Contemporary Chinese Studies

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Preface:
Lisbon, Xuzhou, Auschwitz: Suffering as History
Timothy Brook

St. Paul’s Hospital in the city of Gui’dé was the site of an incongruous celebration on New Year’s Day 1939. Gui’dé (now Shangqiu) sits on the flatlands of Henan, south of the Yellow River. The first major city to the east is Xuzhou, where, for the first five months of 1938, Chinese forces had fought to resist the Japanese invasion. As long as the battling forces focused on Xuzhou, Gui’dé lay far enough away to escape the turmoil. But when the Chinese defence of Xuzhou collapsed on 14 May 1938, the region was plunged into what Diana Lary has called “a ghastly limbo.” Gui’dé was one of the innumerable places to suffer the consequences.

The invaders arrived in Gui’dé two weeks after the fall of Xuzhou. For the next three months, they sealed the city and stripped it of its assets. The one institution they could not dispossess was St. Paul’s Hospital, which medical missionaries from the Anglican Church of Canada had founded in 1912. Like foreign residents elsewhere in the territories that came under Japanese occupation, the Canadians remained at their post as the Japanese advanced, demarcating the hospital as a safety zone. Over 3,000 local people, most of them women, took refuge there. They suffered, but as survivors, not victims. St. Paul’s had to close its refugee camp at the end of the summer, but it continued to function as the one hospital to which Chinese felt they could safely turn for medical help.

As 1938 came to an end, the situation in Gui’dé was still grim. Dr. H.H. Gilbert, the director of the hospital as well as the chair of the Kweiteh [Gui’dé] Area Relief Committee, reported back to Canada that few Christians were in the mood to celebrate Christmas: “How could you expect the people to throw themselves whole-heartedly into celebrations when their country had been lost to an enemy invader, they themselves enslaved in the reaches of a military ogre, and their fellow countrymen in other parts of the land fighting and dying and suffering in defence of their homeland!” Despite all that they had suffered, people converged on the hospital from all over the city and the surrounding countryside on New Year’s Day 1939 to present the Anglican missionaries with memorials of gratitude for the work the hospital staff had done to ease their suffering. Some of these memorials were carved into wood and others written on silk, but five were incised into stone steles two metres tall. Two of the stones were presented by delegations from the North Suburb – one of them from the...
Muslims of the North Suburb – and the other three were donated by elders of
the villages to the north, west, and east of the hospital. One was marked with
the crest of the Henan Diocese of the Anglican Church, and another carried
a Union Jack and a Red Cross flag painted in colour. The steles were erected
at the entrance leading from the forecourt into the hospital so that all who
came to the hospital would know what the missionaries had done. “Our Chi-
nese friends,” Gilbert wrote home, “tell us that these stones will last for about
800 years.”

Gilbert’s Chinese friends were mistaken. They could not have guessed that
these memorials would be removed after the Communist state was established
in 1949. Once foreign missionaries were excoriated as agents of foreign imper-
ialism, their story – in which the people’s redemption came from hospital staff
who were not Chinese, much less Communists – was the wrong story to tell.
Shangqiu Number One Municipal People’s Hospital, as St. Paul’s is known today,
acknowledges its founding by Canadian missionaries, but nothing further is
said or known. The hospital has been absorbed into an official discourse that
is now modernist rather than anti-imperialist. The building of the modern state,
not the compassion of fellow human beings nor the rescue of Chinese from
Japanese, is the storyline now.

Suffering is a universal condition, bound as we all are to the dazzlingly brief
experience that is the life of one person. But one does not have to be Buddhist
to recognize birth and death as the wellspring of suffering. Suffering comes in
many intermediate guises as well. There is the suffering that arises from living
in a natural world made unstable by physical forces – flood and earthquake, for
example. There is social suffering, which is produced by the norms and practices
that constitute societies and which may range from discrimination to poverty
to racism. There is the political suffering that states impose, from policing to
disenfranchisement to torture. And there is wartime suffering, the subject of
this volume. For soldiers, wartime suffering means combat injury and death in
the first instance but also fear and anxiety, brutalization and dehumanization,
and extraction from the routines that constitute normal life. To civilians, war
brings everything the people of Gui’de had to go through, from the “collateral
damage” of armed combat to the broader impact of conflict on food, shelter,
and security.

Most readers of this book will have no personal experience of wartime
suffering. The reports we see in the media are of war waged elsewhere – in Iraq,
in Afghanistan, in the Congo. For us, war is never fought close to home. And
just as it is kept at a distance in space, so too do we think of the suffering of
war as separated from us in time – archaic, almost atavistic. When we do not
locate grand suffering elsewhere, we assign it to the past, to a time when the
technical and moral breakthroughs we associate with modernity did yet work
their magic. Desperate poverty, social degradation, mass starvation, and total
war are for most of us scenes in the theatre of another age. They are offences to
what we understand as modernity. The promise of the modern is to provide
governmental institutions, legal guarantees, and technical capacities that were
unavailable in earlier times to remove the conditions that produce suffering.
Modernity is supposed to banish all suffering, almost to transcend the physical
limits of life itself.

None of these promises is true, of course, least of all the promise to end war.
What modernity has actually done is to enhance the human cost of warfare,
increase the scale and frequency at which armed aggression is committed, and
move it elsewhere. Modern warfare mocks modernity’s false claim that it has
come to benefit humankind. It also mocks modernity’s erasure of the theologies
of suffering that have consoled the victims of state power for centuries. Except
for the more virulent strains of the Near Eastern monotheisms of Christianity
and Islam that survive in parts of the United States and the Middle East, most
people in the world today do not believe that suffering will be corrected or
rewarded in an afterlife. We rely instead on the illusory protections of modernity
itself. Keeping suffering carefully elsewhere and in the past relieves most of us
of the need to come to terms with the brutality of the modern condition.

Not so the people of Gui’de in 1938. Modernity for those living in the pen-
umbra of Xuzhou meant having to deal with soldiers bearing modern arms and
arriving on modern trucks and modern railways to impose the modern dream
of economic imperialism. What modernity brought them was the suffering of
total war.

Reflecting on the experience of evil, moral philosopher Susan Neiman has
identified two poles of suffering. One she calls “Lisbon,” the other “Auschwitz.”
Lisbon stands for the purely arbitrary catastrophe of the great earthquake on
1 November 1755, which flattened the city of Lisbon, followed by a tsunami and
fires in which a third of its population of 275,000 lost their lives. The deaths of
90,000 happened because of a shift of tectonic plates and had no human author,
no human intent. Auschwitz, the site of the notorious death camp that the Nazi
regime operated between 1940 and 1945 to exterminate Jews and other undesir-
able, names suffering in the absence of natural causes, suffering that is produced
by human intent alone. Lisbon victims have no one to blame for their suffering.
Human agents can make suffering of the Lisbon type worse – officials who si-
phon relief funds into their own pockets rather than succour the starving, or
builders who fail to meet safe construction minima in order to enrich themselves
(as in the great Sichuan earthquake of May 2008, after which it was discovered that corrupt contractors had pocketed some of their budget intended for metal reinforcing rods for school roofs) – but their effects are at the margin. The suffering at Auschwitz belongs to an entirely different category. There is no ambiguity about blame. The guards, the prison authorities, and their superiors may have constructed a logic that permitted them to commit evil and insulated their consciences from moral reflection, but their acts were undertaken with the intent to cause suffering and death. Without that intent, there would have been no suffering. The causation was entirely intentional and entirely direct.

What happened in the Xuzhou region in 1938 lies at neither of these poles. I propose it here as a third type of suffering, closer to Auschwitz than to Lisbon yet entailing very different consequences for historical memory – more a third corner of a triangle of suffering than a point midway between the other two. Like Auschwitz, Xuzhou was the product of war and impossible without war. The Japanese attack on this region midway between the Yangzi Valley and the Yellow River flood plain had clear military objectives. These included linking the two separate Japanese invasions at Shanghai and Beijing and driving back the Chinese army from the eastern zones of the country, and in this sense the attack was part of what “normally” happens in war. But the scale of civilian suffering far exceeded what could be deemed militarily necessary for the Japanese army to advance. In this sense, Xuzhou had something of Auschwitz about it, for the scale of suffering it produced signalled an intent far exceeding military necessity. Some Japanese commanders believed that it was vital to their campaign to impress on the Chinese people the peril of resistance if their occupation of China was to succeed, and so there may have been at least a conscious unwillingness to diminish civilian suffering and perhaps even the intention to ensure that civilians suffered on a significant scale. The intent was not extermination, as it was at Auschwitz, but the Japanese army’s indifference to personal suffering conveyed an impression of something beyond “collateral damage.”

Xuzhou is further distinguished by what followed: the Chinese decision to breach the dike holding back the Yellow River farther west at Huayuankou. The military logic at the time was that, Xuzhou having fallen, the Japanese army had to be stopped at all costs, if only temporarily, in order to give Chinese troops a breathing space to regroup and reorganize. Xuzhou was not submerged, as it sat at a location that the flood waters could not reach, nor was Gui’de, as it happens, but vast tracts of farmland in the regions west and south of these cities were submerged. The vast inundation was not Lisbon, for it was human agency, not nature itself, that provoked this violent natural disruption. But the effects were masked, even excused, by the necessities of war. Most who died were
unaware that nature was not to blame. Indeed, the first reports—concocted by Chinese military propaganda—were that the Japanese, not the Chinese army, had bombed the dike as a form of environmental warfare. Once this camouflage was abandoned, the Chinese leadership reverted to the argument that any measure was justified to slow the Japanese advance. The number who died, loosely estimated now at half a million, exceeded the toll in Lisbon (estimated at 90,000), as one would expect when comparing a modest eighteenth-century city with a large twentieth-century farming region, but the two events were roughly equivalent in terms of the percentage of people whose lives, if they preserved them, were disrupted. Besides those who died downriver from the breach, half a million were left homeless and many more were forced into flight.\textsuperscript{7}

The breaching of the dike and the defeat at Xuzhou are normally treated as separate events in the history of the war, the one certainly following the other but not intimately linked. If we put them together as two sides of the same coin of suffering that civilians had to pay not just for the Japanese invasion but for the Chinese defence as well, Xuzhou emerges even more distinctively as a type of suffering that is neither Auschwitz nor Lisbon. It becomes a third case, in which there is neither a clear author to take the blame, nor no author at all, but several authors among whom blame cannot so readily be distributed.

Diana Lary, whose work on wartime suffering inaugurated scholarly inquiry into the problem and inspired the conference at which the essays in this volume were first presented, has been careful not to use her research on Chinese suffering during the Japanese invasion, at Xuzhou and elsewhere, as an occasion for apportioning blame. Her focus has been on those who suffered rather than on those who caused suffering.\textsuperscript{8} In the rush to assign blame or, worse perhaps, in the rush to fold all that suffering into a narrative of sacrifice for the nation that prevailed in the end, there is a danger that the burden of the war for those who actually experienced it will be diminished or forgotten. Many at the time may have conceived of their suffering in national terms, yet their suffering preceded the narratives attached to it. Their suffering therefore deserves to be recorded separately from the tales it is used to tell if their experience is to survive as an episode in the history of the powerless, not just as a stand-in for someone else’s (or something else’s) triumph.

Diana Lary has also observed, however, that cataloguing suffering does not necessarily lead toward historical analysis. In the case of the Japanese invasion, it seems paradoxically to have had the opposite effect, to block an approach to what she has called “a larger meaning.” As she and her co-editor of \textit{The Scars of War}, Stephen MacKinnon, have noted, reciting the atrocities of the period can quickly leave the historian feeling “caught within a mesh of vague generalities about the banality of evil, the cruelty of the Japanese, and the horror of war. We
are somewhere between windy generalization and deep despair about the human condition. It seems so difficult to say anything meaningful about suffering that it is easier to ignore it or push it aside.9

What are we to do with this deficit of meaning? The medical anthropologist Paul Farmer, who has dealt with suffering firsthand as the co-director of the Clinique Bon Saveur in rural Haiti, suggests that suffering evades meaning by virtue of a kind of existential gap. We may be able to achieve consensus on what constitutes suffering, yet the suffering of others has a lesser degree of reality than the suffering of ourselves.10 When this is not the case, as particularly for Auschwitz, it is because the event is remembered by a group whose identity is constructed at least in part on the conviction that the victims of suffering are “us.” The suffering that real people experienced then is transmuted into something that has meaning now; in the case of Auschwitz, this meaning derives from what it signifies to be Jewish or gypsy, or even simply human, in the present. This is how we tend to deal with the difficulty that Lary and MacKinnon have noted about suffering, which is that it is “hard to ennoble except through transcendent narrative.”11 Ennoblement may be essential for commemoration to take place, but there is always the danger that the sufferings of others are exploited to push forward agendas to which they themselves might have been hostile and that have little connection with how they coped with their actual experience. The ennobled people and the transcendent nation come after the fact.

When the people of Gui’de gathered on New Year’s Day to honour those who protected them in a time of great suffering, they ennobled nations that were not their own. The nations represented in the commemorative inscriptions they presented to the staff of St. Paul’s Hospital were Great Britain, and indirectly Canada (which did not yet have a flag independent of the British Empire), and Switzerland (the Red Cross flag in reverse). One could argue that these were signs that had to be used because the Chinese nation could not speak in its own name under military occupation. Property marked with such talismans was beyond the reach of the Japanese. Only by calling on the names of third-party nations such as these, which the Japanese had not yet been able to declare illegal (this would happen in December 1941), could the Chinese stand up to the invader.

Decoding the signs on the steles to obtain this sort of nationalist interpretation may capture some of the sentiment in the air in 1939, but it pretends to know better than the people of Gui’de how they suffered and why they chose to thank the Canadians. If I am arguing for the existential validity of suffering, I do not wish to imply that the Chinese military should not have done everything
in their power to resist, nor deny that the Japanese army should not have been there in the first place. My point is that neither assertion is sufficient to give meaning to the experience of the millions of ordinary people who found themselves caught between two states locked in deadly combat. Simply by surviving, the people of Guìde did indeed keep their nation alive and resist its being swallowed into the Japanese empire. Additionally, this suffering may have strengthened their attachment to the Chinese nation that emerged after the war. Ennoblement may have helped some to make sense of their suffering and provided their descendants with a way to make sense of their legacy. But ennoblement is not a tool for historical analysis. Historians need to be aware of the national valences that attach to suffering, as these animate mentalities of suffering and produce powerful effects. But we also need to incorporate what those who suffered understood of their own experience at the time, lest the retrospective imperatives of national commemoration take us further from the real causes of suffering, in many of which the nation is closely implicated, then as now.

Equally important for acknowledging suffering as history is to ask not just what causes suffering but also what suffering causes. Those who suffer do not simply suffer and do nothing. They act, both to survive at the time and to respond afterward to their traumas. They also leave traces of their suffering, which later generations may revive and re-enact through narratives of transferred victimization, thereby provoking further cycles of action. The capacity of suffering to come back and produce other effects may therefore be the strongest argument in favour of writing suffering into history. As Lary and MacKinnon suggest at the end of their introduction to *The Scars of War*, wartime suffering may eventually help to explain the violence of the postwar decades, from the virulent settling of scores in the early 1950s right down to the Cultural Revolution. The capacity of suffering to have delayed effects reminds us of the importance of integrating suffering into our accounts of the past, lest we fail not just to see the subjectivities driving people’s actions but also to detect the consequences to which these subjectivities may have led.

Lisbon is where the 1755 earthquake is remembered; its memory extends no further. A massive statue of then prime minister Sebastião de Melo, later Marquis of Pombal, who built today’s Lisbon on the ruins of the old, recalls 1755 but as a history of reconstruction rather than of suffering. This suffering, having no author, has become distant and abstract. Auschwitz has spawned a far larger and more inclusive memory, in part because it lies in the recent past and concerns all who are disturbed by war and atrocity, in part because it has been appropriated by a Zionist political identity, but most of all because it has an author who can be blamed and an intent that cannot be denied.
Xuzhou is now largely forgotten except by professional historians and by some who live in the region. Largely forgotten too is the internationalism that moved foreigners to stay behind in the cities and towns, like Gui’de, that came under attack and to do something to relieve the suffering of ordinary people in a time of war.13 Xuzhou has a complicated history that cannot be untangled neatly in any one party’s favour or mobilized to any one party’s discredit. It is a more complicated case than either Lisbon or Auschwitz, and its memory is more difficult to organize and use. But if we forget Xuzhou, we forget what the violence of war does and what civilians can be made to suffer in the name of warring states. Only by recognizing suffering as history’s proper subject, not just its byproduct, as Diana Lary has done, can we begin to understand what happens in places such as this.

Notes
2 Bernard T.L. Tseng, “State of the Church in the Diocese of Honan, China, during and after the War” (received 14 December 1946), Anglican Church of Canada Archives: Missionary Society of the Church of Canada, Leonard A. Dixon Files, China Files, Box 79.
3 H.H. Gilbert, “Annual Report” (1 December 1938 to 30 November 1939), Anglican Church of Canada Archives: Missionary Society of the Church of Canada, Leonard A. Dixon Files, China Files, Box 77.
4 See the brief overview at http://www.sqsyy.com/yyjj.asp, the website of the Shangqiu Number One Municipal People’s Hospital.
5 On social suffering, see Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das, and Margaret Lock, eds., Social Suffering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
8 For example, in the introduction to The Scars of War, she and her co-editor Stephen MacKinnon innovatively position Chinese suffering during the Japanese occupation in the context not of Japanese brutality but of the century of violence preceding the Japanese occupation. They note that blame should be assigned in cases of specific acts of violence but not generalized in such a way that deeper explanations are avoided. See Diana Lary and Stephen MacKinnon, “Introduction,” in The Scars of War, ed. Diana Lary and Stephen MacKinnon (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 6-8.
9 Ibid., 14. The evasiveness of “suffering” as a historical topic is underscored by its absence from the index of The Scars of War.
12 As the anthropologist of Tamil society E. Valentine Daniel has noted, those who suffer by virtue of their national identity tend to identify the nation as their refuge and to align
their individual suffering with the suffering of the nation. Daniel also makes the interesting argument that the recursion to national identity is an “aestheticizing impulse” in that it promises “to bring forth order out of disorder, mold form from that in which form is absent.” E. Valentine Daniel, “Suffering Nation and Alienation,” in Social Suffering, ed. Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das, and Margaret Lock (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 309-11.

The effect of relief on the commemoration or narration of calamity is a topic that would benefit from further reflection. As Diana Lary notes in her conclusion to “Drowned Earth,” 207, the failure of most Chinese civilians to receive relief during or after the Japanese occupation has made their suffering even less accessible to us now.
In the spring of 2009 Chinese audiences lined up in record numbers for two new films on the 1937 Nanjing Massacre and engaged in widespread debate over their merits. Florian Gallenberger’s *John Rabe* and in particular Lu Chuan’s *City of Life and Death (Nanjing! Nanjing!)* were deemed remarkable for their realistic accounts of the massacre and bold portrayals of both Chinese victims and their Japanese victimizers as something beyond the stock heroes and villains who have dominated media representations, including films, in the past. But as one blogger wrote, beyond stirring deep emotions, *City of Life and Death* still failed to engage the underlying historical problems:

*City of Life and Death* is practically a science fiction movie. Don’t get me wrong, I’m not saying that the Nanjing Massacre was imagined ... But we’re in need of a “truth” that is not just a Yes or No answer. We also need a Why and a How, a Who and a When, and only then will we be able to ground our reflections and discussions in the truth, only then will the judgments and conclusions we reach have real value and meaning. We want history to be a mirror, but when history is unclear, what can it reflect?

Leaving aside philosophical debates over “truth” and the uses of history, historians should at least be able to agree with this film critic on the need to recount more fully the complex nature of the chaos and suffering of war, as well as the forms of memory that it inspires.

And there is much to remember. China’s “modern history” is recognized as having begun with the Opium War of 1839-42 and as progressing through the Second Opium War of 1856-60, the Taiping, Nian, and Muslim rebellions during the 1850-60s, the Sino-French War of 1884, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the Boxer Uprising of 1900, the 1911 Revolution, and the many conflicts falling under the “warlord era” of the 1920s. Most traumatic of all was the Anti-Japanese War (War of Resistance) of 1937-45, which was presaged by the Japanese occupation of China’s Northeast in 1931 and followed by the Civil War of 1945-49 and its antecedent Cross-Strait Crisis. As Diana Lary and Stephen MacKinnon suggest, “If looked at cumulatively as a cycle of officially sanctioned violence
that began in the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese experience with the arbitrary violence and destruction of war has no European parallel. And yet compared to our knowledge of the European context, our knowledge regarding the toll of that violence and its continuing influence on Chinese society still presents us with innumerable unanswered questions.

What we do know about Chinese conflict and suffering is largely informed by the frameworks of social, political, and cultural history. Joseph Esherick’s pioneering study The Origins of the Boxer Uprising (1988), for example, treats the Boxer conflict primarily as a problem of ecology, economy, popular culture, and sectarianism. Edward McCord’s Power of the Gun (1993) and Arthur Waldron’s From War to Nationalism (2003) provide more complete sketches of the operational side of Chinese militarism during the 1920s, but their works are also grounded in questions of politics and ideology. Studies of the Anti-Japanese War, from Edgar Snow’s Red Star over China (1937) to J.H. Boyle’s China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration (1972) and Parks Coble’s Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937 (1991), largely bypass logistical and operational questions to emphasize the Communist Party-Guomindang (CCP-GMD) struggle for supremacy. The end of the Cold War has resulted in national and international political realignments throughout East Asia, and with those realignments priorities have begun to shift to the politically sensitive subject of memory, especially as it relates to Japanese war responsibility and the Nanjing Massacre. Notable scholarly works include collected volumes by Joshua Fogel, ed., The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography (2000) and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, ed., The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-38: Complicating the Picture (2007) as well as Sheila Miyoshi Jager and Rana Mitter’s Ruptured Histories: War, Memory, and the Post-Cold War in Asia (2007).

The benefit of this past scholarship is that we have grown to understand warfare in China as being a socially, culturally, and politically integrated phenomenon. At the same time, however, we are left with a less than complete understanding of militarism – which is problematic since, as Hans van de Ven indicates, if we fail to understand battles and wars, we will inevitably fail to understand the history on which they weigh so heavily. A great deal of work remains to be done on this particular front, but since those remarks were published in 1996 we have begun to see a gradual turn toward the much neglected problem of militarism, warfare, and the suffering that it produces. In particular, Scars of War: The Impact of Warfare on Modern China (2001), edited by Diana Lary and Steven MacKinnon, set an example by exposing warfare in China as raw and unfiltered experience.

Given that wartime violence occurs amid the most chaotic of circumstances and leaves only the barest of documentary traces, we have to accept that we may...
never achieve definitive accounts of either events or victims. In this volume, contributors address incidents pertaining to the Boxer Uprising, the Warlord Era, the Anti-Japanese War, and the Cross-Strait Crisis, yet every incident brought to light implicitly suggests countless others in need of further analysis. Such is the knowledge of China’s military history that major incidents, pivotal campaigns, and even entire wars remain only vaguely outlined. On a more human scale, we may never fully know something as basic as how many people died in the conflicts that have come to define the latter years of the Qing Dynasty and the first half of the twentieth century, much less know all of their stories. But if we are to gain a deeper understanding of how China has been affected by both war-inflicted suffering and memory, we have to provide some account, however fragmentary, of those who experienced or inflicted that suffering and whose legacies inspired earlier generations of remembrance as well as present-day commemoration. As Vera Schwarcz writes in her study of grief in China, “In order to fathom the hearts of strangers in pain, we must accept the fractured vision (and versions) of those who have known social suffering first hand. Fragments of experience must suffice in place of encompassing theories about the nature of pain.” Many of the hardships described in this volume have scarcely registered against the chaotic backdrop of modern Chinese history, but as Schwarcz suggests, it is precisely incidents like the massacres at Blagovoschensk and Xiaogan or the trials faced by Jiangxi Number One Children's Home and Lingnan University discussed in this volume that bring us closer to understanding the larger problem of war and suffering in modern China.

With contributions ranging in topic from late-imperial military theory to massacres, refugees, social-reform movements, monuments, and memory, the current volume inherits the social, political, and memorial stances that have defined earlier scholarship while also extending further recognition to the experience of war, the suffering of it, and the ways that it is remembered. The first section, “Society at War,” examines ways that militarization and war structure and destabilize society. Next, in the section on “Institutional Engagement,” we turn to political, cultural, and military institutions and their relationships to war and suffering. The final section, “Memory and Representation,” examines the creation of cultural representation and memory through various media, monuments, and social controls. Collectively, the chapters underline the complexity of recounting war and memories of it.

**Society at War**

Norman Smith, Bernard Hung-kay Luk, Chang Jui-te, and Michael Szonyi demonstrate how militarization and war acted to structure and destabilize society, with varying ramifications for individuals. The increasing social presence
of the military is reflected in how people lived their lives, the ways that they represented their lives and contemporary society, and how they subsequently remembered them. This section especially focuses on life in occupied or wartime Manchukuo, Hong Kong, Chongqing, and Jinmen.

Norman Smith’s “Writing and Remembering the Battle against Opiates in Manchukuo” documents a state-led campaign in Manchukuo, in which colonial administrators tried to mobilize writers in support of a battle against drug consumption to control public opinion and thereby dissociate the regime from the opiate addiction, war, and death with which it had come to be identified, both domestically and abroad. Writers were encouraged to use “social realism” to depict a cohesive, constructive society, yet the result was a legacy of dark, pessimistic literature that underscored the regime’s failings. The backdrop to the propaganda war was an ongoing struggle to increase the working capacity of labourers and to free up resources (including opium) for the war that ravaged Asia. Ultimately, these efforts were no more successful than the movement to paint the regime in a positive light as Manchukuo authorities attempted to gain the co-operation of writers whose work undermined the very regime that they were employed to promote.

In “War, Schools, China, Hong Kong: 1937-1949,” Bernard Hung-kay Luk demonstrates how school administration, teachers, and students in war-torn Hong Kong engaged in a struggle for survival by uprooting and shifting locations as they tried to stay one step ahead of the war. Mobilization for them became part of daily life. Instruction in language, history, art, and music became exercises in patriotism as school authorities and students organized extracurricular activities to raise funds or produce material for the war effort. The schools became essential elements of the wartime environment, participating in a wide range of wartime activities. Luk provides insight into how the war forced the schools to mobilize and adapt to the war even as it tore them apart. When forced out of school, individuals were faced with diminishing choices. The most resourceful were able to find new schools or join other organizations such as the CCP or the GMD. The less resourceful faced bleaker choices: some children found themselves consigned to orphanages; others simply became refugees. In this we have a reminder that suffering grows out of the disintegration of social mechanisms meant to sustain communities, leaving the individual dangerously exposed to disorder.

Such disorder informs Chang Jui-te’s chapter, “Bombs Don’t Discriminate? Class, Gender, and Ethnicity in the Air-Raid Shelter Experiences of the Wartime Chongqing Population.” In this study of the Japanese bombardment of Chongqing, Chang contradicts the perception that mobilization can cause a society to pull together against a common enemy and shatters the illusion of wartime
solidarity by illustrating the many ways that the act of mobilization exacerbated already existing social divisions. Chang demonstrates how the “solidarity” argument oversimplifies the historical realities of contemporary Chongqing by downplaying its inherent complexity. In some respects, the intensive bombardments reinforced a sense of togetherness among the population, but Chang questions the integrity of this solidarity, revealing that the impact of the bombardments was not uniform among different social classes and that vulnerability to bomb attacks differed between social classes and identities. GMD efforts to structure a cohesive defence were undermined by the instability of war and pre-existing socio-economic divisions.

Michael Szonyi’s chapter, “Militarization and Jinmen (Quemoy) Society, 1949-1992,” provides an important reminder that lives are not put on hold by warfare, that day-to-day existence is not divided from global political processes, and that wars do not end when bombs stop falling. Szonyi argues that society is influenced not only by war but also by militarization, defined by Cynthia Enloe as “the step-by-step process by which something becomes controlled by, dependent on, or derives its value from the military as an institution or militaristic criteria.” Szonyi makes clear that such a definition has great relevance to the citizens of Jinmen, who, for decades, experienced a “state of exception,” a suspension of the legal order. That “state of exception,” or “state of emergency,” became a way of life as militarization spread throughout society. As one informant noted, the goal was to mobilize the population into “combat villages” for the purpose of making “every person a combat fighter; every village a combat fort.” The long-term effects of this militarization were thorough, influencing everything from hygiene and sex to agricultural production. Militarization became linked to the production of modern life and the modern state and in turn was paralleled by movements on the Mainland in the People’s Republic of China to co-ordinate and galvanize populations there.

Institutional Engagement
At one level, political, military, social, and cultural institutions have the potential to provide continuity, mediate between opposing forces, relieve suffering, and minimize chaos. Conversely, the failure of those institutions amid chaotic conditions exposes society to the elements and leaves people to suffer and inflict suffering with no recourse to formal sanctuary. But as Victor Zatsepine, Edward McCord, Colin Green, and Colette Plum argue in their respective chapters, institutions do not passively stand or fall on the sidelines of conflict. Geopolitical processes create, manipulate, or attack institutions, using them and the people they represent as pawns in larger power struggles. In that sense, chaos and suffering can also serve a particularly brutal institutional logic.
In “The Blagoveshchensk Massacre of 1900: The Sino-Russian War and Global Imperialism,” Victor Zatsepine shows that despite a lengthy period of peaceful relations between Russia and Qing China, the two sides had developed no mechanism through which they could even discuss the possibility of evacuating Chinese and Manchu residents from Blagoveshchensk before the humanitarian crisis rapidly escalated. In contemporary Manchuria, there were no institutions standing between the military and society, nothing whatsoever to protect Qing citizens or to provide humanitarian aid. Zatsepine illustrates how, beyond merely taking advantage of the lack of institutional infrastructure, Russian authorities deliberately sowed chaos along the frontier, using violence as a means to alter the balance of power in their favour. As General K.N. Gribskii pronounced, this was to ensure that “the name of the Amur Cossack will thunder through all of Manchuria and strike terror among the Chinese population” in preparation for the Russian occupation of Manchuria later that summer. In the final section of this volume, Blaine Chiasson demonstrates how a reinvigorated Chinese regional administration later turned this relationship around, but in the short term Russia was able to create the perception that the Qing Dynasty was incapable of managing its affairs. In a poignant example, Zatsepine notes that although Qing authorities were not even in a position to fish the victims out of the river, Russian steamers continued to ply the Amur, and their passengers continued to be served breakfast on time. Russia’s comparative institutional advantage had the effect of shifting Sino-Russian relations from co-operation to Russian military dominance.

In “Victims and Victimizers: Warlord Soldiers and Mutinies in Republican China,” Edward McCord shows that institutions were only marginally better developed in 1920s Hunan. The failure of military institutions, banks, chambers of commerce, and even the district yamen, hampered by a dysfunctional tax system, meant that none were capable of meeting the basic salary needs of the military rank and file. Recognizing this, mutinous soldiers targeted the most visible financial institutions but turned on the public after failing to obtain satisfactory restitution. For the soldiers, this was presumably an effort to claim outstanding pay rather than to change the nature of those institutions, but that was not the case with their commander, Wang Zhanyuan, who sought to use the resulting chaos to manipulate regional financial and political institutions to his own benefit. Even someone as belligerent as Wang understood the need to control the violence and placate the public, although his strategy for doing so never developed beyond assigning scapegoats and finally gunning down the soldiers behind the mutinies. In making victims of the victimizers, Wang perpetuated the cycle of violence that would eventually force him from power.
Colin Green’s study of GMD military reforms, “Turning Bad Iron into Polished Steel: Whampoa and the Rehabilitation of the Chinese Soldier,” reveals that Chiang Kai-shek understood better than Wang Zhanyuan that breaking the cycle of violence could begin with reform of military institutions. But Chiang’s response went beyond technical institutional reforms to encompass what Alexander Woodside in this volume refers to as “culturalist” controls that were needed to support institutional changes. We may charitably suggest that the GMD did not deliberately sow chaos as the means to bringing about military reform, but Chiang used the constant threat of violence to promote the citizen-soldier as a “missionary” of the New Life Movement, to forge new models of citizens through the conversion of untrained and undisciplined soldiers that had become the norm, and ultimately, to extend those ideals to the rest of society. Unfortunately, the reforms, although initially quite successful, failed to produce lasting effects and could not prevent the degeneration of the military or of society at large. As Chang Jui-te’s chapter reveals, even though the residue of that ethic still survived in the GMD’s wartime capital, Chongqing, it quickly evaporated once the bombs started to fall. Chiang’s culturalist reforms proved no match for the Japanese military.

One does not normally think of soldiers and orphans as being comrades in arms, but Colette Plum’s chapter, “Orphans in the Family: Family Reform and Children’s Citizenship during the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945,” demonstrates that just as the GMD sought the creation of model citizens through military training, so too did it establish orphanages as an institution that, by facilitating the creation of a new form of citizenry, was to go beyond merely stabilizing children’s lives. The orphanages were obviously intended as a benevolent enterprise to relieve suffering, but Plum shows that the GMD also used orphanages, in conjunction with the greater chaos of the Japanese invasion, to bring about institutional change. As in the above examples, institutional change proved in large part to be a response to the failure of other institutions. In this case, the GMD was responding to perceived failures of the family. For the GMD, not only was the war creating problems, but the old family system also impeded “the creation of healthy and productive citizens.” The GMD was not just trying to create model orphans or model orphanages but was also trying to create a new citizenry in which orphans could play up the idea of the GMD as a “national parent” by becoming model “children of the minzu.” But whereas some saw the orphanages as an opportunity to take advantage of a failed family, others saw the failure of the family as something that would create only further instability, laying bare the contradictions and failures of the GMD’s family policy.
Memory and Representation

It is often assumed that memory is lodged in the past and begins where experience leaves off. But as Alexander Woodside, Blaine Chiasson, James Flath, and Diana Lary write, memory is perpetually active, persistently involved in experience, and constantly evolving new personal, community, and increasingly global dimensions.

In his study of late imperial military policies, “Controlling Soldiers: The Memory Scars of Late Imperial China,” Alexander Woodside addresses “the problem of controlling or governing soldiers,” which was not simply construed as an institutional problem but also framed as a failure of memory to retain all of the examples of moral degradation of the past through which society had been reduced to chaos and made to suffer. For Confucian scholars, many of whom were also veterans of bloody military campaigns, there was a compelling need to control the military through the influences of Confucian humanism – the best examples and counterexamples of which could be found in the past. But Woodside argues that memory was not just a recollection of the past, or the use of the past to exhort the present, but also a fundamental aspect of the debate over the “formation and preservation of human moral character itself.”

In “Chinese Savages and Chinese Saints: Russians and Chinese Remember and Forget the Boxer Uprising in 1920s China,” Blaine Chiasson points out that memory can also be a condition of political and social situations, demonstrated by the icon of the 220 Holy Martyrs of the Boxer Rebellion, which memorializes the victims through emphasis on their Orthodox and Chinese identities rather than their Russianness. Chiasson also examines the hybrid nature of the life of Harbin’s mayor, Ma Zhongjun, to show how colonial legacies have been treated in a postcolonial context. The diametrically opposed memories of Chinese and Russians regarding the Blagoveshchensk Massacre, also outlined in this volume by Zatsepine, show that there is no common memory and that memory becomes especially complicated in a multi-ethnic, multicultural, and multipolitical region such as Manchuria. However, not only is unified memory impossible, but it is also not even desirable because of the inherent risks of imposing that memory on a diversified ethnic community; particularly painful memories, as Chiasson points out, risk “rending a fragile society or accommodation asunder.”

If changeable memories can be drawn on to support diverse political factions, the mutable identity of historical monuments, James Flath argues in “Setting Moon and Rising Nationalism: Lugou Bridge as Monument and Memory,” can also be bent to the will of their managerial authorities. Beginning deep in China’s imperial past as a symbol of culture and continuity, Lugou (Marco Polo) Bridge witnessed in 1937 what many consider to be the first battle of the Anti-Japanese War, and consequently the bridge emerged as a symbol of Chinese resistance.
and nationalism. Although its reputation went into decline during the era of Mao Zedong, with the restoration of Sino-Japanese diplomacy in the late 1970s, the bridge began to represent a much more complex set of issues extending far beyond its historical role. Flath argues that Lugou Bridge acquired its political potency through its authoritative lineage, which conditions but does not prevent appropriation by new generations of political and cultural authorities. Like fragments of memory, the fragmentary material past becomes embedded in the modern and expanded historical site and thereby supports new interpretations, new memories, and new histories.

In this volume’s concluding chapter, “War and Remembering: Memories of China at War,” Diana Lary calls our attention to the “vast and almost numbing” scale of suffering that lies at the heart of memories and representations of China’s turbulent twentieth century. Memory depends on its locus: it may emerge as a political creation, it may be altered through the transformative role of an evolving media, and it may vary from one region to another, not to mention from one family and individual to another. Adding to this complexity are the subjects of memory – death, abuse, separation, and loss, as well as rebirth and survival. Memory is also conflicted, as demonstrated by Jerome Chên’s memories of his wartime education, the benefits of which were qualified by loss. Memory born of suffering is inherently unstable, constantly reforming in shifting patterns of understanding as it builds up and tears down the foundations of individual psyches, local communities, and nation-states.

**Conclusion**

So what of those who, why, when, and where questions that opened this introduction? Having answered at least a few of them in this volume, are we any nearer to understanding the roots, the experiences, and the remembrance of suffering; does the “mirror of history” reflect any more clearly for our efforts? A modest respondent might suggest that we have only introduced further convolutions to the problem, but in doing so we would only be driving suffering and remembrance back into the shadows. As historians, we have to accept that most of the details revealing individual suffering will forever remain beyond our grasp. We can only imagine, for example, the terror that gripped the Chinese residents of Blagoveshchensk as Russian Cossacks forced them toward the Amur River on 17 July 1900 or the panic that erupted in the ranks of Wang Zhanyuan’s mutinous soldiers on 10 June 1921 when they stepped from their train expecting to be served a complimentary breakfast only to find themselves standing on their own execution ground. But if this volume achieves anything, it connects suffering to larger geopolitical processes and reveals that chaos is neither happenstance nor temporary. To the contrary, chaos is all too
frequently planned and manipulated by the powers that make war their business and perpetuated by societies unable to break the cycle of violence. Even memory can be destructive, although as Diana Lary reminds us, it is also a means of coming to terms with one's community, one’s family, and oneself. There may be no definitive moment when all of the questions are answered and memories resolved, but as Lu Xun observed in the conclusion to his short story “My Old Home” (1921), history and memory do offer a way forward: “Hope cannot be said to exist” writes the author, “nor can it be said not to exist. It is just like roads across the earth. For actually the earth had no roads to begin with, but when many men pass one way, a road is made.”

Notes
2 One could go on to mention the Korean War, the hardships of the Mao era, various border wars in the 1960s and 1970s, and the countless “mass incidents” that continue to threaten Chinese social stability down to the present, although these lie outside the scope of this volume.
Part 1: Society at War
Writing and Remembering the Battle against Opiates in Manchukuo

Norman Smith

Opium and war are foundational to narratives of modern Chinese history, the start of which is dated to the Opium War (1839-42). This chapter examines the status of opium in the wartime culture of China’s Northeast, namely the Japanese colony of Manchukuo (1932-45), a century after China’s first drug-fuelled battles with Britain. The colony has been remembered, if at all, as a militaristic, oppressive, narco-state. At the same time, Manchukuo also fostered Chinese and Japanese anti-opium activists whose critiques helped to generate the negativity with which the period has been remembered. Yet, for decades, their work has been absent from popular memory and historical study. In this volume, Colette Plum argues that during the War of Resistance (1937-45) orphans were ascribed new significances. So, too, were opium and its users. Foreign occupation and war branded both with a negativity that for decades consigned them to a solely humiliating past. Also in this volume, Diana Lary suggests that for survivors of the war, “the closing-down of memory was a way to erase pain – and with the silence, a tacit recognition that the memories themselves were of pain, not of glory or triumph” (p. 263). In the Northeast, opium and those connected to it were twinned with occupation and war as signposts of a past worthy only of forgetting or grave censure.

This chapter outlines the history of opium in the Northeast from the late Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) through the occupation and the height of the Sacred War (1941-45). Attention is focused on Manchukuo’s opium industry and cultural production to demonstrate how war influenced policies and practices in both arenas. In the early 1940s opium and culture were monitored by officials aspiring to regime legitimization, but despite laws against recreational opium consumption and the production of culture that critiqued Manchukuo, depictions of opium and its users grew in prominence and spawned narratives more critical than might be expected of cultural production within a colonial state at war. Official campaigns against opium spurred social critiques that supported the anti-opium movement while demonizing contemporary society. Writers such as Lan Ling (1919-2003) and Mei Niang (b. 1920) depicted opium, poverty, and patriarchy as constituent elements of “women’s difficulty” (funü de kunan).¹ Wang Qiuying (1914-97) and Ye Li (1902-86) linked opium use with social decline and a Chinese abrogation of civic duty. Such narratives produced a negativity
that ultimately cast into doubt the motives of the movement’s proponents, demonstrating how a battle against drugs within a larger war context complicates efforts to reconcile the past and memories of it.

Opium was introduced to the Northeast during the Kangxi era (1662-1723), cultivated starting around 1860, and first taxed in 1885. John Jennings has argued that in the “frontier” region, opium played a role “similar to that of gold in the settlement of California,” drawing immigrants to engage in regional development. Opium became a requirement of polite society that was offered to guests like tobacco and tea. It also had important medicinal uses, especially as a painkiller. Despite restrictions on opium, by the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1912, it was one of the region’s top agricultural products. The warlord regime of Zhang Zuolin, which eventually succeeded the Qing in the Northeast, half-heartedly extended existing restrictions, but the lucrative industry proved resilient in a vast region with a relatively dispersed population, limited state resources, and officials with disparate priorities. Farmers began to cultivate opium exclusively. Researchers strove to increase levels of morphia in poppies and to bolster production of morphine for export to Japan in order to reduce reliance on German sources. Opium spread, becoming cheaper and more potent.

In the 1920s opium was a mainstay of the Zhang regime. Ronald Suleski has detailed how “opium was used as a money-grab as Zhang tried to pay for pretensions to rule all of China.” Zhang moved to control the opium market and to reap its profits. Opium Monopoly Offices opened in the regional centre of Fengtian (present-day Shenyang) and increased rapidly in number along counties bordering railways owned by Japan’s South Manchurian Railway (SMR) conglomerate. Opium revenues were forwarded to Zhang in Beijing and invested in his army. In 1928, after Zhang’s murder by the Japanese military, control over the region fell to his son Zhang Xueliang, who in 1929 reasserted an opium regulatory framework to dovetail with Republican law, to no avail. Two years later, Zhang’s rule was ended by Japanese invasion while he was undergoing rehabilitation in Beijing for his own longstanding use of opium.

Supporters of the Japanese invasion cited widespread opium addiction as a justification for the occupation. In October 1932 SMR researchers estimated that “roughly 5 percent of Manchuko’s total population of 30 million were opium and narcotic addicts – 1.5 million people (nearly ten times the peak number of registered opium addicts on Taiwan).” Officials subsequently argued that the Japanese army had to intervene to save the indigenous population: “With the Manchu and Mongol races opium-smoking is, so to speak, a historically hereditary disease,” which was exacerbated by inhumane Han Chinese warlord rule. The extent to which the population suffered from the “historically hereditary disease,” however, has recently been challenged by Jiao Runming’s
calculation of a 1931 population of 30,000 addicts, or 0.1 percent of the population.9 Regardless of how much opium was actually consumed, Manchukuo publications consistently condemned the decadence of the previous Zhang regimes, decrying “the whole body of public servants [who], in fact, seemed to be devotees of Morpheus.”10 Officials and reformers labelled opium the “arch-enemy of mankind,”11 an insidious remnant of Western imperialism. They advocated restricted cultivation and an end to imports as key elements of Japan’s “civilizing mission.” In November 1932 the Opium Law was promulgated to gradually lessen and eventually eradicate recreational opium use.12 According to the Opium Law, permits for smoking opium would be granted by the Manchukuo Monopoly only to adult, non-Japanese addicts who sought rehabilitation. Recreational opium use was to be discouraged, but until it was eradicated the state would control and profit from it. Chronic underfunding of Japan’s imperial project, as demonstrated in studies by Michael Barnhart and Alan Baumer, made the sale of opium an appealing and lucrative source of revenue for Japan’s colonial regimes and those who sought to profit from them;13 Manchukuo’s Kangde emperor (r. 1934-45), Henry Aisin-Gioro Puyi (1906-67), claimed in his autobiography that one-sixth of Manchukuo state revenue was derived from opium.14

The Monopoly’s launch in 1933 lent further credence to longstanding critiques of opium use. For decades, articles condemning opiates had appeared regularly in leading Japanese-owned, Chinese-language newspapers, such as Fengtian’s Shengjing shibao (Shengjing Times). Under the new regulatory framework, they became even more frequent; representative examples include “Mafei zhi hai” (“The Harm of Morphine”), “Yinzhe de xin” (“An Addict’s Letter”), and “Jin yan lun” (“Discussion of the Smoking Prohibition”).15 The state’s highly publicized anti-opium platform encouraged cultural production that violated Manchukuo’s publication laws, which forbade overly critical work.16 Increasingly strict cultural policies, designed to encourage the “special, independent characteristics of Manchukuo literature” (Manzhou wenxue de duli tese),17 contributed to an exodus of young Chinese writers, including Xiao Jun (1908-88), who left the colony. Before Xiao departed, in the short story “Zhuxin” (“Candlewick”), he cited “the rustling sounds of opium being smoked” as a characteristic of Harbin.18 Emulating Lu Xun, Xiao aspired to heighten public consciousness through his writing. He depicted Harbin as “a hell on earth” (diyu de renjian), a description echoed by other writers.19 Western observers joined in critiques of Manchukuo’s opium industry, claiming it as evidence of the genocidal nature of Japanese rule in an attempt to overturn narratives of Western oppression and to recuperate American and British participation in the trade. In 1934, for example, in “Japan Builds a New Colony,” famed journalist Edgar Snow, who later detailed Communist
activities in *Red Star over China*, recounted his impressions of Manchukuo for the American publication *Saturday Evening Post*. Snow blamed the Japanese for turning “once delightful” Harbin into “a place of living death.”

The Manchukuo Monopoly and the Opium Law were decried by local and foreign critics who argued that they were manipulated for Japanese benefit – that is, “to destroy independent competitors, not opium use.” Kathryn Meyer has detailed how the Kempeitai (military police) and Special Service Section (army intelligence) took control of the manufacture of heroin and morphine, driving out remaining European firms; private heroin manufacturers who survived came to terms with the army. For many Japanese and their allies, dealing in opium was lucrative. Nitañosa Otozō, for example, rose from obscurity to reign as a regional opium king. Yamauchi Saburō founded the South Manchuria Pharmaceutical Company, through which donations to the Japanese imperial army were made in exchange for military decorations; Yamauchi even claimed that Fujita Osamu, who built his fortune in the drug trade, had financed the establishment of Manchukuo. Furumi Tadayuki, once assistant director-general for administrative affairs in Manchukuo, argued that the colony was “an immense installation created by a top secret fund of the Guandong Army,” which provided “colossal profits which became the financial source for Japan’s military schemes.” Under Japanese rule, the port of Dalian was credited with the highest annual consumption rates of morphine and cocaine in the world. Perhaps the most visible manifestation of the Monopoly’s failings, however, was the “ash heap of Mukden [present-day Shenyang],” an unceremonious dumping ground for dead and dying Chinese addicts outside the city’s West Gate. The blatant failure of the Monopoly to achieve its professed ambitions cast suspicion on the entire industry, a condition exacerbated by the state’s colonial nature and the outbreak of war.

On 1 July 1937, just days before the War of Resistance began, laws regarding cultural production were tightened, and changes to the Opium Law followed. Seven major newspapers closed, as their publishers were daunted by the threat of increasing bureaucratic oversight. Revisions to the Opium Law, implemented in response to the war and rising criticism, placed the industry even more firmly under Japanese dominion. The expansion of hostilities across much of China necessitated increased supplies of opium for medical uses, at least, thus launching further calls to reduce domestic consumption in Manchukuo. In December 1937 the State Retail Sale System was established, with the aim of ending opium use in ten years. Officials again vigorously declared support for the eradication of opium, denying accusations that the state benefited from its sale. The director of Manchukuo’s General Affairs Board, Hoshino Naoki, argued that his government recognized that the financial losses associated with opium addiction...
outweighed the benefits.Officials responded to critics by claiming that annual profits were less than 10 million yuan, an insignificant figure, they contended, because annual opium consumption was estimated at 180 million yuan and “was costing yet another 150 million yuan per year in lost labor productivity and in added policing and administrative burdens.” They suggested that the eradication of opium addiction could free up to 300 million yuan annually for vital industrial development, a priority they vigorously pursued.

As the war continued, criticism of recreational opium use grew exponentially. The director of the Monopoly, Lo Cheng-pang, argued that the administration aimed for “the eventual eradication of the noxious habit permeating the whole of society.” Whether Lo’s aim was to justify the existence of the Monopoly by arguing that the “whole of society” was permeated by opium or to discredit six years of Monopoly operations, the effect was the same – Manchukuo was yet again depicted as a drug haven. Even harsher criticism emanated from outside the colony, beyond the reach of censors and officials. In *Bushido: The Anatomy of Terror*, Alexandre Pernikoff argued that the Japanese sought the region’s “moral destruction” by disseminating free or artificially cheap narcotics among peasants (including “trial offers” for property owners and “junior doses” that were cheaper than bread for children), promoting cheap prostitution, and breaking up families. Pernikoff suggested that such tactics were “more subtle and more effective” than jail, torture, or murder. In Pernikoff’s view, “Manchuria was being slowly poisoned to death, while the Japanese army reaped huge financial benefits.”

Vespa’s denunciation of Japanese rule in Manchukuo was at least partly in response to race-based rhetoric, as illustrated in his citation of a “Japanese Military Command” booklet as evidence that the Japanese sought to “poison the whole world”: “The use of narcotics is unworthy of a superior race like the Japanese. Only inferior races, races that are decadent like the Chinese, the Europeans, and the East Indians, are addicted to the use of narcotics. This is why they are destined to become our servants and eventually disappear.” This racial rhetoric, whether the source is authentic or not, parallels official assertions
in the *Manchukuo Yearbook* that Manchus and Mongols shared a “historically hereditary disease” of opium-smoking. Vespa continued to condemn the Japanese as harshly as Japanese officials attacked Western imperialists and Han Chinese warlords. Such race-based views of addiction were not uncommon. Nakamura Kōjirō, for example, argued that the Japanese may not have been susceptible to opium but that they were vulnerable to alcohol addiction and should avoid excessive consumption of alcohol, which he identified as a tool of Western imperialism that had been deployed to destroy Native communities in Canada and Hawaii. These race-based views of addiction reflect beliefs built into the foundations of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which was conceived in the wake of Western imperialism, social Darwinism, and eugenics and which proved ruinously divisive to Japan’s “civilizing” project.

The oppressive Manchukuo environment forced writers to face difficulties that alternately enhanced and hindered their independence: financial compensation was woefully inadequate, and they risked losing even their pitiful incomes if they ran afoul of censors. In October 1939, in the journal *Nihon Hyōron* (*Japan Debate*), a writer using the pen name M.G.M. suggested that a viable literary world had failed to materialize because intellectuals could not rely on writing to earn an income. Arguing that surveillance of the Chinese-language literary world was overly intrusive, M.G.M. stressed that local literature was doomed to inconsequence unless writers were provided with more freedom and money. This dire evaluation failed to account for idealistic writers who pursued literary careers regardless of the poor pay and risks. Additionally, Japanese intellectuals such as Kobayashi Hideo, Abe Tomoji, and Kishida Kunio encouraged writers to “describe reality” (*miaoxie zhenshi*) and to “expose reality” (*baolu zhenshi*), with particular emphasis on economic hardship, social disorder, and the low status of women. Chinese writers pursued aims similar to those of their Japanese counterparts, with left-wing Japanese writer Shinichi Yamaguchi approvingly noting that “realism seem[ed] to predominate among the main literary trends” in Manchukuo literature.

The work of two Chinese writers, Lan Ling and Mei Niang, is representative of contemporary social realism and opium narratives. In Lan Ling’s 1940 poem “Xiao xiang de chuxi” (“New Year in a Small Alley”), a starving widow makes a last-ditch effort at prostitution on New Year’s Eve to earn money to feed her starving baby, but her only potential client is a “morphine ghost.” His addiction, combined with her poverty and distress, undermines her frantic effort to raise money. The woman collapses, presumably to die in the freezing snow with her “virtue” intact, as a “good wife, wise mother” (*xianqi liangmu*) ought, thus leaving her child alone in a dark, freezing apartment. At the end of the poem, as firecrackers explode around her, she slips out of consciousness. Lan’s portrait
of a desperate widow dying amid New Year’s celebrations highlights a compounding of women’s subjugation by opium addiction in Manchukuo.

The cost of addiction is poignantly detailed in Mei Niang’s second volume of collected works, published in 1940: Di’er dai (The Second Generation).44 The short story “Zhui” (“The Chase”) links addiction and patriarchy in the life of an “opium prostitute” (yan ji).45 A young girl, Guihua, starts working at an opium den after her father dies in order to support her drug-addicted mother and brother, who also drinks heavily. As the only member of the family who is not incapacitated by addiction, she earns money by employing the one skill that her mother taught her: how to prepare an opium pipe. Through her work, Guihua becomes addicted to opium at the cost of her youthful beauty, her ability to earn a living, and her dignity.46 On New Year’s Eve, as she joyfully anticipates telling her mother about a new rich client, her brother returns home and demands her wages. When Guihua refuses, he berates her and storms out. Traumatized, Guihua turns to the mirror and sees “a monkey-shaped face in the mirror, with two cheeks dead-red and lips painted blood-purple.”47 Transfixed with horror at her unrecognizable appearance, Guihua’s eyes fill with tears, which summon memories of her father’s funeral. In a swell of self-consciousness, she comprehends the family burden that has cost her “virgin’s body and heart.”48 Her brother’s outburst, which has destroyed her celebratory mood, finally makes her cognizant of the “life-killing addiction” (yaoming de yanyin) that has taken such a toll on her.49

Guihua’s life is brought to ruin by addiction and subjugation in a business that was regularly condemned by Manchukuo officialdom. Both women in “Zhui” are victimized by men, and Guihua is further oppressed by her mother’s addiction. Guihua’s free-spending father has left the family with inadequate savings and no means of support. Her brother’s character is reflected by his appearance: he has a skinny green-white face, dishevelled hair, rotting teeth, and the odour of a dog. Neither man has a positive influence on Guihua’s life, and “Zhui” climaxes as Guihua returns to the brothel, where she is fired. Her male boss verbally abuses her in front of co-workers, cheats her out of her wages, and pummels her, tossing her like garbage into the alley. When she lifts her bloodied face from the curb, her wretched fate is played out in front of her as a dog feasts on the flesh of a cat before tossing its skeleton aside. Beaten, starving, penniless, and craving a fix, Guihua peers out from the alley to see her brother “walking past accompanied by a young simple girl. Her elder brother’s face looked as if he’d just caught a fish.”50 With Guihua’s use expended, both her brother and her boss turn to new, “young simple” girls to prey on. In “Zhui” the female characters are utterly consumed by men and life-killing addiction.
Also in Dièr dai, Mei Niang links familial decline with opium and Manchukuo in “Zuíhou de qiúzhènzhé” (“The Last Patient”). This short story depicts a young family’s visit to a health clinic. The woman ostensibly seeks treatment for anaemia, but it is really the couple’s opium addiction for which they seek relief. The doctor suspects from the woman’s “pale grey” face that she is addicted to opium. Dishevelled, dirty, and constantly yawning, they appear incapable of caring for themselves or their baby, who is filthy from neglect. Devoid of social and parental skills, the couple bickers over who really abuses opium and what type of “medicine” they are seeking; they both refuse the doctor’s proffered needle as too costly, but the implication is that they are seeking a drug to share later. The man convinces the doctor to prescribe laudanum, an opium-based liquid. As the pathetic couple shuffles out of the clinic, having achieved their goal, a light glints across the national-flag badge on the man’s cap, thus linking their condition with the colonial state.

Lan Ling and Mei Niang depicted opium and addiction as inherently subjugating, vivid manifestations of women’s disempowerment in Manchukuo. As in official rhetoric, Lan and Mei condemned the use of opium, yet they linked it with what they identified as Manchukuo’s patriarchal foundations. Their work thus supported Manchukuo’s opium regulations while subverting cultural policies by not representing Manchukuo as a “paradise land” (le tu). In February 1941, in response to such critical literature, officials launched the Ba bu (The Eight Abstentions), which provided sanctions ranging from censorship to imprisonment for dark, pessimistic writing that officials argued denigrated Manchukuo and Japan. The Eight Abstentions reflect the type of work being produced ten years after the establishment of Manchukuo. Officials soon supplemented them with the Gangyao yíwén zhídào (Summary of Guidelines to Art and Literature), dictating the adoption of Japanese literary traditions and professional organizations as models for Manchukuo’s literary world. Media chief Muto Tomio stressed that in order for the “arts to fulfil the national system’s needs, we still need to focus on the organization of professionals.” On 27 July 1941 Manzhou wényìjià xiéhuì (Manchukuo Writers and Artists Concordia) was established to mobilize writers to “assist in the promotion of the Greater East Asia Sacred War.” Manchukuo’s writers responded in a humbled manner. Gu Ding pronounced the Summary of Guidelines the “most significant matter” of the year. Wang Qiuying mourned the “need to sweep away descriptions of the dark side.” Over the following months, Muto published even more missives condemning “the very troublesome matter” of dark literature.

The dangers of opium were further publicized via medical literature and in advertisements for government policies and institutions that in the early 1940s...
adopted militaristic overtones. In an illustrated ad for the prohibition of opium and morphine from *Shengjing shibao*, the body of a uniformed man slices through the word opium (see Figure 1.1). Behind him, marching celebrants wave a Manchukuo flag and a banner proclaiming “National Refusal” (*guomin jujue*), explicitly linking the refutation of opium with patriotism, national duty, and the masses. Ads such as this were featured regularly, underlining the earnest position of anti-opium activists, who advocated reform, the self-interest of those who sought to legitimize the Japanese invasion to “save” the local population, and efforts to improve domestic and international perceptions of the regime.

Ads also advocated rehabilitation in Kangsheng yuan (Healthy Life Institutes). This example, from the capital Xinjing’s state-run Chinese-language newspaper *Datong bao* (*Great Unity Herald*), exemplifies the official stance on rehabilitation (see Figure 1.2). A woman holds a banner that beseeches: “Give up opium and morphine.” She towers over a number of faceless bodies that raise their arms upward. The caption on the right side reads: “Opium dens guide you into hell, Healthy Life Institutes lead you into paradise.” Drawing on propaganda portraying Manchukuo as a “paradise land,” Healthy Life Institutes were meant to symbolize the state’s benevolence through rehabilitation. The female figure, standing tall and proud above the masses, melds the nurturing nature of rehabilitation with the ideal of the “good wife, wise mother,” through which officials sought to modernize women of the region. But active rehabilitation of Manchukuo’s addicts, regardless of their numbers, was well beyond available resources.

In the early 1940s, Manchukuo officials acknowledged that the anti-opium movement was failing, stating that the “number of addicts is roughly estimated at one million, although no thorough surveys have as yet been made.” Officials conceded that resource allocation was insufficient to implement policy and, further, that addicts were reluctant to voluntarily register out of fear of taxes, compulsory labour, or other punishment. Wartime demands for increased labour and industrial production led to condemnation of “opium fiends” as immoral, physically weak, and ruinous to the labour pool. In the journal *Contemporary Manchuria* it was estimated that only 2 to 3 percent of addicts (no distinctions were made between occasional, regular, or heavy users; all users were labelled “addicts”) could withstand labour, an intolerable statistic for officials engaged in war. Anti-addict narratives in official publications underlined state priorities: recreational opium use was to be eradicated in service of war demands rather than for the sake of users and their families.

Discussion of opium eradication inevitably extended to the relative merits of rehabilitation techniques. Journals such as *Jiankang Manzhou* (*Healthy
Manchukuo) frequently outlined the most up-to-date programs, often with reference to international scientific discoveries. In “Yaowuxue shiyezhong de yapian” (“Opium from a Pharmaceutical Perspective”), Zhang Guochen (a professor at Xinjing’s Medical University) sought to raise awareness about the psychological and economic tolls of opium addiction and about the difficulties of rehabilitation. Zhang outlined the dangers of what he described as the widely held belief...
that opium was simply a recreational product.\textsuperscript{68} In “Yapian” (“Opium”), Zhang Jiyou (director of Manchukuo’s People’s Welfare Department) detailed successes in Germany (Manchukuo’s wartime ally) with three types of withdrawal – immediate, short-term (eight to ten days), and more gradual (two to three weeks), providing analysis of potential benefits and drawbacks of the various procedures.\textsuperscript{69} In Manchukuo a wide range of rehabilitation treatments existed,
from withdrawal and harm reduction to forced labour; “the period of accommodation for each addict [was ideally] 50 days.”70 Even in positive contexts, however, rehabilitation is controversial: sudden withdrawal or forced labour can result in physical damage or death, and harm reduction raises cries of addiction-enabling. But in a colonial, wartime environment, in which officials openly discussed the need for industrial development and framed opium use and control in race-based terms, rehabilitation, no matter what the process, was deeply suspect.

Rehabilitation efforts were undermined by the diversion of resources to war demands, the quelling of domestic unrest, and economic development. Officials conceded that rehabilitation programs at the forty-six Healthy Life Institutes were “far from satisfactory in point of scale and equipment.”71 Forty-six ill-equipped, overcrowded institutions could not serve a population of addicts in the tens or hundreds of thousands. Individuals were thus forced to seek cures at home with a growing range of products aimed at consumers, to receive treatment in hospitals or health clinics, or to risk jail or death. To make matters worse, rehabilitation was elusive: according to state statistics, seven of ten attempts ended with a relapse.72 Reformers thus faced the unenviable task of applying inadequate funding to controversial treatments that had limited success. Insufficient resources and war demands hampered reform efforts in Manchukuo, as elsewhere in Japan’s empire and in the Republic of China. Across Asia in the early 1940s the fight against opium was a difficult proposition in terms of resources, official commitment, and public awareness.

In 1941 Wang Qiuying underlined the importance of battling opium in the novel He liu de diceng (The Bottom of the River) by representing opium as a causal factor of the Japanese invasion.73 The novel is set in 1930s Fengtian and criticizes the elite for a “dissipated bourgeois lifestyle” at a time of national crisis.74 Their profligate lives are contrasted with those of the poverty-stricken, virtuous country folk, who pine for the long-lost Qing Dynasty; rural life is a world apart, yet it is also vulnerable to devastation by the occupying forces. Wang extols rural society, thus reflecting the official promotion of “rural values” noted by Prasenjit Duara,75 yet Wang is critical of both the brutality of the occupation and the privileged Chinese who did not prevent it. The novel recounts the male protagonist Lin Mengji’s move from the countryside to attend university in Fengtian. Lin ignores his parents’ warning to avoid their urban relatives and is “contaminated” by them.76 Ultimately, he fails in his studies. Further, his involvement in Changshi hui (Common Sense Society), a group of youths dedicated to consciousness-raising among the masses, is ended by the invasion.

Wang blames Japanese occupation on a Chinese dereliction of duty that has its genesis in the elite’s opium addiction. The wealthy shirk their responsibilities
and are negative examples for their children, who become wastrels. The “yellow and skinny” matriarch is most ravaged by opium addiction. During the invasion, on “a night of terror in history” (lishi shang de yi ge kongbu zhi ye), she toys with her pipe, and the servants hurry about flustered, without a trace of the patriarch. The invasion encounters no resistance and exacerbates youth’s “intoxication” (mizui) with petty affairs. Lin’s cousins don’t smoke opium but spend their lives gambling, eating in expensive restaurants, and pursuing love affairs. Lin, unable to focus on his studies, returns home defeated. At the conclusion of He liu de diceng, Lin revisits Fengtian to find his uncle dead and his lonely aunt cradling her opium pipe. With the servants discharged, the family scattered, and the region under foreign occupation, the full price of their intoxication is realized.

In 1942 the costs of opium intoxication were the subject of the popular song Jie yan ge (Quit Smoking Song), sung by Li Xianglan (Japanese name, Yoshiko Yamaguchi, b. 1920), the most famous entertainer from Manchukuo. In it, Li decries the “truly terrifying” cost of opium, which turns one’s “life blood to mud.” Jie yan ge was the theme song of the Japanese-produced, Chinese-language movie Wanshi liufang (Eternity), which dramatizes the Opium War. The film and song were produced in Japanese-occupied Shanghai and were intended to incite anti-opium, anti-Western sentiments. Instead, they underline a central contradiction in Japanese colonial culture: through support for government’s anti-opium policies, cultural producers undermined Japan’s “civilizing” mission by explicitly linking opium with Chinese subjugation. Jie yan ge was heralded across China, in territories held by the Communists, Nationalists, and the Japanese, and is symbolic of the wartime border-crossing of Chinese-language cultural production that still awaits further critical scholarly attention. In Manchukuo, sympathetic Japanese encouraged the production of such contentious work even at the height of war. In April 1943 Kitamura Kenjiro argued that if Manchukuo writers followed the dictates of colonial officials and depart from emotion and bury their heads in constructive [pro-state commentary], what kind of condition is that? Isn’t this tragic? Writers should have the intention to write on the constructive side, but they must be allowed mainly to write on the side of emotions. Only with this kind of rich foundation can Manchukuo literature finally have a hundred flowers bloom.

Although Kitamura argued that writers “should have the intention” of writing constructively, he stressed their need to express their emotions. Thus, despite onerous wartime surveillance, anti-opium narratives continued to circulate in East Asia.
In the final years of the occupation, colonial officials, harried by war demands and ambiguous Chinese cultural production, adopted a decidedly martial tone in their policies. On 4 January 1944 the Manchukuo Literary Association initiated use of the slogan “wielding pens as swords” (yi bi dai jian) to steel the hearts and minds of Manchukuo subjects for an intensified war effort. By September the ponderous regulatory framework and paper shortages led to amalgamation of the largest journals into Xin Manzhou (New Manchukuo), which held a writing contest on the theme of “Dadongya shengzhan yu women de juewu” (“The Greater East Asia Sacred War and Our Consciousness”). Organizers hoped for an outpouring of patriotism, but they received more in-depth depiction of the Chinese suffering of economic deprivation and adversity.

It was in this atmosphere that Wang Qiuying published his short story “Lou xiang” (“Vulgar Alley”), which examines life in a suburb that the narrator describes as a “festerling finger.” The poverty-stricken community revolves around an opium den owned by the “greedy ruffian” Gao, who uses his profits to make loans to neighbours at usurious interest rates. Even though none of the residents appear addicted to opium, they are all “trampled on in the evil environment” fostered by Gao’s business. Their misgivings regarding the Manchukuo Monopoly are expressed through debate regarding whether Gao’s lucrative business is licensed. Negativity toward the state is accentuated by the neighbours’ apprehension over Gao’s business and the eviction to labour camps of all residents without “regular” employment, a threat to almost all of the Chinese. Their misery is relieved only by occasional drinking binges, which on one occasion provide the backdrop for the ironic deployment of two Manchukuo wartime slogans, “Dedicated Service to the National Economy” (jingji baoguo) and “Exterminate Dark Behaviour” (pumie anxing). The dedicated service to the national economy that lies at the centre of the “festerling finger” is the operation of an opium den, which fuels the dark behaviour that “suffocates to death” (dusi) its Chinese inhabitants.

In “Lou xiang,” Wang links the opium industry with degeneracy. Opium dealer Gao is greedy and lascivious, his son is an inveterate gambler, and his daughter is “loose.” Gao forces an aging entertainer to become his mistress in order to pay off her debts; she resigns herself to being “played with” by men. Gao’s son exposes himself, urinates in public, and screams obscenities at young women. The only positive act attributed to the family is performed by the daughter, who gives a student some money to save his sick friend. But she steals the money from her father and gives it to the student only to pressure him to have sex with her. “Lou xiang” climaxes as Gao is stabbed to death by a poor worker who mourns the love of his life, the aging entertainer. In a final insult, Gao's fatal stab wounds are compared to his daughter’s “big gaping mouth.” At the end
of “Lou xiang,” the aggrieved worker stands stoically beside the dead Gao. Neighbours gather around but are reluctant to summon the authorities because to them justice has seemingly, and unexpectedly, been served. With a violence that befitted his life, Gao dies for the betterment of a community ravaged by a lack of morality, indicting the opium industry and those who profit from it.

In 1944 as well, Ye Li’s “San ren” (“Three People”) was published in a volume of his collected works titled Hua zhong (Flower Tomb). In “San ren” sex worker Ye Fen narrates her tragic life to a man whom she eventually discovers was her primary-school teacher, Liu Linggen. Following a night of drinking, Liu passes out in an unlicensed brothel in the company of his former student. When he regains consciousness, Ye recounts to him how her mother, who resented being married to a poor teacher, began entertaining men and smoking opium. In short order, her mother spent her days with “opium addicts” (yan ke) and “morphine ghosts” (mafei gui). Ye reveals how her father divorced her mother after she burgled the family home for money to buy morphine. Ye and her mother then lived with a woman who sold Ye to the brothel in order to support their morphine habits. Ye is depicted as a victim of “patriarchal society” (zongfa shehui) who suffered from subjugation as a young woman. Unable to comprehend the addiction that tore her family apart, Ye asks Liu, “in the past, wasn’t Lin Zexu’s refusal of narcotics ... entirely for the nation, for the people, for our later generations? But the people don’t know their sad history.” Ye links the fate of the nation and its people with the forgotten “sad history” of China’s engagement with narcotics, the famous anti-opium Qing official Lin, and the Opium War. Moved by his former student’s predicament and her reminder of China’s sad history, Liu resolves to save himself and rescue Ye from her “evil environment.”

The work of Wang and Ye exemplifies the negative opium narratives encouraged by officials even in the final months of Manchukuo. In their writings, opium is associated with social decline, foreign aggression, and the “sad history” of modern China. They depict the elite indulging in opium as a diversion or selling it for profit even as more altruistic behaviour was demanded to save the nation and its people. The lower classes are shown to be trebly oppressed by addiction, local Chinese elites, and the burden of an immoral society. These stories bolster official condemnation of opium use, yet although Manchukuo officials emphasized the economic ramifications of addiction, these writers cautioned of moral decline and its toll. Opium is shown to intoxicate the Chinese, alienating them from a state that appeared incapable of assuaging their suffering. This alienation is marked in these men’s writings by sexist stereotypes, which depict women as reliant on, or undermining, the men who are often depicted as their “saviours.” Their gendered stance is markedly different from
that adopted by Lan Ling and Mei Niang, who even more forcefully condemned patriarchal society and its ramifications for women.

Throughout the war, anti-opium reformers and anti-Japanese activists condemned “the Japanese [for] turning Manchuria into the world’s chief narcotic supply base,” branding this image into individual and collective memories of the regime. Manchukuo officials had staked claims to legitimacy via a “civilizing” project that included eradicating opium use and rehabilitating addicts. But their policies turned against them, as officially sanctioned condemnation of opium across media accentuated the Monopoly’s failings and, by extension, those of the Manchukuo regime. Since the state claimed control over the opium industry, the industry’s apparent flourishing reflected negatively on the regime. Ironically, the collapse of Manchukuo in 1945 is argued to have increased opium distribution in the region as the regulatory framework disappeared, stock from the defunct Monopoly issued into the markets, and farmers sought a high-value crop with which to sustain themselves during the Civil War of 1945-49. It was Communist Party (CCP) victories through the late 1940s that ultimately forced an end to recreational opium use. What successive regimes had professed to seek for decades, and the Sacred War had failed to secure, was achieved under early socialist rule. Zhou Yongming has described how popularly supported, strict enforcement policies melded with the end of war to legitimize CCP rule in a manner that had long evaded previous regimes. Opium’s reign was ended.

Opium had flourished in the Northeast. Once a mainstay of the regional economy, it had enticed Han migration that enabled rulers of China to claim the Manchu homelands for their own, pre-empting Japanese and Russian (or Soviet) territorial ambitions. It provided a leisurely diversion with which to combat the rigours of life in the frontier region and served important medical purposes. Opium was even said to have left its mark in the local dialect, as harvests signalled the start of autumn, the “smoke season” (yan ji). In the early 1920s opium was a major element of the Northeast’s robust economy, which was the envy of other parts of China. Opium produced revenue for economic and military development; it helped to fund Zhang Zuolin’s national aspirations in China and later those of the Japanese military across Asia. Following the Japanese invasion, however, the dangers of opium dominated official rhetoric and popular culture despite opium’s role in Japanese expansionism.

The inability of Manchukuo officials to actualize their own widely publicized eradication policies undercut the state’s legitimacy. Under Japanese occupation, opium industries expanded, producing cheaper and more potent supplies that filled tax coffers and lined the pockets of the occupiers, their allies, and others who sought financial gain. But although opium could bring wealth and prestige
to those who controlled the industry, the regulatory framework around it enabled, criminalized, stigmatized or killed users, disheartened anti-opium reformers, and stirred race-based prejudices. Manchukuo’s Opium Law was undermined by Japanese dealers and their Korean and Chinese partners, who experienced few real restrictions in the production and distribution of opium. The Janus-faced Monopoly robbed the state of goodwill that might have pertained from other facets of its modernization agenda, all of which was tainted by ever-increasing militarization and racist oppression. Rehabilitation programs failed to win popular support because even the most well-intentioned reforms were defeated not only by officials who wearied of consigning resources to an endeavour that didn’t directly contribute to their own enrichment, economic development, or the war but also by their low success rates. The failings of the Monopoly gave the impression that it was no more than a façade for Japanese drug dealing, making the regime appear not only ruthlessly parasitic but also impotent to effect the social change cited by officials as the reason for the occupation and war.

Opium attained a prominent position in Manchukuo’s Chinese-language culture through social realism as Chinese writers sought to raise mass consciousness; recreational opium use was an attractive target and an ideal vehicle for political commentary, regardless of one’s personal stance on opium use. The opium narratives outlined in this study bolstered Manchukuo’s anti-opium program and heightened awareness of the dangers of drugs to the exclusion of any positive reference to their recreational use. Literature was deployed to promote state regulation of opium, yet it also enabled critical reflection on the nature of Manchukuo rule. Since the Japanese were officially prohibited from using opium, Chinese criticism of opium addiction was not perceived by officials to be critical of the Japanese per se but rather of Chinese weakness and wilful disobedience to the law, discourses officialdom also promoted. Chinese writers decried elite indulgence in, or profit from, opium while the lower classes groaned under the weight of colonization, war, patriarchy, poverty, and addiction.

In Manchukuo’s Chinese-language media, little sympathy was extended to addicts, or “ghosts,” a term that accentuated the “half-death” nature of depictions of opium addiction. Opium may once have been considered a requirement of polite society, but occupation and war had spawned regulatory frameworks and an environment that spelled an end to presumptions of culture. In the opium narratives outlined above, a critical disjuncture attests to contemporary gender constructs. Both men and women condemned opium addiction for its destructive nature, but men tended more explicitly to link this destruction with society or the nation, whereas women associated it with the family and, especially, its patriarchal foundations. These opium narratives not only underline Confucian
maxims that consigned women to the domestic sphere but also reflect deep-seated anxieties over the health, status, and self-identities of the Chinese in Manchukuo – not the economic or industrial obsessions that came to dominate official rhetoric.

The Chinese writers discussed in this chapter echoed the Manchukuo regime’s anti-opium agenda because it appealed to them as well as to many colonial officials, who treated opium and popular culture with a similar disdain: they acknowledged that both required supervision, and laws were drafted to control them, but Manchukuo officialdom never mustered the willpower, resources, or legitimacy necessary to bring either fully to heel. As war spread across Asia, Japan’s empire grew ever more reliant on the eradication of recreational opium use to increase industrial and military capacity even as it depended on the revenues generated by opium sales. Ultimately, anti-opium narratives worked to the state’s disadvantage; claims in 1944 that the number of addicts in the colony had reached a daunting 1.2 million did little to instill confidence in the regime. Not only was the handful of Kangsheng yuan (Healthy Life Institutes) numerically inadequate, but postwar memoirs also tend to depict the institutes as little more than drug-distribution centres or labour camps. Such accounts argue that addicts who entered rehabilitation lost their lives, causing locals to mock the centres as Kengsheng yuan (Cheating Life Institutes). The failings of state-sponsored rehabilitation programs led Chinese to ridicule the Shengkang yuan (Raising Resistance Institutes). The “resistance” that such centres inspired is suggested by the summary execution of directors of Healthy Life Institutes by enraged locals on liberation in 1945. Unsuccessful rehabilitation programs in a racist militarized environment, which historian Yamamuro Shin’ichi has termed an “Auschwitz state,” cemented anti-Manchukuo feeling and contributed to postoccupation memories of this sentiment.

In Manchukuo, writers’ support for official drug policies enabled the production of a Japanese-sponsored, Chinese-language literature that did not simply parrot official policy but rather added fuel to the fire of anti-Manchukuo narratives and forged a legacy that consistently reinforced negative memories of the regime. Although the Japanese escape explicit criticism, dark portraits of opium addiction and subjugation are implicitly critical of their rule. Despite its military might, the Manchukuo regime proved unable to fully silence its critics or to curtail the opium industry; in fact, certain forms of criticism were encouraged. The condemnation of opium and, by extension, imperialist subjugation proved as damaging to the Japanese as such narratives had to the British. Yet since the collapse of Japan’s empire, the battle against opium in Manchukuo has been forgotten. Major studies by Zhou Yongming and Alan Baumler examine twentieth-century antidrug campaigns in China with no reference to activities
in Japanese-held territories. Japanese rule in China’s Northeast has been utterly excoriated in popular memory and in scholarly study for wartime atrocities, including drug trafficking. But those Chinese and Japanese who battled opium have to date been excluded from historical narratives, even though their work lay at the heart of domestically produced anti-opium, anti-Manchukuo discourses. In this volume, Bernard Hung-kay Luk outlines how disruptions caused by war and Japanese occupation altered the education of Chinese in Hong Kong, impacting both personal lives and careers. In Mainland China, for decades after the collapse of Manchukuo, those who had attained high-profile careers during the colonial era, like the writers Mei Niang and Wang Qiuying, had their personal lives and careers devastated, as they were hounded as traitors for their career achievements under Japanese occupation, regardless of the critical nature of their work. With regime change and the shifting of historical narratives, those whose work battled opium use were consumed by the condemning memories that they had played no small part in creating.

Acknowledgment
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Notes
5 Zhang Guochen, “Yaowuxue shiyezhong de yapian” [Opium from a pharmaceutical perspective], Jiankang Manzhou [Healthy Manchukuo], April 1941, 6.
7 Jennings, Opium Empire, 83.
8 Manchoukuo Yearbook: 1941, 731.
10 Manchoukuo Yearbook: 1941, 728.
11 Ibid.
12 See Contemporary Manchuria 3, 1 (1939): 38-44.
Cited in Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, “Introduction: Opium’s History in China,” in Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952, ed. Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 17. The emperor’s assertion must be suspect because of the context within which he wrote his autobiography and the extent of his personal knowledge of the Manchukuo state’s financial operations.

“Mafei zhi hai” [The harm of morphine], Shengjing shibao [Shengjing Times], 30 December 1933, 4; Ah Ling, “Yinzhe de xin” [An addict’s letter], and Yue Ai, “Jin yan lun” [Discussion of the smoking prohibition], Shengjing shibao [Shengjing Times], 3 October 1941, 5.


Published under the pen name San Lang, “Zhuxin” [Candlewick], in Bashe [Trek], ed. San Lang and Qiao Yin (Harbin: Wuri huakan yinshuashe, 1933), reprinted in Zhuxin ji [Candlewick Collection], ed. Liang Shanding (Shenyang: Chunfeng wenyi chubanshe, 1989), 18.


Jennings, Opium Empire, 87.

Xu Naixiang and Huang Wanhua, Zhongguo kangzhan shiqi lunxianqu wenxue shi [History of the Literature of the Enemy-Occupied Territories during China’s War of Resistance] (Fuzhou: Fujian jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995), 1.

Losses cited included lost work hours, reduced levels of workers’ skills, and land lost to opium that could be used to grow food, to mine, and so on. Jennings, Opium Empire, 87.

Contemporary Manchuria 3, 1 (1939): 36. Jennings, Opium Empire, 87, argues that 1938-39 opium revenues were approximately 30 million yuan.


Jennings, Opium Empire, 173.

Ibid., 106.

“Shops” could be just a hole in the wall: heroin addicts could knock at a door, whereupon a “small peep-hole opens, through which he thrusts his bare arm and hand with 20 cents...
in it. The owner of the joint takes the money and gives the victim a shot in the arm.”


36 Hua Jiangrong, “Yan lou suohua: Ge lingmaisuo nü zhaodai sumiao” [Trivial talk about opium dens: Sketches of monopoly hostesses], *Shengjing shibao* [Shengjing Times], 10 April 1936, 7.


38 Nakamura Kōjirō, “Kessenka no sake to tabako” [Drinking and smoking under the condition of total war], *Manshūkōron* [Popular Debates in Manchukuo] (March 1945): 58-61.


42 Lan, “Xiao xiang de chuxi,” 810.


46 Ibid., 135.

47 Ibid., 136.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid., 144.

51 “Patient” is a compound of two characters, *qiu* (to seek) and *zhen* (needle). The couple, however, is not seeking a needle but rather drugs that they can more easily share. Mei Niang, “Zuihou de qiuzhenzhe” [The last patient], in *Di’er dai*.

52 Ibid., 88.

53 Ibid., 89.

54 Ibid.


56 The Summary of Guidelines is reproduced in ibid., 174-78.

57 Kazeta, “Wei Manzhouguo wenyi zhanye de fazhan,” 164.

58 Ibid., 165.
59 Xu and Huang, Zhongguo kangzhan shiqi lunxianqu wenxue shi, 267.
60 Ibid., 269.
61 Ibid., 266.
62 Shengjing shibao [Shengjing Times], 3 October 1941, 5.
63 Datong bao [Great Unity Herald], 6 December 1941, 4.
64 For details, see Smith, Resisting Manchukuo, 30-40.
66 Ibid.
68 Zhang, “Yaowuxue shiyezhong de yapian,” 8-12.
69 Zhang Jiyou, “Yapian” [Opium], Jiankang Manzhou [Healthy Manchukuo], March 1939, 12.
70 Lo, “Fight against Opium,” 72.
71 Manchoukuo Yearbook: 1941, 722. In 1939, 46 institutes (each with a capacity of 2,672 patients) were established, with a planned 156 more to be constructed before 1942, yet in 1942 there were only 46 institutes; see Contemporary Manchuria 3, 1 (1939): 33-36. Based on US government statistics, Jennings, Opium Empire, 101, argues that 189 treatment centres were established.
72 Manchoukuo Yearbook: 1941, 725.
73 This novel was originally published under the pen name Qiu Ying, He liu de diceng [The bottom of the river] (Dalian: Shiye yanghang chubanbu faxing, 1941), reprinted in Zhongguo xiandai wenxue buyi shuxi [Addendum of Modern Chinese Literature Series], ed. Kong Fanjin, vol. 5 (Jinan, Shandong: Mingtian chubanshe, 1990).
74 Ibid., 834.
76 Qiu, He liu de diceng, 742.
77 Ibid., 721.
78 Ibid., 811.
79 Ibid., 805.
80 This song is also known as the Get off Opium Song, words by Li Juanqing, music by Liang Leyin; see Li Xianglan Collection (Taipei: Zhonghua Records, 1999).
82 Xu and Huang, Zhongguo kangzhan shiqi lunxianqu wenxue shi, 267.
84 Ibid., 116.
85 Ibid., 119.
86 Ibid., 112.
87 Ibid., 131.
88 Ibid., 127.
89 Ibid., 120.
90 Ibid., 141.
91 This story was written in 1939 and published in 1944. Ye Li, “San ren” [Three people], in Hua zhong [Flower Tomb] (Xinjing: Zhushi huise dadi tushu gongs, 1944), reprinted in Zhuxin ji [Candlewick Collection], ed. Liang Shanding (Shenyang: Chunfeng wenyi chubanshe, 1989).
92 Ibid., 261.
93 Ibid., 264.
Ibid., 261.

95 Ibid., 263.

96 Pernikoff, *Bushido*, 104.

97 See Lu Shouxin, “Härbin de yapian yandu” [Harbin’s poisonous opium smoke], in *Wei Man wenhua: Wei Man shiliao congshu* [Bogus Manchukuo Culture: Collection of Historical Materials on Bogus Manchukuo], ed. Sun Bang (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1993), vol. 7, 446.


105 Baumler, for example, in *The Chinese and Opium under the Republic*, outlines four major anti-opium movements in China without reference to efforts made in occupied territories.