TWO MEDITERRANEAN WORLDS

Diverging Paths of Globalization and Autonomy

Edited by Yassine Essid and William D. Coleman

Translated by Käthe Roth

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The Globalization and Autonomy Series: Dialectical Relationships in the Contemporary World

THE VOLUMES IN THE Globalization and Autonomy series offer the results from an interdisciplinary Major Collaborative Research Initiative (MCRI) funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). SSHRC set up the MCRI program to provide a vehicle to support larger projects with research objectives requiring collaboration among researchers from different universities and across a range of disciplines. The MCRI on Globalization and Autonomy began in April 2002. The research team involved forty co-investigators from twelve universities across Canada and another twenty academic contributors from outside Canada, including scholars from Australia, Brazil, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Slovenia, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Drawing on additional funding from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the project became affiliated with a separate interdisciplinary research team of twenty-eight scholars, the Groupe d'Études et de Recherches Interdisciplinaires sur la Méditerranée (GERIM). GERIM is based in Tunisia and includes members from France, Spain, Jordan, and Lebanon as well. Scholars from the following disciplines participated in the project: anthropology, comparative literature, cultural studies, economics, English literature, geography, history, music, philosophy, political science, and sociology.

The project was conceived, designed, and implemented to carry out interdisciplinary research. We endeavoured to put disciplinary-based theories and conceptual frameworks into dialogue with one another,

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with a view to developing new theories and understandings of human societies. Four conditions needed to be met if research was to be done in this way. First, we brought humanities and social science disciplines into a relationship of mutual influence, where perspectives were integrated without subordinating one to another. To achieve this integration, the team agreed on a set of core research objectives informed by existing writings on globalization and autonomy. Members developed a number of research questions designed to address these objectives and a research plan that would permit them to address these questions in a focused, systematic way. Second, team members individually were encouraged to think inside disciplines other than their own and to respect differences across disciplines in terms of how the object of knowledge is constructed. Third, team members were selected to ensure that the research was carried out using multiple methodologies. Finally, faced with researching the complex relationships involved in globalization, an interdisciplinary approach meant that our work would be necessarily pluritheoretical. We held to the view that theories would be most effective when, in addition to applying ideas rigorously, their proponents acknowledged the limitations of any particular theoretical perspective and consciously set out to cross boundaries and use other, sometimes seemingly incommensurable, perspectives.

To ensure intellectual integration from the start, team members agreed on this approach at the first full meeting of the project and committed to the following core objective: *to investigate the relationship between globalization and the processes of securing and building autonomy*. To this end, we sought to refine understanding of these concepts and of the historical evolution of the processes inherent in both of them, given the contested character of their content, meaning, and symbolic status. Given that *globalization* is the term currently employed to describe the contemporary moment, we attempted to:

- determine the opportunities globalization might create and the constraints globalization might place on individuals and communities seeking to secure and build autonomy
- evaluate the extent to which individuals and communities might be able to exploit these opportunities and to overcome these constraints
- assess the opportunities for empowerment that globalization might create for individuals and communities seeking to secure and to build autonomy

- determine how the autonomy available to individuals and communities might permit them to contest, reshape, or engage globalization.

In seeking to address the core objectives for the project, we moved our research in three interrelated directions. First, we accepted that globalization and autonomy have deep historical roots. What is happening today in the world is in many ways continuous with what has taken place in the past. Thus, the burden of a contemporary examination of globalization and autonomy is to assess what is new and what has changed. Second, the dynamics of the relationship between globalization and autonomy are related to a series of important changes in the locations of power and authority. Finally, the globalization-autonomy dynamic plays out in the construction and reconstruction of identities, the nature and value of community, and the articulation of autonomy in and through cultures and discrete institutions. In each of these three areas, the team developed and agreed to answer core questions to provide clear direction for the research. The full text of the questions is available at http://globalization.mcmaster.ca/ga/ga81.htm.

Over successive annual meetings of the team, our research coalesced around the following themes: institutions and global ordering; democracy and legitimacy; continuity and rupture in the history of globalization and autonomy; history, property rights, and capitalism; community; culture; the situation and struggles of indigenous peoples; and the Mediterranean region as a microcosm of North-South relations. The researchers addressing these themes tended to be drawn from several disciplines, leading to interdisciplinary dialogue within each thematic group. The themes then crystallized into separate research problems, which came to be addressed by the volumes in the series. While these volumes were taking form, the project team also developed an online publication, the *Globalization and Autonomy Online Compendium* (see next page), which makes our findings available to the general public through research summaries; a glossary of key concepts, organizations, people, events, and places; and a comprehensive bibliography. The ultimate objective of all of these publications is to produce an integrated corpus of outstanding research that provides an in-depth study of the varying relationships between globalization and autonomy.

Globalization and Autonomy Online Compendium

Readers of this volume may also be interested in the *Globalization and Autonomy Online Compendium* (available at www.globalautonomy.ca). The *Compendium* is a collective publication by the team of Canadian and international scholars who have been part of the SSHRC Major Collaborative Research Initiative that gave rise to the volumes in the Globalization and Autonomy series. Through the *Compendium,* the team is making the results of their research available to a wide public audience. Team members have prepared a glossary of hundreds of short articles on relevant persons, places, organizations, events, and key concepts and have compiled an extensive searchable bibliographical database. Short summaries of the chapters in other volumes of the Globalization and Autonomy series can also be found in the *Compendium,* along with position papers and peer-reviewed research articles on globalization and autonomy issues.

Preface to the English Edition

THIS BOOK WAS COMPLETED before the events of the so-called Arab Spring began in December 2010 in the country of Tunisia, the home of the large majority of the scholars in this book. The revolutions for change that broke out in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, on the south shore of the Mediterranean Sea, reflect both the effects of globalization processes discussed in this book and the desire for collective autonomy and individual autonomy. In surveying the differences between the wealthier European Union states and the poorer states on the southern shore, this volume reveals the underlying causes of demands for change: the lack of responsible, democratic governance; economic stagnation; cultural insecurity and loss; religious differences and a growing "global Islam"; problems in the education system; and a growing number of educated but unemployed young adults. This book is, therefore, a useful source of analysis and data for understanding why populations living on the southern shore of the Mediterranean might demand profound change. By tracing the growing influence of a form of "global Islam," this volume also points to the kinds of conflicts that the Arab Spring precipitated between those who want religion to have more influence in the governance of society and those who look towards more secular forms of government.

William Coleman

Introduction

Yassine Essid and
William D. Coleman

Because our group encourages openness to all fields of knowledge — as the name Groupe d'études et de recherches interdisciplinaires sur la Méditerranée (GERIM; Interdisciplinary Research Group on the Mediterranean) indicates — the members of the team that wrote this book work in a wide range of disciplines. This heterogeneity enabled us to place the social and human sciences in an interactive relationship in which perspectives are integrated without one being subordinated to any other. At the methodological level, the team members agreed on this fundamental project requirement. We then had to ensure members' intellectual engagement and that we could reach consensus on our research subjects and objectives. Although everyone concurred on the significance of the phenomenon called globalization — a historically unprecedented phenomenon, since the entire world has never before been subjected to a single economic, political, and cultural system — how it interacts with autonomy seemed unclear, if not completely opaque.

With regard to the Mediterranean, the idea was to form a team that was as representative as possible of the region, including both the north shore and the south shore of the geographic basin. Colleagues from Tunisia, France, Spain, Lebanon, and Jordan were recruited and brought into the project. A pluridisciplinary team of twenty-two researchers was built comprising economists, historians, anthropologists, a philosopher, an Islamologist, a specialist in Judaic studies, a musicologist, and a psychiatrist. We learned to collaborate and have discussions without regard for

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our respective statuses of professor, associate professor, assistant professor, or doctoral student.

We also had to make sure that our team was consistent, united, and capable of envisaging the research subject without a particular political or emotional attitude. We had to gradually convince our colleagues to reconstruct reality without prejudices or preconceptions. This was a difficult task, since the subject, globalization, tended to resonate in the minds of our researchers, especially the younger ones, with Americanization, neo-imperialism, Westernization, and similar terms. They were asked to read the numerous studies made available by the project designers in order to orient themselves in relation to the work of their transatlantic colleagues, notably on the concepts of globalization and autonomy.

Finally, we had to consider how this volume would contribute to the existing books in this series, for it would be justified only if it offered a different perspective and point of view to the project. The notion of point of view should be thought of here as the *place from which one speaks, the place at which one situates oneself to speak*. This place is the Mediterranean region.

Why the Mediterranean region? Because we all saw it as a privileged ground for investigation on both the cultural and geo-strategic levels in a project that, by definition, was intended to be all-encompassing. Moreover, studying ongoing globalization, insofar as it is taking place beyond our control, would be both rich and edifying in the Mediterranean context. For these reasons, we decided to devote ourselves entirely to this space, to make it the exclusive subject of an economic, cultural, and historical investigation. A good number of questions that are now vital for the future of the world have their original point of focus in the Mediterranean. Even if it is not on the leading edge of the globalization movement, the Mediterranean is at the centre of the world's concerns.

Dealing with globalization — economic, political, and cultural — and autonomy in the Mediterranean first means distancing ourselves somewhat from the globalist or universal-focused discourse that presumes that all of humanity can be integrated by doing away with the economic, political, and cultural conditions specific to each country or region. Whereas in Northern countries we can easily credit agents with a capacity for rational economic behaviour, in Southern countries economic transactions are still largely commanded by the state or dictated by social or familial obligations. Between the universal capacity that constitutes the norm in Western democracies in the North and the particular realities of

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each Southern country are interposed institutions whose actions are based on the assumptions of neoclassic economics; these assumptions have been more or less imposed on the entire world, and we know what the results have been. We deduce from this observation that the attitude towards globalization cannot be identical in every state.

Taking the Mediterranean as a reference, we can make the following remarks. First, there are states that have achieved modernization but not modernity: they are characterized by an absence of civil society, an attachment to national interests, entrenched ideas about sovereignty and borders, and a government that holds a persistent monopoly on legitimized violence. Second, there are postmodern states, Western-type democracies, that have rejected the use of force to settle their disputes; in these states, security is based in large part on transparency of foreign policy and interdependent economies.

There are, therefore, many differences between countries on the north shore of the Mediterranean and countries on the south shore, and these are the main focus of this book. A number of peoples live around the Mediterranean. Plato would have said that they are like frogs around a pond: they share a common past, but historical circumstances — invasions, religion, colonization, and economic and technological progress — have created deep divisions among them. Thus, countries in the North are prosperous and developed, while those in the South have difficulty, given past experiences, catching up with the developed nations. This is the context within which globalization is taking place. A discussion of globalization and autonomy in the Mediterranean requires, first, that we overcome these differentiations. In the North, the social state, by offering a predictable existence (Bourdieu 2000) through the welfare state, has provided the social supports that allow individuals to establish themselves as autonomous subjects. There is nothing like this in the South, where, socially and politically, individuality is diluted in community, tribe and clan, family, or neighbourhood. Furthermore, by depriving individuals of the tools for exercising citizenship, governments have deprived them of all autonomy.

Governments that act this way remind us that the concept of autonomy can also be defined as collective in nature. This notion refers to the capacity of communities — states, cultural minorities, and Aboriginal peoples — to devise their own laws, or, in other words, to exercise their right to organize themselves. In democratic theory, the two concepts of autonomy — individual and collective — are mutually reinforcing. As

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the philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1996, 120, emphasis in original) explains, "The idea of self-legislation *by citizens,* that is, requires that those subject to law as its addressees can at the same time understand themselves as authors of law." Although this is often true in Northern countries, the essays in this book show that the exercise of collective autonomy by Southern states often leads to repression of individual autonomy, and this becomes more common as globalization accelerates.

What are the historical roots of globalization in the Mediterranean? The following four aspects seem to us to be the most important:

- *Historically,* the Mediterranean has been the site of hegemony, imperialism, and colonialism.
- *Culturally,* it was the cradle of monotheistic religions and the source of their impetus to take over Rome, then the North; it also gave rise to great and prestigious societies. Today, it is at the centre of East–West confrontation.
- *Economically,* it is a region of great contrasts: industrialized and underdeveloped countries, North–South, Europe-mena (Middle East and North Africa), and so on.
- *Strategically,* it is a region of open or incipient political and military conflicts.

Given this perspective, studying the North–South reality of the Mediterranean has its specificities in terms of the following:

- the pace of economic integration with globalization
- the desire to democratize political life
- the desire to adhere to the values of good governance
- the desire to review concepts of family, the liberalization of women's status, secularism, and so on
- the capacity to have access to elementary, secondary, and higher education; reduction in economic disparities; and the closing of the digital divide.

For the first time in history, there have been attempts at Mediterranean integration that are not hegemonic, imperialistic, or colonialist, including the Barcelona Declaration, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreements, and the 5 + 5 Group. Because the economic development gap between the north and south shores remains so wide, however, these

attempts have failed; today, integration is reduced to security cooperation and common management of migratory flows.

And so, what is the relationship today between globalization and autonomy? This question is addressed in a region where there are two types of societies, geographically united but socially, culturally, and economically unequal. The Mediterranean offers a good case study of North-South opposition:

- In one type of society, individuals' roles and choices are subjected to customs and often-implicit rules — a restrictive system that nevertheless provides support and sustenance. In Southern societies, people's relationships with the spheres of daily life and existence fit within what Cornelius Castoriadis (1975, 138-43) terms *heteronomy* — that is, the rules governing behaviour are produced beyond the control of individuals, who apply these rules, often unknowingly, through the transmission mechanism that forms the culture.
- In another type of society, this heteronomy has long been challenged by *autonomy,* which is the rule supposedly produced and applied by individuals at the end of a decision-making process that expresses collective autonomy. In Northern societies, in which the rise of individualism took place over the twentieth century, this change underlies, feeds into, and is fed by collective autonomy.

Individuals in the Mediterranean also have divergent relationships with practices of everyday life. For those in the North, these practices are the sum of individual, more or less enlightened or rational choices (individual autonomy); for those in the South, they are inscribed within a network of material constraints and embedded in a tight fabric of representations, functions, and social and symbolic statuses (collective and individual heteronomy). Globalizing processes have the effect of placing these two cultural realities in a relationship of opposition rather than convergence: they arbitrate between the heteronomy of the one, by eroding it, and the autonomy of the other, by reducing it. This dynamic is where the focus of our work lies.

Adapting and Integrating: Governing in Globalization

One fundamental aspect of globalization is governance, the subject of the contribution by Abdeljabbar Bsaies, whose essay leads off this book

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(Chapter 1). In fact, the efforts of almost all countries today, and particularly Southern countries, to open up to international trade and foreign investment and to form markets that go beyond national boundaries reduce national economic and political influence. The autonomous exercise of national sovereignty is thus tending to fade. In this context, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), the international community's tools for monetary and financial regulation, have been transformed into intermediaries for the hegemony of Western powers. Faced with these bodies' policies, a series of resistance fronts — a sort of global civil society — is taking shape to demand an alternative globalization that includes democratic institutions and the right to life, global citizenship, and dignity for all human beings. Moreover, the convergence of technological and political changes has made the world both smaller and less tolerant of social and political injustices. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) pursue interventionist activities throughout the world more quickly and effectively than previously. Oppressed peoples and individuals now have powerful allies for consolidating their autonomy, either individual or collective, and therefore enjoy greater voice on the international scene and more political weight in their own countries. As Bsaies emphasizes, this is the essence of adaptive governance: as it evolves, it is characterized by new relations between the state and citizen, and between the state and groups.

The question of governance is even more pointed in Southern countries, which are subjected to the dictates of international organizations that require them to review their methods of government and management. After Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) failed in a number of Southern countries typified by a strong state presence and ineffective institutions, resulting in what may be termed public governance, these countries were pressed by international financial institutions to show "better governance." The notion of better governance involves the characteristic features of market governance with a particular emphasis on the state's respect for the law and accountability by the holders of power.

Bsaies distinguishes between two types of governance. The first, which he calls effective governance, is an abstraction based on the neo-liberal theoretical model, which defines the contours of good governance as giving primacy to law and the laws of the market in the citizen-state relationship. It would be the most appropriate for the effective operation of a market economy. Faced with this type of governance, states react to

preserve aspects of individual and societal autonomy through appropriate institutions forming specific governances.

Bsaies refines the notion of governance of reference and discusses two cases of specific governance. In the North, France functions based on principles closer to the model of governance of reference, but with a renewed attempt by the state to maintain autonomy regarding social arbitration. In Morocco, in the South, governance departs from the reference model and is still conditioned by interpersonal relationships; in contrast, civil society is increasingly taking over from the old authoritarian state relationships, pushing the country closer to the reference model. The author's objective is to see if these models of specific governance make it possible for the two countries to preserve their respective economic margins of manoeuvre and political autonomy following their integration into globalizing markets and related processes.

The author then describes how the countries on the south shore of the Mediterranean have reacted to the good governance proposals that have penetrated on the economic level. They take up these proposals, to varying degrees, because almost all Southern countries, because of their economic difficulties, have been forced to implement SAPs and liberalize their trade. However, these countries' social, historical, and political structures, combined with the weakness of their civil societies, have enabled them to preserve their authoritarian — and sometimes quasi-monarchical — exercise of political power. Thus, when globalization is sufficiently constraining, and when there is a civil society tradition, the state, and then the government, should theoretically weaken, which is translated into a loss of autonomy. Conversely, civil society becomes stronger, and men and women who had previously been subjects are able to accede to citizenship.

Bsaies illustrates another form of governance that is taking shape in Morocco as the state reduces its intervention in various fields of economic and social activity under the constraints imposed by implementation of an SAP and by the country's integration into globalizing markets. The evolution of this process has gradually led to the creation of a civil society that, unlike those of Morocco's neighbours, has become so important that the government is forced to deal with it. Those forming this associative fabric have sought autonomy vis-à-vis political parties and have strived for a separate identity by adopting, among other things, a national human rights charter in 1990. This step towards increased

autonomy offers a possible path to institutional change initiated by its own momentum through the effects of globalization. In the end, it may lead Morocco, by its own path, towards democracy and, consequently, towards a stronger role on the global stage.

Whereas good governance raises the first challenge arising from neo-liberal globalization, integration of the region (or regionalization) raises a second. A book on the Mediterranean could not ignore the issue of the relationship between what is commonly called the Euro-Mediterranean Process (EMP), launched in Barcelona in 1995, and globalization. This is the subject of the essay by Faika Charfi and Sameh Zouari (Chapter 2).

Let us take a brief look at the historical background of the inception of this process in order to get a sense of its full scope. It started with the Euro-Arab Dialogue, which was instigated in 1973 and formally institutionalized in 1974. In 1979, the revolution in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops signalled the weakening of Arab nationalism and the concurrent rise of the Islamist movement (Chevallier 1997). Taken together, the signing of the Camp David Accords, the first Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet empire, and US supremacy in a unipolar world saddled the European Community with new responsibilities. The Arab states also sensed the need to rethink their own responsibilities, after long having split their alliances between a hegemonic United States and an expanding Europe. The US offensive to occupy economic positions in the region after the Gulf War (notably through the different economic reform programs imposed by its secular branches, the WB and the IMF), the aggravation of regional conflicts, the rise of religious fundamentalism, successive failed attempts at economic reform in Southern countries and these countries' persistent underdevelopment, and the difficulty of stemming uncontrolled migratory flows stimulated by the deterioration of social conditions in these countries made it urgent for Europe to find an answer to the following question: How can development be encouraged in the countries on the south shore of the Mediterranean in a rapidly changing global and regional context?

States responded via economic, political, and cultural interventions in the Mediterranean:

- *Economically,* they installed a free trade zone that lasted from 1995 to 2010 and opened a large market to all Mediterranean products. At the same time, to make products from the Southern countries competitive, Europe agreed to support the economic transition of

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Southern countries with financial aid to encourage the development of social and urban infrastructure.

- *Politically,* the conviction was upheld that economic liberalization would ineluctably lead to political liberalization.
- *Culturally,* the myth of the Mediterranean Sea as the cradle of civilization was reformulated to justify this sudden economic and geopolitical interest.[1]

Out of these changes came the organization in 1995 of the Barcelona Conference and the inauguration of the "partnership" process. Given the meagre results obtained, however, hopes faded that the region would climb to the rank of regional power. The partnership did not lead to a marked increase in private investment, and the economic reforms did not lead to political reform and democratization — to the contrary (Hibou 2003). More than ever, Europe needed the authoritarian regimes on the south shore of the Mediterranean to form a first line of defence against would-be immigrants and to contain Islamism. As for the free trade zone, the cornerstone of the mechanism, it excluded agricultural products, the only comparative advantage held by the Southern countries, and was simply a "mechanism that was inserted into the global dynamic of liberalization undertaken in Europe. Yet liberalization alone, in a context of deep inequality, could guarantee neither economic development nor integration of profoundly destructured societies, especially because these were free trade zones under European conditions" (Naïr 2003, 297, our translation). Despite its stated desire to participate, massively and decisively, in the future of the countries on the south shore of the Mediterranean, the European Union (EU) seemed to be exclusively interested in and supportive of cooperation programs dealing with terrorism, clandestine immigration, personal mobility, information, and other specific issues. In other words, Europe's Mediterranean policy was more and more structured according to the threats that the Southern countries were reputed to pose and in response to the presence in the North of large immigrant communities from the South.

It remains unclear whether this ambition to construct a Euro-Mediterranean space is a desire for autonomy on the part of a Europe threatened by globalization, a revolt against the US foothold in the region, or an attempt to build a reserved domain by creating a large market in the Mediterranean. Another possibility is that the EMP is an extension of a regionalization policy, begun with the construction of Europe, and

thus an attempt to engage Southern countries on a partnership basis — a hybrid status midway between association and membership. Making this choice involves:

- forgetting that Europe's new political will is based on the liberalism prevalent in the context of the Treaty of Maastricht. By proposing an opening and liberalization of Southern economies, Europe is simply continuing with an ideology that it has always promoted. Well before the Barcelona Process, European countries had subscribed to the economic globalization rationale that has dominated and fuelled the region, if only via outsourcing of some activities to Southern countries[2]

- forgetting that free trade, which is the basis for the entire Euro-Mediterranean partnership approach, "in fact falls within the dynamic of the imperial market world-system. A subregion of the world-system, Europe proposes that the Mediterranean countries be, in their turn, a sub-subregion" (Naïr 2003, 298, our translation) for which the partnership would be nothing but a rapid and painful transition to the liberalized market

- finally, forgetting that this "partnership" undeniably reflects a very liberal ideology: supporting this point is the centrality, in institutional terms, of free trade zones between each partner in the South and the EU, the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programs, the primacy of economic and trade strategies over social and development strategies, [and] the conviction ... that economic liberalization will lead to political liberalization" (Hibou 2003, 119, our translation).

In short, the EMP is perfectly integrated with Europe, as a response to globalization — in ways not to thwart it but to make it more acceptable and less noxious.

Globalization and History: Great Texts and Religion

The examination of globalization and autonomy in the Mediterranean space also takes us deep into the history of the region. These depths are explored in two case studies: Ibn Khaldūn's analysis of society (Chapter 3) and translation of the Bible from Hebrew to Castilian in the fifteenth century (Chapter 4). This translation was commissioned by a Muslim

ruler who called upon a Jewish scholar to produce the first-ever edition of the Bible in the vernacular in Spain.

History is also central to understanding the relationship between globalization and religion. Religion is first discussed by Yassine Essid in his study of Islamism at a time when the deregulation of Islam is giving free rein to multiple Islams (Chapter 5). Just as globalization sets out to standardize the human being in the name of universal reason, Islamization sets out to standardize good and evil in the name of God; these approaches are interdependent. The mechanisms of authority framing Islam — family, social traditions, and local customs — as well as the great historical religious institutions with concrete jurisdiction over the truth are increasingly discredited by globalization. There has been a vast liberalization of the market for symbolic goods, over which the great institutional bodies no longer have control; this development has induced a trend towards homogenization of autonomous belief systems that are able, in a context of general cultural globalization, to find a place in world-scale networks.

In different Mediterranean cultures, women are linked to important aspects of culture that they have transmitted through the ages: language, religious beliefs, oral literature, and ecological and artistic knowledge. More recently, with growing access to education and training, women have brought a new dynamic to the spheres of business, politics, education, and culture. Nevertheless, the status of women varies widely between the northern and southern Mediterranean countries, among women living in different Southern countries, and among women living in rural and urban environments. Changes in the status of Muslim women in Mediterranean countries — with a few exceptions, such as Tunisia and Turkey — have evolved very slowly. In the Arab Mediterranean countries, women of working age constitute only one-third of the job-seeking population and less than one quarter of the employed population. Although women now have greater access to education, their job prospects are not improving to the same extent. Could this be the consequence of deeply rooted cultural, religious, or legal discrimination?

Taking a look at various historical contexts, both colonial and postcolonial, and their impact on the evolution of Arab Muslim women, Latifa Lakhdhar examines the side effects of socio-economic policies linked to globalization and their repercussions on women's autonomy (Chapter 6). Has globalization been good for women in the Arab Mediterranean?

Whereas in the countries on the north shore the question is essentially a political one, in the countries on the south shore the social and religious remain inextricably entwined. For example, there are two primary sources of jobs in the region, especially in the Maghreb countries and Turkey: the public sector and the manufacturing sector, particularly the textile and clothing industry. Both are currently undergoing a contraction: the former has seen a reduction in public expenditures, and the latter has suffered a loss of competitiveness on European markets because of the elimination of the Multifibre Arrangement on 1 January 2005. The current trends in economic policy thus do not favour the integration of women into the official economy and, consequently, there are not many opportunities for financial autonomy through paid work. Globalization, already strongly prejudicial to women's material situation, also affects their legal and cultural status. Lakhdhar underlines that globalized Islam, "incapable of evolving towards an egalitarian ideology or a more secularized vision of social relations," has brought back into fashion "all of the archaic norms governing relations between the sexes — relations thought to have been left in the past. The 'Islamic veil' is its most obvious expression."

Before reaching this conclusion, however, Lakhdhar takes us through the various historical stages that led women into a situation that may point to regression rather than progress in their quest for autonomy. For example, although the end of colonialism and access to political independence helped to emancipate Arab women in the Mediterranean through education and jobs, it nevertheless did not accord them greater autonomy. Moreover, women, as the most vulnerable group in society, were the first to feel the effects of the development crisis, which resulted in greater pauperization and a drop in their status as the rise of Islamism accelerated. This issue is even more relevant in the context of globalization. The preservation of cultures requires the social and intellectual development of all social actors, men and women, and the taking into account of the opinions of both sexes. When they are absent from this dialogue, women become victims of cultural relativism and Islamism, which tend to reduce their rights and worsen their condition.

Cultural Autonomy: Music and Food

The field of culture draws, more than other fields, on new technologies. In the past, family, school, places of worship, the daily press, clubs, parties,

and associations both provided essential links between individuals and the outside world and served the purpose of sorting, prioritizing, evaluating, and transmitting information and cultural content carried by the media. This is no longer the case. Individuals, confronted with waves of various kinds of cultural content over multiple channels, are no longer able to partake of this beneficial filtering. It has become clear that what is at stake in cultural hegemony and private control of cultural industries is the capacity of communities to produce their own culture and resist the selective invasion of cultural goods. Accordingly, no political party, state, or local community can remain indifferent to the industrialization of culture. Thus, the question of cultural policies is posed at each level of political community and on the world scale. How can unique cultures — traditional and local ones — react to such waves? What are the consequences for the cultural autonomy of communities and individuals?

Prominent among the themes that call for reflection in relation to globalization and autonomy are music and food. Music is the expression of deep human feelings anchored in culture and traditions, as embodied in the intonations of people's voices and the playing of instruments, as rudimentary or sophisticated as they may be, as well as the emotional reactions of listeners. As planet-wide distribution and mass production take hold, music is not only increasingly overflowing geographic and cultural boundaries but also sometimes escaping its creators, becoming what is now known as world music. Food is imbued with strong gustatory, ritual, and collective dimensions; ever since cooking was discovered, men and women have constantly transformed, accommodated, and ameliorated it through conquests. Various inventions, notably of techniques for conservation and distribution, have led to what is called, analogously, world cuisine.

For these reasons, we have devoted much space to these two aspects. The first chapter on the subject is by Myriem Lakhoua, a musicologist well aware of the stakes of globalization and of the autonomy of music in the Arab Mediterranean world and in the Maghreb diaspora in Europe (Chapter 7). Following her work are several chapters written by a team of anthropologists interested in the changes affecting regional eating habits in the Mediterranean and the capacity of populations in this region to preserve their culinary culture and resist the hegemony of the globalized market.

Opening the series of contributions on food, Amado Millán Fuertes (Chapter 8) reminds us that the theme of food is at the confluence of all

of the other themes addressed in this volume: trade, culture, forms of government, economics, religion, agricultural policy, and the right to have regular, permanent, and free access to nutrition that is qualitatively and quantitatively adequate and sufficient and that corresponds to the cultural conditions of the peoples who consume it. This right has even been enshrined in the constitutions of countries such as South Africa.

Fuentes de Ebro, a mainly agricultural village in Spain, is Rulof Kerkhoff's subject of study (Chapter 9). In the 1960s, the residents were able to combine a small local industry with mechanized farming of wheat, corn, and alfalfa destined for the market. The village also possesses a rich market-gardening production zone, irrigated by a tributary of the Ebro River and by the Ginel stream, which is reputed to confer exceptional qualities upon vegetables. One of these is the famous Fuentes de Ebro sweet onion *(Allium cepa)* — a vegetable whose fate serves as an example of resistance by the local to the global. In general, however, the well-known saying "Tell me what you eat, and I will tell you who you are" is belied in the era of globalization. Modern food no longer possesses authenticity, is no longer identifiable, and therefore creates a problem of identity for consumers of the product, who, not knowing what they are eating, no longer know who they are. The revolution of far-reaching distribution, which has led to an extreme variety of products put on the market, with origins that are difficult to trace, is a direct consequence of globalization and trade liberalization. It becomes a source of anxiety for consumers, and producers lose control over their product.

According to Almudena Hasan Bosque, the author of the third essay on food (Chapter 10), socio-cultural practices and representations associated with food are starting to change, on both the local and global levels, at the same time as norms and values are changing. Bosque uses the case of Amman, Jordan. Until recently, much of the daily food supply in the city was produced locally. A limited number of products were imported, and they were often highly valued, either because they were consumed on rare occasions or because they enhanced the taste of everyday dishes. Individuals' nutritional environments were thus relatively stable throughout their lives. This situation no longer holds. The development of wide distribution in the North, and then its expansion to the southern Mediterranean countries over the last decade, has inaugurated the era of mass consumption for the novelty-seeking consumers of these countries.

Finally, Paula Durán Monfort (Chapter 11) analyzes the effects of globalization as a phenomenon of the acculturation of local food models.

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She is particularly interested in the changes observed in food-distribution spaces in Tunisia around a particular product: meat. She has also observed the strategies that social actors develop in relation to this food and its local or globalized availability.

Cultural Autonomy: Languages and Education

Globalization is not reducible to liberalized market integration, new technologies, or the emergence of global thought; it is also the source of an intermingling of cultures. How can cultural autonomy be preserved? All of the Arab countries of the Mediterranean have, at one time or another, been confronted with the question of language, a fundamental element of identity, along with territory and, today, religion. How can I express my identity and culture in my own language? Is it still my own? And do I still have a choice?

Envisaging the relationship that writers have with their readers in a context of globalization is the theme of the essay by François Zabbal (Chapter 12). Zabbal sees literary texts as inscribed in a local history that is heavily marked by form, style, and content. This old territorial order of literature, however, now seems submerged in the imperatives of the world market. The national origin of works is blurred without disproportionately affecting their content. Their provenance is of little consequence, provided that the language used permits them to be sold. The result is literature without a particular social space and identity. Well before the advent of globalization, however, Arabic authors glorified deterritorialization of the literary work not only in order to gain freedom of expression but also, especially, because the local market for Arabic-language books lacked both readers and recognition.

What makes a creative work such as a book cross national borders? It is a question that involves how fields of cultural production and transnational trade (in other words, globalization) function. The economic approach — identifying the translated book as a good that is produced and consumed according to the law of supply and demand, and that circulates according to the laws of national and international trade — is not pertinent here. It conceals the specificity of cultural goods and of the terms of their distribution and valuing. Thus, in retracing the paths taken by Arabic-language books to exist elsewhere than their country of origin, Zabbal's analysis leads inevitably to the problem of relations of force among languages, national cultures, and global powers.

We must consider here the relationship between an Arab context of production, suffering from a lack of readers, and a Western receiving context, in which Arabic literature occupies a modest rank. It is a case of cultural transfer that is ruled not by the logic of the market (as is the case for American literature, for example), but by the intervention of certain institutions or a particularly motivated publisher or distributor that is interested in a small country's literary production or a non-Western literature. For dissemination of such literary works not belonging to central languages to occur, and for this product to become globalized — in other words, for the market to take account of cultural diversities — two steps must be taken. The first step is *partial autonomy,* provided by translation, which enables the work to cross the threshold beyond the source language but remain attached to a territory and a nationality. The importing of Arabic-language books depends, at this stage, on a strategy of limited production based on limited selection criteria: low print runs, quality of translation, small readership, grants, relationship between the countries, and other factors. This is a market, but the market for creativity, which responds above all to cultural criteria. The second step is *total autonomy,* in which the creative work responds above all to economic criteria, and in which publication is no longer embedded in relations of force among countries and their languages. Authors write directly in the global language in order to free their work both from the structure of the hierarchical transnational space, with its modes of domination, and from all individual or institutional intermediaries, to become global and autonomous.

Once they achieved independence, the three Maghreb states faced this problem. The unanimously repeated slogan was that no cultural identity would be possible without an Arabic language that it was high time to reclaim. Morocco and Tunisia, as protectorates, and Algeria, as a colony, had become bilingual, with French as the predominant language. The education system, largely in French, involved teaching neither Arabic nor national history, and very little Islamic culture.

Tunisia, the subject of Mongi Bahloul's essay (Chapter 13), was established as bilingual (Arabic-French) when it became independent. The first educational reform in 1958 was to eliminate French in the first and second years of primary school, but it was reinstated in the third year as the language of arithmetic and common knowledge. "This reform," writes Chedly Fitouri (1983, 68, our translation), "maintained the options of unbalanced and conflictual biculturalism" throughout the protectorate

period. Programs were then designed with large sections devoted to national history, Arabic, and Islamic culture, leaving the teaching of scientific subjects to French "as the sole means of guaranteeing an opening to the modern world and providing the country with the effective means of battling underdevelopment" (ibid.).

Arabic is not only the language of independence, of national history, of religious identity, of integration with the Maghreb but also of the Arab world. A political and ideological language, Arabic left neither choice nor autonomy to the collectivity. As an expression of the state's political orientation, it was imposed and planned throughout the Tunisian educational system. In an independent but underdeveloped country, French had been considered an instrument for catching up — for access to modernity and economic development. Although seen as being in the domain of scientific education, French left behind it, in an era of exacerbated nationalisms, a lingering sense of alienation and cultural dependence. As the focus of a political and ideological debate, it was imposed on the population in spite of everything, under the leadership of the planned state. Nevertheless, whatever one might say about it, French is not an imperialist language; the Algerian author Kateb Yassine has even called it the "spoils of war." A language of coexistence and human rights, French is recognized as a means of facilitating access to other languages. In addition, it is spoken by the sizeable Maghreb diaspora in France. Thus, different roles are attributed to Arabic and French, and "this balancing, between the quest for identity and the aspiration to modernity, is perhaps what best characterizes biculturalism in the three countries of the Maghreb" (Fitouri 1983, 73, our translation).

In contrast, English, the language of globalization and economic exchange, a utilitarian language, reputed to be ideologically neutral but culturally invasive, has been left to the free choice of individuals without interference by the state. In Tunisia, for example, English has no specific status; it has not supplanted French, nor has an equivalent status been claimed for it. Although it is treated as a foreign language taught as an option, like German and Spanish, English has been strongly promoted, since the early 1960s, by the culture departments of the US and British embassies. It was said that French was the language of integration into modernity, but while French required a state policy, English was swept in by globalization, bringing its cultural baggage with it. It thus became the mode of transmission for a culture that was de-materialized, not reduced to patrimony or objectives, and posed no problem to the political

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system. This lack of connection between cultural identity and language is another strength of English, which has the status of a language of communication — and this is not the case for Arabic or, incidentally, French. Unlike French, suspected of association with neocolonialism, English did not provoke cultural conflict by forcing initiation to a second culture or having pre-existing roots in an indigenous cultural tradition — in other words, English respected autonomy. In fact, it was the language par excellence for autonomy, especially of individuals (Naïr 2003, 24; Rabenoro and Rajaonarivo 1997).

Beyond this historical overview, Bahloul's discussion shows that, at first, the linguistic question was the prerogative of the state, which it managed according to its domestic and foreign constraints. The Tunisian government's official attitude towards English did not result, as it did for Arabic and French, in friction between Arabic, the language of authenticity (ineffective), and French, the language of opening (charged with history and resentment). English was imposed on people without provoking soul searching. It was an even more deliberate choice given that Arabic was unable to serve as a universal language.

We have seen how the commodification of music, through communications technology and mass reproduction of cultural goods, threatens artistic creation and the very future of creators. Education faces a similar phenomenon, and it is not by chance that we speak today about the formation of *human capital,* an expression that is reorienting all educational programs, and perhaps even the very spirit of education. Houda Ben Hassen, in her essay, discusses a field that is still beyond the market sector to a great extent: higher education (Chapter 14). Using two examples, France, north of the Mediterranean, and Tunisia, on the sea's south shore, Ben Hassen shows how globalization is resulting in the convergence of higher education systems. In both countries, this standardization process started because of the need to cut costs and improve the employability of graduates — both concerns reflecting the market laws that underlie globalization. The three main actors in higher education — teachers, students, and advisers — are seen, in these two examples, to be gradually losing their autonomy.

Globalization and Autonomy: The Economic Question

Throughout history, the Mediterranean has been the object of a number of attempts at economic integration. The current plan to form a regional

free trade zone is nominally a voluntary project, and its economic dimension is highlighted. Its central axis is the creation of a large free trade zone around the Mediterranean Basin, which will be tied to the European Union. This project, in parallel with that of globalization, was advanced considerably with the signing of trade-liberalization agreements among Mediterranean countries. From the point of view of the region as a whole, they serve as the foundation for a regional coalition progressing towards globalization of trade and production. From the point of view of each country, Mediterranean integration raises the need to redefine national economic autonomy, which is at risk of being eroded by economic opening and its implications, and involves a questioning of the actors' socio-economic positioning.

The GERIM working group on economics has sought to analyze the possible outcomes of movements towards greater integration and their social and economic implications at the regional and domestic levels. The authors report on the Mediterranean integration project and its progress, as well as the motivations of the concerned parties, the means that they are implementing, and the new socio-economic configuration that could result around the Mediterranean.

In his essay, Lotfi Bouzaïane (Chapter 15) exposes the dilemma in the region, which is torn between integration with the global market and the need to preserve some autonomy. He observes that the current form of globalization is the result of a long process in which the countries in the region have been engaged since the 1940s. This process took a new turn at the end of the twentieth century, with trade liberalization. However, paradoxes continue to hinder the progress of globalization and lay bare the weaknesses of autonomy in relation to insertion into the global economy, and even into the regional zone. Persistent gaps in standards of living are key to these paradoxes. As a consequence, two issues will continue to be prominent on the road to the region's economic integration: mobility of individuals and management of natural resources. In an exploration of the region's future between autonomy and globalization, Bouzaïane observes that opposing models of society, currently covered heavily in the media, are an outcome of other, more influential economic and geopolitical variables.

Passing from the general to the specific, a series of studies illustrate Bouzaïane's premises. Rim Mouelhi uses the sociology of organizations to analyze the Mediterranean in relation to how the stakes of globalization might weaken or strengthen the projects of the main actors in the

region (Chapter 16). She discusses possible alliances and conflicts among these actors in their efforts to safeguard their autonomy and push their plans forward and shows that, in general, there is a convergence of interests in favour of globalization. But whereas actors in the northern Mediterranean countries are in a position of strength and join the process without fearing for their autonomy, countries in the South are ready, in Mouelhi's view, to sacrifice part of their autonomy to take advantage of more of the economic development promised by globalization.

Samouel Béji deals with the challenges of autonomy linked to financial liberalization for developing countries in the Mediterranean South (Chapter 17). All of these countries have been engaged in SAPs or similar policies to various degrees since the 1980s. Béji shows how all of the countries on the south shore, except for Libya and Syria, now have partially or completely modernized financial systems. The region as a whole has remained cautious, however, about integration into the international financial system, and domestic investments and savings remain more strongly embedded than in the rest of the world. The countries of the South continue to fear the implications of greater financial opening on their collective autonomy, for both monetary and fiscal policy. Added to this fear is the new risk, not yet defined clearly, of deterritoralization of currency.

Jihen Malek compares industrial policies in the Mediterranean countries before and after globalization (Chapter 18). She attempts to establish that under the effects of international free trade agreements — and the mitigated results of these policies — these countries are shifting from a policy of direct support, using a wide range of instruments, to one of support almost exclusively for research and development and attracting foreign direct investment. States are trying, through this change, to influence the nature of industrial activities, which will develop and provide access to the targeted objectives. Malek adds, based on the cases of France, Italy, and Tunisia, that states in the North have much more institutional capacity to implement such an industrial policy successfully.

Nizard Jouini discusses the economic implications of the integration of southern Mediterranean countries into the global economy by showing that this integration translates into more interdependence with the rest of the world (Chapter 19). Jouini also observes that greater economic opening by countries in the region, theoretically the source of more growth, will lead to the convergence of income per inhabitant with the European average for a limited number of countries, such as Cyprus and Israel. Turkey, Tunisia, and Egypt will retain the same gap with this

average. For the other countries, the gap will grow. Finally, Jouini ob-serves that integration into the global economy is being conveyed by the development of civil society. He indicates that the greater opportunities for financing the activities of NGOs and the larger sphere of activity now open to these organizations because of contraction of the state's role are the most decisive driving forces in this evolution. In this regard, Jouini concurs with Bsaies' analysis of the situation in Morocco.

In her essay (Chapter 20), Fatma Sarraj shows that globalization results in the development of outsourcing activities that contribute to the frag-mentation of production processes among different firms and world re-gions. According to Sarraj, the Mediterranean is only beginning to develop outsourcing. Within the Mediterranean space, the redeployment of Northern firms' activities to Southern countries may strengthen the economic integration of the region and be a source of greater regional autonomy. The future of potential investments will depend on greater involvement by the region in outsourcing activities. At the moment, however, the region is not as attractive as are other world regions. In Sarraj's view, more competitiveness must be developed in the business environment to draw more outsourcing activity. Competitive costs, which once encouraged subcontracting (a primary form of outsourcing), are no longer sufficient for access to greater integration into the global-ized production process.

The book ends with an interview by one of the volume editors, Yassine Essid, with a psychiatrist, Dr. Hashmi Dhaoui (Chapter 21). As a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst practising in a country on the south shore of the Mediterranean, Dr. Dhaoui discusses with Essid a very specific character of the Maghreb and the East Mediterranean: the Arab individ-ual. By *individual,* he does not mean someone who comes to see him for treatment, but an individual representative of a community, or a society, who today is prey to a complex malaise provoked by an increasingly globalized world. Psychoanalysis serves here as a tool for interpretation of the current state of affairs in this region, and that is why this interview comes at the end of the book.

Conclusion

There was a time when the Mediterranean was the centre of the world. An impressive range of historical civilizations vied to take possession of it: Babylonians, Akkadians, Hittites, Phrygians, Assyrians, Achaeans,

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Mycenians, Phoenicians, Dorians, and even peoples from neighbouring shores — Himyarites, Sabians, and Anatolians. Each rival wanted sole power and supremacy. All of these attempts were halted at the threshold of success — all except one, perhaps: the Roman Empire. For about three centuries, the Pax Romana managed to unify what Romans called the *mare nostrum*. Government by men, pacification of the territory, administration by the state, respect for the cultural diversities of subject peoples, and fluidity of trade and communications were ensured under the vigilant eye of a capital that saw itself as eternal because of the Pax Romana.

The miracle, certainly unique in ancient history, was the maintenance of the *limes* citadels protecting the empire from what came to be called the barbarian invasions. The chaos that followed these destructive incursions divided the empire until the advent of Islam. The new energy that came with the Islamic Arabic thrust, much more cultural than simply religious, as is commonly believed, sought to emulate the Roman success in commanding everything within the Mediterranean perimeter and beyond. The plans were aborted for many reasons, some of them analyzed in this book, and for a long time Islam was confined to the southern half of Iberia and, of course, the southern shores of the Mediterranean.

After the beginning of the Reconquista and especially with the discovery of the Americas, Islamic energy in effect withdrew definitively to focus on the southern part of the Mediterranean. Ibn Khaldūn was the first to intuit a resurgence in creativity by the people of the south shore towards the north shore, accompanied by a desire for power, hegemony, and subjugation.

Eventually, the most definitive outcome was the dividing up of a South utterly stripped of all of its resources and reduced to an indigenous status at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. It was an arrangement that was far from satisfactory for the peoples in the region, and their desire for freedom was finally expressed in their regaining at least their political autonomy in the aftermath of the Second World War and the advent of the United Nations. The resulting nation-states, whose independence was earned through a deceptive process that some called neocolonialism, have been unable to make progress. It has been necessary to redress the delays accumulated under the fiat of globalization that was unfurling beyond their control, through which the entire field of human existence

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was being standardized relative to a world scale, leaving no room for political initiative.

Today, two Mediterranean worlds confront each other, irremediably irreconcilable despite timid and tactical attempts at formulating unifying projects. In the face of Europe, which is tending to move its centre of gravity farther eastward, and which sees globalization as inevitable and necessary, is a second Mediterranean. Often shaken by stormy agitation, vulnerable, this second Mediterranean forms a political economy in thought alone; not only will it not have any major effect on major economic and financial issues, but it will remain increasingly shut out from the decision-making processes that affect it.

It is the ambition of this book and its contributors to determine whether the paths to globalization and autonomy for these two Mediterranean worlds will remain forever divergent. Facing the constraints of forced integration, followed by the extreme interdependence of economic, social, political, religious, and cultural spaces, or the effects of international organizations' prescriptive programs, is there still room for these developing countries on the southern shore to negotiate their fate and perhaps ward off the inevitability of exclusion?

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