrators, something that, historically, has been resisted by bureaucrats from all ethnic communities. Without romanticizing local spaces, they document rich experiences of community-level conflict resolution, multicultural coexistence, and development cooperation. Strengthening these experiences requires state reform and project interventions. "If project interventions are to be part of a peace agenda that includes substantive democracy by strengthening local capacities," they argue, "more attention would have to be given to the analysis of local politics and local knowledge" (Mayer, Rajasingham-Senenayake, and Thangarajah 2003, 8). State reform should include complementary strengthening of local and national capacities to deliver public goods and accountability to various constituencies.

The preview of the study on peacebuilding in Mozambique (see Box 4),⁷ written by colleagues at the Centro de Estudos de Democracia e Desenvolvimento, provides a sense of how these dynamics are unfolding in a relatively promising environment for peacebuilding.

In sum, over the past fifteen years, the policy and scholarly sides of the peacebuilding community have accumulated considerable knowledge about democratic governance in postwar contexts. The belief that democratic development is central to peacebuilding has become entrenched, yet there is a clearer awareness of the dilemmas and difficulties that this entails. There is much more caution about imposing superficially liberal institutions through hasty elections, and there is a clearer understanding of the need to develop long-term, context-specific democratic development strategies. However, research suggests that donor assistance in this domain remains non-strategic, short-term, and under-resourced.

Moreover, despite some work on national institutions, there is a need for greater comparative analysis of the types of national strategies, institutional innovations, and national political coalitions that are conducive to sustainable democratic development.

*Box 4***Democratization, Decentralization, and Peacebuilding in Mozambique**

Peacebuilding has brought enormous benefits since the war ended in 1992:

- Three free and fair national elections have been held. The national elections in November 2004 did not generate serious incidents of violence.
- Two rounds of local elections have also occurred.

Yet certain trends could undermine peace:

- Power remains concentrated in the hands of the central government and the ruling party. The eruption of violence after the 1999 national elections, in a region with a strong RENAMO presence, highlights the links between the concentration of political power and the fragility of peace.
- The limited character of decentralization reflects and aggravates these trends. Only thirty-three of 151 cities and major towns have been included in the process. The centre remains reluctant to devolve significant fiscal powers (to tax and spend) to municipalities. Decentralization has been a top-down process controlled by the central state, especially in municipalities where the opposition is strong. According to the Mayor of Nacala: “In one word there isn’t decentralization because control ... by central government remains strong and that doesn’t give the municipalities the tools to work efficiently.”
- Though women play important roles in Mozambican public life (e.g., through their high level of representation in the National Assembly), men continue to hold the levers of power nationally and in most municipalities.

Nonetheless, there are important opportunities emerging to advance democratic development, including at the local level:

- The World Bank worked with the Government of Mozambique to develop a decentralization strategy and to conclude a letter of sector policy in 2006. Other donors have supported decentralization efforts, with different degrees of commitment to deepening their democratic and peacebuilding aspects.
- The new National Association of Municipalities presents an opportunity for local leaders and civil society organizations, including women’s organizations, to engage the government in a process to deepen democratic decentralization.

A major change in recent years has involved the broadening of peace-building to include local-level actors as key players. There is an emerging consensus that local engagement should include efforts to strengthen the capacities of municipal governments and CSOs for democratic governance, while fostering national frameworks that enable decentralization. There is a growing understanding of the political obstacles to decentralized governance, including the mixed agendas of donors and of different national actors. What is required is a much greater understanding of the “politics of the possible” – namely, the types of local innovations that are possible in different contexts and the political coalitions that could sustain successful strategies over the long term.

Socioeconomic Development and Its Local Dimensions

In the late 1990s, there was a revival of the old debate on the relationship between armed conflict and socioeconomic development. There is broad consensus on the inverse relationship between level of economic development and proneness to armed conflict. The poorer the society, the greater the likelihood that it will experience armed conflict. Yet there is little consensus on the relationship between conflict and the variable of socioeconomic inequality. Drawing on large data sets, some analysts conclude that poverty and inequality lead to armed conflict where there is strong “horizontal inequality” (i.e., overlap between socioeconomic inequalities and ethnic, class, or geographic identities that provide bases for rebellion) (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Drawing on case studies, others suggest that the strategies and capacities of state elites, versus those of opposition leaders, also mediate the links between socioeconomic conditions and war (Daudelin 2002).

One strand of this debate has become known as the “greed and grievance debate.” Seminal works reconceptualize contemporary wars as struggles for power and profit rather than as struggles over causes like social justice (Berdal and Malone 2000). They argue that the key to ending these wars involves, for example, denying spoilers such as UNITA in Angola access to the revenues from diamond extraction, while enhancing incentives for them to lay down their arms and to comply with peace agreements. Outcomes of this work include the development of new multilateral regimes to regulate the revenues from extractive industries such as diamonds and oil. Yet recent studies have yielded more nuanced analyses of the interplay between greed and grievance. For example, Ballentine and Sherman (2003) show how economic incentives combine with socioeconomic or political exclusion to fuel contemporary wars. Therefore, they conclude, the international community should continue to tighten belligerents’ access to natural resource revenues, while also promoting inclusive governance and socioeconomic reforms that increase incentives for belligerents to lay down their arms for good.

Paul Collier and his World Bank colleagues bring these insights together in a report on civil wars and development policy. They argue that four measures are central to preventing armed conflict: (1) tightening international governance of natural resource revenues; (2) increasing aid and targeting it towards extremely poor countries at risk; (3) improving the sequencing of postwar aid by scaling it up gradually and sustaining it over longer periods of time; and (4) using international forces to lay the foundations for peace. They suggested that national actors should: (1) give priority to infrastructure rehabilitation, social investment, and macroeconomic growth, in that order; and (2) reduce military spending, pursue security sector reform, and promote genuine democratic governance (Collier et al. 2003). Although this work has attracted many followers in governmental circles, it is being criticized by others on several grounds. First, respected analysts have carefully reviewed this research and concluded that some of its arguments rest on problematic coding, deceptively small sample sizes, and other shaky methodological foundations (Suhrke, Villanger, and Woodward 2004).

Second, Collier's work does not do justice to the accumulated knowledge on how donors actually act in postwar situations. It does not acknowledge the tendency for externally sponsored macroeconomic and fiscal policies to undermine rather than to reinforce peacebuilding processes. As the chief UN mediator in the peace talks in El Salvador in the early 1990s, Alvaro de Soto had observed how the peace accords he helped broker between the government and the insurgents were undermined by a structural adjustment program (SAP) negotiated between the government and the international financial institutions (IFIs). For example, the fiscal austerity measures in the SAP weakened the government's ability to finance key commitments in the peace accords, such as the creation of a new civil police (de Soto and del Castillo 1995). In the late 1990s, James Boyce and Susan Woodward looked at a larger number of cases to see whether the international community had learned from de Soto's critique. They observe that some donors had enhanced their ability to support national institutions and actors that are crucial to peacebuilding and to deny assistance to spoilers. Yet they conclude that, despite these advances, the IFIs and some other donors had difficulties abandoning their commitments to economic orthodoxy, even in postwar settings. Donors still tend to privilege measures to purchase short-term stability over equitable growth. They also spend too much on the services of external agencies and too little on strengthening national capacities for peace (Boyce 2002; Woodward 2002a).

These findings converge with a study on peacebuilding programming conducted by the original Utstein countries – Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. That study concludes that, despite many advances in recent years, peacebuilding programming in those countries suffers from a “major strategic deficit” (Smith 2003, 10). It is based on

short-term planning, inadequate consultation with national stakeholders, poor integration of governance and socioeconomic interventions, inadequate coordination among donors, as well as poor monitoring and evaluation. Indeed, “despite this considerable effort in evaluating peacebuilding activities ... there is no basis for drawing wider conclusions about ... what works and what does not in [Utstein-4] peacebuilding” (50). This finding, by four of the most active bilateral donors, suggests that greater changes are needed to improve donor practices than those recommended by the World Bank.

A third limitation of this literature is that it also tends to focus on international actors and their policy options. When it does look at national actors, it tends to emphasize spoilers at the expense of institutions and leaders that anchor or could anchor effective conflict prevention. As a literature review commissioned by the War-Torn Societies Project some years ago concludes: “Discussions are primarily led by external actors and Western scholars. Subsequent recommendations are directed at international organizations involved in post-conflict countries rather than at the domestic actors of reconstruction ... The focus of attention should thus shift to domestic actors and involve them in research on – and design of – locally accepted solutions” (Carbonnier 1998, 64).

There are exceptions to this tendency, including the work of the War-Torn Societies Project. Collier’s 2003 report certainly includes recommendations for national governments. Yet there is also a storehouse of work on the economic dimensions of peacebuilding being generated in the South. For example, a consortium of Guatemalan organizations joined forces to produce the first independent assessment of the Land Fund, an institution crucial to the implementation of the land and rural development policy commitments in the peace accords. That study looks at the interplay between national institutions and international donors, and it includes policy recommendations that have since been taken up by both sets of actors (CONGCOOP and CNOC 2002). Similarly, Sri Lankan researchers have produced illuminating analyses of the tension between the previous administration’s economic and peace policies. One such study includes pointed recommendations for what the new national government and donors could do to harmonize economic policies and peacebuilding – by placing greater emphasis on equitable growth in the south of Sri Lanka and on institutional capacity-building in the north and east (Kelegama 2004a).

Southern analysts are also generating insights into the contributions of local actors to economic reconstruction. For instance, a group of Sri Lankan and German scholars has examined the ways in which subnational spaces can become arenas for non-discriminatory approaches to reconstruction – in the rehabilitation of agricultural production or educational services, for example – that could lay the foundations for sustainable peace. However,

for this to work, local, national, and international agencies will have to conduct conflict impact assessment more systematically and design conflict-sensitive development interventions to avoid dividing communities further (Mayer, Rajasingham-Senenayake, and Thangarajah 2003). In Guatemala, La Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) recently published a study documenting the highly uneven capacity of local governments and indigenous peoples' organizations to administer municipal lands. Based on that finding, this research highlights the potentially negative impacts of decentralizing the administration of lands without investing much more in strengthening the capacities of local actors to manage those assets in conflict-sensitive ways (Thillet and FLACSO Guatemala 2003).

The preview of the case study on Afghanistan (see Box 5),⁸ shows how these patterns manifest themselves in a particularly challenging setting. In sum, over the past fifteen years, renewed debate at the interface of socio-economic development and peacebuilding has generated considerable insight. The international community has learned about the pitfalls of orthodox approaches to economic liberalization in postwar contexts. At the policy level, more clarity has emerged about the need to balance measures to secure macroeconomic stability and growth, with measures to restore social services and to lay the foundations for equitable development. Much is also being learned about how to generate more inclusive socio-economic development in rural areas and at the local level beyond large cities – through enabling national legislation and institutional reforms, by building the capacity of smaller municipal governments in areas like transparent taxation and fiscal management, and by nurturing the economic potential of communities. Yet our case studies suggest that practice still lags far behind policy learning and that there is room for much bolder innovation on the ground.

DDR, Spoilers, and Agents of Change

DDR is another area in which there is a pressing need for bolder innovation. The three chapters on the demobilization and reintegration of combatants offer a compelling analysis of the policy literature on DDR and spoilers. They remind us of the accumulated insights into the factors that shape the success of DDR programs:

- contextual factors such as the nature of the armed conflict
- the character of armed actors themselves
- the nature of the DDR programs deployed to deal with combatants.

They observe that the most prominent contributions to this literature, for example by Stedman, place more emphasis on the urgency of disarming

Box 5

Peacebuilding, Rural Development, and War in Afghanistan

The international intervention against the Taliban government in October 2001, and the implementation of the Bonn Agreement since, have brought benefits to Afghanistan:

- Complex processes of constitutional reform and democratic consultation led to relatively free presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004-05.
- Over 3 million refugees have returned, reconstruction has begun in many provinces, and there have been important initiatives in the area of women's rights.

The high-priority National Solidarity Program (NSP) was initiated by the Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) in 2003 to foster rural development and to improve relations between the central state and rural communities.

- By January 2006, almost 10,000 of Afghanistan's 20,000 villages had been reached through small NSP projects in areas such as public health.
- To be eligible for an NSP grant, communities must elect a Community Development Council (CDC) and include women as well as men. The experience of local participation has been positive for many communities.
- Though the NSP appears to be popular, the sustainability of NSP projects is questionable. Evidence from thirty communities suggests that consultation with stakeholders is inadequate and that the needs of women and the poor remain marginal to major decisions. Moreover, many community-level projects lack connections to each other or to other rural development programs.

At the macro level:

- The war between Taliban and al Qaeda forces and US-led coalition forces continues in the southern and eastern provinces.
- The central state remains weak and unable to deliver basic public goods.
- Rural development, a key to peacebuilding in a country where 70 percent of the population lives in rural areas, remains incipient – outside the opium economy.

What could be done to change these dynamics?

- The government and the international community could harmonize their practices with the goal of sustainable peacebuilding. They could channel more investment into national institutions, socioeconomic development, and rural development.
- This could include providing longer-term funding to the NSP to ensure its sustainability. MRRD, facilitating partners, and development councils

could strengthen their capacities to apply good practices of development – including finding more effective ways of nurturing participation by women.

It could also include fostering real dialogue with Taliban leaders.

and demobilizing combatants to prevent their emergence as spoilers and less on the need for sustainable reintegration. They note the emergence of a counterpoint to this line of analysis, particularly from UN agencies and their NGO associates, advocating more developmental approaches, more support for community-based DDR, and more emphasis on strengthening national institutions' ability to complete reintegration over the long run.

Still, all three chapters fault mainstream and developmental approaches to DDR for not sufficiently considering the potential of ex-combatants as agents of change. In particular, they suggest that the tendency to demonize combatants – due to their human rights violations or their potential to undermine peacebuilding – has blinded us to the possibility that some of these movements, the individuals in them, and the communities in which they are embedded, might actually contribute to peace implementation.

The case studies explore this possibility in three societies – Afghanistan, Guatemala, and Palestine. In each case, they start with careful analyses of the characteristics of different armed actors and their historical links to conflict and peace processes. In each case, they conclude that there is untapped potential to bring certain ex-combatant groups more fully into peacebuilding processes as agents of change. However, in the case of Palestine, the authors conclude that this is unlikely given the current convergence of powerful national, regional, and international actors' strategies around the War on Terror.

Conclusion

This chapter introduces the question of what kind of peace is possible in the post-9/11 era by reviewing major debates related to postwar peacebuilding and more specific literatures on the challenges of democratic governance, economic development, and the demobilization of ex-combatants in postwar contexts. Through this review, I craft a critique of dominant approaches and highlight alternatives emerging from the margins of the field, including the South. The following propositions capture the hunches that guide the more grounded exploration of these issues as presented in the case studies offered in this book.

Proposition 1: It is fair to assess postwar peacebuilding efforts in the first ten years primarily according to whether they have helped end wars. Yet it is important to assess longer-term peacebuilding efforts according to whether they are addressing the causes of conflict and are leading to sustainable peacebuilding.

Proposition 2: Multidimensional peacebuilding has contributed much to ending several wars since 1989. Yet a major limitation of these efforts is that few have paved the way for the deeper reforms required to sustain peace beyond the initial decade of peacebuilding.

Proposition 3: The termination of these wars was due to a convergence of the interests of key domestic stakeholders with those of major international actors. Yet it has been difficult to forge the transnational coalitions required to underpin more profound changes – such as deepening democratic practices at the local level – over the long term.

Proposition 4: Multidimensional peacebuilding provides a framework for nurturing transnational coalitions – or peace infrastructures – linking agents of change from the local to the national and international levels. Yet stakeholders should invest much more to build the domestic base of these coalitions and to deliver the institutional reforms required to extend their life well beyond the departure of major international actors.

Proposition 5: From the standpoint of sustainable peacebuilding, the outcomes of third- and especially fourth-generation peacebuilding efforts are even more problematic than are those of second-generation operations. This is partly due to the mixed international motives that have tended to drive such operations, despite the ideals of the R2P discourse. It is also due to the unpromising national and local circumstances one tends to find in situations in which key stakeholders are excluded by warfare and/or by limited negotiations.

Proposition 6: Even in such situations, peacebuilding can move towards a more solid footing by engaging a broader range of stakeholders, including leaders of the poor, women, or ethnic groups that have been excluded from transitional arrangements. Addressing these groups' legitimate political, socioeconomic, and/or cultural demands through reforms could help reposition peacebuilding efforts. Decisive movement towards the use of force as a last resort, based on the rule of law, is also a necessary ingredient for recovering ground lost during contested interventions.

Proposition 7: Despite the belief that democratization is essential to peacebuilding, the achievements of these processes have been quite limited in many postwar contexts (e.g., with regard to the participation of women, the poor, and indigenous peoples in decision making, particularly at the local level beyond capital cities).

Proposition 8: There are many entry points for democratic development in postwar contexts. These include fostering national legal and institutional reforms, strengthening municipal governments' capacities for participatory policy making, and building the capacities of historically excluded stakeholders to influence policy processes.

Proposition 9: Economic and social policies for sustainable peacebuilding continue to attract too little attention and investment. Macroeconomic orthodoxy still tends to trump creative public policy for inclusive development. Official development assistance tends to focus on immediate postwar priorities and invests too little in strengthening national and local capacities for conflict-sensitive development over the long term. National governments are failing to deliver enabling policies such as fiscal decentralization and rural development. Community-level projects remain poorly linked to broader strategies.

As such, economic and social policies/programs in postwar settings still fall short of yielding the outcomes necessary to sustain peace and to prevent the recurrence of conflict.

Proposition 10: In some societies there are spaces for much more innovative, conflict-sensitive economic and social policies/programs, such as harmonizing macroeconomic policies with the goals of sustainable peacebuilding, investing much greater resources in strengthening the capacities of national and local governments, and linking community-based projects with strategies for more inclusive rural and urban development. Politically, it is essential to nurture broader coalitions of reformers in order to advance such approaches for the generational time frames required to consolidate peace.

Proposition 11: Despite successes and innovations in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants in some contexts, these programs still tend to suffer from an over-emphasis on military instruments, an under-emphasis on long-term socioeconomic and political reintegration, and an insufficient consideration of ex-combatants as potential agents of peacebuilding.

Proposition 12: DDR programs could be enhanced by starting with more careful analyses of different armed groups, drawing them and their communities (not just senior commanders) into peacebuilding processes where possible and linking these to strategies to deepen governance and socioeconomic reforms over the long run.

This chapter also presents some findings from the case studies. The previews already presented dealt with cases in which peacebuilding has occurred in one form or another for at least five years. The preview of the Sri Lankan case (see Box 6),⁹ illustrates the challenges of sustainable peacebuilding in a process that has relapsed into open warfare.

The propositions put forth in this chapter were initially offered to the WKOP team to provoke reflection and to guide their case studies. Researchers picked up on those most relevant to their cases. They use a common methodology, beginning with a review of the literature on peacebuilding in their society. This secondary research is complemented by analyses of primary documents, aggregate data such as opinion polls, key informant interviews, and participant observation at the national and local levels. Each study then examines implementation patterns in selected areas of governance, economic reconstruction, or DDR, weaving gender and social analysis into the assessment. All case studies have been revised on the basis of peer reviews as well as validation meetings with local, national, and international stakeholders.

The concluding chapter revisits the propositions offered here by comparing the case studies in a more systematic manner than I have done. In particular, it returns to the core question of the book – what kind of peace is possible in the post-9/11 era? – with more definitive yet more pessimistic conclusions than those suggested in this introduction.

*Box 6***War and Peace in Sri Lanka**

Even before the peace talks between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) reached a deadlock in early 2003, several obstacles had emerged that made sustained progress difficult:

- The LTTE leadership had shown little sensitivity to other stakeholders' demands that any devolution of power to the north and east be conditional on a democratization of LTTE practices.
- The United National Front (UNF) government was unable to respond positively to LTTE proposals for interim arrangements that would have tested a model of regional autonomy within the framework of a unitary state.
- The UNF government's position was weakened by its orthodox market-oriented economic policies, which failed to distribute the peace dividend to the north and east or to the rural poor in the south.

In 2004 and 2005 this led to the election of new governments. Since then the following occurred:

- Two governments have had even less margin to return to the negotiation table, partly due to the influence of Sinhalese nationalist elements in their coalitions.
- Despite mediation efforts by the Norwegian government, the LTTE has felt sidelined by other international actors due to the global War on Terror.
- The LTTE has also split along regional lines and has repeatedly violated the 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA).
- Notwithstanding the creation of the Civil Society Sub-Committee on Peace and Reconciliation, civil society has remained marginal to the peace talks.

These dynamics, the pressure they have put on the CFA, and the destruction caused by the tsunami in December 2004 have made it difficult to keep creative options for transformative peacebuilding on the agenda.

Though national key actors' energies are currently focused on waging war, the case studies in this book suggest that, at some point, they will have to return to negotiations. At that time, a deeper transformation will have to be on the agenda.