NORTH OF AMERICA

Canadians and the American Century, 1945-60



edited by ASA McKERCHER & MICHAEL D. STEVENSON

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Contents

Introduction

Canada and Canadians in the Shadow of the American Century

ASA McKERCHER AND MICHAEL D. STEVENSON

In February 1941, American magazine magnate Henry Luce took to the pages of his *Life* magazine to make the case to readers that the United States should reject a posture of so-called isolationism and instead undertake an active role in international affairs. With much of the world embroiled in another conflict, Luce saw that his country was primed to find itself in a position of unprecedented global authority in the years ahead, and he appealed to Americans "to accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world" to use that power "to exert ... the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit."[1] In Luce's view, the basis of that influence was US economic and potential military might and American cultural products – jazz, Hollywood films, "machines and patented products" – that were "the only things that every community in the world, from Zanzibar to Hamburg, recognizes in common."[2] Published nine months before the United States entered the Second World War, Luce's article became famous as a declaration of intent by internationalist-minded Americans aiming to create what Luce called the "first great American Century." This phrase became shorthand for describing the era of US preponderance that began amid the war. The American Century's nature and extent are a subject of debate, but what is clear is that, during the war and in the decades that followed it, the impact of the United States was felt the world over.[3] And it was in Canada that the American presence loomed especially large.

Perhaps it is no surprise that in 1948 Luce himself called not only for closer Canadian-American cooperation to maintain "world order" but also for a "complete and permanent economic union" between the two neighbours.[4]

The Second World War accelerated a process of North American integration that had begun decades earlier, binding Canada and the United States through a series of economic and defence agreements that outlived the conflict – and indeed expanded as the Cold War unfolded. These measures complemented a massive flow of trade and investment across the border, with Canadian natural resources helping to maintain, first, the American arsenal of democracy and, then, the prosperity of the postwar era. In addition, there was an increasing range of cultural and intellectual contacts as well as the cross-border flow of tourists, students, and other travellers, producing what, in 1946, American historian A.L. Burt called an "international intimacy."[5] That same year, Ray Atherton, the US ambassador in Ottawa, told NBC listeners that the bedrock of the close relationship between Canada and the United States was "the free circulation of knowledge and ideas between the two peoples of North America ... a mass phenomenon involving millions and millions of people" that had created an "intellectual and social harmony" between the neighbouring peoples.[6] And, in the view of Canadian political scientist Alexander Brady, seldom was "there a major movement in the neighbouring Republic without its repercussion in Canada."[7] These observations testified to the interchange among Canadians and Americans, but as Brady noted, this process often seemed to be one sided.

At the same time, as many Canadians embraced growing ties with the United States, this intimate relationship also caused disquiet among Canadian nationalists. In 1951, the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, or Massey Commission, decried that "our use of American institutions, or our lazy, even abject, imitation of them has caused an uncritical acceptance of ideas and assumptions which are alien to our tradition."[8] "We can only survive," wrote political economist Harold Innis the following year, "by taking persistent action at strategic points against American imperialism in all its attractive guises."[9] Canadians were slow – or reluctant – to heed these

warnings, and in 1960 novelist Hugh MacLennan warned of the "Americanization of Canada." Although this was a century-long concern, as he contended, recent increased exposure to "that cluster of ideas, values, habits and thought-patterns called by Mr. Harry Luce The American Way of Life" was actively transforming Canada into "a mental and spiritual colony of the United States."[10] Over the course of the 1960s, many Canadians came to share MacLennan's jaundiced view of the American Century, though their anxiety reflected the immense popularity of the American Way of Life in Canada. The chapters in this volume explore some of these tensions and attractions while providing new light on the history of Canada in the early postwar period, roughly 1945–60, the high-water mark of the American Century – also dubbed the Age of Eisenhower by historian William Hitchcock after one of the period's leading personalities.[11]

Although there is no shortage of works on Canada-US relations, the early postwar era has received relatively scant attention from historians. One reason for this oversight is that many histories of this relationship are surveys in which the postwar years are allotted a chapter, sometimes two, and focus mainly on a handful of high-level bilateral issues such as continental defence, tariffs and trade, and responses to Cold War flashpoints.[12] By necessity, then, these treatments are limited. Moreover, the late 1940s and 1950s are often characterized as a time of consensus between Canada and the United States, and historians are drawn mainly to periods of crisis and confrontation.[13] This volume redresses the lack of attention to an important time period while also underscoring the need for a broader understanding of Canadian-American relations that accounts for the observation made by Michael Behiels and Reginald Stuart that "although the border has separated the countries and their policies, it has had far less impact on cultural values, ideas, ways of life, [and] human relationships."[14] Just as the recent scholarly focus on the British World has allowed historians to trace the impacts of transnational, global, and imperial trends on Canada, so too can growing attention to the influence of the United States and comparisons with the American experience enrich understandings of Canadian history.[15] What is true of the postwar years is the case with other periods as well.

Our collection starts from the premise that the history of the northern part of North America is best explored by looking not only at state-to-state interactions between Canada and the United States but also at the wider gamut of interactions among Americans and Canadians. Whether utilizing international, transnational, or more local historical lenses, our contributors stress the ways in which, from the Canadian perspective, these interactions were often reactive, with actors in Canada – consumers, diplomats, jazz musicians, urban planners – responding to developments in the United States. Of course, not all Canadian actions were reactions to things American. Still, whether considering constitutional reform, engagement with countries in the so-called Third World, or challenges to white supremacy, Canadians were mindful of the United States, often drawing comparisons with American experiences and utilizing these examples for their own purposes. That the United States loomed so large is not a surprise given American preponderance; what is surprising is the extent to which so little has been written about this aspect of postwar Canadian history (or, for that matter, other periods).[16] In contrast, historians of Europe have devoted considerable attention to tracing the US impacts on culture, politics, and society, showing the complicated nature of American-European relations, not just at the elite level but also more widely. As these studies stress, European identities were often crafted in contradistinction to the United States.[17] Although the importance of anti-Americanism in building Canadian identity has long been recognized, there is a need for wider examinations of the US impact in Canada.[18] One reason, for instance, is that, in contrast to the common emphasis on anti-Americanism as a theme in Canada's history, many Canadians have been attracted to American ideals, culture, and commerce. This very fact explains Canadian nationalists' concern with US influences.

With the goal of exploring American influences on Canadian life, this collection provides a new look at Canada's postwar history partially through the lens of Canadian-American relations and partially by tracing the extent to which developments in Canada were part of wider trends in North America. In doing so, the collection offers a mix of topics that gives welcome attention to both elite-level issues and the concerns and perspectives of everyday people. Although transnational and international historians

of Canada are now placing a welcome focus on exploring Canadian interactions with the world beyond North America and the North Atlantic,[19] relations with Americans remain of central importance, not only because of matters of propinquity, but also because of the economic, military, diplomatic, and cultural power of the United States, particularly in the American Century.[20]

Importantly, just as the postwar period saw a new sense of power among Americans, so too Canadians seemed to have earned a new prominence in global affairs and developed a nascent perception of their country as a middle power. The notion had begun during the war, when the *Economist* opined that Canada had earned a new international status, making "a category for herself all of her own. Relative to her resources her effort is second to none. In absolute terms the distance which separates Canada from the Great Powers is less than that between her own achievements and that of any other of the smaller powers."[21] Home to huge natural resource deposits, with a booming economy untouched by modern warfare's devastating effects, and a large complement of military forces, wartime Canada seemed to have grown in importance. This appreciation outlived the fighting. "The evidence of Canada's new position in the world is unmistakable," wrote academic Lionel Gelber in 1946. "Henceforth in world politics she must figure as a Middle Power." Historian Arthur Lower agreed that Canada "has risen considerably above the status of a small power and materially (but, in the writer's opinion, not psychologically) possesses far more weight than the size of its population alone would seem to indicate." Journalist Grant Dexter put the matter more simply: "The Canada of 1939 no longer exists."[22] Yet, like Henry Luce, who had invoked the idea of the American Century to urge his compatriots to pursue global primacy, many Canadians who saw their country as a middle power pushed for the adoption of a new, internationally engaged foreign policy. In the closing months of the war, Brooke Claxton – who would serve as defence minister from 1946 to 1954 – gushed that "Canada's part in this war has given her the opportunities and responsibilities of world-wide interests," especially "furthering international co-operation." Similarly, diplomat Hugh Keenleyside explained that along with new power came "new responsibilities." As he emphasized, "*whether Canadians like it or not, their country*

has to play a new and gravely broadened role in international affairs."[23] Historians have cast much doubt recently on whether Canada played this middle power role in the postwar years.[24] Even so, the country had gained more prominence and prosperity, and with Europe and Asia devastated by the war Canada became – albeit briefly and in relative terms – more important.

The idea of Canada as an internationally engaged middle power signified Canadians' hopes for a world without war and economic depression. In September 1945, *Maclean's* magazine expressed this buoyancy: "This is the postwar world, the world for which the toil and sweat, the tears and blood of history's most terrible war were expended. This is the time of freedom, of security, of new life and great hope for which millions fought and died. This is the peace of which scores of millions dreamed."[25] There were reasons for hope. Because of their many wartime sacrifices, Canadians demanded government action to provide social welfare measures and to avoid a return to the privation of the 1930s. The federal and provincial governments responded, with a rapidly growing economy financing an expanded welfare state. As in the past, natural resources were a key element fuelling the postwar boom, whether the oil of Alberta or the mineral wealth of Canada's northern regions. Indeed, the Canadian north seemed to promise unlimited opportunities, signified by the creation in 1953 of the federal Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources and Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's articulation in 1958 of a Northern Vision for prosperity.[26] The previous year journalist Bruce Hutchison had predicted that Canada would be "Tomorrow's Giant."[27] Other markers of affluence included increased homeownership in seemingly ever-expanding suburbs and ballooning population growth, the product of high levels of immigration from war-shattered Europe and the baby boom. Historian Doug Owram was right to title his history of Canada's baby boomers *Born at the Right Time*.[28]

Yet the postwar era also produced stresses and strains, including anxieties stemming from the Cold War – both anti-communist paranoia and fear of nuclear holocaust – and dissatisfaction with modern life, whether the "creeping conformity" of suburbia or the shallowness and stultifying nature of mass culture, consumerism, and domesticity.[29] Although Canadian

citizenship was legally established in 1946, there remained the questions asked by the *Canadian Forum* that year: "Is Canada a nation, and if not, should she be?"[30] Defining Canadian identity has been a perennial issue, not helped by proximity to a cultural behemoth. In 1951, the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences voiced concerns about the eclipse of Canadian culture by "a vast and disproportionate amount of material coming from a single alien source."[31] Six years later another royal commission examined Canada's economy and highlighted the related issue of the vast extent of American ownership of Canadian resources and industries, whether through subsidiary operations of US multinationals or via direct investment. Although this situation spurred employment in Canada, the commission warned that "continuing integration might lead to economic domination by the United States and eventually to the loss of our political independence."[32] And, in terms of defence and foreign policy issues, Canadian officials were constantly attuned to the need to protect Canada's sovereignty from their southern neighbour while also supporting a key ally and protector. "To almost every Canadian," Luce's *Time* magazine observed in 1957, "the US is an enveloping fact of life."[33]

Throughout this collection, the contributors examine these issues and more, offering comparisons with the US experience, tracing the impacts of American influences, and charting interactions between Canada and the United States. The book is divided into three thematic sections. The chapters in the first section examine issues of postwar Canadian foreign policy. Here the authors consider how Canadian policy makers had to balance alliance solidarity with the United States against the pursuit of policies meant to advance Canada's own perceived interests. First, David Webster analyzes how Canadians viewed and engaged the so-called Third World during a period in which formal European empires collapsed and the Cold War struggle shifted to the Global South. Next, Susan Colbourn provides an important look at how Canada dealt with Soviet bloc countries – a topic that has received almost no attention from historians – while still toeing a pro-Western line. Then, in his chapter, Timothy Andrews Sayle analyzes how Canadian officials dealt with the stark realities of the nuclear age and the dilemmas of Canada's reliance on the United States for its

defence. Finally, in the section's last chapter, Asa McKercher and Michael Stevenson place various developments in the relationship among Canada, Britain, and the United States against the backdrop of the evolving American Century.

In the second section, the chapters explore Canadian political developments and connections to issues of Canadians' evolving identity. From the low-level politics surrounding the nuclear family to high political questions involving the role of Canada's Supreme Court, the United States served Canadians as a point of comparison. First, Penny Bryden traces Canada's evolving constitutional order and emphasizes how judicial activism in the United States served as a point of inspiration – and revulsion – for Canadians. Then, Bettina Liverant examines the nuclear family and its role in setting consumer patterns. Many Canadians were also disgusted by racism in both Canada and the United States, and, as Jennifer Tunnicliffe shows, they utilized the example of Jim Crow segregation in America to challenge Canadian white supremacy. Finally, François-Olivier Dorais and Daniel Poitras offer an important look at changing Québécois attitudes toward the United States and how those views evolved in the postwar period amid changes in Quebec society.

The chapters in the third and final section probe various cultural issues in postwar Canada and the impacts of the United States on Canadians both directly and indirectly. In his wide-ranging chapter, Stephen Azzi reviews how American economic and cultural influences – from television to investment capital – shaped Canada in the years of postwar prosperity. Television is at the heart of the next chapter, by Emily LeDuc, who scrutinizes this new medium's reception by older Canadian media. Jonathan English then uses the urban developer Frederick Gardiner to look at one signature aspect of North American culture from this era: the automobile. Finally, Eric Fillion highlights the role of jazz at the Stratford Shakespearean Festival and how Canadians reacted to this American art form at a venue meant to promote Canada.

Overall, these contributions shed new light on a period of transition in Canada, presaging the later tumult of the Sixties. Moreover, they testify to the need for historians of the United States in the world to pay more attention to Canada, an observation as clichéd as it is true.

NOTES

1 Henry R. Luce, "The American Century," *Life,* 17 February 1941, 63.
2 Ibid., 65.
3 See Michael J. Hogan, ed., *The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the "American Century"* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999); *The Short American Century: A Postmortem,* ed. Andrew J. Bacevich (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); and William O. Walker, *The Rise and Decline of the American Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018).
4 Henry Luce, "Customs Union with Canada," *Life,* 15 March 1948, 40.
5 A.L. Burt, *Canada: Our Oldest Good Neighbor* (Washington, DC: American Historical Association, 1946), 5.
6 "Our Foreign Policy," transcript, presented by NBC University of the Air, 14 December 1946, Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), External Affairs Records, vol. 6184, file 1415–40-pt. 2.1.
7 Alexander Brady, "Canadian-American Relations," *International Affairs* 29, 2 (1952): 193–94.
8 Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, *Report* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951), 15.
9 Harold Innis, "The Strategy of Culture," in *Changing Concepts of Time* (1952; reprinted, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 14.
10 Hugh MacLennan, "It's the U.S. or Us," *Maclean's,* 5 November 1960, 59.
11 William I. Hitchcock, *The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2018).
12 Robert Bothwell, *Your Country, My Country: A Unified History of the United States and Canada* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Stephen Azzi, *Reconcilable Differences: A History of Canada-US Relations* (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2014); John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies,* 4th ed. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008); Reginald C. Stuart, *Dispersed Relations: Americans and Canada in Upper North America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or for Worse: Canada and the United States into the Twenty-First Century,* 2nd ed.(Toronto: Nelson, 2007).
13 The editors of this book themselves are guilty on this score: Asa McKercher, *Camelot and Canada: Canadian-American Relations in the Kennedy Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Michael D. Stevenson, "'Tossing a Match into Dry Hay': Nuclear Weapons and the Crisis in U.S.-Canadian Relations, 1962–1963," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, 4 (2014): 5–34.
14 Michael D. Behiels and Reginald C. Stuart, "Introduction: Forging a New American Continent; Transnational Theories and Studies," in *Transnationalism: Canada–United States History into the 21st Century,* ed. Michael D. Behiels and Reginald C. Stuart (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010), 5.
15 On the British World, see Phillip Buckner, ed., *Canada and the End of Empire* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005); and Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, eds.,

Canada and the British World: Culture, Migration, and Identity (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006). For an introduction to the United States in the world, see Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan, eds., *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013); and Andrew Preston and Doug Rossinow, *Outside In: The Transnational Circuitry of US History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

16 Exceptions can be found in several of the essays in Magda Fahrni and Robert Rutherdale, eds., *Creating Postwar Canada: Community, Diversity, and Dissent, 1945–75* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).

17 Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Rob Kroes, *If You've Seen One, You've Seen the Mall: Europeans and American Mass Culture* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996); Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997); Victoria De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); David Ellwood, *The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

18 The most useful study of Canadian anti-Americanism remains J.L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1996).

19 Asa McKercher and Philip van Huizen, eds., *Undiplomatic History: Rethinking Canada in the World* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2019); Karen Dubinsky, Sean Mills, and Scott Rutherford, eds., *Canada and the Third World: Overlapping Histories* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016); Karen Dubinsky, Adele Perry, and Henry Yu, eds., *Within and without the Nation: Canadian History as Transnational History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015).

20 On postwar American power, see Stephen Wertheim, *Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of US Global Supremacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020); and Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).

21 "A Foreign Idea?," *Economist,* 29 May 1943.

22 Lionel Gelber, "Canada's New Stature," *Foreign Affairs* 24 (1946): 277; A.R.M. Lower, "Canada, the Second Great War, and the Future," *International Journal* 1, 2 (1946): 99; Grant Dexter, *Canada and the Building of Peace* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1944), 18.

23 Brooke Claxton, "The Place of Canada in Post-War Organization," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 10, 4 (1944): 421; Hugh L. Keenleyside, "Canada's Department of External Affairs," *International Journal* 1, 3 (1946): 190.

24 Adam Chapnick, "The Canadian Middle Power Myth," *International Journal* 55, 2 (2000): 188–206; Hector Mackenzie, "Golden Decade(s)? Reappraising Canada's International Relations in the 1940s and 1950s," *British Journal of Canadian Studies* 23, 2 (2010): 179–206; Greg Donaghy, "Coming Off the Gold Standard: Re-Assessing the 'Golden Age' of Canadian Diplomacy," paper presented to the symposium A Very

Modern Ministry: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, 28 September 2009.

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26 See the chapters by P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Michel S. Beaulieu in *The Unexpected Louis St-Laurent: Politics and Policies for a Modern Canada,* ed. Patrice Dutil (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2020).

27 Bruce Hutchison, *Canada: Tomorrow's Giant* (Toronto: Longman, 1957).

28 Doug Owram, *Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby Boom Generation* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).

29 Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Security State, 1945–1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); Tarah Brookfield, *Cold War Comforts: Canadian Women, Child Safety, and Global Insecurity* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2012); Andrew Burtch, *Give Me Shelter: The Failure of Canada's Nuclear Civil Defence Program, 1945–1963* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012); Richard Harris, *Creeping Conformity: How Canada Became Suburban, 1900–1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); L.B. Kuffert, *A Great Duty: Canadian Responses to Modern Life and Mass Culture, 1939–1967* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003); Valerie Korinek, *Roughing It in the Suburbs: Reading* Chatelaine *Magazine in the Fifties and Sixties* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).

30 "Is Canada a Nation?," *Canadian Forum,* June 1946.

31 Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, *Report,* 18.

32 Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, *Final Report* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957), 390.

33 "Canada," *Time,* 5 August 1957.

Part 1

NORTH AMERICA IN A COLD WAR WORLD

1

"A Natural Development"

Canada and Non-Alignment in the Age of Eisenhower

DAVID WEBSTER

It is possible that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has been given a raw deal regarding his reaction to Cold War neutralism. His views on non-alignment might have been more subtle than is often portrayed. It hardly matters, though. What many in the Global South heard was Dulles calling their abstention from the Cold War an "immoral and short-sighted conception."[1] Showing important continuities between the administrations of Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, Dulles echoed here his Democratic predecessor Dean Acheson, who dubbed neutralism "a shortcut to suicide."[2]

Where did Canada stand on non-alignment in this age of "two camps," of the "us or them" Cold War, of McCarthyism and fallout shelter drills, of "rollback" and "massive retaliation"? Even while Canada's own military expenditure soared and Canada acted as a loyal and active member of the Western alliance headquartered in Washington, policy makers in Ottawa worried about the growth of the US national security state, a major aspect of the "American century" of the 1950s.[3]

Canadian views stood at several removes, reflecting the Canadian diplomatic self-image of Canada as a less aggressive country, aligned with the United States but willing to "constrain" aggressive American impulses when necessary. The trouble with this "diplomacy of constraint" was that it forced Canadian governments to walk a tightrope between criticism of Cold War excesses and the vital need to get along with Washington.[4]

This chapter highlights one area where Canada's government walked that tightrope. As with policy toward the Soviet Union, there was what Susan Colbourn in her chapter calls "a delicate balancing act" that Ottawa managed reasonably well. Canadian policy makers, unlike their US counterparts, welcomed the Asian-African conference in Bandung in 1955, which signalled the arrival of "Third World" assertion in international politics. The word *non-alignment* did not come to the centre until the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, but Bandung is generally seen as an expression of non-alignment "avant la lettre."[5]

As Asa McKercher writes, "decolonisation posed a challenge to the stable, familiar global order that Canada had helped to establish following the Second World War."[6] For Canada's Department of External Affairs, gradual decolonization seemed to be a sensible course of action, and it was both unsurprising and unobjectionable that Asian governments that had just won their independence would want to avoid entanglement in the Cold War and the militarism that it entailed. Neither "immoral" nor "shortsighted," Bandung represented "a natural development arising out of the concern of the countries of the area to meet and discuss common problems, and significant [evidence] of the increasing importance of the Asian countries."[7] This was simply another conference and nothing to be feared. It could even help to cool tensions in Asia and improve understanding between the People's Republic of China and its neighbours.

This was a far cry from the attitude both in Washington and in Commonwealth capitals, where polarization between China and neighbouring countries was preferred to the amity of Bandung. The armistice in Korea, where US and Chinese soldiers had confronted each other directly, was less than two years old. Conflict in the Taiwan Strait had soared even more recently. It was just months since the signature of the Treaty of Manila forming the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Along with the United States, Britain and the "Old Dominions" of Australia and New Zealand joined the new alliance. The Asian Cold War was very much alive.[8]

Bandung was one event in a chain. In this chapter, I treat it as an episode in Canada's approach to Asian non-alignment, taking the same approach as Tim Sayle does in his chapter, which addresses "ducks in a row" rather than individual crisis moments. Canada approached Southeast Asia with a self-conscious non-American tread. It aspired to be a "bridge" to the

continent's new states. Policy makers in Ottawa saw no problem if those states wanted to avoid alliances. Canada itself had opted not to join its major US and Commonwealth allies in SEATO, after all. Rather, it backed "constructive" non-communist developments in non-aligned Asia. This meant efforts to build a "special relationship" with India, which "held pride of place in Canadian eyes" among Asian states.[9] So Canada (after initial hesitations) embraced the Colombo Plan, which saw development aid flow not only to India but also to assertive nationalist states such as Indonesia and Burma.

Canadian policy makers found ways to pursue an independent policy toward non-aligned Asian countries while working to win the Cold War. Canada's approach to non-alignment diverged from American policy, yet it also served Cold War goals, as Ottawa interpreted them.

THE COLOMBO PLAN AND THE KOREAN WAR

After independence, Asian and African countries aimed at improved standards of living and economic development, often simply reaffirming late-colonial development strategies. Thus, "the development project was constructed on the shaken foundations – rather than the ruins – of colonialism," as development scholar Molly Kane writes.[10] In responding to the call for aid, donor self-interest clearly operated. Historian Corinna Unger concludes that "there were very few, if any, instances in which aid was not connected to larger political, economic, ideological or strategic positions."[11]

The Commonwealth's Colombo Plan for economic development assistance to South and Southeast Asia was no exception. It aimed, openly, at Cold War motives. Aid to India, Pakistan, and other Asian countries, its boosters hoped, would help to keep Asian governments friendly to the West. This seemed to be all the more important since China was "lost" to communism.[12] Canadian planners hoped to preserve Asia within the non-communist world, and aid seemed to be a way to safeguard "the weakest link in the capitalist chain," as diplomat Escott Reid, citing Soviet leader Josef Stalin, called it. Asia represented, he wrote, a "main base of western Europe," Canada's central strategic preoccupation.[13] Asia mattered. As a result, Reid wrote later, "we in Canada also became conscious of the

great value of the new Commonwealth as a bridge between the older democracies of the West and the newer democracies of Asia."[14]

The influence of Reid, a self-described "radical mandarin" on the left wing of the Department of External Affairs, should not be overestimated. His hopes for a "special relationship" between Canada and India generally took a back seat to concerns more central in Ottawa.[15] Still, this mental map of Canada serving as a "bridge" to neutral Asia became a significant if subordinate stream in Canadian diplomatic thinking. "This new commonwealth is providing not only a link between the Asian and the other members that comprise it, but also a very valuable link between the east and the west," Pearson argued.[16] The Colombo Plan, he told Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, was "one situation where the countries of the Commonwealth can play an important part in bridging the gap between the poverty and therefore the neutrality and indifference of free Asia and the wealth and therefore, at times, the 'interventionist' and impatient tactics of the United States."[17] His Progressive Conservative successor, Sidney Smith, felt just the same. Smith called the plan "one of the particularly productive bridges between Canada and our friends in south and southeast Asia."[18]

India was especially crucial. It was the Commonwealth's largest member, the keystone to the multiracial "new Commonwealth" in the making, and as the great capitalist democracy of Asia it could pave the path for other colonies as they regained their independence. Instructions to Canada's high commissioner in New Delhi expressed hopes that India could become "a durable bridge between the West and Asia" and that India would "look to the Western world for support and understanding."[19] Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru reciprocated, praising Canada's "very important service in being in some ways a link between the growing countries of Asia and Europe and the Americas."[20]

Canadian policy makers made decisions on a realist calculus of the national interest, one that ironically enough would help to forge the Canadian diplomatic self-image as mediator.[21] That self-image painted Canada as kinder and subtler than the United States. Underpinning the self-image was a different form of public engagement. In Canada, for instance, right-wing "Asia hawks" were rarer than in the United States, where the so-called China Lobby was politically influential, whereas Canadian officials regularly

leaned on the work of groups such as the United Nations Association.[22] Certainly, US policy makers, both Democrats and Republicans, were much more skeptical about India than their Canadian counterparts.[23]

Thus, Canadian diplomats tried to work with India in particular during the conflict in Korea and saw the chance to collaborate with their counterparts in India as one argument for joining the truce supervision commissions in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The existence of non-communist neutral states, Canada and India agreed, was acceptable, despite US objections.[24] In Korea, the "diplomacy of constraint" included efforts to act as a channel between New Delhi and Washington, and there were occasional efforts to mediate in Vietnam between Asian opinion and Washington. This experience shaped Canada's stance toward early Asian constructions of what would become non-alignment.[25]

THE ORIGINS OF ASIAN NON-ALIGNMENT

With African independence lying mostly in the future, the idea of an organized group of countries that chose to abstain from the Cold War formed mainly in Asia, with three countries – India, Burma, and Indonesia – forming the "hard core" of this "Asian neutralism."[26] Yet in 1949 all three appeared to be poised to follow policies broadly sympathetic to the Western powers in the Cold War. The course of events in 1949–53 set each of them on the path to what would become non-alignment. Ironically, US government choices were a big part of why they opted for "neutralism."

In 1945, Asian delegates to the founding conference of the United Nations planned an Asian Relations Conference, meant to be the expression of the continent's resurgence. Nehru, soon to be India's prime minister, hosted the event in 1947, stressing that there was no hostile intent toward Europe.[27] When delegate John Thivy of Malaya "suggested the formation of a neutrality bloc," delegates – including Nehru's sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit – shot down the idea.[28] When Nehru and prime minister of Indonesia Mohammad Hatta rejected alignment, it was in response to domestic calls to ally with the Soviet Union. Hatta preferred to "row between two reefs" rather than take up with Moscow. In practice, that meant closer ties to the United States.[29] This stance lined up well with that of Secretary of

State Dean Acheson, who agreed with Nehru's statement that "time was not ripe for a pact corresponding to the North Atlantic Treaty, owing to [internal Asian] conflicts."[30] Whereas Canada and Australia opposed American positions on the UN Temporary Commission for Korea in the late 1940s, India sided with Washington and promised more of the same in exchange for economic aid.[31] A US report on Nehru's tour of Southeast Asia in 1950 noted that "the theme of his speeches was a strong attack against Communism instead of the continued existence of European colonialism in Asia which it might so well have been ... In speaking so frankly Nehru served our purposes admirably."[32]

Early moves toward non-alignment can be traced to the Conference on Indonesia in 1949, the first regional meeting of Asian governments. Proposed by prime minister of Burma U Nu and hosted by Nehru in New Delhi, the conference aimed to mobilize anti-colonial sentiment in support of Indonesia's struggle for independence against Dutch rule. It picked up on moves by Burma, India, Pakistan, and (in its first foreign policy step as an independent government) Ceylon, all of which banned Dutch overflights.[33]

Most of the speeches in New Delhi breathed outrage at Dutch actions. "Those of us," said Ceylon's delegate, Solomon Bandaranaike, "who believe in the democratic way of life and who wish therefore to establish close and friendly relations with other democratic countries, particularly of the West, – I should like to say and quite frankly, – ... have suffered a grievous disappointment."[34] But again this meeting framed itself not as anti-Western but as assisting the United Nations. If alignment was rejected, then it was alignment with the Soviet Union. General Carlos Romulo of the Philippines saw a chance "to strengthen the forces of democracy, to prevent other ideologies from capturing the faith of Asia by default," and to produce "an Asian front against Communism."[35] The same belief seems to have been held in Moscow. According to *Pravda* on 9 February 1949, the goal of the conference was "to create an anti-Communist bloc, which will serve as an instrument of an imperialist war against the USSR, against the new democracy of China and the freedom of Asiatic peoples."[36]

No Asian bloc resulted, but the supports were in place for common action during the Korean War. Asian states, by and large, saw that conflict

as a clear case of aggression that had to be halted by UN action. Burma's U Nu told his parliament that "the United Nations was pledged to suppress aggression wherever it occurred and if Burma did not support it now, other member nations might take little interest in Burma, if she was ever faced with a similar situation."[37] Along with Indonesia and India, it pledged non-troop contributions to the UN effort.[38] Yet US government actions and language would start to push them away. A false report that Indonesia would close its ports prompted an angry message from Acheson that accepted Indonesia "maintaining neutrality within limits for a reasonable length of time" but threatened to suspend US aid since "in [the] struggle between USSR and free world Indonesian choice is not only unavoidable but has been made."[39] Indonesia soon reaffirmed its loyalty, and India's parliament voted unanimously to support the "United Nations Command" in Korea.[40]

Then, in Indian diplomat K.N. Pannikar's recollection, the Truman administration "willy-nilly as a result of the Korean incident stepped directly into the Chinese civil war" by guaranteeing support for Chiang Kai-shek's "Republic of China" based in Taiwan.[41] Few in non-communist Asia welcomed the triumph of China's communists and their declaration of a new People's Republic of China (PRC) in late 1949, but it would be necessary for the peace of Asia to recognize the PRC, as most Asian countries soon did. Nehru appealed to Acheson to allow the PRC to assume China's UN seat.[42] Indian observers hoped that the move might avoid too close an alignment between China and the USSR and saw India-China friendship as a way to prevent Soviet advances and keep regional peace.[43] In Korea, India famously warned the United States that its forces should not enter North Korean territory as they advanced for fear of provoking China.[44] India pressed for a UN committee to examine all ideas on Korea, a concept originally proposed by Pearson but that, in the end, he felt he could not support openly in UN voting.[45]

Conversations about a possible league of neutral nations took place between India and Egypt in 1952, but Nehru was not prepared to agree until preparations began for the founding conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961.[46] Instead, he sought an "area of peace" anchored in five principles (Panch Sheel) agreed between India and China in 1954. It was

in many ways a self-interested response to China's annexation of Tibet and threats to Nepal, which pointed to the need for a deal between the Asian giants. "By this agreement," Nehru told Premier of China Zhou Enlai, "we ensure peace to a very large extent in a certain area of Asia. I would earnestly wish that this area of peace could be spread over Asia and indeed over the rest of the world."[47] The peace area, Nehru told his parliament, might provide safety from "those great countries that are so explosively bitter against each other."[48] The peace area, "materially speaking, [was] a weak man's policy," in the words of Indian diplomat V.K. Krishna Menon.[49] It was also a step toward non-alignment.

This type of non-alignment could be welcomed in Ottawa, where Pearson saw India as a partner in the quest for peace, even while he knew that Canada itself would side with the United States if the cards were down. Ottawa's smiling policy seemed to be justified when neutral Asian governments appealed to China, as they had earlier to the United States, not to cross the former North-South boundary in Korea. The appeal, in the words of another top Indian diplomat, Benegal Rau, "gave the first indication to a distracted world that the countries of Asia had taken the initiative – as they would be immediately concerned – to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in the East, which might ultimately envelop the entire world."[50] Pearson teamed up with Rau and Iran's Nasrollah Entezam in a General Assembly–mandated peace bid, which he described at length in his memoirs and which carved his path to a Nobel Peace Prize for his later Suez Crisis work.[51] Contrary to the trio's wishes, the United States insisted that China be branded as an aggressor and again drove Asian states away. Once pro-American, Indonesia, for instance, warned the US government against the "second failure" that its policies in Korea seemed to be indicating.[52]

Nehru believed that he had an implicit deal with the Canadians to restrain the United States while India restrained China.[53] Yet the pressure from Washington was too strong for Canada not to support the "aggressor" resolution. Thus, India and Burma joined the Soviet bloc in opposing the US resolution, whereas other Asian countries abstained from voting. Rau noted that "when the world was marching, in our view, toward disaster we – most of the Asian powers – did all we could to halt that march." He did not blame Canada, though. "United States pressure was too great for them,

and they were unable to act independently and according to their own better judgment."[54] Canada, in other words, seemed to be more sympathetic than the United States but powerless to act on its convictions.

Peace in Korea was not the top Canadian priority. As a draft memorandum for cabinet noted, "the present negotiations looking toward a ceasefire in Korea, important though they are, must not be allowed to obscure the extreme danger in which the free world now stands and in which it will continue to stand until it has greatly increased its forces in being."[55] Following this first unified Asian action at the United Nations, India would rely less on the Commonwealth bond and more on its neutral neighbours.[56]

When most Asian governments were left out of the Geneva Conference on Korea and Vietnam in 1954, five of them formed a new association of their own to try to promote peace in the region. The Colombo Plan conference of Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia "was going to demonstrate to the world that the people of Asia know what was good for them," said John Kotelawala, Ceylon's staunch anti-communist prime minister.[57]

A peculiar association of Asian nations had formed out of the Korean War. Part of the reason was the effort to restrain the United States and seek good relations with China, the new unavoidable presence in the region. From that came disappointment with American actions. There was disappointment with Canada, too, but it was accompanied by a greater understanding, a sense that Canada had not done the right thing but at least had *wanted* to do so. Krishna Menon told High Commissioner Escott Reid that the Americans were as bad as the Russians, with Canada a little better.[58] Faint praise but an opening nevertheless.

CONSTRAINING DULLES? THE COLOMBO PLAN CONFERENCE, OTTAWA, 1954

The Colombo Plan, and "the transnational aid impulse"[59] more generally, offered Canadian policy makers a way to expand that opening, widening the "bridge" to Asia and reducing the temptations of communism. Aid, in other words, was harnessed to the national interest.[60] This was no accident:

documents produced at the time make it clear. The "daily practices of people and government" have maintained a system of domination ever since.[61]

Canada's aid policy served the wider Western interest but with more smiles. While Eisenhower and Dulles waved sticks, Ottawa offered some carrots. But did Asian leaders want those carrots? The Colombo Plan was one way to find out. When Canada's turn to host the plan's annual conference arrived, policy makers aimed to advance a very different approach than that of the United States.

Although the Colombo Plan was a proud Commonwealth initiative, much of Canada's attitude toward it revolved around Canada-US relations and the American government's Asia policy. Initially, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent resisted any Canadian pledge unless the United States also joined it. Yet Congress wanted any aid to Asia framed "in terms of the defence of the free world."[62] It was especially suspicious of India. "To Canada," a dispatch from Ottawa to New Delhi noted, "this means that the economic foundations of the Colombo Plan become more shaky just at a time when the political desirability of Canada showing its support for India becomes more urgent."[63]

In the end, US aid did flow, though most of it went outside Colombo Plan channels. National Security Council document NSC-124 concluded that aid could help to "prevent the countries of southeast Asia from passing into the communist orbit, and to assist them in developing the will and ability to resist communism from within and without and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world."[64]

The Colombo Plan also satisfied the goals of non-Commonwealth Asian states. Burma, Indonesia, and others signed on by 1953, seeing the prospect of modernization with fewer strings attached than other aid sources. Echoing Frantz Fanon, President of Indonesia Sukarno spoke of combining modernization with preservation of Indigenous traditions: "We don't aim to tear off the skin of our cultural and social face, and put on a European or American mask," he told a US audience in 1956. "What we of Indonesia are aiming at, is to rejuvenate our own precious cultural and social heritage by opening our doors for influx from the West."[65]

US allies Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand were ready to join at the plan's conference in 1954, held in Ottawa. Here lay a chance, in the words

of a Department of External Affairs memorandum, to "increase support for expenditure to help the under-developed countries" and to "stimulate public awareness of North American interest in the Area from a political point of view."[66] A sense pervades the documents that Canadian officials were trying to convince their American counterparts to take a friendlier stance toward neutral Asia. The plan could still serve Cold War goals. From Moscow, the Canadian embassy reported that "the Soviet Government are genuinely concerned at the possibility of an Asiatic Marshall plan."[67]

The tone of helping the Cold War cause through sunnier ways is clearest in a memorandum from Pearson to St. Laurent seeking increased contributions to the Colombo Plan and UN technical assistance schemes:

> I am sure that you will agree with me that nothing is more important in the fight against Communist penetration of Asia than assistance of the kind we have been giving under the Colombo Plan and the United Nations scheme. I think that Canada can play a more important role in the fight against Asian Communism by assistance of this kind than by joining organizations such as SEATO ... Something really big and imaginative has to be done in Asia in the social, economic and technical assistance fields if the ground that is being lost because the Communists have been able to identify themselves with nationalism and change ... is to be regained.[68]

With the apparent success of the Colombo Plan, US diplomats began to wonder whether it could be the basis for a non-communist regional association, a valuable economic counterpart to SEATO. "We could gain a great deal of advantage in using the Colombo Plan as a springboard for an Asian development program," one State Department official argued.[69] The prospect worried some Asian neutrals. Indonesia's foreign minister, for instance, shared his "fear that the United States would tend to dominate what has been, up to now, a very agreeable and acceptable form of aid."[70]

Thus, Ottawa followed a dual policy. On the one hand, US consideration of increased economic aid was welcome. "The growing appreciation

of the importance of economic assistance as a major means of promoting stability in the area is very much to the good," External Affairs telegrammed the embassy in Washington. On the other hand, any linkage to SEATO and US strategy had to be avoided. As External Affairs put it, there was a "real need ... for the type of association in which the Asian 'neutrals' can rest easily. The Commonwealth is one such association and the Colombo Plan is another. We therefore think it highly important to preserve the present character of the Colombo Plan."[71] The plan represented an "important factor in the effort to create basically stable conditions in the area, and it is performing a useful service as a common meeting ground for the free nations of Asia and the West."[72]

The primary goal, then, was to educate the Americans, especially if the secretary of state himself attended. The Colombo Plan gathering could "be a good experience for Mr. Dulles and might give us an opportunity to impress upon him one aspect of the general approach to the countries of South and [S]outheast Asia which we think constructive," one External Affairs memorandum argued.[73] Furthermore, it "might help him to appreciate the importance of the United States seeking in this field [economic development] the free co-operation of all the Asian countries and not limiting participation to those which might be prepared to join SEATO."[74] There were shades here of the Washington elite's perception of Dulles as "an awkward dinner guest, often inelegantly dressed in off-green suits," somehow needing to be educated in proper ways.[75]

Dulles did not attend, and the conference did not see closer Colombo Plan alignment with SEATO. Asian neutrals and Commonwealth member states retained their leading role. Still, US development aid to Asia soared in the years that followed. The Mutual Security Act of 1956 authorized this aid given "international communism and the nations it controls by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion and other means to attempt to bring under their domination peoples now free and independent."[76]

Canada's approach to aid also had Cold War goals, though it stressed nonmilitary aid and a charm offensive directed at the neutral Asian governments. That approach continued as Asian and African independent states gathered as a group in 1955.

BANDUNG: "A NATURAL DEVELOPMENT"

When Indonesia hosted the twenty-nine-member Asian-African conference at Bandung in 1955, only one Western alliance member sent greetings. Perhaps as a result, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent's relatively anodyne wish that "the Conference will contribute to the welfare of the people of Asia and Africa and promote the settlement by peaceful means of all disputes" featured prominently on the opening page of one issue of the Bandung Conference daily bulletin.[77]

St. Laurent did not speak in a daring fashion. Still, his words were a far cry from views in Washington, where the news that an Asian-African conference would take place drew fears that China would hoodwink the "relatively inexperienced Asian diplomats" into opposing SEATO and US policy and ultimately aid "the communist engulfment of these nations."[78] Britain and France opposed the conference and initially urged invitees not to attend it, then joined the United States in accepting that it would take place but pressing for it to avoid strong positions.[79] Australian foreign minister R.G. Casey wrote to Lester B. Pearson to "greatly regret the holding of this conference, which is the first attempted large-scale line-up of non-Europeans against Europeans."[80] Against this background, polite good wishes from Canada must have looked like a whole-throated endorsement, breaking with the United States, France, and the Commonwealth.

"Bandung introduced a fundamentally anticolonial discourse," writes Sara Lorenzini.[81] This anti-colonialism crossed and linked nations, advancing what Vijay Prashad calls the "Third World project" of national and global liberation.[82] Both historians cite Sukarno's declaration that Bandung marked Asians and Africans becoming "masters in our house." The conference aimed not to create a new regional organization but to change the norms of international relations.[83] But in regard to economic aspects, there was no fundamental challenge. Rather, as development scholar Gilbert Rist argues, Bandung accelerated rather than opposed the promotion of Western development models.[84]

The conference in the end did not launch any head-on challenges to existing global norms or signal any advances for the Soviet Union. True, China improved relations with its Asian neighbours, but this was possible

only by replicating the existing China-India accord on a larger scale. China acquiesced to neutral governments in Asia cracking down on their local communist parties, even seeking friendship with the Philippines as it backed US Cold War aims and suppressed leftist movements.[85] Bandung accepted the United Nations as the major channel for economic change, welcomed aid and foreign investment, and shied away from calls to establish a permanent Asian-African organization.

In a circular to Canada's overseas posts, diplomat Arthur Menzies praised the "responsible attitudes in the discussions" and "spirit of moderation." Calling the Bandung final declaration on world peace and cooperation "a thoughtful and construct[ive] document" that lacked "any aura of Communist peace propaganda," Menzies speculated that the conference "may have the final result of bringing closer the time when Asia will be able to co-operate with the West without any of the afterthoughts of colonialism which have impeded good relations until now. If this is so, the beneficial results of the Asian-African Conference from the Western point of view will outweigh Communist China's undoubted success there."[86]

There was no doubt that Canada's stance was still dictated by Cold War goals – to hide that would have been "absurd," one External Affairs official wrote.[87] Hopes in India that Canada itself would move toward nonalignment were "mistaken," in the words of Chester Ronning from his perch as high commissioner in New Delhi.[88] Ottawa diverged but did not break ranks. Its positive attitude toward the conference seemed to be justified when both the United States and Britain expressed relief at the moderation of the event.[89]

The diverging Canadian attitude lingered, for instance, during the Suez Crisis in 1956, when

> the Colombo Plan has taken on even greater significance as a means of preserving the ties of friendship and mutual interest among the Asian and Western members of the Plan (Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth alike), and in presenting to the world at large an example of successful co-operation in the field of economic development among countries whose political relationships have been subjected to recent strains.[90]

CANADA AND THE INDONESIAN CIVIL WAR, 1956–57

It is possible that the Canadian divergence led to three of its main allies leaving Canada out of a covert effort to overthrow the Indonesian government in 1956–57. The Eisenhower administration was much concerned that "Asian dominoes" might fall in the face of advancing communist tides and entirely happy to engage in "secret wars" to topple non-communist nationalist governments in the Global South.[91] Generally, these covert actions, which most famously saw US-backed coups in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), are associated with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). But Eisenhower, in this as in other aspects of his administration, was also an active participant. To cite Allen Dulles, the White House had "an intense interest in every aspect of covert action."[92]

American embassy, State Department, military, and CIA officials all maintained contacts with opponents of President Sukarno in Indonesia. In 1956, they encouraged plans by these dissidents, linked to Indonesia's more conservative political parties, to declare a dissident "emergency government." The "Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia" also drew covert support from Britain and Australia, and US flights in support of the rebels came from bases in Taiwan and the Philippines. In tandem with covert intervention in this Indonesian civil war, American, Australian, and British officials became much more hostile to Sukarno's government.

For Canada, nothing changed.[93] None of the three governments trying to topple Sukarno informed their Canadian counterparts of their intentions. Thus, Ottawa continued to seek cordial, if not close, relations with Sukarno's government and to negotiate possible aid projects through the Colombo Plan. When External Affairs signalled that it planned to approve the sale of trucks made by Ford Canada to the Indonesian army, the news drew a rebuke from Australia. The tone of injured surprise in an External Affairs report indicates the gulf between views in Canberra and Ottawa:

> To the extent that we had considered that these trucks might have some influence on developments within Indonesia we had for our part regarded it as important to ensure that the trucks would in fact

> remain under the control of the central government; otherwise our release of this might encourage dissident groups to undertake (or assist them in undertaking) armed revolt ... To act otherwise could be interpreted as giving tacit support to the opponents of the central government, and surely would tend sooner or later to drive the government further towards the Communists and hence render substantially less likely a stabilization of the situation on terms reconcilable with western interests.[94]

The question of how best to promote Western interests explained the divergence. Canadian officials believed that aid to Sukarno's government would "strengthen the position of the political moderates in Djakarta," whereas their Australian counterparts feared that aid would encourage Indonesians already "turning to communism."[95]

Officials in Ottawa quickly realized what their allies were up to, and it was undeniable after Indonesian forces captured a CIA operative bombing their country. Diplomat John Holmes urged a quiet Canadian effort at constraint, wondering "if we could not prod our NATO colleagues into revising an attitude towards Indonesia that is quite clearly accelerating the drift to catastrophe."[96] Ottawa duly instructed Canadian missions in London and Washington to stress the "danger that resentment against alleged 'foreign interference' may inflame anti-Western feeling in Indonesia and may force the moderates in the Djakarta Government to adopt a more extreme position."[97]

It was military victory by the Indonesian army, rather than Canadian urging, that ended covert operations against Sukarno. He emerged stronger from the episode and far more skeptical of the West. Canada's stance, though not decisive, marked another example of a different approach to neutral Asia, one that sought to advance Western interests in ways that welcomed rather than condemned Asian assertiveness.

THE ROAD TO BELGRADE

This discussion has concentrated on uncommitted Asian states. Africa appeared on Ottawa's agenda later. When Ghana became the first Black

African member of the Commonwealth in 1957, some hoped that it might look to Canada for guidance, but relations remained low key. Canada's high commissioner in Ghana was unimpressed with the All-African People's Conference in 1958, and Canada showed limited interest in francophone Africa, even going so far as to side with France over the non-aligned states in the Algeria conflict.[98] It was not until 1960 that the Commonwealth established an African counterpart to the Colombo Plan.

Non-alignment did not become official until the Belgrade conference of 1961 founded the Non-Aligned Movement. Along with the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples and Countries passed in December 1960, it might be called the end of the "age of Eisenhower" for the Global South and the non-aligned world. (Unlike the United States, Britain, France, and most other colonial powers, Canada voted for the declaration.[99]) For some, the high hopes of non-alignment were dashed by 1960, even before Belgrade sought to revive them. Gamal Abdel Nasser, for instance, "spoke of non-alignment in the past tense" and "had lost faith in the UN," according to the report of Canadian ambassador Arnold Smith as 1960 drew to a close.[100]

Changes under the presidency of John F. Kennedy can be read as a belated American embrace of Canada's softer stances toward non-alignment and the Global South. Kennedy pledged to be more sympathetic to anti-colonial struggles than Eisenhower, and it would be for his administration to determine the US stance toward non-alignment as the Eisenhower presidency ended. Kennedy modified rather than abandoned the Eisenhower stress on a Cold War national security state and US global leadership. On non-alignment, the Kennedy administration was closer than its predecessor to the Canadian stance that had emerged in the 1950s toward Asian desires to abstain from the Cold War and plot an independent course in global affairs – an "independent and active" policy, as Indonesia's government called it, or "positive neutralism" in Egypt's formulation. Eventually, it was willing to embrace the Belgrade conference's call for "peaceful co-existence."[101]

Non-alignment was born in the 1950s before the word was applied. So too was Canada's attitude toward it. The difference simply might have been more tactical than substantive, part of what Escott Reid described as a preference to follow "the main lines of the larger world strategy" over

"consideration of short-run gains or losses to our Western cause."[102] Still, it was a genuine divergence. On this, the St. Laurent and Diefenbaker governments made similar choices. Diefenbaker preferred pro-Western Pakistan to non-aligned India but still tried to work with the whole Asian Commonwealth. The prime minister cherished the Commonwealth "mission and mandate of freedom" and its capacity to act as a "dynamic incubator of new nations."[103] Thus, he fought to keep it united – prioritizing African non-aligned states' wishes over that of South Africa, for instance.[104]

All this made a good fit with the Canadian diplomatic self-image, which sought differentiation from the United States. As Janice Cavell concludes, "anti-American nationalism" served Diefenbaker electorally.[105] It simply developed Pearson's statement in 1951 that the "relatively easy and automatic relations" with Canada's mighty ally had ended.[106] Diefenbaker's stance on Eisenhower-era crises such as the deployment in 1958 of US troops to Lebanon was little different from Canadian foreign policy under St. Laurent or Pearson.[107]

Canadian generosity as an aid donor should not be overestimated. Canada was a laggard in the 1950s, as it is today, scoring below average among donors in terms of aid as a percentage of gross national income. In 1957, Canada stood with the United States and Britain in voting against a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED), which "died on the vine" despite the hopes of poorer countries.[108] Canada in the 1960s would attempt to side with demands for decolonization in order to moderate African governments but abandoned the effort and came to side with the West.[109]

Nor should any of this be taken to suggest Canadian altruism. Canada's dilemma lay in a fervent wish to avoid any "white versus Asiatic" split, coupled with a determination to remain "loyal" to one team in the Cold War.[110] This was true at both national and global levels. Canada's relations with Egypt, for instance, were "more as a member of 'the West' than bilateral," as Arnold Smith noted.[111] Similarly, Pearson stressed that "membership in the Atlantic group, of which the US was the leader ... did not prevent us from speaking with our own voice or making our own decisions."[112] Canada's friendlier attitude toward non-alignment is best seen as a different tactic aimed at winning the same Cold War battles.

Canadian policy makers, more than their American and other Western counterparts, saw the prevalence of assertive, "independent," and "active" positions in Asia and later Africa as a "natural development" that was no threat to the Western alliances that formed the core of Canadian foreign policy. Canada was able thereby to abstain from some aspects of the hard-line Cold War of the Eisenhower years. Seen from Ottawa, non-alignment was not "immoral" but natural. It deserved quiet Canadian sympathy, even while Canada remained firmly anchored in its own alliances.

NOTES

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