GLOBAL ORDERING

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globalization + autonomy

GLOBAL

Institutions and Autonomy in a Changing World

ORDERING

Edited by Louis W. Pauly and William D. Coleman

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Preface   The Globalization and Autonomy Series: Dialectical Relationships in the Contemporary World

THE VOLUMES IN THE Globalization and Autonomy series offer the results from an interdisciplinary Major Collaborative Research Initiative (MCRI) funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). SSHRC set up the MCRI program to provide a vehicle to support larger projects with research objectives requiring collaboration among researchers from different universities and across a range of disciplines. The MCRI on Globalization and Autonomy began in April 2002. The research team involved forty co-investigators from twelve universities across Canada and another twenty academic contributors from outside Canada, including scholars from Australia, Brazil, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Slovenia, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Drawing on additional funding from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the project became affiliated with a separate interdisciplinary research team of twenty-eight scholars, the Groupe d'Études et de Recherches Interdisciplinaires sur la Méditerranée (GERIM). GERIM is based in Tunisia and includes members from France, Spain, Jordan, and Lebanon as well. Scholars from the following disciplines participated in the project: anthropology, comparative literature, cultural studies, economics, English literature, geography, history, music, philosophy, political science, and sociology.

The project was conceived, designed, and implemented to carry out interdisciplinary research. We endeavoured to put disciplinary-based theories and conceptual frameworks into dialogue with one another, with a view

to developing new theories and understandings of human societies. Four conditions needed to be met if research were to be done in this way. First, we brought humanities and social science disciplines into a relationship of mutual influence, where perspectives were integrated without subordinating one to another. To achieve this integration, the team agreed on a set of core research objectives informed by existing writings on globalization and autonomy. Members developed a number of research questions designed to address these objectives, and a research plan that would permit them to address these questions in a focused, systematic way. Second, team members individually were encouraged to think inside disciplines other than their own and to respect differences across disciplines in terms of how the object of knowledge is constructed. Third, team members were selected to ensure that the research was carried out using multiple methodologies. Finally, faced with researching the complex relationships involved in globalization, an interdisciplinary approach meant that our work would be necessarily pluri-theoretical. We held to the view that theories would be most effective when, in addition to applying ideas rigorously, their proponents acknowledged the limitations of any particular theoretical perspective and consciously set out to cross boundaries and use other, sometimes seemingly incommensurable, perspectives.

To ensure intellectual integration from the start, team members agreed on this approach at the first full meeting of the project and committed to the following core objective: *to investigate the relationship between globalization and the processes of securing and building autonomy.* To this end, we sought to refine understanding of these concepts and of the historical evolution of the processes inherent in both of them, given the contested character of their content, meaning, and symbolic status.

Given that *globalization* is the term currently employed to describe the contemporary moment, we attempted to:

• determine the opportunities globalization might create and the constraints globalization might place on individuals and communities seeking to secure and build autonomy
• evaluate the extent to which individuals and communities might be able to exploit these opportunities and to overcome these constraints
• assess the opportunities for empowerment that globalization might create for individuals and communities seeking to secure and to build autonomy

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- determine how the autonomy available to individuals and communi-
ties might permit them to contest, reshape, or engage globalization.

In seeking to address the core objectives for the project, we moved our
research in three interrelated directions. First, we accepted that globaliza-
tion and autonomy have deep historical roots. What is happening today in
the world is in many ways continuous with what has taken place in the
past. Thus, the burden of a contemporary examination of globalization and
autonomy is to assess what is new and what has changed. Second, the dy-
namics of the relationship between globalization and autonomy are related
to a series of important changes in the locations of power and authority.
Finally, the globalization–autonomy dynamic plays out in the construc-
tion and reconstruction of identities, the nature and value of community,
and the articulation of autonomy in and through cultures and discrete
institutions. In each of these three areas, the team developed and agreed to
answer core questions to provide clear direction for the research. The full
text of the questions is available at http://globalization.mcmaster.ca/ga/
ga81.htm.

Over successive annual meetings of the team, our research coalesced
around the following themes: institutions and global ordering; democracy
and legitimacy; continuity and rupture in the history of globalization and
autonomy; history, property rights, and capitalism; community; culture;
the situation and struggles of indigenous peoples; and the Mediterranean
region as a microcosm of North-South relations. The researchers address-
ing these themes tended to be drawn from several disciplines, leading to
interdisciplinary dialogue within each thematic group. The themes then
crystallized into separate research problems, which came to be addressed
by the volumes in the series. While these volumes were taking form, the
project team also developed an online publication, the *Globalization and
Autonomy Online Compendium* (see next page), which makes our findings
available to the general public through research summaries; a glossary of
key concepts, organizations, people, events, and places; and a compre-
hensive bibliography. The ultimate objective of all of these publications
is to produce an integrated corpus of outstanding research that provides
an in-depth study of the varying relationships between globalization and
autonomy.

Globalization and Autonomy Online Compendium

Readers of this volume may also be interested in the *Globalization and Autonomy Online Compendium* (available at www.globalautonomy.ca). The *Compendium* is a collective publication by the team of Canadian and international scholars who have been part of the SSHRC Major Collaborative Research Initiative that gave rise to the volumes in the Globalization and Autonomy series. Through the *Compendium*, the team is making the results of their research available to a wide public audience. Team members have prepared a glossary of hundreds of short articles on relevant persons, places, organizations, events, and key concepts and have compiled an extensive searchable bibliographical database. Short summaries of the chapters in other volumes of the Globalization and Autonomy series can also be found in the *Compendium*, along with position papers and peer-reviewed research articles on globalization and autonomy issues.

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Global Ordering

chapter 1　　　　　　**Globalization, Autonomy, and Institutional Change**

William D. Coleman, Louis W. Pauly, and Diana Brydon

Individuals and communities around the world are becoming ever more deeply connected to one another. For better or for worse, what happens abroad now affects us deeply at home. Nevertheless, whether as individuals or as members of discrete communities, human beings continue to place a high value on their autonomy. They insist on shaping the conditions of their existence to the fullest extent possible. This book, and the series of which it is a part, investigates the relationship between globalization and autonomy.

Personal and collective autonomy are to some degree modern practices, emerging out of the idea of individualism. "The picture of [modern] society is that of individuals who come together to form a political entity against a certain pre-existing moral background and with certain ends in view" (C. Taylor 2004, 3). To a certain extent, this modern idea of society has been globalized over the past three centuries. This process does not mean that it is necessarily acted upon or fully implemented; rather, it implies that some subset of persons in many societies learn and think about such an idea. If it is acted upon, the results are not necessarily the same in all parts of the world. We are, rather, in a condition of "global modernity," where there are conflicting perspectives on the idea of individualism, not just a dominant Eurocentric one. Accordingly, how societies understand individualism, how individuals come together, what autonomy means, and how it is practised vary depending on historical and cultural context (Dirlik 2007). Such a coming together presumes individuals have autonomy

and that they form societies that will be self-governing or autonomous. The notion of the sovereignty of the people and related ideas of self-government and self-determination are also implicit in this conception of modern society. In this research project, we refer to this notion as *collective autonomy,* in the sense that it presumes a community or society, a collectivity, that seeks to govern itself.

This book focuses on one aspect of the modernity project — political institutions, specifically those that codify and make routine the creation of a public sphere and arrangements for governing activities within it. Such institutions shifted and changed as, after the eighteenth century, personal autonomy gradually extended beyond a nucleus of men with significant property holdings. Over time, society itself became larger and characterized by a more complex division of labour or, in sociological terms, more pronounced levels of functional differentiation. For the most part, however, when people today refer to "society" they are thinking of nation-states or state-nations that exercise collective autonomy and that have institutionalized personal autonomy through practices like citizenship.

We argue that globalization troubles the social imaginary of modernity and the associated notions of personal and collective autonomy in several ways. In doing so, it puts significant pressures on actual political institutions, and creates demands, in some instances, for new global ways of ordering. First, modernity has itself become globalized and, in the process, contextualized in ways often different from its European roots. As such, the relationships between personal and collective autonomy differ from one place to another. Such differences may complicate finding the consensus needed to build new institutions with more global mandates. Second, globalization gives rise to some particular challenges that cannot be addressed well by individual societies acting alone or even by states acting in cooperation with one another (internationalization). Third, the dominance of a given nation-state society or community in the lives of many diminishes relative to membership in other communities including a "human" one. Personal autonomy thus expands when it comes to defining, living, and working within possible collectivities. Finally, globalization creates openings for new social imaginaries that radicalize individuals' understandings of their personal autonomy and its relationship to the collective autonomy of the society of which they are part. As Appadurai (1996, 31) notes, "the imagination has become an organized field of social practices, a form of work …, and a form of negotiation between sites of agency (individuals) and globally defined fields of possibility."

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This opening chapter offers a framework for thinking about these re-lationships. The chapters that follow use that framework to describe and analyze changes and developments in important institutions that mediate these relationships. Human beings still separated by boundaries and barriers of various kinds are adapting existing institutions and creating new ones as they seek to bring order to their increasingly complex and increasingly shared lives. The authors of this book come from different scholarly disci-plines, but they all begin with a common understanding of key concepts.

Globalization

Globalization is typical of many concepts in the social sciences in that it carries considerable ideological baggage. Its meaning differs depending on whether one listens to protesters on the streets during World Trade Organization (wto) meetings, or to global bankers talking about market structures, or to government ministers from Australia to Zambia. Some speak of a process that enriches and extends human life, while others de-scribe a pathway to marginalization, impoverishment, and insecurity. Not only does the term *globalization* carry considerable ideological baggage, but it is also a term at the centre of a growing body of social theory that chal-lenges other theories and ways of understanding the world in which we live. Mindful of its ideological as well as social scientific uses, scholars are learning to proceed carefully as they inquire into its causes, consequences, and meanings. Although the authors assembled in this volume recognize that ideologies inform social analysis, they are also interested in rigorous theoretical debate aimed at deepening understanding of what globalization entails and what it means for how human beings change the way they act towards one another in a shared world.

Considerable reflection on globalization has taken place in the social sciences since the early 1990s. After reviewing many of the competing definitions of globalization emerging through that work, Scholte (2005, 59) neatly suggests that globalization involves "the spread of transplanetary — and in recent times also more particularly supraterritorial — con-nections between people." A political scientist, Scholte emphasizes social connections "that substantially transcend territorial geography" (Scholte 2005, 61). Tomlinson, a sociologist, similarly characterizes this "empirical condition" of supraterritoriality as one of "complex connectivity" — a set of "connections that now bind our practices, our experiences and our political, economic and environmental fates together across the modern

world" (J. Tomlinson 1999, 2). For their part, some literary critics see globalization as "a structure of feeling … that springs from the media-saturated soil of our daily life" (Livingston 2001, 145). Others stress the ideological force of globalization narratives, particularly the ways in which they seem to achieve a levelling around the world, with the result that the inequalities of connections and their critique tend to be ignored (O'Brien and Szeman 2001, 606). The relative importance of physical location is reduced by globalization. Especially characteristic of the current era is that these supraterritorial connections are emerging on a larger scale and at an accelerating rate. In this respect, contemporary globalization is different from the spread of transplanetary connections in the past.

Latham and Sassen amplify this point by commenting on the role played by communication and information technologies in reshaping social space, particularly in terms of its scale. They write:

> What has tended to operate or be nested at local scales can now move to global scales, and global relations and domains can now, in turn, more easily become directly articulated with thick local settings. In both types of dynamics, the rescaling can bypass the administrative and institutional apparatus of the national level, still the most developed scalar condition. As a result of the growing presence and use of these technologies, an increasing range of social relations and domains have become de facto transboundary. (2005, 2)

It follows that the building of connections in global spaces means that individuals are conscious of the globality of those spaces. Robertson (1992, 8) refers to "an intensification of consciousness of the world" or increasing globality in many societies, where *globality* refers to the consciousness of the world as one place. As relationships are formed in such global spaces, Appadurai notes a changing role for the imagination. Individuals place themselves in a world context and imagine themselves doing new things in different ways than before.

With these points in mind, the collaborators in this volume begin with the following understanding of globalization. Globalization is the transformative growth of connections among people across the planet. In the contemporary era, many of these connections take a supraterritorial form. In ever more profound ways, globalization ties together what people do, what they experience, how they perceive that experience, and how they

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reshape their lives. In short, individuals and communities begin to see the world as one place and to imagine new roles for themselves within it.

Supraterritoriality

This definition of globalization suggests that *supraterritoriality* is a distinguishing characteristic of many transplanetary connections being formed in the world today. As such, a growing minority of individuals, still ostensibly rooted in discrete nation-states, now live and work in the space of global flows — of capital, of information, and of unbounded possibilities. In contrast, the vast majority of the world's population continue to live and work in the space of defined places.

When one views globalization as the growth of supraterritorial connections and one makes the linkages between this growth and underlying changes in technology, one can see more clearly how space itself is being reordered. In the space of flows, where elite individuals move relatively freely between the office towers and entertainment venues of global cities, the world is increasingly experienced as one "timeless" place (Castells 1996, chap. 7). This space is not limited to the advanced industrial states that built the cooperative intergovernmental institutions still attempting to regulate it; elites in the relatively more prosperous developing and transition states have increasing access to it as well. But the lucky few who happen to be born in rich countries still appear to benefit disproportionately.

In contrast, the space of places is filled with people who face boundaries that remain difficult to penetrate. These are the boundaries that separate the poor from the wealthy, that restrict movement from one state to another, that force movement from rural areas to urban slums, and that limit access to education and health. This space continues to be shaped by the territorial boundaries of states. To the extent that it is regulated, it is regulated by states; and states therefore remain the principal targets of those seeking the means to break through those boundaries. The space of places remains the predominant space in developing countries; it is matched in developed countries wherever living conditions are in decline.

The chapters in this book suggest that the denser the space of flows, and the greater the challenge of holding the allegiance of super-empowered elites, the more difficult it is to address problems of global order through existing institutions. At a certain point as globalization proceeds, institutional adaptation seems likely to be superseded by the necessity to create

new kinds of institutions. The image as well as the reality of supraterritoriality in the very processes that sustain — or endanger — life itself cannot help but force a re-imagining (Sen 1999). That this imagining is difficult is immediately understandable. History, ideology, habit, and vested interest stand in our way. In these respects, autonomy becomes a crucial avenue of investigation.

Autonomy

Autonomy, like globalization, is a controversial and often-contested term. It is commonly used in two general ways. First, it refers to the situations of individual persons and to their capacity to shape the conditions under which they live (Held 1995). In part, their capacity to shape those conditions depends on the kinds of conditions in which they find themselves. As Appiah notes: "To have autonomy, we must have acceptable choices" (2005, 30). In other words, certain conditions and certain institutions will prove more amenable to the exercise of autonomy than others. The term is also used in connection with collective bodies — nation-states, minority groups within states, indigenous peoples, and religious movements being common examples. In this collective sense, autonomy usually means something closer to the Greek roots *autos* (self) and *nomos* (law): the capacity to give oneself laws. Autonomy is the principle that modern thinkers assume ensures individual and collective fulfillment and that enables legitimacy to be realized when it comes to collective decision making within democracies. The extent to which autonomy is a universal value is much debated in contemporary times. As Marilyn Friedman notes, "The ideal of autonomy is a debatable requirement for a good human life" (2003, 189). She finds that some groups explicitly reject this value and others implicitly value collective autonomy while refusing to recognize the need for personal autonomy. Nonetheless, it is difficult to discover an alternative principle on which to base respect for the decisions of others.

Autonomy and Modernity

Many would associate autonomy in these forms with the onset of modernity in Europe. Writing over a century ago, Simmel (1971, 219) argued that the oppressiveness of medieval institutions gave rise to the idea of the pure freedom of the individual based on "natural" equality. This eighteenth-century idea of individualism, he added, came to be complemented by

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another version of individuality in the nineteenth century, that of the particular and irreplaceable person. Such an idea, rearticulated and developed by philosophers since Simmel's time, has become incorporated into what Charles Taylor (2004, 23) calls the "social imaginary": "the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations." In the West, such an imaginary is translated into notions related to autonomy: people have "a right to choose for themselves their own pattern of life, to decide in conscience what convictions to espouse, to determine the shape of their lives in a whole host of ways that their ancestors could not control" (C. Taylor 1991, 2). The Western social imaginary, in turn, takes different forms in different societies, both within and outside the West, with the result that the performance of autonomy now varies from one place to another.

Philosophers see the modern view of personal autonomy as complementary to collective autonomy in the sense that, in modern societies, individuals decide upon the rules and the forms through which they will be governed. Originally, the idea of collective autonomy was anchored in personal autonomy. Simmel (1971, 252) added that the larger the collectivity involved, the more personal autonomy is available, at least in theory: "Individuality in being and action generally increases to the degree that the social circle encompassing the individual expands." For larger collectivities, individuals create "forms" or institutions that are based on an increasingly complex, functional division of labour that permits, in turn, the continued freedom of the individual to choose a particular pattern and way of living. Adam Smith, of course, had discussed the institutional structure of the market economy in similar terms in 1776 (Smith 1776/1991).

By the early twentieth century, however, when Simmel was still writing, this fortunate complementarity of personal and collective autonomy seemed increasingly belied by practice. The very institutional forms that were supposed to free the individual had come to operate on the basis of a technical rationality that frequently left the individual in what Weber called an "iron cage." The technologies accompanying these institutions and required for their functioning narrowed and flattened human lives (C. Taylor 1991, 6). Bauman (1998) highlights the advent of a highly consumerist, materialist individualism that leads to a kind of narcissism that is antithetical to concerns about others or the functioning of society. Accompanying this centring on the self is an indifference to participating in self-government,

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or in the realization of collective autonomy, thus opening the way to a modern form of despotism (C. Taylor 1991, 9). Drawing on Tocqueville, Charles Taylor sees collective autonomy placed in the hands of mild and paternalistic governments, where everything is run by an "immense tutelary power" (ibid., 9).

Globalization is seen by some as a set of processes that intensify the decline of a positive link between personal and collective autonomy. Technology becomes ever more dominant, to the point that Beck (1992, 2006) can plausibly argue that societies the world over are held hostage by the risk of their own disintegration and the calamitous consequences that would follow. For individuals, consumerism and materialism transform basic ways of living, both inside and outside of Europe and America. The "soft" despotism that Tocqueville long ago identified as becoming commonplace appears, in fact, to have hardened even in the wealthier countries of the world. Yet, where some see dark changes, others see new opportunities for the building of global institutions that might change the balance between risk and reward in the continuing development of technology. They see the possibilities for building transnational coalitions to counter despotic practices, and they articulate visions of an alternative world where the narcissistic individualism of modernity is replaced by an outward-looking search for social justice.

Autonomy has traditionally been seen in the West as providing the foundation for the principle of the "examined life." Autonomy requires an individual capacity for self-reflection and self-government and an ability to exercise that capacity within social conditions that enable its flourishing. Autonomy is always a matter of degree, because autonomy (even at the individual level) is a social concept that governs relations within a social world. There can be no absolute autonomy. Although most contemporary understandings of autonomy assume that an autonomous decision cannot be made to undermine autonomy, some of the most interesting recent theoretical work stresses the fundamentally relational nature of the concept (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000; Nedelsky 2001). Being autonomous grows out of reciprocity, obligations, shared experiences, and cooperation with others. Without the support of such relationships, individual autonomy is inconceivable.

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Defining Autonomy

In attempting to define *autonomy,* we are conscious of the need to extend the concept beyond the levels of the individual and the nation-state to global forms of self-government. The notion of individual or personal autonomy again relates to the idea that participation in some form of life without serious arbitrary limitations is "our most basic human interest" (Doyal and Gough 1991, 55). There are two basic needs for such participation to occur: health or physical capacity and mental capacity or autonomy. "To be autonomous in this minimal sense is to have the ability to make informed choices about what should be done and how to go about doing it" (Gough 2003, 8).

Doyal and Gough (1991, 55-9) go on to identify three key factors that shape the degree to which individuals might enjoy autonomy. First, they must have the cognitive and emotional capacity to initiate action. Doyal and Gough suggest (ibid., 180) that across cultures one can identify a common set of disabling symptoms indicating weakness in this regard: hopelessness, indecisiveness, a sense of futility, and a lack of energy. Second, individuals must have cultural understanding that permits them to situate themselves in their culture and to know what is expected of them in their daily living. Such understanding requires teaching and learning, whether in the family, through community practices and ceremonies, or in schools. Finally, they refer to critical capacity, the ability "to compare cultural rules, to reflect upon the rules of one's own culture, to work with others to change them and, *in extremis,* to move to another culture" (ibid., 187). To exercise this critical capacity, Doyal and Gough add, requires some freedom of agency and political freedom. Held (1995, chap. 8) adds to this point by listing some human rights necessary for critical capacity: freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and freedom of association. In sum, individual autonomy means being able to formulate aims and beliefs about how to achieve one's choices, to seek out ways to participate in social life in pursuit of these choices, and to evaluate one's success based on empirical evidence in working towards these aims. If a particular society is structured in such a way as to prevent the pursuit of such choices for members of particular groups — women, for example — then the autonomy of those persons may be constrained or eliminated entirely.

This understanding of individual autonomy, therefore, cannot be divorced from collective autonomy, particularly the autonomy of states. Castoriadis (1991), a French philosopher of Greek origin, reminds us of

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the root meaning: self law-giving. In this respect, autonomy is the opposite of *heteronomy*, which entails subjection to the power of another. To be collectively autonomous, according to Castoriadis, a society as a whole has to have a place for "politics" and thus the exercise of individual autonomy. To the extent individuals must live in community, there must be public spaces where citizens are able to ask themselves freely the following questions. "Are the rules and the laws under which we exist the right ones?" "Are they just?" "Could they be better?" For Castoriadis, therefore, collective autonomy exists when a society is reflexive and is able to look at itself critically. It exists where its members are free, have access to public spaces, and possess the resources, the understanding, and the education needed to interrogate themselves and their laws.

What is also clear about autonomy in this meaning is that it involves an act of the imagination. Castoriadis terms it the "radical imagination." Individuals and groups are able to imagine different futures, different ways of living, and different arrangements in their own lives. They are able to take an idea, talk about it, imagine how it might work in practice, and then take action to see if they can get it to work. In this respect, collective autonomy depends strongly on escaping the bonds of what Charles Taylor calls "tutelary power" and recovering individual autonomy. And the relationship is dialectical: sustaining individual autonomy requires collective autonomy over the longer term.

Autonomy and Sovereignty

Defined in this way, collective autonomy is conceptually distinguishable from state sovereignty. Following James (1999, 39), *sovereignty* is linked to constitutional independence. It consists of "being constitutionally apart, of not being contained, however loosely, within a wider constitutional scheme." James adds that sovereignty has three features. First, it is a legal condition, "founded on law inasmuch as a constitution is a set of arrangements that has the force of law" (ibid., 40). Second, sovereignty, taken in this strict sense, becomes an absolute condition, either present or absent. It is not possessed in terms of more or less. Finally, sovereignty defined in this fashion is a unitary condition. Within the defined territory, only one authority, the state, is in the position of being formally able to make decisions.

Sovereignty typically implies or advances collective autonomy. The degree to which states can take advantage of this condition depends on certain anterior conditions. Within the given territory there must be a

polity, an imagined community in whom sovereignty is vested through the constitution. The existence of such a socially integrated community has been problematic for many developing countries because of the haphazard definitions of territory bequeathed to them by departing imperial powers. There must also be a functioning state capable of establishing authority in the territory, backed by a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion. The state must have a bureaucracy sufficiently effective that it is able to implement laws and policies and to gather resources, particularly taxes. The territory in which the polity exists must have sufficient resources both to maintain state institutions and to provide for the economic and social well-being of the citizens concerned. If globalization makes it more difficult to construct such a polity, to maintain a functioning state, or to sustain an effective bureaucracy, the degree to which sovereignty might advance autonomy is less.

Absolute sovereignty also implies that no external authority structures are active in the territory of a given state. As Krasner (2001a) points out, such a situation has rarely been achieved in the real world, and it is certainly compromised in principle in an increasingly globalized world. States simply find it more difficult to control or regulate the movements of goods, capital, people, and ideas across their borders. In such circumstances, they increasingly contract with other states to establish transnational authority structures in an attempt to find ways to control and regulate such flows. The creation of the WTO and the revised system of international trading rules that accompanied its creation illustrate these processes. Even if we accept James' definition of sovereignty, such actions do not involve "giving up" sovereignty. The states concerned still have constitutional independence in a strict, legal sense. Rather, we might say that states are reducing their respective collective autonomies and pooling their authority to expand their options for giving themselves laws. In doing so, they may be placing themselves in a situation of increased heteronomy. This possibility is examined in more depth in another volume in this series on legitimacy (see Bernstein and Coleman, forthcoming).

Although the attraction of parsimony bids us simply to begin with a strict definition of sovereignty, much recent empirical research reminds us that actual institutions enshrining political and legal authority have changed in complex ways throughout human history. Grande and Pauly (2005, 5), for example, observe that in the contemporary environment a complex and partly contradictory transformation of authority remains centred on the state. They contend that even inside the state "this transformation affects

the basic institutions, principles, norms and procedures of contemporary policy-making … It affects all aspects of public authority, in particular the distribution of political decision-making power across territorial levels; the relation between public and private actors; and the definition of public functions." And even if states remain indispensable in efforts to extend political authority beyond conventional boundaries, this new complexity of sovereignty-in-practice means that states themselves "have gradually become enmeshed in and functionally part of a larger pattern of global transformations and flows" (Held et al. 1999, 7). Such complexity is most evident today in the case of the European Union (EU), where the sharing of sovereign prerogatives in a rapidly evolving system of decision making is both subtle and impossible to dismiss. Chapters 11 and 12 by Ulf Hedetoft and Ian Cooper assess the dimensions of institutional adjustment and compromise currently underway among the members of the EU and outline some of their broader implications. In turn, the idiosyncrasies and perhaps the limits of that case are set into sharp relief by the contrasting chapter by Stephen Clarkson on governance in a North America dominated by the United States.

Even if we accept a protean conception of sovereignty-in-practice, it is reasonable to assert that access to the structures of the state today still creates the surest possibility for any specific community to make a claim to collective autonomy in a full range of areas of life. We see this clearly in Chapter 13 by Natalia Loukacheva, who examines the evolution of arrangements for self-governance among indigenous peoples in Greenland and the Canadian territory of Nunavut. Globalization creates situations where states find themselves pushed to delegate their authority, to share it, and, increasingly, to accept a reduction in the scope of claims to unimpeded action. These situations do not necessarily imply the vitiation of political and social structures aimed at the provision of effective government. Rather, the imperatives of globalization and the insistence on autonomy in its various forms come to exist in deepening tension.

Institutions and Global Ordering

Just such a tension defines the terrain for all of the chapters that follow. Upon that shifting terrain, whether through the state or through other authoritative structures, human beings negotiate trade-offs, and they now often do so collaboratively. To the extent that explicit or implicit negotiations regularize patterns of behaviour and continuous interaction, they

constitute institutions. By observing the changing contours of those institutions, we can catch a glimpse of the complex relationship between globalization and autonomy.

Globalization and Internationalization

Some of the following chapters deal with the adaptation of established institutions to new environments, others trace the beginnings of new institutions attempting to provide order in increasingly complicated arenas of human interaction, and still others depict institutional dysfunction in the context of conflicting demands. In order to understand all of these developments, we need first to distinguish between the processes that constitute globalization as defined here and internationalization. *Internationalization* refers to the expansion of transactions and flows of resources of various kinds between countries. In aggregate, it generally depends upon and reaffirms nation-states as the basic actors in the international system (Katzenstein 2005, 17). Globalization can encompass such flows, but it entails a basic transformation in perception, a transformation with wide-ranging impact that accompanies a profound deepening in individual and collective connections. If the planet were a human brain, internationalization would signify an increase in normal functioning through established neural networks. In contrast, globalization would suggest the construction of new networks, innovative ways of thinking, and a reconceptualization of the environment within which those networks exist.

Globalization and internationalization processes have coexisted for several centuries, although their relationship to one another has changed over the same period. They are not mutually exclusive or zero-sum processes in the sense that, as globalization increases, internationalization necessarily decreases, or vice versa. They may complement one another, they may co-occur without necessarily having an impact on one another, or they may contradict one another. Historians of globalization argue that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, globalization and internationalization tended to coexist. Non-national loyalties were seen to complement a sense of nationality; state borders were porous; the transnational corporations of the day, like the British East India Company, linked consumers and producers across continents; and cosmopolitan thinking flourished among intellectuals (Hopkins 2002a, 24-6). O'Brien and Szeman (2001, 604) note that "literature was global … before it was ever national." Whereas, in the seventeenth century, most territories were subject to multiple systems of

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rule, the situation changed as nationally sovereign states began to gain "exclusive authority over a given territory and at the same time this territory was constructed as coterminous with that authority, in principle ensuring a similar dynamic in other nation-states" (Sassen 2006, 6).

Beginning in the nineteenth century, the nation-state "imposed its system of more rigidly bound territories, languages, and religious conventions on all international networks" (Bayly 2004, 234). Earlier global links were reconstructed by the system of nation-states and ultimately controlled by them. Hopkins (2002a, 30) adds that the cosmopolitanism that was a marked feature of the preceding two centuries was "corralled, harnessed and domesticated to new national interests." Across the globe, land "was converted to property, property became the foundation of sovereignty; sovereignty, in turn, defined the basis of security" (Hopkins 2002b, 6). In the economic realm, older and looser links of global trading gave way to more formal agreements between states. The growth of transplanetary connections accelerated as dominant states built empires and imposed systems of formal and informal rule.

Globalization scholars do not agree on when the tipping point occurred that saw supraterritorial transplanetary connections become sufficiently important that the historic grip of internationality lessened. Eventually, however, a companion system of rule alongside nation-states became conceivable. Karl Marx's analysis of the inexorability of capitalist growth certainly opened one prominent pathway for thinking about such a development. More recently, Castells (1996) points to an information and technology revolution beginning in the 1970s that combined with the capitalist mode of production to produce a new global capitalism. For her part, Sassen (2006, 17) sees globalization breaking through by the early 1980s. Appadurai (1996) concurs but stresses the combination of digital technologies and of increasingly diverse movements of people as creating new opportunities for the social imagination and the working out of global ties.

Globalization scholars do agree that the unleashing of new globalizing processes was made possible by states and the high level of coordination among them that had evolved as part of internationalization. Sassen (2006, 13) suggests that the very highly developed corporate globalization of today would not have been possible without the use of the sophisticated capabilities of national economies that matured under the arrangements of the post-1945 Western economic system. Castells notes the importance of US state intervention to support technological development, particularly

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that related to national defence, as a key factor in the information technol-
ogy revolution hatched in Silicon Valley. Both Castells and especially Sassen
stress the importance of the concentration of financial and business services
in "global" cities that came with internationalization. They suggest that this
phenomenon created the basis for the nodes and material infrastructure for
the supraterritorial connections that characterize contemporary globaliza-
tion. That infrastructure, in turn, has led to new challenges to the role of
institutions in mediating personal and collective autonomy.

With internationalization, the realization and securing of collective
autonomy became primarily the responsibility of nation-states. The ex-
pansion of empires in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries meant
that imperial states controlled to a significant extent the degree to which
peoples in many other territories of the globe could exercise collective
autonomy. These controls could be direct and formal or indirect and infor-
mal. US power in the present era tends to be more indirect and informal.
Hedetoft (forthcoming) uses the term *neo-imperial* to refer to "the aggre-
gate capacity to project power and interest beyond one's formal sphere of
sovereign authority in such a way that other political units … are induced
or coerced into pursuing choices in keeping with the interests and prefer-
ences of the neo-imperial sovereign, accommodating it in multiple ways
by adapting to its agenda, and more often than not taking this road because
it is viewed to be the lesser evil or the most beneficial way to protect and
defend national interests." Katzenstein (2005, 2 and 208) offers the term
imperium to characterize US rule: it refers to the conjoining of power that
has territorial and non-territorial dimensions, with the former being re-
lated to internationalization and the latter to globalization. Whatever term
is used, the assessment of the degree of presence or absence of collective
autonomy becomes more difficult as forms of rule influenced by global-
ization conflict with traditional patterns of territorially-based empires and
states.

The intensification of internationalization in the nineteenth century
meant that the degree to which individuals possessed personal autonomy
came to depend heavily on the nature of rule in the state within which
they were citizens or (imperial) subjects. Other factors were obviously im-
portant: relative wealth, gender, access to food, and physical well-being, to
name but a few. These factors too were variously available depending on
the state to which one belonged. Associated processes of individualiza-
tion — the spread of private property rights, the expansion of the electoral
franchise, and the growth of material consumption — all contributed to

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transforming the values of autonomy in a direction of individual, and overwhelmingly male, self-reliance.

Over this same period, various globalizing processes challenged the exclusive control of personal autonomy by states: anti-slavery movements; campaigns to remove wealth-based criteria for manhood suffrage; the growth of trade unionism and worker internationalism; the struggle for female suffrage and other rights for women; and the pursuit of self-determination by colonized areas, indigenous peoples, and cultural minorities. The fostering of ideas focused on claims to rights simply on the basis of being human generated similar challenges. These globalizing processes encouraged questioning and ultimately the broadening of claims to collective autonomy, and this questioning challenged the state's monopoly.

Consequently, as the repositories of rules and the mechanisms for establishing order, institutions provide a window on how globalization is shaking up established patterns in the exercise of collective and individual autonomy. As Dunn (2003, 53-60) suggests:

> It remains a question of the keenest interest how far globalization has in practice enhanced the autonomy of different groups of human beings, and how far such gains in autonomy as it has delivered have been applied in practice for the advantage or disadvantage of other human beings … If we think of autonomy as a metric for social achievement, and ask how far different societies today contrive to maximize it, we can be confident of some of the answers … But if we ask how far globalization promotes or impedes the maximization of autonomy in different settings, we should expect a somewhat different cartographic pigmentation … The autonomy of some will be all too evidently a reciprocal of the heteronomy of others.

Accordingly, we allow for the possibility of variable relationships between globalization on the one side and individual and collective autonomy on the other. We also keep in mind that in modern societies individual autonomy and collective autonomy are related to one another in complex, dynamic ways.

Assessing Institutional Change

As a first analytical cut, we might surmise that the scope and novelty of change in institutions should vary depending on whether they are a response to internationalization or globalization. Katzenstein (2005, 20) suggests that

the former points to "incremental change" while the latter involves more "transformative change." In principle, distinguishing these two types of change from one another should be relatively straightforward. If we see distinctly new global institutions and processes or if we note fundamental changes to international institutions, we are likely observing globalization. For example, the chapters by Guy Gensey and Gilbert Winham and by William Coleman in this volume demonstrate that the WTO is identifiably different and profoundly global in ways that the loose set of agreements clustered around the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were not. Correspondingly, the role of the World Heritage Committee of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), reviewed by Caren Irr in Chapter 5, exemplifies the evolution of an existing institution consistent with incremental change. On the surface, there seem to be no fundamental reforms afoot, such as those periodically articulated in institutions governing global trade. But, as Irr herself suggests, a deeper look is warranted.

Saskia Sassen emphasizes a second set of globalizing processes, in addition to distinctly novel global institutions and processes, that do not necessarily result in formal institutions of the familiar type. Rather, changes can occur inside defined territories and even within national and international institutions that emerged as part of earlier processes of internationalization. Even though such developments can be lodged in national, if not subnational, institutions, they "are oriented towards global agendas and systems. They are multisided, transboundary networks and formations which can include normative orders; they connect subnational or 'national' processes, institutions and actors, not necessarily through the formal interstate system" (Sassen 2006, 3). Sarah Eaton and Tony Porter in Chapter 7 give us an indication of this kind of globalization in their discussion of the emerging system for regulating the accounting systems of corporations. No conventional institutions are formed in the development of such regulations, but some established practices are changed, and some existing nation-state institutions become linked in novel ways. What emerges is a global network that mixes private and public governance under an increasingly shared set of norms that is no longer controlled or channelled through states. Similarly, Irr describes the path taken by the World Heritage Committee to the point where it could speak of a global cultural "commons" by the end of the 1990s. It had developed a set of global networks and norms such that the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha statues in Afghanistan could be constructed and perceived as a loss to the "world" in ways inconceivable even some thirty years before.

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In short, institutional forms within and across states can appear quite static, but their actual underlying condition may be one of deepening enmeshment in processes that remain open-ended. More than one observer has recently noted that a new global order is today being built on the recognition that addressing many of the most pressing problems of the age — environmental degradation, human security, systemic risks associated with globalizing finance, continuing abuses of human rights — requires systematic interaction and cooperation among political authorities at various levels. Slaughter (2004, 10) echoes many analysts when she notes that what is new is the "scale, scope, and type of transgovernmental ties" now implicated by this requirement. The resulting networks "are driven by many of the multiple factors that drive the hydra-headed phenomenon of globalization itself, leading to the simple need for national officials of all kinds to communicate and negotiate across borders to do business they could once accomplish solely at home" (ibid., 11).

Globalization, in practice, has the effect of disaggregating the state and involving various parts of the state — regulatory agencies, executive ministries, legislatures, judiciaries — in increasingly complex global networks. Ironically, such dynamic change can sometimes help account for the growing ascendancy within states of the executive branch, and particularly the head of government or state, at the expense of legislatures and legislative oversight. In Chapter 2 by Louis Pauly, for example, the extension of executive authority is certainly evident in a halting but stubbornly persistent effort to reform the United Nations, and especially to use it more effectively to address the challenges globalization poses for poor countries. The UN is, in part, a classic intergovernmental organization that still symbolizes a world defined by internationalization. The painful, often contradictory, but persistent struggle to adapt it to a new global context points ultimately to broadly perceived shortcomings in contemporary governance structures.

The difficulties confronted in this attempt are currently stimulating much research on the conception of political legitimacy in a system being reshaped by the myriad pressures of globalization. Some of that work (Clark 2005; Reus-Smit 2004b) suggests the possibility that the nation-state is adapting itself to changing normative understandings of appropriate behaviour in a more integrated world. As it does so, it again disaggregates some of its functions and forms, more often now in collaboration with other actors. This type of process constructs new kinds of global networks. The dilemmas faced by such networks in actually addressing hard policy problems are well exemplified not only in Pauly's chapter, but also in Petra

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Rethmann's chapter on the frustrating experience of the International Whaling Commission.

Sometimes complementing and sometimes challenging networks that continue to rely on the political authority of nation-states are newly assertive networks of activists engaged in local actions linked to global struggles and campaigns. New communications technologies make such networks viable beyond the conventional boundaries of nation-states in ways not seen before (Sassen 2004; Appadurai 2002). The institutional and policy outcomes associated with them are likely to vary. Chapter 9 by Michael Webb with Emily Sinclair examines the limits of such networks in the crucial arena of social policy, which has become increasingly prominent as the economic dimension of globalization disrupts traditional social orders around the world.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think too narrowly about the institutional and policy implications of globalization as it is manifesting itself in the contemporary period. Globalization is by now endogenous to nation-states as well as to the international institutions established by them. It is also exogenous to the extent that it forms new global structures and transnational connections unlikely to be broken by any circumstances short of catastrophe. The chapter by Claire Cutler on the development of transnational private law provides a highly suggestive template for examining other institutions that begin to deliver what can accurately be termed *governance,* even to widely dispersed communities of human beings. Read together, the chapters by Eaton and Porter, Cutler, and Webb and Sinclair provide a glimpse of a world beyond the straightforward interdependence characteristic of internationalization, a world characterized by "the actual production of spatial and temporal frames that *simultaneously* inhabit national structures and are distinct from national spatial and temporal frames as these have been historically constructed" (Sassen 2006, 23).

Structure of the Volume

In just such a view, our aim in this volume is to bring evolving compromises and adjustments to light through comparative explorations of change within institutions of global ordering. Most of the chapters in this volume begin with a key state, international, or global institution, that already embodies some imposition of collective rights on the absolute freedom of the individual. But they also concern other embodiments of the principle of collective autonomy, which under conditions of global economic and social transformation challenge both the dominance and the radical

independence of the state. Indeed, the common thread pulling the chapters together is the deepening struggle between different expressions of collective identity, and between different sets of collective and individual interests, associated mainly with supraterritorial pressures that privilege the space of flows over the space of places. Each chapter brings a particular element of that struggle to the fore by examining its observable manifestation in unique institutional contexts.

To discipline the analysis across the chapters, each author structured an exploration of a particular established or rapidly evolving institution around the following specific questions:

1   In a given area, how are established institutions with governance/ steering/meaning-generation functions adapting to the dynamic tension between globalization and autonomy? Or, how and why are new institutions, or institutionalized practices, coming into existence to address such a tension?
2   Why are the most significant changes occurring, and how do they bear upon global ordering? What specific conceptions of autonomy are at work underneath those changes, and why are any contests between differing conceptions playing out the way they are?
3   What are the most important implications of institutional changes for the autonomy (explicit or implicit) of the key actors involved? Do these changes force revisions in traditional or conventional understandings of the nature and meaning of those institutions — or of the sense of the efficacy, justice, and fairness implied by their operation?

The first few chapters in the first section look at established international organizations, all of which have lately been struggling to adapt to rapidly changing global conditions. They concern the economic role of the United Nations, aspects of the development of the World Trade Organization, and contemporary developments in UNESCO and the International Whaling Commission. These chapters are followed by others examining the possibilities and limits of new forms of global ordering that arise within and outside the conventional realm of state authority. The second section of the book compares and contrasts experiences with institutional evolution at the regional level in North America, Europe, and the Arctic. Together, the authors of this collaborative work demonstrate the usefulness of the autonomy metric as they examine institutions being moulded and remade by globalization.

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