AGAINST ORTHODOXY
Studies in Nationalism

Edited by Trevor W. Harrison and Slobodan Drakulic
To our best friends and collaborators in life,
Terri Saunders and Patrizia Albanese,

and

to Slobodan Drakulic
(1947-2010)
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No book, or any act of creativity, comes about in exactly the same way as its counterparts. In the spring of 2008, the two editors met at the Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences meetings being held that year in Vancouver. Slobodan Drakulic had organized one of several sessions on nationalism put on by the Canadian Network for the Study of Identities, Mobilization and Conflict (within the Canadian Sociology Association). Trevor Harrison was a discussant and a presenter (on Japan) in two of the sessions, along with James Kennedy, Liliana Riga, Karen Stanbridge, and Elke Winter, all of whose chapters appear in this volume.

At the end of one of the sessions, something like the following conversation took place:

Trevor: “Slobodan, have you thought of putting these papers together as an edited volume?”
Slobodan: “No. Do you really think there’s a book?”
Trevor: “Yes.”
Slobodan: “Why don’t we do it together?”

Of such things academic collaborations and friendships are made.

Of course, editors are only as good as their authors. Both of us are the huge beneficiaries of the authors whose works appear in this volume. To a person, they know of what they write and – equally important – of how to write.
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As always, we bear responsibility for any errors and omissions contained herein.

T.W.H. and S.D.

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T.W.H.
AGAINST ORTHODOXY
The Rediscovery of Nationalism

During much of the second half of the twentieth century, nationalism attracted little theoretical or empirical interest. The two sides in the Cold War – Marxist-inspired communism and liberal-inspired capitalism – viewed nationalism as a spent force. For Marxists, the course of history hinged on class; for liberals, of either the economic or social kind, continued social progress rested on individual freedom and entrepreneurial initiative. Where nationalism still breathed, the signs of life were faint, or so it appeared.

Suddenly, however, nationalism rose from the grave, though – to adopt Mark Twain’s famous line – its demise had always been exaggerated, or prematurely surmised. In fact, politicians, media pundits, and intellectuals had simply failed to recognize nationalism’s adaptability and resiliency, denying it proximity to anything socio-historically significant within their explanatory frameworks. Thus, according to prevailing Cold War rhetoric, the fight was purely class-ideological – beyond ethnocentric and patriotic sentiments – even when the conflicts or struggles against foreign powers or their domestic puppets in (for example) Yugoslavia, Algeria, Vietnam, or Cuba bore a decidedly nationalist stamp.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 unleashed pent-up nationalist impulses or, in other instances, provided a basis for their renaissance and regeneration. A host of former Soviet republics suddenly acquired or reacquired national independence: Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine, and others. Further afield, ethnic groups within Yugoslavia reprised some of their historical ethno-national (or ethno-religious) conflicts, giving often violent birth to an assortment of new/old national states: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Czechoslovakia, though more peacefully, was likewise split asunder by ethno-nationalist impulses.

The rekindling of nationalist fervour was not confined to Europe. Outside the Communist Bloc, neo-liberal globalization – with its emphasis on markets over states and traditional cultures – weakened central governments and gave renewed impetus to long-submerged ethnies. It is no accident that the indigenous peoples of Chiapas, in southern Mexico, launched their cultural-political struggle on the same day that the North American Free Trade Agreement came into effect in 1993 (see Julián Castro-Rea’s Chapter 10), or that Canada, scant years after adopting free trade, barely escaped dissolution in 1995 in a referendum on Quebec independence.

Nor did nationalism abate with the onset of the new millennium. Throughout Africa, the boundaries set by former colonial powers burst, resulting in new and bloody national reconfigurations. In East Africa, Eritrea separated from Ethiopia after a long armed struggle, and the rest of the country – discussed by Sarah Vaughan in Chapter 7 – federalized along its ethnic lines, with outcomes of mixed blessings. Further to the north, Sudan remains racked by multiple ethno-religious conflicts and wars. Westward on the continent, Nigeria has survived the bellicose secession of Biafra, but it remains a deeply divided state of dubious nationhood. Elsewhere on the continent, diverse ethnic parties struggle to create a nation-state in the name of ethnic self-determination, or maintain the ones in which they dominate in the name of multicultural civic nationalism.

In southeastern Europe, the remainders of Yugoslavia continued to disintegrate into Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia, while further east, Georgia effectively lost Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and further north, Moldova lost control of Transnistria. And time and again, nationalists of the hegemonic, or would-be hegemonic, ethnies defended the threatened multi-ethnic polities in the name of federalism and multiculturalism against their neither more nor less ethnically nationalist opponents, who regularly retorted by invoking the right of self-determination and human rights, in tune with actual relations, or out of it.

In Asia also, ethnic riots erupted in Tibet and Xinjiang, and Sri Lanka’s ethno-nationalist Sinhalese-dominated government (at least temporarily) quelled its ethno-nationalist Tamil challengers. In the continent’s southeast,
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Ethno-religious clashes and insurrections do not seem to be abating. In central Asia, the largely unforeseen effects of an almost decade-long Western intervention in Afghanistan has spilled over into Pakistan and the former Soviet republics to the north, pitting diverse ethnies and religions against each other. Likewise, the countries of the Middle East – with their jigsaw straight colonial borders – experienced renewed demands for self-determination, notably from the stateless Kurds, spread over Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, and from the Palestinians. Studies in nationalism seem to be ill-prepared to help understand these and other conflicts and contestations, largely because of ossified orthodoxies that cramp their epistemological flexibility.

Such events call for a reconsideration of the historical significance and power of nationalism. Indeed, considerable work has already been done. Nationalism is once again a “serious” field of study. Yet, even as the last quarter century has witnessed fresh insights into the phenomenon on one hand, studies in nationalism have also atrophied into a set of orthodoxies on the other. This book challenges some of these orthodoxies, and attempts to offer new ways of thinking about nationalism based on a wedding of critical theory and empirical rigour. In doing so, the authors take as their starting point the understanding that nationalism is not a singular phenomenon – as Gordon Laxer aptly states in Chapter 13, there is no “it,” only “them” – but, rather, a generative force that arises often in unexpected, yet understandable, ways. What follows is a collection of writings that merges both the general and the specific, penned by authors from several countries.

Orthodoxies and Nationalism

There have arisen a number of accepted and rarely challenged orthodoxies – conventional beliefs that have taken on a quasi-sacrosanct status – within studies in nationalism, some of a general nature, others more specific, some long-standing, others fairly new. What are these postulates? A few are easily identified.

The Modernization Thesis

This orthodoxy holds that nationalism emerged relatively recently, as a fairly novel epiphenomenon of modernity. Its adherents include most of the pioneers in the area, such as John Acton (1972 [1862]), Ernest Renan (1996 [1882]), Carlton Hayes (1931, 1933), and Hans Kohn (1945, 1962, 1965, 1969), as well as more recent influential scholars in the field, such as Ernest Gellner (1983, 1994, 1997), Elie Kedourie (1998), Eric Hobsbawm (1983,
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1997), Anthony Smith (1971, 1998, 2000, 2004), and Benedict Anderson (1991). Ecumenical to a fault, conservatives (Acton and Hayes), liberals (Smith), and socialists (Hobsbawm) – not to mention Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1976 [1848]), or Vladimir Lenin (1974 [1916], 1977 [1914]) – have also, at one time or another and in diverse ways, pledged allegiance to the modernization thesis.

With some exceptions – and only recently – the modernization thesis has seldom been questioned in a decisive manner. Yet the broader point is not to reopen the perennialism-versus-modernism debate, which is at once fruitless and irrelevant. Conceiving of nationalism as perennial sets us down a path of infinite regress toward some elusive prehistoric prototypes anchored in human nature, while wholly adopting the modernist argument binds us to a kind of creationist myth in which nationalism suddenly appears in the wake of modernity, a *deus ex machina* of sorts, which sweeps away a premodern social world supposedly ontologically incapable of engendering nationalism.

The modernist line of theorizing hinges upon the presumed – and dubious – parallelism between the emergence of the scientific-technological complex and of modern social aggregates or associations. But although we can affix a relatively precise location and date to the advent of steam power (for example), we cannot do the same for the genesis of *all* (or even *most*) modern ethnies, nations, and nationalisms, not to mention a host of other social phenomena. Julián Castro-Rea makes this point in Chapter 10, which deals with Mexico. Many ethnies, nations, and nationalisms are neither perennial nor modern, and their diverse origins are likewise neither chronologically nor spatially uniform, yet not necessarily singular. They emerge in between places and peoples, or from their social interrelations and interactions, internal and external, proximate and distant, modern and premodern.

**The Creationist Elite Thesis**

A second orthodoxy, though of a less general character, is that nationalism is the brainchild of political elites or intellectuals, who subsequently implant it in the malleable lesser minds of the plebeian masses by means of propaganda and indoctrination (see Kedourie 1998; Hroch 1985; Smith 1971; Gellner 1983). A variant of this thesis is the pervasive assumption that nationalism is an exclusively public sphere phenomenon, associated with the state, political parties, social movements, and suchlike, or what Adolf Hitler in 1934 called “the greater world,” or “the world of the man,” contrasted to

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“the smaller world” of women: “her husband, her family, her children, and her home” (in Noakes and Pridham 2000, 326).

In contrast to such elitist views, several of the chapters in this volume note the role of popular movements in forging nationalism. Indeed, as Gordon Laxer points out in Chapter 13, nationalist movements increasingly find themselves in opposition to elites and the state. Further, as Karen Stanbridge argues in Chapter 2, the loci for the propagation and maintenance of nationalism include – or even necessitate – small social groups such as the family and kinship, and the immediate social interactions typical of them, and not exclusively elites at all. What might be called “nationalism from below” is a vast area of research virtually untapped, awaiting future explorers.

As for the alleged power of intellectuals – a power attributed most often to themselves by themselves – one is tempted to adduce in such arguments a surfeit of academic hubris and a privileged but nondominant social category’s frustrated will to power. Some early modern nationalists knew better than those who study them: Goethe and Herder actually sought inspiration in the artifacts of the plebeian mind.

The White Western Civilization Thesis
A third orthodoxy, promoted by Hans Kohn (1945, vii), is that nationalism emerged in the socio-historically vanguard regions of the world – West Europe and/or North America, or what might be termed “the white civilizations” – whence it spread export-import style to the laggard peoples trudging forth in their evolutionary trail. In turn, it is argued that these “lesser peoples” misunderstood, mistranslated, and misapplied nationalism so that its original progressiveness and benignity gave way to regressiveness and malignancy, a conclusion maintained in varied ways by other adherents of this orthodoxy, such as Elie Kedourie (1998), John Plamenatz (1973), and John Breuilly (1982, 1994), among others. An updated version of this thesis is boldly stated in Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” works (1993, 1996) and in Benjamin Barber’s Jihad vs. McWorld (1995), but with an additional argument: the virtual inevitability of ethnic, or ethno-religious, conflict.

Yet, as Rogers Brubaker (2004) has aptly noted, ethnies are categories or aggregates; they are not groups such as – in Weberian terms – political parties. Making this “category mistake” has often resulted in the erroneous conclusion that entire ethnies and nations collide and clash amid inter-ethnic
and inter-national tensions and conflicts. In fact, even at the peak of ethnic and national animosities, mobilizations, and conflicts, sections of the ethnies or nations involved often remain immobile, unaffected by the overall bellicose spirit – a point brought home by Michael Rosie and Ross Bond in their study of Scottish nationalism (Chapter 9). They show that the presumably separatist members of the Scottish National Party may not all be equally eager to attempt secession, nor are their opponents in the Labour Party altogether averse or immune to separatism. Rémi Léger’s Chapter 6, on French-English relations in Canada, similarly complicates the portrait of ethnic conflict, showing that there is both unity and disunity on both sides of the great Anglo-French divide. Sarah Vaughan’s case study of Ethiopia (Chapter 7) points out the problematic nature of overlaying dichotomous categories of “ethnic versus civic nationalism” upon nationalism in the so-called underdeveloped world, and conceivably elsewhere as well.

In sum, reified civilizations may be clashing in principle, or in theory – in the minds of its adherents, that is – yet real civilizations are neither principled nor theoretical: they are complex, heterogeneous, contingent, and anything but thing-like. Like ethnies and nations, civilizations are categories or aggregates, not groups or parties. The former do not act; the latter act in their stead.

The Ontological Duality Thesis

With roots in the white civilization supremacy claims, the ontological duality thesis asserts the supremacy of liberal or civic nationalism in accommodating ethnic minorities as contrasted against its illiberal ethnic cousins elsewhere, engaged in ethnocracy and genocide. Will Kymlicka’s version (1997) of this thesis – the best known and currently most influential of this genre – argues that Western countries are liberal and democratic (i.e., dedicated to freedom and equality of their citizenry); that liberal democracies are civil and pluralistic; and that their nationalisms are therefore liberal, civil, and tolerant, or even better, supportive of their minorities and their cultures. Yet a host of recent confrontations between the Canadian settler authorities and/or populations and First Nations activists – at Oka (1990), Ipperwash (1995), Burnt Church (1999-2001), as well as several ongoing ones (at Caledonia, Tyendinaga, Akwesasne) – suggests that Kymlicka’s syllogism hinges upon conformist political amnesia rather than upon empirical evidence. Yet how may we understand such amnesia? Slobodan Drakulic’s Chapter 1, dealing with academic subjectivities – what he calls academic nationalism – suggests one possible answer.
New Directions
If quite a few paths previously taken in researching nationalism have reached an impasse, might there be other, more fruitful paths yet to be explored? The chapters contained here argue that this is the case. Each author combines a theoretical argument with an empirical study of the situation “on the ground,” whether in historical time or in a single state or country, with the promise of leading the reader to think differently about nationalism in general, and in its diverse aspects and manifestations.

Part 1 sets the stage through an examination of current nationalist theory and its historical consequences. In Chapter 1, Drakulic addresses the ethnocentrism, patriotism, and supranationalism of influential thinkers, as seen in their academic and related works written between the mid-nineteenth century and today. He argues that studies of nationalism have hitherto often echoed their subject matter rather than critically analyzed it. Indeed, notes Drakulic, many authors have often shown marked empathy (or outright sympathy) toward their own ethnos, nation, or region, while withholding it from non-preferred others – with real consequences for the nations involved and deplorable outcomes for this field of study.

Much of mainstream scholarship has been blind not only to its own subjectivities, however. It has also failed to notice entire areas of propagation and reproduction of nationalism, such as the family and primary socialization – and their historical and cultural plurality. Drawing upon Ernest Gellner’s famous inquiry, “Do nations have navels?” Karen Stanbridge in Chapter 2 considers the absence of children and childhood – and thereby of primary socialization – from mainstream theories of nationalism. Specifically, the author argues that scholars of nationalism often assume that the normative conceptions of children and childhood inherent to the practice of nationalism are acceptable bases for their analyses of modern nationalism, and that the conceptions of the child and childhood upon which nationalists base their claims can be taken for granted and not explored theoretically. As a result, modernists and ethnosymbolists universalize conceptions of children and childhood that are in fact unique to Western modernity, and imply that the acquisition of (national) culture during childhood socialization is a uniform and seamless process. Stanbridge argues that to better understand the origins and reproduction of nationalism, theories of nationalism must acknowledge the historicity of modern national subjects, including children, and the ways in which culture is passed on in the name of the nation – within the educational system and beyond.
The consequences of ethnocentric scholarship (as put into political practice) in disregarding the deep socio-historical roots of nationalism can be seen in the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference, the empirical focus of Liliana Riga and James Kennedy in Chapter 3. Versailles led to the creation of a host of new nation-states in east-central Europe but also left stranded more than 25 million members of minorities within them. The introduction of majoritarian democracy in the new states meant that formerly dominant or privileged ethnies suffered status decline, while previously subjugated or underprivileged ones gained political power. For Riga and Kennedy, Versailles and its aftermath carry a stark message: that, in contexts of deep diversity with little institutionalized liberalism, the result is likely to be majoritarian democracy – and thus likely ethnocracy – an outcome that cannot be resolved within liberal conceptions of minority rights that rely on cultural protections, Kymlicka’s and other claims to the contrary notwithstanding.

Part 2 builds on the theoretical and empirical issues raised in Part 1 to examine the nature of minorities and multiculturalism within national states. The Balkans were the powder keg that exploded in 1914, setting off the First World War. That, and subsequent outbursts of ethno-nationalist wrath in the region, were seen as perennial by some (Huntington 1993, 1996), or as novel facets of the “dark side of democracy” (Mann 2005).

In an attempt to test such contrary claims, Slobodan Drakulic in Chapter 4 takes us from the late medieval and early modern times toward our own, in search of the socio-historical roots of ethno-religious antagonisms between the ancestors of today’s Muslim Slavs and their ethno-linguistic Christian kin. He argues that those antagonisms spread in the seventeenth century, kindled by the changes in and around the region, which had pitted local converts to Islam against the foreign and local foes of the Ottoman Empire, including their Christian Slav cousins – setting off a number of mutual ethnic expulsions and concomitant antagonisms that entered collective memories of diverse Balkan nations as a living force of the past. This chapter draws attention to the importance of understanding all nationalisms in their historical specificity and contingency and to the need to recognize that when it comes to nationalism, premodern history often does not sleep but lies awake plotting revenge – in a past-in-the-present kind of way.

Historical memory also plays a part in Elke Winter’s exploration, in Chapter 5, of how nationalism impacts the public framing of multicultural immigrant integration. Adopting a comparative historical perspective, the author reconstructs the vicissitudes of nationalism and multiculturalism in Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands. Winter notes that, traditionally, the
three countries’ differences in how they have historically reacted to ethnic diversity created by postwar immigration have been explained by reference to two explanatory models: the opposition between Old World nation-states and New World settler societies, as well as the differentiation between predominantly ethnic (Germany) and civic (Canada, Netherlands) nationhood. Winter argues that, although this approach is somewhat helpful, it fails to note that despite their differences in the way of dealing with immigration, ethnic diversity, and nationhood, the three countries have something in common: they are – or were – divided societies facing the challenge of integrating newcomers. The author concludes that claims on ethnocultural grounds by traditionally incorporated groups impact the willingness of national majorities to grant multicultural rights to immigrants and that this phenomenon requires a third way to be explained.

Winter’s focus on multiculturalism sets the stage for Rémi Léger’s incisive interrogation, in Chapter 6, of Will Kymlicka’s depiction (1997) of Canadian pluralism and the limits of multiculturalism in Canada. In Léger’s view, Kymlicka conflates the situation of the Québécois majority in Quebec and francophone minority communities elsewhere, which are actually quite different. Using Kymlicka’s own contextual approach, Léger examines positional varieties of Canada’s “French fact” – which is not singular, but plural – and the concomitant plurality of political demands put forth by activists of francophone minority communities. In doing so, he brings to light the fact that francophone minority communities make claims clearly distinct from those of the Québécois – such that the “French fact” should more appropriately be understood as the “French facts.”

In the final chapter of Part 2, Sarah Vaughan takes us to Ethiopia for a critical examination of the presumed differences between its ethnic and civic nationalisms. The author argues that these two types of nationalism are not as distinct as many scholars suggest – indeed, so-called civic nationalism often has an ethnic basis. Specific to her case study, Vaughan shows how this spurious theoretical distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism has dogged Ethiopian politics and vitiated understanding of the country’s ethnic federalism. In doing so, Vaughan alerts us to the problem of disassociations between actual nationalisms and theories meant to help understand them.

Part 3 focuses on politics and the state. Collectively, the chapters in this section show that nationalism cannot be separated from the roles of politics and the machinery of state, and that, rather than speaking of the nation-state, it is often more accurate to refer to the state-nation. In Chapter 8,
Trevor Harrison examines the recent defeat of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the longer historical context of a wedding between militarism and nationalism in that country. The author argues that nationalist militarism has retained its appeal among some elements in Japan, yet not as a realistic option but as a quasi-quixotic nostalgia for past glories. More broadly, however, Harrison questions the (often implied) necessary connection between militarism and nationalism, asking whether it is possible to conceive of a form of nationalism that does not rely on, as Max Weber argued, the state as the legitimate possessor of instruments of coercion.

Japan’s LDP is an old established party, comprising of many members of that country’s traditional nationalist elite. Michael Rosie and Ross Bond, by contrast, examine in Chapter 9 the slow emergence over forty years of the Scottish National Party (SNP) from a political outsider to a major player in the Scottish political scene and (since 2007) the party of (minority) government in Scotland. Their examination of the party is an empirical one, focusing on the key socio-economic and political characteristics of contemporary SNP supporters, as well as often neglected areas such as gender, British identification, and political values. Beyond description, however, the authors also highlight the complexities and uncertainties of nationalist appeals. They show, in particular, that Scottish identification and support for political independence cuts across the political spectrum, somewhat in disregard of party support and endorsements of independence – a disjunction found in other nationalist contexts as well. Put differently, nationalists are neither obliged to do what they say nor say what they do, or would do, such that a federalist may become a secessionist and a separatist may settle for (con)federation.

Julián Castro-Rea’s Chapter 10 on Mexico closes out Part 3. Like Rosie and Bond, Castro-Rea alerts us to the often hastily assumed equivalence between the “state” – or political parties – and the cultural community (or communities/nations) within its borders, and an equally ahistoric assumption of ontological ethnocultural immanence present in most nationalist discourses. The author shows that Mexico is neither ethnically nor culturally homogeneous and debunks the assumption that a Mexican identity has been in place since the beginning of the movement for independence two hundred years ago – and has remained essentially the same – by showing how multiple, fluid, and changeable it has actually been: a state seeking nationhood above its diverse and often restless submerged nations, rather than a nation-state.
Introduction

For decades after the Mexican Revolution, the left-nationalist Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party), or PRI, governed and attempted to manufacture a unitary Mexican national identity, to build the nation as an imagined community. Faced with a debt crisis in the early 1980s, the PRI steadily began moving away from its leftist policies of autonomous socio-economic and socio-cultural development, embracing instead neo-liberal economic policies and thereby setting the stage for its defeat in 2000 by an even more “free enterprise” conservative party, the Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party), or PAN.

Economic liberalism is one ideological element of American-led globalization, but there are others. Chapter 11, the first chapter in Part 4, which explores the projection of nationalism onto the global stage, thus begins with Michael Parenti’s investigation of the ideological underpinnings of American nationalism and imperialism, noting both their messianic and fear-driven components. The author argues that the United States’ power is of unique reach and influence but notes — contra common assumptions (e.g., Bellah 2006) — that its messianic nationalism is not at all unique. Rather, it has many parallels with other nationalistic movements in history, some of which the author touches upon. These other movements lay to rest the notion (held by many Americans) that national virtue and world leadership or hegemony are uniquely American callings, but instead go far back into the past, and far and wide around the world.

In Chapter 12, Trevor Harrison likewise examines the confluence of religion and nationalism, but in the Middle East, and in the context of imperialism. Focusing on Islamic and Arab nationalisms, the author argues that Islamic fundamentalism must be understood as one of a series of competing forms or types of supranationalism. More specifically, he shows how the rise of Islamic nationalism since the early 1970s is at least in part a by-product of Western imperial actions, that the delegitimation of other (secular) forms of nationalism in the Middle East resulted in Islamic nationalism virtually becoming the “only game in town.” In doing so, Harrison draws attention to the need to understand nationalist phenomena as products not only of endogenous but also exogenous forces, not least of all the ones behind globalization. This is in tune with the notion that no phenomenon can be understood outside of its entire context.

Given the hyper-patriotism of the United States, and the history of nationalist conflicts elsewhere, it would be easy to denounce all nationalisms. As Laxer argues in Chapter 13, many writers on the political left since the
mid-1970s have certainly essentialized and condemned all nationalisms across the board. He argues, however, that not all nationalisms are alike and not all should be dismissed or opposed. Nationalism has such a variety of meanings and a history of association with most kinds of politics that it is both facile and incautious to be categorically for or against “it.” Moreover, in an era when the United States has reasserted its reach for a new form of global empire, progressive internationalist-nationalisms are being retrieved in struggles for national and popular sovereignty, their appeal being more than ever to international norms, rather than go-it-alone strategies. Ultimately, Laxer argues that what appear on the surface to be battles between disengaged elites and rooted citizens are, at a deeper level, struggles over class power, colonialism, and popular sovereignty. Thus seen, nationalism can be a progressive harbinger of the future – as it is in the cases of anti-colonial struggles or independence movements – and not a dead-end relic of the past.

Building on this notion of progressive nationalism, John Hannigan’s Chapter 14 takes nationalism in an even more unusual and fairly neglected direction. Nationalism and environmentalism are rarely examined as mutually related beyond reports on diverse nations’ adherence to various international treaties related to the environment, or criticisms for failing to do so. Hannigan brings the two issues together, however, showing that there lies a profound closeness between environmental policies and the national/ist interests of the political actors involved in international and intranational political arenas. On a parallel line with Laxer, he argues that environmentalism can thus be nationalist and internationalist, and nationalisms and internationalisms can be environmentally responsible or irresponsible. The author also brings into focus how environmental issues – especially that of global warming – may result in new forms of nationalism, some potentially more benign than its older forms, and others perhaps less so.

In conclusion, the aim of this volume is to raise questions about some existing hypotheses in the studies of nationalism, which, hallowed by tradition and the stature of their originators and inheritors, have acquired (or nearly acquired) the status of orthodoxies. The authors assembled in this volume challenge some of those orthodoxies that seek to give definitive explanations to the objects of their scrutiny, explanations that too often obscure more than they reveal. The human universe is far more tentative and incomplete than scholars tend to admit. To paraphrase Heraclitus, in studying nationalism, one can never step into the same stream twice, as no stream is a thing but a flow. No one paradigm can capture the endless
variety of nationalist streams. This volume is above all an invitation to explore the varieties of nationalism – idiosyncratic, contingent, whimsical, unpredictable as they often are – searching for the insights they give us into the human condition.

NOTE
1 Adrian Hastings (2006) traces nationalism back to medieval England, which he sees as a universal prototype. Aviel Roshwald (2006) traces it back to the Greeks and Jews of antiquity, arguing that both modern nations and nationalisms have their premodern precursors. Slobodan Drakulic (2008) traces the emergence of modern Croatian nationalism from its premodern forerunners of the early sixteenth century, arguing that the fountainheads of nationalism are multiple and varied.

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PART 1

THEORY AND HISTORY
Studies of nationalism emerged from attempts to understand the growing politicization of the old phenomenon of ethnocentrism and its fusion with dynastic, aristocratic, clerical, or plebeian patriotism (Hayes 1966 [1926], 6). In accord with then-prevailing evolutionist views of society, scholars dichotomized types of nations and nationalisms into progressive and regressive, historic and ahistoric, liberal and illiberal ones, and so on. The progressive or historic nationalisms were customarily associated with cradles of modernity – most narrowly, England and France or, more broadly, western Europe and North America – the presumed fountainheads of socio-historical progress. The regressive or ahistoric nationalisms were identified with the rest of the world.

The proponents of such dichotomies seem unperturbed by the proximity of their conceptual apparatus to ethnocentric, patriotic, nationalistic, or supranationalistic stereotypes – or their slight empirical anchorage. They fail to recognize that their categories are instances of academic nationalism poorly reflective of actual nations and nationalisms, and that they rationalize and reproduce prejudices about diverse races, ethnies, and regions. Seldom challenged, these prejudices are part of our intellectual heritage. This chapter is an examination of a few examples of academic nationalism, meant to illustrate my main points in the available space, not to be rounded or exhaustive.

Academic nationalist arguments are often circular. Modernity produces progressive, liberal, or civic nations, regions, and nationalisms, and thrives
amid such progressive, liberal, or civic areas free of nationalism or endowed with its benevolent forms. But where nationalism emerges in economically, politically, and culturally retarded nations or regions, it is perverted or distorted. This line of reasoning is often associated with proclamations of one’s own nation or region as the vanguard of the socio-historic progress of humanity.


Academic nationalism contains at least four orientations: Marxist, imperialist, Hesperian, and liberal. Marxist nationalism is here represented by Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, and Otto Bauer; imperialist nationalism, by John Acton, Ernest Renan, and Heinrich von Treitschke; Hesperian (supra)nationalism, by Carlton Hayes, Hans Kohn, Elie Kedourie, Isaiah Berlin, John Plamenatz, Anthony Smith, John Breuilly, Benedict Anderson, and George Schöpflin; and liberal nationalism by Yael Tamir and Will Kymlicka.

Marxist Nationalism

Within the Marxist Weltanschauung, capitalism transcends premodern societies and prepares terrain for its own overcoming by the communist revolution. Whatever accelerates these processes is progressive; whatever hampers them is regressive. In 1845, young Marx and Engels judged nationalism as regressive “egoism of the nation” (1975 [1845], 119), and Engels denounced it as “that blasting curse, national pride” or “nothing but wholesale selfishness” (1975 [1845], 298, emphasis in original). By 1848, they concluded that “national differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily ... vanishing” (Marx and Engels 1976 [1848], 503). That made nationalism despicable and sentenced to perdition by history.

A decade later, Engels re-emerged as an ardent exponent of the egoism he disparaged as a youth. This was in 1859, when a Franco-Piedmontese
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alliance defeated Austria, and Prussia feared Louis Napoleon’s designs in Rhineland. In a spirit worthy of Bismarck, Engels (1980 [1859], 254) argued that “the big and viable European nations” should have “their real natural frontiers ... determined by language and fellow-feeling,” while “the remnants of peoples ... no longer capable of national existence, remain incorporated into the larger nations and either merge into them or are conserved as merely ethnographic relics with no political significance.” Such “remnants of peoples” excluded the Irish (Marx 1985 [1867]; Marx and Engels 1971 [1867]), who enjoyed Engels’ affection (perhaps because of his amorous liaisons), but Austrian Slavs received his ire. Engels dismissed their national aspirations as “antihistorical,” took their subjugation as proof of their “lack of viability” and regressiveness, and “either denied or else commended as beneficial” the German and Magyar policy of their subjugation (Rosdolsky 1986 [1948], 111; also Ritter 1976).

Engels’ apology for Austro-Magyar dominance over the Slavs was not his sole expression of German nationalism. He also argued that “if the map of Europe is to be revised, we Germans have the right to demand that it be done thoroughly and impartially, and that Germany should not ... make all the sacrifices alone,” adding that “we Germans” should “trade the Po, the Mincio, the Adige and all the Italian rubbish for unity ... which alone can make us strong internally and externally.” Thereafter, “the defensive can come to an end,” and attack commence, at “some sore points where this will be necessary” (Engels, 1980 [1859], 254-55). The likely objects of German attacks were Austria and Russia, roadblocks to German unification and expansion. The founders of Marxism have thus bequeathed us an odd admixture of internationalism and nationalism (Wolfe 1958).

This concoction resurfaces in Vladimir Lenin, although subtler than Engels’. Shortly before the October Revolution, Lenin (1974 [1916], 143) argued that capitalism cannot evolve any further, and that it was time to replace it by socialism, based upon the “full equality of nations” and “the right of nations to self determination” and “independence.” There should also be “complete freedom to agitate for secession” and to organize “a referendum on secession by the seceding nation” (146). However, socialism would not preserve ethnic diversity, because it aims “not only to end the division of mankind into tiny states and the isolation of nations” and “bring the nations closer together but [also] to integrate them” (146). Clearly, ethnic integration in Russia would approximate assimilation, with Lenin’s own Russians singularly positioned to “integrate” others. This became obvious with Joseph Stalin.
Shortly before the First World War, Lenin dispatched Stalin to study nationalism in the multi-ethnic city of Vienna and report back (Deutscher 1976, 128–29). Stalin (1936, 13) concluded that nationalism had emerged with “the epoch of rising capitalism,” when the British, French, Germans, Italians, and others “formed themselves into nations” and “independent national states,” which occurred across western Europe – excepting Ireland, once again (14). However, “matters proceeded somewhat differently in Eastern Europe,” where “multinational states were formed, each consisting of several nationalities,” such as Austria-Hungary and Russia. Being “politically the most developed” or “the most adapted for the state organisation,” the Germans and Magyars undertook to “amalgamate” their “nationalities.” In Russia, “the role of welder of nationalities was assumed by the Great-Russians” (13).

Stalin ignored the existence of hegemonic ethnies and subjugated minorities in Britain and France, amalgamated into the majority’s ethnic images. Moreover, while proclaiming the right to self-determination in theory, Stalin later on denied it in practice by hailing “the right of nations and colonies to political secession and the formation of independent states” (1936, 111) and by “encouraging the backward nations to raise themselves to the cultural and economic level of the more advanced nations” (115).

Stalin went to Vienna aware of a group of Marxists writing about nations and nationalism in Austria-Hungary. Known as the Austro-Marxists, they included Max Adler, Otto Bauer, Rudolf Hilferding, and Karl Renner – and Austrian Marxists they were indeed.

In 1907, Otto Bauer argued that “common history” is the matchless constitutive element of nationhood that “determines and produces” all others: common descent, language, mores, customs, laws, and religion (Bottomore and Goode 1978, 102). This implies that regions inhabited by an ethnic minority belong to the dominant ethnos by historical right. In Austria-Hungary, that would pertain to the lands with Italian, Romanian, and Slavic majorities. Bauer averred that they shared “a common cultural traditions,” their linguistic differences of secondary importance (102–3). This claim is vacuous, because the Bosnian Muslims shared limited cultural traditions with any ethnies in Austria-Hungary, including their Slavic kin. Likewise, the Serbs and many Ukrainians were Christian but not Catholic, so they did not readily identify with Catholic Slavs, nor did the latter unhesitatingly accept them as kin.

Besides, the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had not lived jointly long enough for a “common cultural tradition” to evolve: Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats, Muslims, and Serbs were brought under the
Hapsburg aegis in 1878; most of Dalmatia, Istria, and the Republic of Dubrovnik in 1815; and southern Poland in 1795. Most Slavs shared more history and culture with their Slavic kin abroad than with Austro-Germans and Magyars. Finally, most Slavs, Italians, and Romanians felt distinct from the Austrians and Magyars by the selfsame constitutive elements of nationality Bauer regarded as inessential: ethnicity and language. His Austrian commonwealth was thus a myth obscuring the fact of Austro-German and Magyar domination over ethnic minorities within the Hapsburg Empire (R.W. Seton-Watson 1915, 121-61). Behind the Austro-Marxist federalism and internationalism lurked Austro-German nationalism.

Five decades after Stalin’s sojourn in Vienna, two Soviet authors proclaimed that “the problem of nationalities has been solved in the Soviet Union” with “full equality of rights between races and nationalities” having become reality (Tsamerian and Ronin 1962, 9). Somewhat later, Julian Bromley (1982, 267, 269-70) concluded that “the elimination of national inequality” and “integration of the peoples of the USSR” in “a new historical community” of “the Soviet people” has been accomplished. A while later, the historical community of the Soviet people had disintegrated into its supposedly integrated constituent republics and peoples, amid manifold ethnic acrimonies.

The last Yugoslav constitution, promulgated in 1974, dealt similarly with the “national question.” The wordy document pronounced “the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession,” as the way to “realize and ensure” the proclaimed “brotherhood and unity” of its “nations and nationalities” (Trifunovska 1994, 224). A while later, fraternal Yugoslav ethnies were seceding from each other, having restricted brotherhood and unity to their own ethnos. Engels’ “wholesale selfishness” had triumphed over communist internationalism.

Most Marxist theorists failed to comprehend nationalism because they were critical of it in principle, but when dealing with their own nation and nationalism, they became nationalistic. The failure to transcend nationalism in theory led to an inability to bridle it in practice. The proletarians of the world have therefore repeatedly united – not behind the revolutionary banners but behind their national flags – to slaughter each other at the bidding of their national vanguards. This inability of socialism to emancipate itself from nationalism lay in its incapacity to transcend the horizon of a hierarchical social world protected by the nation-state.

In such a world, some ethnic elites are positioned closer to the state power than others, and that compels the marginalized elites to compete for influence within the status quo or seek to secede and create their own
polities. That is what brought the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia down (Brubaker 1996, 23-54) and is what threatens other social systems, as we shall see. This is not to say that all Marxists are nationalists – because Rosa Luxemburg and Antonio Gramsci were not, for instance – but only that even this purportedly internationalist intellectual tradition was more than spottily tinged with nationalism.

Imperialist Nationalism

This type of nationalism appears in multiple garbs – liberal, conservative, socialist, or theocratic – but its basic trait is the demand for, or defence of, an empire controlled by one’s own ethnic or national elite. I will examine its three representatives from Britain, France, and Germany.

John Acton’s essay on nationality reflects and vindicates a hierarchical social world organized into empires and nation-states, and its ultimate concern is the British Empire, curiously vindicated by a Catholic. Manifestly critical of ethno-nationalism as a regressive social force, Acton (1972 [1862], 166) hails the multi-ethnic states, claiming that “the progress of society ... depends on the mixture of races under the same government.” This premise authorizes him to conclude that “those states” are “substantially the most perfect which, like the British and Austrian Empires, include various distinct nationalities without oppressing them.” To resist such perfection would be “a retrograde step in history” (168), or a rejection of progress.

Aware that an empirical examination of the treatment of Austrian and British colonies would debunk his claims to those empires’ majestic benevolence, Acton bypassed it. He mentions “Irish agitation” (Acton 1972 [1862], 154), but not the recent British quashing of the Sepoy insurrection in India. That matches his view that “barbarous or sunken nations” should be raised to “a higher level” by subjugation to their civilized progressive superiors (162). The “progress of civilization” requires that smaller states wishing “to maintain their integrity” should “attach themselves ... to greater Powers, and thus lose something of their independence” (165) or else become “impediments to the progress of society” (166). And while acceding that in a multi-ethnic state “the inferior races are exterminated, or reduced to servitude, or outlawed, or put in a condition of dependence” (168), Acton maintains that this “problem ... is solved in England” (167).

Acton’s claims that ethnic domination was overcome in England and the British Empire, that peoples are either progressive or regressive, and that imperialism represents progress make him an English ethno-nationalist and
European supranationalist. His critique of nationalism is mainly reserved for the subjugated peoples seeking independence from their imperial masters.

Like Acton’s essay, Ernest Renan’s Sorbonne lecture is a manifest critique of nationalism. Renan’s rejection (1996 [1882], 27) of “the primordial right of race” and ethnically homogeneous polities could be an early critique of ethnocracy, were it not meant to delegitimize Germany’s occupation of Alsace and Lorraine. But instead of confronting German nationalism as a French nationalist, Renan donned his academic garb and lectured that ethnically homogeneous societies were a historical anachronism, and that “the fact of race was ... of absolute primacy” among the “tribes and cities of antiquity” (27), transcended by modern societies.

This is nonsense: the tribes and cities of antiquity were less preoccupied with racial and ethnic boundaries than with narrower kinship and citizenship. That is why the Hellenes could join the Persian armies and fight against Athens, Sparta, or Macedon, why tribal societies often adopted outsiders, and why ancient city-states allowed immigration and naturalization, albeit reluctantly.

To Acton, England was most perfect. To Renan, France was such, praise-worthy for its ethnic tolerance. It is “to France’s honour,” he gasconaded, that “it never sought to obtain linguistic unity through coercive measures,” whereas “Prussians, who now speak only German, spoke a Slav language a few centuries ago,” and “Welsh speak English,” and “Egyptians speak Arabic” after forcible assimilation (Renan 1996 [1882], 37). Yet Renan’s compatriot Émile Durkheim (1966 [1895], 3) testified that although “not obliged to speak French with [his] fellow-countrymen,” he “cannot possibly do otherwise,” and Eugen Weber (1976) has shown that France’s minorities were obliged to speak French at the time Renan extolled France’s tolerance, and that French linguistic unity did involve coercive measures.

Renan’s praise of France’s mythical ethnic tolerance, his subtle claiming of Alsace and Lorraine, and his condemnation of ethnically homogeneous nations as anachronistic amount to ethnic and imperialist nationalism — not a critique of nationalism as such, but of nationalisms threatening his nation.

While Renan lectured at the Sorbonne, Heinrich von Treitschke (1914, 58) lectured in Berlin about how “we Germans are today in an unfortunate position” because “the sub-German peoples” are beginning “to awake to self-assertion.” This was a problem because “we [Germans] wish and ought to take our share in the domination of the world by the white race,” as part of “our tasks of civilization” (55). Namely, “the aim of human culture will be the
aristocracy of the white race over the whole earth,” and “the importance of a nation will ultimately depend upon what share it has in the domination of the transatlantic world” (109).

This sort of supremacism found its anchorage in Charles Darwin’s socio-biological notions (1874, 699) of “less civilized nations” and “more civilized races,” adopted by the socialists and imperialists. They shared the logic of Rudyard Kipling’s supremacist lament (1956 [1899], 444) in the “White man’s burden”:

Take up the White Man’s burden –
Send forth the best ye breed –
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives’ need;
To wait in heavy harness
On fluttered folk and wild –
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half devil and half child.

Such apologies for imperialism have encountered ideological and political resistance. The former are well represented by Mahatma Gandhi’s nationalist claim (1993, 35-36) that India “has nothing to learn from anybody else,” least of all from “this cursed modern civilization.” In different form and context, such arguments are formulated by Islamist nationalists, discussed by Trevor Harrison in Chapter 12. Their ideological antagonist is Western or Hesperian nationalism, my next topic.

**Hesperian Nationalism**

The presumption of this ( supra )nationalism is that the so-called Western world is different from, and superior to, other regions. Its primacy is claimed on three grounds: that nationalisms in the West are older than others, that they are more civil or liberal than others, and that nationalism in the West (or parts thereof) has withered away, unlike elsewhere. Hesperian nationalism censures separatism and irredentism – unless they threaten some enemies of the West. Whereas its imperialist cousin vindicates an imperial nation-state, Hesperian nationalism supports an imperial alliance revolving around a hegemonic power.

Hesperian nationalism is associated with the rarely discussed pan-Anglo-supranationalism, historically rooted in British imperialism and British-American alliances. In tune with the Cold War transmutation of the former
enemies (such as Germany) into allies, Hesperian nationalists have expanded their embrace. That is revealed by three claims, discussed below, related to seniority, civility, and cosmopolitanism.

**Hesperian Seniority**

Like its imperialist cousin, Hesperian nationalism is manifestly critical of nationalism and latently and selectively supportive of it. In Carlton Hayes’s work (1966 [1926], 6), nationalism is “a modern emotional fusion and exaggeration of two very old phenomena – nationality and patriotism,” or “a proud and boastful habit of mind about one’s own nation, accompanied by a supercilious or hostile attitude toward other nations” – a “mania, a kind of extended and exaggerated egotism” bearing “easily recognisable symptoms of selfishness, intolerance, and jingoism.” Quite “artificial” and “far from ennobling,” nationalism is “patriotic snobbery” (275, emphasis in original).

Yet nationalism is also “a prime characteristic of modern civilization,” engendered in western Europe and then spread abroad, stirring “Hindus and Chinese and Turks and Filipinos and the most outlandish peoples” (Hayes 1931, 288). One might note, however, that the assumed European leadership and outlandishness of non-Europeans is an instance of a “boastful habit of mind” Hayes otherwise condemned.

The dichotomy between the advanced and retarded ethnies and nations reappears in Hans Kohn’s postulate (1945, 330) that “all rising nationalism and the whole modern social and intellectual development outside Western Europe were influenced by the West, which for a long time remained the teacher and the model.”

This claim of Hesperian seniority was taken over by Elie Kedourie (1998, 23), who viewed nationalism as “largely a doctrine of national self-determination” invented in early-nineteenth-century Europe in response to the ailments of modern social life – “oppression, alienation, and impoverishment of the spirit” (xv). Nationalists see humanity as “naturally divided into nations” and consider “self-government” to be “the only legitimate type.” Having been “firmly naturalized in ... the West,” nationalism was adopted by “the whole world” (1).

The same evolutionary scheme appears in the writings of Isaiah Berlin (1972, 15), who saw nationalism as an ideology emergent “at the end of the Middle Ages in the West, particularly in France,” where it became “a coherent doctrine.” It subsequently emerged in Germany “in the conceptions of the *Volksgeist* and *Nationalgeist*” of Johann Gottfried Herder, and then spread beyond its cradles and changed its character – for the worse.
The Hesperian seniority claim underpins Benedict Anderson’s hypothesis (1991) that west European nationalisms were modular and ready for export in the late eighteenth century, whence the Haitian slaves acquired them in 1790. Such a claim surprises in an author who argues “that an unselfconscious provincialism had long skewed and distorted theorizing on the subject” of nationalism because “European scholars” were “accustomed to the conceit that everything important in the modern world originated in Europe” (xiii).

Eurocentrism nevertheless seeped into Anderson’s work, reducing the complex social geneses of nationalism to a hazy export-import scheme duplicating the logic of capitalism. And while pointing out “the role of the local colonial state, rather than the metropole, in styling of ... nationalisms” (Anderson 1991, xiii), Anderson failed to accommodate it in his work. He seemingly forgot Tom Nairn’s obliging rejection of the dissemination hypothesis, although he quoted it: “Actual repetition and dissemination are scarcely ever possible, whether politically, economically, socially, or technologically, because the universe is already too much altered by the first cause one is copying” (156; Nairn 1977, 18).

Nationalism was neither diffused by emulation nor invented by Europeans, as Anderson (1991, 67) well knew when he wrote that “the close of the era of successful national liberation movements in the Americas coincided rather closely with the onset of the age of nationalism in Europe.” Yet his inadvertent Eurocentrism made him miss the fact that the American Creoles were not the global vanguard of nationalism either. Their movements were simultaneous with, or subsequent to, those of the Inca in 1780, which failed (Owens 1963, 35; Crow 1992, 404-8); the uprising of the Haitian Black Jacobins in 1791, who won (C.L.R. James 1989); or the Serbian uprisings of 1804 and 1815, the first defeated, the second moderately successful (Jelavich 1983, 193-204).

Anderson’s claim that the American Creoles led the way in the emergence of nationalism is questionable on other grounds. The United States could be a model for Afrikaners – who would not accept Africans as compatriots even if culturally assimilated – but not for the Magyars, who wanted the assimilated Romanians and Slavs as compatriots. The emergent nations could not emulate older European monarchies either, because – as Anderson (1991, 83) himself put it – “the fundamental legitimacy of most of these dynasties had nothing to do with nationalness.”
In sum, the Hesperian seniority hypothesis is an epistemologically simplistic and empirically vacuous continuation of nationalism by academic means – and so is the Hesperian civility hypothesis.

Hesperian Civility
This hypothesis dichotomizes nationalisms into civic or liberal categories in the West and ethnic or illiberal ones elsewhere. Kohn (1945, 457) has ascribed this dichotomy to the transplantation of novel Western ideas, including nationalism, to divergent social contexts, where they “encountered ... a great diversity of institutional and social conditions” atypical of western Europe, “and were shaped and modified by them.” This resulted in “different types of nationalism – one based upon liberal middle-class concepts and pointing to a consummation in a democratic world society, the other based upon irrational and pre-enlightened concepts and tending towards exclusiveness.”

Kedourie linked this fall of nationalism from its original civility to ethnic barbarism with the aftermath of the First World War. The triumphant Anglo-Americans, momentarily able “to bind and loose for the whole world,” faced a host of “claimants and suppliants” seeking nationhood at peace conferences, as discussed in Chapter 3 by Liliana Riga and James Kennedy. These supplicants erroneously interpreted the English tradition of civil and religious freedom and liberty in terms of nationality (Kedourie 1998, 128-29), engendering uncivil nationalism.

John Plamenatz (1973, 29) reiterated the Hesperian civility hypothesis by arguing that in the West, although “not entirely liberal,” nationalism “was so more often than not.” Any illiberal nationalism found there is limited to the peoples “defeated in war or disappointed in victory,” like the Germans and Italians. Liberal Western nationalism is cultural, akin to patriotism or “devotion to the community,” and “a lively sense of, and perhaps also a pride in,” one’s cultural identity (24). Illiberal “eastern nationalism” is political, found among the Slavs, Africans, and Asians (23, 30), who “argue that people who share the same culture should be united in one political community” (25). Progressive ethnies, such as the English and French, thus face the regressive ones – among the Africans, Asians, and Slavs (26, 34). The latter generate an “eastern kind” of nationalism, “imitative and competitive” because their “ancestral cultures are not adapted” to Western ideas and practices (33-34).

Anthony Smith (1971, 8) espouses the same dichotomy in terms of regional variances in the power and spread of nationalism – lower in “the
more secure Anglo-Saxon countries, where there was no special need to emphasise a doctrine of self-determination for the oppressed” – Northern Ireland notwithstanding. Such Anglo-centric contentions persist in Smith’s subsequent work (1994; 2000, 6-10; 2001) – his critique of Eurocentrism in social theory (Smith 2004, 102) notwithstanding. His caveat that “every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms” (Smith 1991, 13) does not transcend the dichotomy. It merely loosens it.

George Schöpflin (2001) likewise accedes that “all nations have both civic and ethnic dimension,” but not equally, because the central and eastern European nations had “to call themselves into existence without pre-national state institutions, to mobilise on the basis of culture – particularly language” (60). Furthermore, “a fairly well developed society with growing literacy, including the rise of a civil society, with aristocracy, gentry, bourgeoisie, peasantry, and the beginnings of an industrial working class” emerged in the West, while “the East had only an aristocracy and a peasantry, and sometimes only peasantry” (61).

Actually, western Europe was neither liberal nor civil when nationalism emerged, which Kohn places between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. England’s elites were building an empire marked by racialized slavery, forcible assimilation of the Celts, and palpable residues of feudalism. Their illiberalism triggered American separatism, yet the presumably liberal United States maintained slavery longer than the illiberal Russia. With its feudalism and its lingering apartheid, the United States was an unlikely model of civic and liberal nationalism before 1965.

France may have been democratic for a while after 1789, but its nationalism was ethnic when its revolutionary army famously roared “Vive la Nation” before the Battle of Valmy in 1792. The allegedly progressive, civic, and liberal France abolished slavery in 1794 – five years after proclaiming that all men are equal and three years after Haitian slaves had liberated themselves from their French masters by force. Danton and Robespierre were skeptical about the abolition act, but hoping it might induce those “Black Jacobins” to fight against Britain and Spain, they condoned it (C.L.R. James 1989, 137-42). This means that Haitian insurrectionists guided the reluctant French revolutionists toward civility – albeit momentarily – not vice versa. French nationalism became even more pronouncedly ethnic during Napoleon’s conquests, kindling German, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and other nationalisms in response.
Schöpflin’s assertion that West European polities had pre-national state institutions and that their eastern counterparts did not is groundless. Of today’s larger West European polities, Denmark, England, France, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland had so-called pre-national state institutions, but so did their neighbours to the east: Austria in the Hapsburg Empire and Hungary in its own kingdom and the Hapsburg Empire; Croatia, as a kingdom within Hungary and the Hapsburg Empire; Germany, in the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation and diverse German states; Italy, in Genoa, Milan, Venice, and so on; Lithuania and Poland, in the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom; Romania, in Moldavia, Transylvania, and Wallachia; Montenegro, in its ethno-theocracy, which promulgated a legal code in 1798 (Petrović-Njegoš 1992 [1903]); Russia, after Ivan the Terrible; and Turkey, in the Ottoman Empire. In sum, Europe is not as divergent as Kohn, Plamenatz, and Schöpflin have portrayed it.

The same goes for social-structural dichotomies, with a complex West facing a simple East split into aristocracy and peasantry. Some eastern European societies – such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Turkey – had sizable gentries, and no society consisted of peasantry alone. The Ottoman Muslim elites ruled over a complex society in which even the subjugated Christians had their notables, clerics, merchants, and even nobility (in the Phanariotes), and mutinous Christian Albanian, Montenegrin, and Herzegovinian tribes had their chieftains, prelates, and notables.

Since Columbus, the main trade areas were around the oceans and seas, with trading routes connecting the Americas, India, China, the Ottoman Empire, and Mediterranean and Baltic regions. The main European land routes traversed Germany, France, Italy, and eastern Europe. Western merchants traded with their colleagues in Archangel, Dubrovnik, Istanbul, Odessa, Alexandria, and beyond, and their commodities were produced by the artisans and workers nearby and afar. And so, Europe again emerges as socio-historically unified, rather than rent asunder.

Moreover, the civil-ethnic dichotomy is misleading because nationalism is ethnic even in its supranational Hesperian incarnations. The difference between nationalism and supranationalism is in the breadth of ethnic identification, not in its presence or absence. Hesperian supranationalism privileges the West because its proponents’ ethnies belong to it, and the same applies to the claim that unlike the Rest, the West is cosmopolitan – my next issue.
Hesperian Cosmopolitanism

Although the Hesperian civility hypothesis recognizes benign Western nationalisms, this one depicts some Western ethnies, nations, or regions as free of nationalism or as cosmopolitan. Kedourie (1998, 143) thus avows that in “Great Britain and the United States of America ... nationalism is unknown,” and supports his claim by making notional distinctions between patriotism, xenophobia, and nationalism: “Patriotism, affection for one’s country, or one’s group, loyalty to its institutions, and zeal for its defence, is a sentiment known among all kinds of men; so is xenophobia, which is dislike of the stranger, the outsider, and reluctance to admit him into one’s own group” (68). Nationalism is “largely a doctrine of national self-determination” (23), so it is “therefore, loose and inexact to speak ... of British or American nationalism when describing the thought of those who recommend loyalty to British or American political institutions” (68).

Whatever nationalism may persist in Britain and the United States, Kedourie opines, it would be among the “marginal and insignificant” groups (1998, 69; also Kaufmann and Zimmer 2004). Otherwise, Britain and the United States – their histories of slavery, apartheid, genocide, and forcible assimilation (Elkins 1959; Banton 1967, 1998; Hechter 1975) notwithstanding – are cosmopolitan bastions to be emulated by nations wishing to transcend nationalism.

Within Kedourie’s Weltanschauung, nationalism persists beyond the United Kingdom and the United States, and in problematic forms because of the confusion of civil liberty and national self-determination by non-Anglo-Americans (1998, 128-29). However, his separation of self-determination from civil liberty contradicts at least one liberal view on this issue. Namely, John Stuart Mill (1991 [1863], 392) argued that “one hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves.” Contrary to Mill’s affirmation of collective freedom as an expression of civil liberty, Kedourie (1998, 128) denounces quests for collective freedom as its negation. It would follow that demands for independence from Britain, Canada, or the United States by the Scots, the Québécois, or the Iroquois would violate the “old English tradition of civil ... freedom.” If so, Kedourie’s ramparts of freedom – Britain and the United States – appear like ethnic detention camps, not the cosmopolitan havens of liberty and civility.

Actually, Britain and the United States were never citadels of cosmopolitanism fighting uncivil and illiberal nationalist hordes at their gates, but
polities with nationalisms specific to their histories. In Lawrence James's words (1996, 215), “Britain entered the twentieth century as the world’s greatest imperial power,” which “was widely trumpeted by politicians and journalists, along with platitudes about dispensing civilisation to those who lacked it,” while a “reassuring propaganda ... emphasised national greatness and the innate strengths of the Anglo-Saxon character.” If so, British patriotism is an instance of imperialist nationalism – and moreover, nationalism and patriotism are not dichotomous. “Patriotism” is just another word for “nationalism,” there being no profound divergence between the two: patriots love the country they have, and nationalists want a country to love – hardly a difference worthy of fundamental distinctions.

The Hesperian cosmopolitanism hypothesis has found another proponent in Isaiah Berlin (1972, 18), who claimed that nationalism thrives beyond the English-speaking world, among aggrieved, historically frustrated, oppressed peoples, such as the early-nineteenth-century Poles, Germans, Italians, and Balkan peoples, or latter-day Africans and Asians. Whereas the world’s marginal peoples burn with nationalist passion, “the West has, by and large, satisfied that hunger for recognition,” the denial of which “more than any other cause, seems to lead to nationalist excesses” (30). Perhaps because of his Anglocentrism and Zionism (Miller 2005), Berlin did not clarify who denies recognition to whom in the world, and whether that denial may be rooted in the deniers’ own nationalism. Moreover, it is difficult to perceive the United States’ Security Strategy proclamation of “the safety of the nation, its citizens, and its way of life” (G.H.W. Bush 1990, 3) and “defending our nation against its enemies” (G.W. Bush 2002, iii) as expressions of cosmopolitanism, but rather of imperialism, as Eric Hobsbawm (2008, 61) remarks – the United States’ official strategy documents’ defensive verbal posture notwithstanding.

By the late twentieth century, the Hesperian cosmopolitanism hypothesis had become a rarely challenged orthodoxy supported by prominent scholars in the field. John Breuilly (1994, 397) thus argues that “there are still areas of the world where the sort of situation which originally generated nationalism continues to exist,” such as eastern Europe. In “the developed world,” contrariwise, “states are increasingly concerned with the effective management of more or less free market economies, [and so] the conditions for the emergence of such nationalist movements largely cease to exist” (400).

There is slender empirical evidence that economically advantaged capitalist polities are immune to nationalist challenges. The record of secessions in the West attests to that: Belgium in 1830 (Kossmann 1978), the
Confederate States of America in 1860-65 (Faust 1988), Norway in 1905 (Haugland 1980), Ireland in 1921 (Cullen 1980), Iceland in 1944 (Karlsson 1980), Scotland since 1979 (Devine 2000; and Rosie and Bond, this volume), Quebec since 1980 (Lévesque 1979; Trudeau 1991; Keating 1997), or the restive northern (and other) regions of Italy since 1980 (Ginsborg 2001).

Market economies engender separatism by unequal regional development, which prompts indigent ethnies to separate from their perceived oppressors and exploiters, as in Northern Ireland (See 1986; Cox 1997), or wealthier ethnies to secede from their perceived parasitic kin, as in northern Italy (Ginsborg 2001). There is thus little reason for nationalism to disappear where market economies prevail, and Hesperian cosmopolitanism may therefore be better understood as a supranationalist ideology of neoinperialist capitalist expansion, euphemistically named globalization. And now we turn to liberal nationalism.

Liberal Nationalism
This hypothesis is a variant of Hesperian nationalism that acknowledges the presence of nationalism in its own nation but claims that, unlike others, it is liberal, civil, and tolerant – because of the liberal, civil, and tolerant character of its polity. Among its advocates is Yael Tamir (1993, 83), who contrasts liberal western European nationalism against its illiberal eastern European counterpart, replete with cultural or ethnic nationalism that “verges on the pathological.” The former is “modeled on the Enlightenment”; it “broadly follows humanistic tradition” and “requires a state of mind characterized by tolerance and respect of diversity for members of one’s own group and for outsiders” (90).

In principle, liberal nationalism is associated with the “liberal state,” which should be “a neutral mediator and ... an honest broker of individual interests, forbidden to promote or express any particular life-plan or conception of the good, and ensuring all members an equal chance to pursue their individually defined goals.” In practice, however, the “liberal state has ... continued to operate” like “the modern nation-state and to see itself as a community with a distinctive culture, history, and collective destiny” (Tamir 1993, 141). Tamir recognizes the tension between the ideal and reality here but dismisses it as “endogenous to any liberal national entity” and one that “cannot be resolved” (163).

I disagree. The said tension is not endogenous to any species of national entities but to those imbued with self-styled liberal nationalism, which
nevertheless remains a mélange of ethnocentrism and patriotism. In principle, or within the ivory towers, liberal, civil, tolerant, and egalitarian; in practice, authoritarian, anti-egalitarian, and oppressive, as Noam Chomsky (1999), Edward Said (2000), and others have argued about Tamir’s own Israel – in their scholarly and polemical works alike – nominally liberal for all, but actually such only for its titular ethno-religious majority. And there is nothing exceptional about Israel in this. The nation-states have historically been the states of some ethnies more than of others, in liberal or any other polities, and that is because of their statism, which inevitably stratifies ethnies as it does individuals and social groups.

Will Kymlicka (1997, 41) likewise distinguishes between the liberal and illiberal nations, suggesting that the former should liberalize the latter. For instance, “Flemish, Scottish and Quebec nationalisms are liberal, because Belgium, Britain and Canada are long-standing liberal-democracies,” and “Serb, Ukranian and Slovak nationalisms are illiberal, because they emerged in illiberal states” (42). Illiberal nations could conceivably be liberalized by “marketing” liberal nationalism, such as Canada’s (Kymlicka 2004). With Canada’s past treatment of Native and other peoples in mind, one wonders what is so civil and liberal around here to be marketed abroad as a solvent for illiberal ethnic maladies. Canada has been labelled an unjust society (Cardinal 1999), or even genocidal (Davis and Zannis 1973), and recurrent conflicts between First Nations peoples and settler populations and authorities suggest that Canada has little civil and liberal commodities to market abroad.

In sum, liberal nationalism is ethnic – like any other – and its unfounded claims to civility and tolerance are so many instances of a “boastful habit of mind.” In response to likely rejoinders that Canada or the United States may have harboured illiberal nationalism once upon a time – but not any longer – I can only say that nationalism with a conscience is likely to make such patriotic claims.

Conclusion
Studies of nationalism have heretofore too often theorized nationalism in nationalistic terms, driven by the authors’ ethnic, national, regional, or geopolitical loyalties. We therefore need to critically re-examine this field of work and devise epistemological and methodical guidelines that may steer us away from academic nationalism. That brings us to the old methodological problem of how to scrutinize an object we are part of.
To understand human actions, we should empathize with the actors, but if we are akin to them we may easily slip from empathetic to sympathetic understanding and condone in our neighbours what we indict in foreigners. Ethnocentrism and patriotism imbibed through socialization – a heretofore largely ignored issue raised by Karen Stanbridge in Chapter 2 – makes some forms of behaviour intuitively normal or commendable and others abnormal or condemnable. We are thus emotionally attached to our linguistic, religious, cultural, or regional kin, and detached from others. It is therefore easier to recognize problematic phenomena abroad and ignore them in our neighbourhood, and to exaggerate or minimize dis/similarities between various ethnies, nations, or regions – more in tune with our upbringing than with scholarship.

To get past such cognitive entrapments requires an approach that clearly states our presumptions, rigorously and evenly examines all phenomena under scrutiny, and provides comparative evidence qualitatively and quantitatively adequate to carry our conclusions beyond reasonable doubt. This is not to say that we should not harbour any ethnic, national, or regional sympathies or antipathies, but we must not present them as theories or facts. We would do well not to write about ethnies, nations, or regions we adore or loathe – or write about them but state our partiality. We should not write about topics we are superficially acquainted with – or declare our limitations. We should refrain from portraying ethnies, nations, or regions as extraordinary unless a demonstrable idiosyncrasy compels us to do so. And last but not least, we should have no faith in orthodoxies, because faith is myopic, or worse.

NOTE
This chapter, the one on Balkan enmities (Chapter 4), and this volume’s Introduction and Conclusion would have been notably more metaphysical and less transparent without Trevor Harrison’s tireless straightening of the many meanders of thought and formulation I have repeatedly ventured upon (with pleasure). Any remainders of such escapades either eluded my perceptive colleague’s gaze, or he had no heart to ruffle my intellectual feathers any further. My thanks also go to the two UBC Press readers – for their criticisms and compliments alike.

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