Electing a Diverse Canada

Edited by Caroline Andrew, John Biles, Myer Siemiatycki, and Erin Tolley

Electing a Diverse Canada
The Representation of Immigrants, Minorities, and Women

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This volume examines the electoral representation of immigrants, minorities, and women in cities across Canada. It is the first of its kind and, perhaps most importantly, it provides a baseline of data against which we can compare future electoral outcomes. When researchers, policymakers, and civil society organizations think about integration and inclusion, much of their attention tends to focus on economic indicators, with far less attention being given to other indicators, including those related to political participation, electoral involvement, and civic engagement. This is unfortunate, and perhaps misguided, given that it is elected bodies and other decision-making structures that largely regulate labour market policies and thus have the potential to shape economic outcomes. We hope that this volume goes some distance toward readjusting this balance.

A volume of this nature has a significant gestation period and complex parenthood. Its origins lie in the Third International Metropolis Conference, which was held in Israel in 1998. At that time, researchers from eleven cities from around the world came together to consider our existing knowledge of newcomers' participation in formal electoral processes in Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This foundation led to nearly a decade of work within Canada and internationally under the aegis of the Metropolis Project, with this publication standing as one of the important results. Along the way, versions of some chapters have been presented at meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association in London, Ontario, the Seventh National Metropolis Conference in Montreal, and the Biennial Meeting of the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association in Ottawa. We are grateful to participants for their thoughtful insights and constructive feedback. Equally, we extend our gratitude to our chapter authors for their hard work and remarkable patience and for the collaborative spirit that is needed to create a truly comparative edited volume.

We also thank the elected officials who participated in the research for this project; the graduate students who collected data in earlier iterations; Shuguang Wang and Andrea Kmetty of Ryerson University who developed the data tables and maps for each chapter; Eric Leinberger of the University of British Columbia who prepared the maps for production; the reviewers selected by UBC Press who provided valuable and constructive comments; Emily Andrew and Holly Keller at UBC Press for their support in the development of the manuscript and their capable assistance through every facet of the publishing process; and Leslie Kenny and her colleagues at the University of Victoria's Centre for Studies in Religion and Society as well as Danielle Turpin of Llama Communications who ably formatted the manuscript. Finally, we recognize a number of collaborators who began this journey with us but were not able to stay with us to the end: Anver Saloojee who returned to South Africa to take an active role in the policy life of that country, Jim Curtis who sadly and unexpectedly passed away, and Tina Chui and Steven Bittle who, through the exigencies of life, were unable to continue with the project.

This volume is based on a survey of elected officials at three levels of government from across the country, which was made possible through funding from the Metropolis Project, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and the Department of Canadian Heritage. This funding supported data collection and the initial meeting of contributors that laid the groundwork necessary to complete a comparative volume of this scope. We also acknowledge support provided by the Aid to Scholarly Publications Program of the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, as well as funding from Ryerson University and the University of Ottawa, which made the publication of the manuscript possible.

We dedicate this volume to the brave men and women who willingly participate in the electoral life of our country; democracy is not a spectator sport.

Electing a Diverse Canada

Introduction

Caroline Andrew, John Biles, Myer Siemiatycki, and Erin Tolley

Canada has always been a country of diversity – one with indigenous Aboriginal populations and a history of immigration. This diversity is celebrated and is, indeed, a key feature of the Canadian identity. Nonetheless, while diversity may be present in our schools and workplaces, at folk festivals, and in our "ethnic" restaurants, grocery stores, and communities, it has not always been evident among our leaders and representatives. With the appointment of Adrienne Clarkson and then Michaëlle Jean as Governor General – both visible minority immigrant women – Canada's public face was finally one that was more reflective of the country's contemporary character. Although the office of the Governor General has few real institutional powers, the appointments were important symbolic gestures that signalled the recognition of Canada's changing face and a desire to see that diversity represented in our institutions.

The selection of representatives indeed reflects who we are. It influences how other countries see Canada and how Canada wishes to be seen. It also makes a statement about role models and about legitimacy, about who is included in our institutions and has access to public space, who is excluded, and who represents what and who we are. Those who occupy our institutions – our public space – are our public face, and that face has implications, not just for those who do not see themselves, but also for those who are affected by the decisions that are made, the policies that are implemented, and the public positions that are taken on behalf of Canadians.

This volume looks at just one aspect of this public face – our elected institutions. It is about diversity among elected officials in cities across Canada. It is about the reflection of various identities and the extent to which certain identities are included and others excluded in Canadian electoral bodies. It looks at conventional wisdom regarding the participation of immigrants, minorities, and women in electoral politics and examines whether or not these "common-sense" understandings are supported by evidence or hold consistently across the country. It looks at a number of identities central to

our understanding of Canada, including ethnicity, visible minority status, immigrant status, Aboriginality, gender, religion, language, age, and education, and it builds on our knowledge in these areas.

This volume includes case studies of eleven Canadian cities, as well as an examination of the House of Commons, an introduction and a conclusion. The chapters were written using a standard template and a core set of variables. This allows readers to compare results from each of the chapters and across the cities examined. The cities included in this volume are Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Regina, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Toronto, Hamilton, Ottawa, Montreal, and Halifax. They were selected on the basis of their size and their history of immigration and diversity and to ensure that cities from across Canada were included. Among these cities are those with the highest proportions of visible minorities, urban Aboriginals, foreign-born populations, and ethnic and religious diversity, and also those with sizable populations of both official language groups. This collection thus allows for a rich discussion of the representation of diversity in electoral office in Canada.

In this introduction, we situate the volume within the literature on diversity and electoral representation and introduce a number of key concepts and common themes that run throughout the subsequent chapters. We return to these themes in the conclusion of this volume and provide an overview of some of the volume's principal findings.

We began this project with a basic question in mind: To what extent do elected officials in Canada reflect the populations that elected them? We were curious about the municipal, provincial, and federal levels of government – not all of which have been the subject of research in this area – and we wanted to focus on a number of large urban centres, since this is where diversity is most present. Mirror representation, while a complex and contested concept, provides the empirical base for this volume. In other words, do the characteristics of elected officials mirror the characteristics of the population they represent? Moreover, we wanted to test some of the conventional wisdom that appears in the existing literature on women, immigrants, and minorities in politics and to see whether these beliefs are supported by empirical analysis.

This volume is not just an examination of the results of the electoral process in Canada, but an evaluation of representative democracy in urban Canada. There has been much debate recently about the existence of the "democratic deficit" and the decline of our democratic institutions (Gidengil et al. 2004). Part of the aim of this volume is to raise questions, while also addressing some of the concerns raised in discussions about the democratic deficit. One of these concerns is the extent to which our system – and by extension our elected officials – reflect the characteristics of the electorate and, whether, in the absence of such reflection, there can be appropriate representation. A second is the apathy with which many approach the

electoral process, the extent to which some voters feel they "don't count" or cannot make a difference, and the sense that elected officials "don't get it." Although the chapters in this volume do not provide a definitive answer, the volume is premised on the idea that a healthy democracy must include mechanisms for translating citizens' wishes into policy, legislation, and decision-making processes. The roles played by various actors in this translation process are taken up in existing research in this field, including examinations of various aspects of civil society, the public service, the non-governmental sector, and the media (see, among others, Frisken and Wallace 2003; Good 2006; Lapp 1999; Savoie 2003; Trimble and Sampert 2004; Young and Everitt 2004). Thus, the chapters in this volume focus on the interplay between elected officials and the general population. Elected officials are not the only political channel linking citizens and their governments, but they are an important – and visible – channel, and as we outline below, there are still a number of important research gaps in this area, which this volume aims to address.

Why Is This Important?

Although there are examples of literature examining the electoral participation of immigrants and minorities in other countries (see, for example, Koopmans and Statham 2000; Ramakrishnan 2005; Saggar 1998), until recently, relatively little research in Canada has looked at the electoral – or even political – dimensions of the integration of immigrant, refugee, and minority populations in Canada. Rather, much of the integration literature focuses on economic, and to a lesser extent educational, social, and cultural dimensions, or on the theoretical underpinnings of inclusion and "full citizenship" (on the latter, for example, see Kymlicka 1995, 1998). This relative neglect is somewhat surprising, given that the political arena is often a space where social change can occur. It is through the political process that the rules of the game are established. Canada is constitutionally committed to "peace, order and good government," and thus, not only is "playing by the rules" important, but so too is being able to influence those rules. Why has research not focused on the political or electoral participation of immigrants and minorities in Canada? Is the political process not viewed as an important mechanism for minority communities? Is decision making simply dominated by bureaucratic elites, rendering electoral bodies less relevant? Have we assumed – perhaps incorrectly – that research findings on the electoral representation of women can simply be applied to the situation of immigrants and minorities? Or have researchers in Canada given greater priority to the socio-economic situation of immigrants and minorities because it is felt that this is what "really matters"? Whatever the explanations, a new century has ushered in renewed scholarly attention to the political participation of the diverse identities that make up Canadian society, whether

immigrants, minorities, youth, Aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities, or women. (Notable exceptions in the 1990s were Black 1991; Black and Lakhani 1997; Chui, Curtis, and Lambert 1991; Lapp 1999; and Megyery 1991. For more recent examples, see Abu-Laban 2002; Biles and Tolley 2004; Bilodeau and Nevitte 2003; Bird 2004, 2007; Black 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2003; Black and Erickson 2006; Black and Hicks 2006; Bloemraad 2006; Canada, Elections Canada 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2006; Siemiatycki 2006; Siemiatycki and Matheson 2005; Siemiatycki and Saloojee 2002; Simard, 2001, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; Tossutti and Najem 2003; Tremblay and Trimble 2003; Trimble and Arscott 2003.) This volume is designed to build on this research and therefore to contribute to what we hope will be a growing body of research on the electoral representation of diversity in Canadian society.

Although Canadian scholars are now giving greater attention to the political engagement of newcomers and minorities, gaps remain. Electoral representation is not always the focus, and when it is, virtually every study is narrowly focused on a particular city or a particular level of government (typically the federal Parliament). A major contribution of this volume is to present research on several cities never before analyzed, and more importantly to permit for the first time a comparison of newcomer and minority representation across many Canadian cities, attentive to the differentiated experience at three levels of government for a variety of identity groups. This volume offers a comprehensive overview of the electoral representation of immigrants, minorities, and women in cities across Canada. This provides a platform for testing "common-sense" assumptions and comparing the representation of groups that have often been examined in isolation. Moreover, this volume situates cities as important centres of electoral – and political – activity. Not only is the Canadian population increasingly located in major cities and their city-regions, but greater attention is being paid to cities as a locus for policy change and to the "urban agenda" in general (Andrew, Graham, and Phillips 2002; Bradford 2003, 2005; Lorinc 2006; Sandercock 2003). Federal and provincial election platforms, for example, now routinely reference matters of interest to cities, such as infrastructure, public transit, and sustainable development. As a result, the elected officials described in this volume are an increasingly important part of the political decision-making system in Canada. Not only is it important for us to know who they are – and perhaps who they are not – but also to increase awareness about Canada's heterogeneity and the need to integrate this awareness into policy formulation and decision making.

There is also the potential here to contribute to our understanding of electoral representation, of electoral involvement, and of the factors that may facilitate or impede that involvement. The literature on women and politics, for example, is quite extensive, but research on immigrants and minorities is less developed. Are there lessons that can be learned? Are there

similar experiences, and therefore similar strategies to be employed? Thus we have included gender and other forms of diversity in this volume. This will enable us to ascertain whether previous findings on the factors that may encourage or discourage women's involvement in electoral office remain valid, as well as whether these can tell us anything about the presence – or absence – of immigrants, minorities, and other under-represented groups in electoral office. Some suggest that women will be more present at the municipal level of government than at the federal or provincial levels, as the geographic proximity to one's home facilitates involvement in the electoral arena. Others suggest that the absence of political parties in municipal elections – with the notable exceptions of Vancouver and Montreal – also makes the municipal level more open to women and other under-represented groups. Still other observers argue that it is the issues dealt with by the various levels of government that attract politically interested people to seek elected office at one level rather than another. Provincial jurisdiction around health policies and child care programs might draw women into provincial politics, while the federal level may appeal more to immigrants, given that issues related to citizenship and foreign policy are largely dealt with at this level (Trimble 1995; Tremblay and Trimble 2003; Trimble and Arscott 2003; Tremblay 2005; Maillé 1997).

The chapters in this volume also look at how various forms of capital – human, economic, and social – play out in electoral politics. Human capital, such as education or one's family background, as well as economic capital, or income, have long been considered political resources, with recent research looking at the importance of one's social capital, or networks (Li and Kunz 2004; Hero 2003). Several chapters contribute to the rich literature on the impact of the disproportionate allocation of socio-economic power and privilege by exploring how one's resources, or assets, may affect one's involvement in the electoral arena, and whether human, social, and economic capital can have differential impacts on various groups.

One difficulty in assessing these factors is that there is limited empirical evidence to explain individuals' motivations for getting involved in electoral office. Moreover, it is not clear whether women's motivations, for example, are the same as those for immigrants or other under-represented groups, nor is it clear whether the same impediments exist. Finally, as some of the chapters in this volume show, some of the findings of earlier research in this area do not necessarily continue to hold, and it is important that research continue. This volume offers, therefore, a rich basis for comparative analysis in major Canadian urban centres, and it will advance – and update – the debate on electoral representation.

Indeed, as will be shown in the chapters that follow, there is no single experience with diversity and its representation in the electoral arena. There is much variation among cities, between jurisdictions, and within the diverse

groups examined. Recognizing this, much emphasis is given to local specificities, with each chapter providing a historical portrait of diversity, including details on immigration, on demographic change, and on challenges that have arisen as the population has grown and become more diverse. Moreover, the chapters in this volume highlight local examples – local stories – that make Canada and its cities unique.

While much emphasis is placed on these local specificities, the chapters are consistent in their use of variables, terminology, and methodology to increase the comparative nature of the analysis. This volume examines electoral representation in 11 cities as well as the House of Commons, and each chapter is based on a comparison between the demographic characteristics of the general population and those of the elected officials who represent them.[1] Variables examined include ethnicity, visible minority status, country of birth, Aboriginality, gender, religion, language, age, and education. Of course, defining the various dimensions of diversity is highly complex and fiercely debated. Unless otherwise noted, the definitions used here are derived from those used by Statistics Canada, which allows us to make comparisons with census data (see Statistics Canada 2006).

Ethnicity is defined as one's ancestral origins, whether ethnic or cultural. This variable captures one's ancestral ethnic origins – where one's ancestors came from – rather than one's ethnic identity or self-identification. For example, you may have little or no identification with Italian culture or heritage even if your ancestors originated in Italy, but your ethnic origin nonetheless remains Italian, and you would be asked to indicate this on the census form. This is the difference between one's ethnic origins and one's ethnic identity. Indeed, it is complex, and, recognizing this, the census allows respondents to specify as many groups as applicable. Some people indicate a single ethnic origin, but many indicate that they have multiple ethnic origins. Others are increasingly indicating Canadian, either alone or in combination with another ethnic origin because of intermarriage or new conceptions of ethnicity. We will see, in a number of the chapters that follow, additional examples of this complexity.

This volume also looks at individuals labelled as "visible minorities," a term that originates in the *Employment Equity Act* and includes "all persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race and non-white in colour." People who are Chinese, South Asian, Black, Filipino, Latin American, Southeast Asian, Arab, West Asian, Japanese, and Korean are visible minorities, as are individuals with multiple visible minority origins. A child of Black and Latin American parents, for example, would be a visible minority, and so too would a child of two Black parents. The term of "visible minority" is not without its critics, with some suggesting it is divisive or imprecise. Indeed, as Canada has become more diverse, visible minorities are, in a

number of cities, becoming the majority, and while this makes the term somewhat out of date, it is still the term used in the bulk of the literature.

In the case of Aboriginal persons, Statistics Canada uses two dimensions; the first is the question of one's Aboriginal ancestry, and the second relates to one's feeling of Aboriginal identity. Aboriginal ancestry refers to those who can trace their origins to the native or First Nations people who resided in what is now known as Canada at the time of European contact. Although some have gained Aboriginal rights through legislation (including legislation that provided Aboriginal status to the non-Aboriginal spouses of Aboriginal persons), Aboriginal ancestry is largely defined on the basis of blood. However, the census also asks questions about Aboriginal identity and notes that a person has an Aboriginal identity if "he or she identifies with, or is a member of, an organic political or cultural entity that stems historically from the original persons of North America" (Canada, Statistics Canada 2006). This is similar to the distinction between ethnic origins and ethnic identity, which we discussed earlier. Aboriginal peoples include Indian, Inuit, and Métis. Chapters in this volume largely use "Aboriginal" to refer collectively to persons of all three groups; however, in some chapters, particularly those with larger Aboriginal populations, a distinction is made between Indian and Métis.

Immigrants are also examined in this volume. An immigrant is someone who was born outside of Canada and has been granted the right to live permanently in the country. Immigrants may come to Canada for economic reasons, such as to work, or they may come to join family members who are already here. In this volume, we use the generic label "immigrant" or "foreign-born" to describe these individuals, as well as to capture those who are classified as refugees and who came to Canada for humanitarian reasons or to escape persecution. It is important to note that Canadian legislation does distinguish between immigrants and refugees, but the public generally does not, so when "immigrant" is used in this volume, it should be taken to include all foreign-born individuals, regardless of their reason for coming to Canada. We also discuss, in some chapters in this volume, the Canadian-born children of immigrants, who occupy an interesting space between their foreign-born parents and other native-born Canadians (Chui, Curtis, and Lambert 1991). Although not, in fact, immigrants, these individuals are sometimes referred to as "second-generation immigrants" or "second-generation Canadians."

The volume also explores age, and this includes examining the median age of the population and comparing this to the median age of the elected officials. To calculate the median of a set of data, the numbers are arranged in a list from smallest to largest, and the median is the number that falls in the middle of the list. Age is increasingly important in politics, as concern

has risen over the participation of youth in the political system in general and over declining voter turnout among youth voters in particular (Blais et al. 2002; Milner 2005; Pammett and LeDuc 2003).

The chapters look at language, as well, using mother tongue as our variable; one's mother tongue is the language first spoken at home and which is still understood. In Canada, language is one of our defining variables, given that the country was formed when English, French, and Aboriginal populations came together. Although official bilingualism remains one identifying feature of Canada, there are more than one hundred languages spoken by Canadians. Public institutions, such as government offices and schools, regularly provide documents and even some services in non-official languages. The predominance of signage in non-official languages has even sparked public debate in some cities, including the outlying suburbs of Vancouver and Toronto, leading some to question the integration of the cities' large Chinese-speaking populations. Language, thus, remains contentious.

Finally, the chapters in this volume discuss religion. Religion is examined in terms of one's religious affiliation or identification; this is a self-identification and is not necessarily based on one's religious practice or participation in religious activities. One may thus identify as Catholic even if church attendance is limited to Christmas mass. Religion is an important variable, but one that is often forgotten or misunderstood. Although collecting data on religion can be difficult, its inclusion is vital if we are to properly understand diversity in Canada today.

In addition to these concepts, the chapters in this volume are woven together by a common methodology, which used a standard survey to collect information about the characteristics of elected officials so that these could be compared to those of the general population. Survey responses were collected using a variety of methods including email, fax, and telephone, and where responses could not be obtained, secondary analysis through websites, media reports, and surname dictionaries assisted in compiling a more complete portrait. The survey allowed us to obtain a snapshot of elected officials at one moment in time, with the chapters in this volume covering elections up to 2005.

Each chapter employs a proportionality index, which is a tool to facilitate comparisons between the general population and the elected officials on variables of interest. The index is calculated by taking the proportion of a particular demographic group within elected office and dividing that by the proportion of that demographic group in the general population. A score of 1.00 is an indicator of perfect proportionality. Anything above 1.00 indicates over-representation, while a score greater than 0 but less than 1.00 indicates under-representation, with 0 signifying a total absence of representation. Thus, if women comprise exactly 50 percent of the population, and if women held 50 percent of elected positions, the proportionality index

would be 1.00. This would mean that the proportion of women in elected office perfectly mirrored their proportion in the general population. However, if women comprise 50 percent of the population but only 18 percent of elected officials, the index would be 0.36, indicating under-representation. The proportionality indices for three key groups – women, visible minorities, and the foreign-born – are highlighted throughout the volume, and the conclusion of this volume provides an overview of our findings on proportionality. As we shall see, however, *disproportionality* in representation is more the norm than proportionality.

Theories of Political Representation

Debates about the nature of political representation have existed for centuries, but their tenor and fervour fluctuates. The debate in Canada appears to be changing, driven by worries about growing political disaffection, particularly among young Canadians, and also by rapid changes in the country's demography, particularly in larger urban centres. These changes raise questions about the extent of representation, its quality, and whether or not the presence of particular groups in elected office is proportionate to their presence in the population.

As the literature on representation makes clear, there are a number of ways to conceive of "representation" and the relationship between the citizenry and its decision makers (Pitkin 1967; Phillips 1995). One's conception of representation will influence not just the decisions that are made, but also how they are made. If we look, for example, at the ancient Greek city-states, direct democracy was favoured, and this was a model that saw no need for representatives. Rather, with this approach, decisions were taken directly by citizens; they were the decision makers. Although we have now largely moved to models of representative democracy, elements of direct democracy remain. For example, the participatory budget processes in Porto Alegre and other Brazilian cities contain an element of this model in that all citizens participate in initial meetings where decisions on neighbourhood budget priorities are taken. There is also space for some forms of direct democracy within a system of representative democracy. One example is the referendum. In a referendum, a question is posed by elected representatives to voters who then choose their preferred option. The results are binding, and representatives must act according to the will of the people. Although referenda have been used from time to time in Canada – referenda on Quebec's secession are perhaps the examples that come most immediately to mind – decisions are generally taken by representatives.

In a representative democracy, citizens select, through the electoral process, those whom they would like to represent them in the decisions that are taken in legislatures, on city councils, on school boards, and in the House of Commons. This model is firmly rooted in the franchise – in one's right

to vote – and those with the right to vote ultimately decide who will have the authority to take decisions. The parameters of the franchise, and particularly the criteria that determine who has the right to vote, are contested, and the criteria used to either include or exclude have varied depending on the period in history, the jurisdiction, and one's background. How one defines the franchise ultimately determines who votes, and this may have a marked impact on decisions taken. Moreover, many of the groups that remain under-represented in the electoral arena today are those who were historically excluded from voting.

A study of the franchise in Canada reveals many such exclusions (Canada, Elections Canada 1997). Exclusion has been based on race, with Chinese, Japanese, Aboriginal, and Indo-Canadians having all faced exclusion at various points in history. For example, if we look just at federal elections, Chinese and Indo-Canadians were not granted the franchise until 1947, while Japanese Canadians were not permitted to vote federally until 1948. The Inuit population did not gain the right to vote in federal elections until 1950, and while status Indians were given the right to vote in 1920, the condition that they would need to give up their status and treaty rights to do so was not removed until 1960. Some people have also been excluded as a result of their religion. Catholics, for example, were denied the vote in pre-Confederation Canada unless they swore to uphold the king and denounce Catholicism and the authority of the pope. Although the exclusion was intended to ensure loyalty to Canada, it discriminated against Catholics, and also against Jews and Quakers who were prevented by their religions from swearing oaths. While women were given the right to vote in most provinces in 1918, gender exclusion remained in Quebec until 1940. Importantly, the franchise can change, and those who may have at one time been allowed to vote can suddenly find themselves excluded. For example, property ownership has, at various points in time, been used to define one's right to vote, excluding those who did not own property. This was the case in pre-Confederation Canada. Women who owned property could vote at this time, but when gender became the explicit criterion for exclusion, they could not vote. Inclusion, thus, is not necessarily a constant; it can be reversed or altered. While racial, religious, and gender exclusions have now been removed from the electoral process, questions about who should have the right to vote continue. The age at which one should be permitted to vote remains a perennial question. The voting age was lowered to eighteen from twenty-one in 1970, and there is currently some discussion on lowering it further to sixteen years of age. There are also other ways in which the franchise could be expanded. For example, some question exclusion based on citizenship and suggest that residency should be the criteria for voting, at least in municipal elections. Yet others question the extension of the franchise to all prison inmates, which was mandated by the Supreme Court in 2002. In

short, while the right to vote is fundamental in a representative system of government, there are a variety of ways to define that right, and the definition has evolved over time.

Moreover, there are a variety of perspectives on the nature of the relationship between voters and those they choose as their representatives; this is at the very heart of representative democracy. In the delegate model, representatives are viewed as the "voice of the people" and are elected to bring the wishes of their constituents to the decision-making arena. They are not autonomous actors, but rather agents of the people. This is a fairly rigid conception, and it presumes that representatives will have the means and the ability to accurately gauge and bring forward the views of their constituents. Moreover, it ignores the existence of party discipline, which can often pull representatives to vote according to their party ideology or party line rather than according to their constituents' wishes. Nonetheless, this model is employed from time to time, often on questions of conscience. We saw this, for example, in 2005, when Parliament considered changes to the *Civil Marriage Act*, which would allow same-sex partners to legally marry. Many Members of Parliament (MPs) stated that they would canvass their constituents and vote according to their wishes. Some are even more rigorous. For example, Jay Hill, the MP for Prince George-Peace River in British Columbia, commissioned a poll of his constituents in advance of the vote on same-sex marriage. He voted based on his findings, although, admittedly, the poll results were a confirmation of his own personal view and the stance of his party; he was thus not forced to confront a clash between his constituents' views and competing perspectives, a situation that can emerge in this model of representation. This model is not just employed on questions of conscience, however, but also because MPs believe they are there to represent their constituents. This was the explanation given by the late Chuck Cadman, an Independent MP for Surrey-North in British Columbia, when he voted for the minority Liberal government's 2005 budget, a vote that prevented the government from falling. He polled six hundred of his constituents before the budget vote and, finding that two-thirds did not want an election, decided to vote with the government.

The delegate model of representation can be contrasted with the trustee model, in which representatives are not viewed as agents but rather as trustees who have some autonomy to make decisions on the basis of the "common good," even when this might clash with the wishes or interests of their constituents. In this model, representatives are entrusted with weighing the various perspectives, the impact of the decisions, and the interests of those beyond their constituency. In this model, voters may even try to influence representatives other than "their own," and representatives may feel a sense of loyalty not just to their own constituents, but also to voters from other constituencies. This often arises when representatives belong to traditionally

marginalized groups. Women and visible minorities, for example, are frequently entrusted with the responsibility of representing not just their constituents, but also the views of all women or all visible minorities. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, for example, Rahim Jaffer, the MP for Edmonton North and also a Muslim, became an unofficial voice for Canada's Muslim community and was viewed as a representative of this community. This raises questions about whom elected representatives are responsible to, and whether the representation of one's constituency should take priority over the representation of one's "group" or "groups." Moreover, there are situations – some detailed in this volume – in which elected representatives have soundly refuted the idea that they represent particular groups outside of their constituents, whether they are women, visible minorities, Aboriginals, immigrants, youths, gays or lesbians, religious, linguistic, or ethnic minorities, or, significantly, combinations of any of these.

Although the symbolic representation of these groups is important, representation must go beyond tokenism and the "famous firsts." Representation depends not just on electing a few women, or the first Muslim MP, but rather, on working toward greater inclusion and having elected officials who are able to reflect the characteristics and the perspectives of their constituents. We find here different understandings of what types of representation matter. Should representatives merely "look like" their constituents (sometimes called *mirror representation*)? Or should they also make decisions that are in the interests of those they represent, whether those are their constituents or the individuals who belong to their group (sometimes called *substantive representation*)?

The literature on *mirror,* or *numerical, representation* suggests that in order to be "representative," the characteristics of elected officials must be similar to those of the population. This form of representation is primarily concerned with what elected officials look like or, as Hanna Pitkin might suggest, with who you are and not necessarily what you do (Pitkin 1967). Mirror, or numerical, representation is the central focus of this volume and the basis for the empirical description of the various cities. At the same time, mirror representation does raise a series of complex questions. Can someone represent other people simply because they share some common characteristics? Who decides about the representation – do visible minority voters decide whether they feel represented by an elected representative who is a visible minority, or does the elected representative decide that she or he will represent visible minority voters? What is the process by which groups to be represented are constituted? How does one represent visible minority voters, and does this imply that visible minority women have the same interests as visible minority men? Indeed, there is always heterogeneity within any defined group. Francophone racial minority voters may sometimes see their

interests represented by an anglophone racial minority candidate and sometimes by a francophone candidate, yet, in both cases, those voters can be defined as part of the francophone group.

There is, however, a body of literature that moves beyond "how many" and looks in addition at what elected officials do. This is often referred to as *substantive representation*, where the focus is on the results or the impact of elected officials on policies or programs. Research on substantive representation asks whether or not having more women in politics or more minority MPs will affect policy outcomes or lead to legislation that is more favourable to these groups. Although some chapters in this volume look briefly at the substantive representation of particular groups, the emphasis is on creating a portrait of elected officials in the House of Commons and the eleven cities we explore with a focus on determining just "how many" or, perhaps more appropriately, "how few."

Indeed, there is a common-sense reality check that reminds us that legislative bodies made up entirely of middle-aged White men make us uncomfortable, no matter how politically attuned they are to voters' ideas. This discomfort indicates that we feel some degree of numerical representation to be a necessary element in political representation. A variety of theories or perspectives provide us with ways of thinking about the degree of representation that is adequate or optimal. For example, the idea of *symbolic representation* suggests that it is not the exact number of young elected representatives that determines whether youth are, or feel, represented, but rather that some youth are elected so that they can act to symbolically represent youth. In this perspective, one elected representative is perhaps not enough – think of the negative connotation of a "token" – but the symbolic representation of various politically salient categories is important. It is not necessarily the exact replication of the general population that is needed but certainly a mixture of individuals from the group that comprise the general population.

On the other hand, arguments about "critical mass" do depend on numbers (Trimble and Arscott 2003; Bystydzienski 1992; Skjeie 1991). There are, in fact, a number of ways in which the idea of critical mass is used in this volume. In some cases, it is used to describe the needed residential concentration for some particular minority group to have a chance to elect one of its own members. Others use the idea of critical mass to suggest that minority groups must have a certain number of elected representatives if they are to have real influence. It is argued that below a critical mass the representation of minorities is ineffective, as the representatives are not able to effectively represent the groups they belong to or wish to represent.

The idea of a critical mass is appealing in suggesting that simply being elected with certain characteristics does not necessarily mean that one can

be effective in acting for people who share those characteristics, but an understanding of just how a critical mass operates is more elusive. Moreover, this idea assumes that all the representatives sharing some characteristics would want to represent that shared characteristic. The example of Margaret Thatcher, the former prime minister of Britain, is a reminder that not all women want to represent women. Although Thatcher was Britain's first female prime minister, critics argue that she undermined women's position in society, in part because of cuts to social programs and services. Likewise, several visible minority representatives described in this volume refute their membership in the "visible minority" category. It is therefore not easy to apply the idea of a critical mass, although again we can recognize in a common-sense way that being the only woman on a twenty-person municipal council would make it harder to promote the interests of women than being one among a group of eight women on the same council.

There has been research (Tremblay 1992, 1998; Erickson 1997) exploring the degree to which female elected representatives see themselves as representing women and whether they are more likely to espouse positions favourable to women's equality or feminism than are male representatives. The results suggest that women are somewhat more likely to take positions favourable to women's equality. Less research has been done on the municipal level, but there is anecdotal evidence that suggests that elected women have, in some cases, been leaders in measures promoting women's equality (in Ottawa, for example), although there is also evidence of male representatives initiating measures to promote women's equality (in Toronto, for example). What about representatives with immigrant and minority backgrounds? Are they more likely to espouse pro-immigrant or pro-multicultural perspectives? The research here is less developed, but as the chapter on Toronto points out, representatives from minority backgrounds will not necessarily espouse positions that reflect the views of those from "their communities." However, if as preliminary research by Karen Bird suggests, visible minority MPs are more likely than other MPs to address ethnic-related issues in debates in the House of Commons, then the number elected can have an impact on the attention given to particular issues (Bird 2007).

If one is interested in the overall composition of the collective group of elected representatives of some particular city, questions relating to the electoral system are also important. For some, a system involving some element of proportional representation is the remedy (Milner 1999). Party slates, it is argued, would be more likely to include minorities than the present system of single-member constituencies. There are a multitude of different versions of proportional representation, and it is not the purpose of this introduction to discuss them, but it is important to note that the question of the electoral system takes on greater pertinence given our current

preoccupation with the representation of under-represented groups. Interestingly, several different electoral systems are covered in the different chapters in this volume. The standard model is geographically based wards, each electing one member to sit on city council, and a mayor elected at large across the municipality. The system for electing mayors does mean, for instance, that the mayor of Toronto has more people voting for him or her than for any other elected official in Canada. However, there are some variations on this pattern, from the entire council being elected on an at-large basis in Vancouver, to wards where two representatives are voted for in Edmonton, to councils and mayors being elected at both the borough and city levels in Montreal. Some of the representatives voted for within the ward sit on city council, but some sit only at the ward level. These different systems provide a background against which to think about the relative receptivity of different electoral systems to representing diversity. If people are voting for more than one representative, for example, does this make it more or less likely that they will choose diverse candidates? This kind of reflection is also true for questions of quotas, an issue that relates primarily, although not exclusively, to the representation of women.

In this volume, the individual case studies deal primarily with the profiles of the elected representatives and only secondarily with the contents of their decisions as legislators. It is, however, important to remember that, in the final analysis, it is the actions of the various legislative bodies that determine the degree to which traditionally under-represented groups have their interests truly represented. Our analysis of the profiles of the elected representatives is, however, a first step to understanding the nature, and present state, of electoral representation in Canada.

The chapters in this volume consist of case studies about numerical representation in Canadian cities, as well as one chapter that details the representation of various groups in the federal House of Commons between 1993 and 2004. The chapters on particular cities allow us to compare local specificities and regional variations, while the chapter on the House of Commons provides a more national perspective, as well as a longitudinal analysis. One principal advantage of such an analysis is that it gives us an opportunity to examine change over time and to test the common-sense hypothesis that representation will naturally improve over time.

Although each of the chapters looks at the numerical representation of groups, and we use a proportionality index or a comparison of proportions to illustrate this, the intent is not to make a mechanical argument for a perfect mirror-system of representation. Rather, our aim is to illustrate patterns of representation; to draw attention to those groups that are under-represented, those that are over-represented and, perhaps, most importantly, those groups that are completely absent in elected bodies; as well as to test assumptions about electoral representation.

Throughout the chapters, a number of themes are evident. These relate either to patterns of representation or to the broad picture of democracy and diversity in Canada. Political parties are seen as important actors in many of the chapters, notably those of Edmonton-Calgary, Winnipeg, Regina-Saskatoon, Montreal, and the federal Parliament. The weight of incumbency is highlighted in several of the chapters, particularly in the longitudinal federal study. Moreover, the impact of municipal amalgamation in Toronto, Montreal, Hamilton, and Ottawa is linked to incumbency in that a reduced number of elected representatives, in a system where incumbency is important, may dramatically narrow the opportunities for new candidates to have a chance to win elections.

The degree of group cohesion and the group's resources are also seen in several cities to be a factor in electing members of a group. One of the indicators of what Raymond Breton (1964) describes as "institutional completeness" is the existence of ethnic media, and the chapters on Toronto, Winnipeg, and Regina-Saskatoon mention such examples. Another theme that runs through the chapters is the importance of multiple identities and of questions about how we should understand these multiple identities (Andrew 1996). A related question is what people mean when in response to the census question on ethnic origin, they describe themselves as having a "Canadian" identity. These questions underline the fact that we live in an era of identity politics and that the categories we use to illustrate our arguments about representation oversimplify – sometimes necessarily – the highly complex ways in which individuals, and their elected representatives, think of their identities.

Although the chapters in this volume deal primarily with the composition of elected bodies, some of the chapters do look at decisions taken by the elected representatives. Indeed, the Toronto and Ottawa chapters argue that those two city governments have, in fact, taken a number of decisions that go in the direction of recognizing diversity, even though the elected representatives are not representative of the cities' diversity. On the other hand, the Halifax chapter describes municipal decision making in the area of planning that did not take account of the diversity within the population but rather mirrored the composition of the elected officials. This leads us in a number of directions: the need for more research on public policies that recognize diversity, but also the need for more research on the organizations of civil society, their recognition of diversity, and their capacity to advocate for, partner with, or put pressure on, governments to act in ways that fully recognize diversity (Frisken and Wallace 2003; Good 2006).

There is an archetype of the Canadian elected official – male, White, middle-class, middle-aged, Christian, Canadian-born, and majority-language speaking – that runs through the chapters, explicitly described as such in Edmonton-Calgary, Ottawa, Toronto, Winnipeg, and Montreal. This is clearly

the dominant pattern – the archetype. But we also see what we might call emerging archetypes of greater diversity – the multi-ethnic elected officials in Winnipeg, the elected officials of Italian and Jewish origin in Toronto and Montreal, the elected representatives of Filipino origin in Winnipeg, the success of Asian-origin and foreign-born officials in Vancouver, and the election of visible minority women in both Toronto and the House of Commons (Black and Hicks 2006). These emerging archetypes may represent the beginning of a challenge to the national and historical archetype, but, as we are reminded in this volume, the "inevitable, over time" argument is neither true nor useful. In addition, the chapters also illustrate that certain groups remain considerably under-represented in Canadian elected assemblies. These are important themes, which we will return to in the conclusion when we take up the task of evaluating the current state of electoral representation in large urban centres in Canada and help readers understand the patterns revealed in the individual chapters, as well as the factors that explain the current status of electoral representation in Canada.

Note

1 Note that the geographic area examined in each chapter varies. Some use data that cover the entire Census Metropolitan Area (CMA), while others use data based on city boundaries. This depended on local specificities as well as the boundaries of the geography in question and is noted in chapters where applicable. The Ottawa-Gatineau CMA, for example, includes Hull, Gatineau, Aylmer, and other Quebec districts not examined in the survey of elected officials, so census data are drawn from the City of Ottawa proper, not the CMA.

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1
Reputation and Representation: Reaching for Political Inclusion in Toronto

Myer Siemiatycki

By its own self-definition, the City of Toronto should be a model of equitable political inclusion. Toronto has, after all, branded itself as a cosmopolitan city *extraordinaire*. "Diversity Our Strength," proclaims the city's official motto.

Indeed, the city's messaging routinely strives to position Toronto in a demographic league of its own. In 2000, the city saw fit to declare: "Toronto is the most diverse city on earth, with more than 150 ethnic backgrounds" (City of Toronto 2000, 4). Similar claims of statistical supremacy abound in the city's communications (Doucet 2001). But beyond numbers and *quantity*, Toronto also frequently asserts the unmatched *quality* of its multicultural integration. "Nowhere else in the world," a 2002 city council report declared, "do so many people from so many different cultures, different ethnic backgrounds, different religions, races, creeds, colour, sexual orientation, live together in peace, harmony and mutual respect" (City of Toronto 2002, 2). So much for the inferiority complex and identity crisis Toronto is said to harbour. This city has come to define itself in terms of the many immigrants who have chosen to make Toronto their home.

But does this idyllic description of Toronto's experience of diversity extend to the city's political arena? Is diversity of membership a strength of its elected governmental bodies? Paradoxically, this chapter contends that Toronto's record of political inclusion is both worse and better than one would expect. Toronto's elected politicians do not reflect the city's population profile. Yet, the policies they have espoused and enacted have been significantly attuned to the diverse communities that comprise Toronto. In short, inclusive policies have been promoted by decision-making bodies that themselves are not inclusive of the city's diversity. As we will see, the "politics of difference" in Toronto are considerably more ambiguous and interesting than the city's self-styled reputation for unproblematic integration suggests.

Coming to Toronto: Past to Present

In its early years – as today – Toronto's population came from diverse streams. In between, however, the city was more commonly associated with demographic homogeneity. Toronto is therefore historically notable for its trajectory from demographic diversity to uniformity and back to unprecedented diversity. Toronto's experience reminds us that the population makeup of cities can change dramatically.

"Long before it became an urban community, long before incoming Europeans reached it," historian J.M.S. Careless notes, "Toronto was a recognized location in wilderness America" (Careless 1984, 9). For centuries, Toronto served Aboriginal peoples as the entrance to a valued shortcut. Located at the head of Lake Ontario, the "Toronto passage" was a well-worn Indian travel corridor between Lake Ontario and northerly Georgian Bay on Lake Huron. Traversing this passage by land was far quicker than navigating the waters between the lower and upper Great Lakes. These origins bequeathed several lasting legacies to Toronto: Aboriginal foundations, commercial activity, and, most symbolically, the site's name. Derived from the name of a significant Iroquois settlement, "Toronto" prophetically meant "Place of Meeting" (Armstrong 1983, 12). Suitable beginnings for a site now identified as "The World in a City" (Anisef and Lanphier 2003).

European colonizers quickly recognized the strategic significance of Toronto's location. During the eighteenth century, the French twice established outposts of New France at Toronto – first as a fur-trading post and then as a military fort. After the British conquest of New France, Toronto reverted to being a trading post in the fur trade. The turning point in Toronto's urban destiny was triggered by a late eighteenth-century refugee movement emanating from the United States. Following the successful American Revolution, thousands of British Loyalists left the newly formed American Republic to resettle in British North America. Through the 1780s and '90s, many moved into present-day Ontario. This prompted the Toronto Purchase of 1787, whereby the British bought title to vast tracts of land in present-day Toronto from the Mississauga Aboriginal nation. Four years later, the British divided their Quebec colony into two provinces of Lower Canada (Quebec) and Upper Canada (Ontario).

The new province needed a capital, and the nod went to the tiny settlement of York (later renamed Toronto), rather than the larger urban centres of Kingston or London. York's site was deemed better suited to repel American invasion across Lake Ontario. However, many were unimpressed with the choice. Colonel Thomas Talbot of London, Ontario, called York "better calculated for a frog pond, or beaver meadow, than for the residence of human beings" (cited in Spelt 1973, 11). York's early years seemed to confirm Talbot's assessment. The town soon took on its first identity as "Muddy York," and its population grew slowly. Home to fewer than a thousand persons in 1800,

the town's population barely exceeded five thousand in 1834 when it was renamed Toronto, on the occasion of becoming Upper Canada's first incorporated municipality with an elected council. (Toronto's first mayor set a standard for historical significance difficult for his successors to match: Scottish-born William Lyon Mackenzie led the failed Rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada and bequeathed to Canada a grandson who would be its longest-serving prime minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King.)

Fuelled by immigration, Toronto grew dramatically through the nineteenth century. By 1851 the city had over 30,000 residents – more than twice the population of the next largest Ontario city, Hamilton. By 1901, its population was 208,000 – almost four times the size of Ottawa, by then the province's second-largest urban centre. Migration from Britain accounted for the vast bulk of Toronto's nineteenth-century population growth. Toronto *was* demographically a British town. In 1851, fully 97 percent of its population claimed British ethnic origin; by 1901, through the city's sustained massive population growth, Torontonians of British ancestry still accounted for 92 percent of the city's population (Careless 1984, 202). Yet it must be noted that "British" was no synonym for homogeneity. Animosities among English, Scottish, and Irish identities could collide, not to mention religious differences among Catholics and Protestants. These ethnic and religious clashes played out on the streets of nineteenth-century Toronto. The most vulnerable and marginalized of British subjects to arrive in Toronto were the Irish Catholic. Driven by famine, arriving impoverished and practising a "minority" religion, their reception in nineteenth-century Toronto set a sorry precedent according to J.M.S. Careless: "The reactions of established Toronto society to the displaced Catholic Irish collecting in its midst were a good deal like those the host society would show to subsequent ethnic groups who also entered at near-bottom levels. These newcomers seemed entirely too cohesive and distinct as they crowded into mean shanty dwellings" (Careless 1984, 74).

The most significant non-British migration to Toronto during the nineteenth century involved American Blacks fleeing slavery and discrimination through the Underground Railway. The numbers settling in Toronto are difficult to estimate, but likely amounted to many hundreds by the middle decades of the nineteenth century. While some encountered prejudice in Canada, others made remarkable advances in Toronto public life. Mary Shadd was the first Black woman editor of a newspaper in North America, publishing the *Provincial Freeman* in Toronto. Wilson Abbott prospered in local real estate and served on Toronto City Council. Early in the twentieth century, Toronto-born Black William Hubbard not only was elected to Toronto City Council, but also served as acting mayor (Winks 1997).

The first years of the twentieth century also witnessed the first significant flow of non-British European migration to Canada. While newcomers came from many different countries, by far the largest single newcomer community

was Eastern European Jews. Like Loyalists and Blacks before them, Jews looked to Toronto as a haven from persecution and poverty. Significantly, from 1901 to 1951, Jews were the only non-British ethnic group in Toronto with (barely) over 5 percent of the city's population (Siemiatycki et al. 2003, 377). No other ethnic group would break the 5 percent ceiling until the great post-Second World War migration of Italians brought their community to 7.7 percent of Toronto's population by 1961 (Breton et al. 1990, 17-18).

Through the first half of the twentieth century, Toronto consolidated an uncharacteristically narrow demographic profile and civic culture. In 1931, one local historian observed that "no other city of comparable size ... is as homogenous" (cited in Lemon 1985, 50). The city was commonly referred to as the "Belfast of Canada," a bastion of Irish Protestantism where the Orange Order (imperially British and suspicious of Catholicism) set the political and moral standards of the day. Endorsement by the Orange Order was understood to be a requisite for winning a seat on Toronto City Council (Careless 1984, 64; Lemon 1985, 33). By the 1940s, when Toronto's metropolitan population approached one million, a decidedly unhappy Wyndham Lewis (English writer and painter) described the Toronto he had lived in for several years as "a sanctimonious ice-box ... this bush-metropolis of the Orange Lodges" (cited in Fulford 1995, 2).

Clearly, cities *can* change. By the end of the twentieth century, Toronto was proclaiming itself the most diverse city on earth. Toronto's demographic transformation may be categorized in two stages. The period from the late 1940s through the 1960s saw massive European migration to Toronto, particularly from Italy, Greece, and Portugal. The city's metropolitan population climbed from just under one million in 1941 to over two and a half million in 1971. As James Lemon notes, such large numbers of newcomers challenged conventional norms in "old, British Toronto the Good" (Lemon 1985, 116). An early sign of new beginnings was the election of Toronto's first non-British Protestant mayor in 1954. Not only did Nathan Phillips, child of Jewish immigrants to Toronto, win the mayoralty; he did so defeating the Orange Lodge-backed incumbent, Leslie Saunders. Today, Toronto's most beloved public space – the civic square at City Hall, used for political, community, and cultural gatherings – is named Nathan Phillips Square. The city's most cherished "place of meeting" is named for a minority-community elected politician.

Toronto's second stage of demographic transformation has been ongoing since the introduction of the immigration point system in the 1960s. As Kelley and Trebilcock note, with the adoption of objective merit-based criteria for immigrant selection, "the 1967 regulations finally removed all traces of racial discrimination from Canada's immigration laws" (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998, 351). The past forty years have witnessed the most sustained flow of

immigrants to Canada ever, and Toronto has been by far the destination of choice for newcomers. Thus, from 1991 to 2001, 43 percent of all immigrants to Canada settled in the Toronto census metropolitan area. This compares with 18 percent and 12 percent going to the next most popular destinations – the Vancouver and Montreal areas respectively. Put more graphically, the 792,000 immigrants added to the Toronto area's population between 1991 and 2001 exceed the *combined* 2001 metropolitan population (778,000) of Halifax, Regina, and Saskatoon. Moreover, the newest Torontonians certainly reflect the globalization of Canadian immigration. Almost eight of every ten newcomers to Toronto in this ten-year period have been visible minorities, and almost half the total came from the top five Toronto-bound source countries of China, India, Philippines, Hong Kong, and Sri Lanka (Schellenberg 2004).

Few cities have changed so much and so fast as Toronto. Writing at the end of the twentieth century, the *Globe and Mail*'s Toronto affairs columnist John Barber nicely compressed the transformation into a generational comparison. "I grew up," Barber wrote, "in a tidy, prosperous, narrow-minded town where Catholicism was considered exotic; my children are growing up in the most cosmopolitan city on Earth. The same place" (Barber 1998, A8). A place, we will see, where Catholicism is now by far the largest religious affiliation, and the fastest-growing faith communities are non-Christian.

Profiling Toronto's Population

As if to underscore its impressive recent growth, there are now three territorial incarnations going by the name "Toronto." This chapter focuses on the Municipality of the City of Toronto. The City of Toronto underwent major restructuring in 1998, when the provincial government imposed full amalgamation on six previously federated municipalities. By 2001, the City of Toronto's population stood at 2.48 million, making it North America's fifth-largest municipality. The Toronto census metropolitan area (CMA) that same year had a population of 4.68 million. And since the 1980s, the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) has described the City of Toronto and its four neighbouring two-tier municipalities of Durham, York, Peel, and Halton Regions. The Toronto CMA and GTA largely, but not entirely, overlap. In 2001, the GTA population stood at 5.08 million, and this is the geo-political space most often associated with the Toronto city-region. Unless otherwise specified, every reference to "Toronto" in the remainder of this chapter describes the City of Toronto. The city's boundaries are shown in Map 1.1.

The City of Toronto is indeed a remarkably diverse place. This is strikingly evident from 2001 census data on the immigrant, visible minority, linguistic, ethnic, and religious composition of the city. Unless otherwise specified, all subsequently cited demographic data for Toronto in this chapter is derived from the 2001 Canadian census.



Map 1.1 Federal electoral map of Toronto, 2001
Source: Canada, Statistics Canada (2001a).

Just under half (49 percent) of Toronto's 2.45 million population was foreign born – compared with an 18 percent immigrant population for Canada as a whole. And many of Toronto's immigrants are very recent arrivals. As of 2001, 21 percent of all city residents were immigrants who had arrived

Table 1.1

Visible minority population, Toronto, 2001

	Number	% of city population
Total	2,486,800	100.0
Visible minority	1,051,125	42.3
Chinese	259,710	10.4
South Asian	253,915	10.2
Black	204,475	8.2
Filipino	86,460	3.5
Latin American	54,350	2.2
Other visible minorities	37,980	1.5
West Asian	37,200	1.5
Southeast Asian	33,870	1.4
Korean	29,755	1.2
Arab	22,355	0.9
Multiple visible minorities	19,855	0.8
Japanese	11,595	0.5

Source: Canada, Statistics Canada (2001b).

during the previous ten years. Visible minorities comprised 43 percent of the city's population, compared to a national rate of 13 percent for visible minorities across Canada. Particularly noteworthy in Toronto is the variety of large visible minority communities who now call the city home. The three largest visible minority groups in Toronto are Chinese (259,710), South Asians (253,915), and Blacks (204,075). (Here is a telling indicator of how large these three visible minority communities are: if they were the *only* people living in Toronto, the city would be Canada's fourth most populated municipality after Montreal, Calgary, and Ottawa.) Table 1.1 identifies Toronto's various visible minority communities in 2001.

It was no accident that Canada's most successful sitcom television series about ethnic diversity – the 1970s *King of Kensington* – was set in a downtown Toronto neighbourhood. Well over a hundred different ethnic groups have established a collective community presence in Toronto. An interesting dimension of this diversity is the number of Torontonians bearing hybrid ethnic ancestry themselves. Based on the 2001 census, 27 percent of Torontonians declared multiple ancestry, while 73 percent declared a single ethnic ancestry. As the census further revealed, there are many large ethnic communities in Toronto. Based on both single and multiple ethnic ancestry responses, nine groups each totalled over 100,000 residents in the city. In order, these are Canadian, English, Chinese, Scottish, Irish, Italian, East Indian, Jewish, and French. An additional fifteen ethnic ancestry groups in 2001 registered between 25,000 and 100,000 members in Toronto. Table 1.2 identifies the twenty-four largest ethnic origin groups in the city. Beyond these largest communities, there are dozens of smaller ethnic groups from around the world who have also imprinted their identity on the Toronto landscape with distinctive retailing, places of worship, cultural events, and community publications.

One indicator of Toronto's rich multiculturalism is its diverse ethnic press. A comprehensive scan of this sector identified 157 different ethnic publications, each aimed at one of 40 different ethnic groups. Fifty-six of the publications appeared weekly, and Toronto also boasted 7 daily ethnic newspapers: 3 in Chinese, and 1 in each of Italian, Spanish, Polish, and Korean (Doucet 2001, 65-70). Languages from around the world are spoken on the streets of Toronto.

Of all transformations experienced by Toronto over the past fifty years, the change in religion is perhaps the most dramatic. In 1951, two of every three Torontonians were Protestants (Lemon 1985, 197). The Anglican, Methodist, and Presbyterian churches had long been the mainstays of civic morals, propriety, and politics. However, by the 2001 census, barely two in ten residents declared a Protestant affiliation. Roman Catholicism had become by far the largest religious attachment in Toronto, with 755,465 followers compared to 150,220 Anglicans and 131,825 United Church members.

Table 1.2

Ethnic origins, combined single and multiple responses, Toronto, 2001

Ethnic ancestry	Number	% city population
Canadian	373,540	15.2
English	345,890	14.1
Chinese	273,855	11.1
Scottish	232,025	9.4
Irish	222,880	9.1
Italian	185,230	7.5
East Indian	167,005	6.8
Jewish	101,380	4.1
French	100,470	4.1
German	97,945	4.1
Portuguese	95,225	3.9
Filipino	90,215	3.7
Jamaican	88,305	3.6
Polish	79,215	3.2
Greek	56,000	2.3
Ukrainian	55,060	2.2
Spanish	40,205	1.6
Russian	39,610	1.6
Sri Lankan	34,060	1.4
Dutch	30,880	1.3
Korean	30,205	1.2
Vietnamese	29,990	1.2
Iranian	26,445	1.1
Hungarian	26,280	1.1

Source: Canada, Statistics Canada (2001b).

But the 2001 census also showed that the city's fastest-growing faith communities were non-Christian. For instance, Toronto's Muslim population of 165,135 had surpassed the number of Anglicans. This is a new Toronto, where "making space for mosques" and for Muslims is now redefining the civic identity (Isin and Siemiatycki 2002). Toronto's religious profile in 2001 showed the following distribution: Roman Catholics, 31 percent; Protestants (all denominations), 22 percent; no religion, 19 percent; Muslims, 7 percent; Hindus, 5 percent; Jews, 4 percent; Christian Orthodox (all denominations), 4 percent; and Buddhists, 3 percent.

Interestingly, there is one significant identity that does not find a place in our narrative of ever-deepening diversity in Toronto over the past half century. The group that first inhabited Toronto and gave it its name, today barely has a foothold in the city. In 2001, there were 11,370 Aboriginal persons in Toronto, accounting for less than half of 1 percent of the total

population. As Toronto has grown, its First Nations communities have become ever more marginal to overall population in this urban "place of meeting."

Identifying Who Represents Toronto

Is the diversity of Toronto's population reflected in its elected government representatives? To answer this question, we will explore the identity of all municipal, provincial, and federal politicians elected in the City of Toronto. The politicians to be studied are those who were elected in the Ontario provincial election of October 2003, the City of Toronto municipal election of November 2003, and the Canadian federal election of June 2004. In total, the voters of the City of Toronto elected 90 politicians across all three levels of government. Municipally, Toronto City Council is comprised of 44 councillors (one elected in each of the 44 wards), plus the mayor (elected at large across the entire city). Provincially, Toronto elected 22 of the 103 Members of Provincial Parliament (MPPs). Federally, Toronto elected 23 of the country's 308 Members of Parliament (MPs). Due to population growth and constituency redistribution, the 2004 federal election featured a new constituency (Pickering-Scarborough East) encompassing residents of both Toronto and the neighbouring municipality of Pickering. This constituency is included in this study.

Two methodologies were followed to establish demographic and biographical information about these 90 elected politicians in Toronto. First, all politicians were sent a survey inviting them to provide information about themselves. This survey was conducted in the summer of 2005. Previously, between the fall of 1998 and winter of 1999, I had conducted a similar survey with members of Toronto City Council for another study (Siemiatycki and Saloojee 2003). These initial surveys were used for this study in instances where an elected politician had completed the earlier survey, but not the most recent. In total, 55 of 90 politicians responded to the survey, for a 61 percent response rate. Participation rates varied significantly across the three levels of government. The municipal response rate was by far the highest at 80 percent, compared with the 48 percent federal and 36 percent provincial response rates. It should be noted that 5 respondents indicated that it was not their practice to reply to such information requests.

For those who did not respond to the survey, I relied on assorted sources to determine relevant demographic and biographical information. These included media coverage, politicians' websites, phone enquiries to politicians' offices, and Internet searches. Considerable information about our elected officials is available from these sources. The net effect is that information on 50 Toronto politicians is based on their own survey answers, and information about the remaining 40 is based on the sources identified above.

Methodologically, this research poses a number of challenges. As is apparent, securing the co-operation of all elected officials is difficult. Despite repeated requests, a good number chose not to supply information. Illustrative of the difficulty a researcher may encounter was the reply from one federal MP when reached by phone and asked to complete the survey sent earlier. "I don't have time", the long-time parliamentarian complained, "for people to pick my brain" (Anonymous 2005).

Additionally, there are differing orders of clarity or ambiguity in the information sought about elected politicians. Biographical information such as age and educational attainment involve precise measurable facts – date of birth and level of study completed. I have established this information for the great majority of Toronto's elected officials. Other identity issues of interest rely on the subjective attachments or beliefs of individual politicians. Like Canada's census, I am interested in the religious "identification or affiliation" of our elected officials. In this case, I relied exclusively on survey replies for our information. Finally, some of the identity markers of interest are inherently fuzzy, and open to differing interpretations. Ethnic ancestry is a prime example. Following the lead of the Canadian census, my survey asked elected officials to identify "the ethnic or cultural group to which your ancestors belonged." In probing ethnicity, therefore, politicians were not asked to define their own sense of ethnic identity, nor what ethnic group their voters may believe the politician belongs to or is attached to. Rather, respondents were asked to identify their ancestors' ethnic origins. Consequently, for politicians who did not complete the survey, I have been able to attribute their ethnic ancestry based on such factors as place of birth, surname, and ethnic references in their biography or media coverage. Yet, notwithstanding any of the afore-cited methodological challenges and ambiguities, a clear, and even stark, picture of identity and politics does emerge. Toronto's elected politicians are neither a random nor a reflective cross-section of the city's diverse population.

Elected in Toronto

In very few significant demographic categories does the profile of Toronto's elected politicians mirror – or even approximate – the general population profile of the city. Particularly under-represented in positions of elected office are women, young adults, immigrants, visible minorities, ethnic and religious minorities, and people from non-business or non-professional careers. Moreover, with few exceptions, these imbalances of representation apply across all three levels of government. Table 1.3 lists proportionality indices measuring the representation of various groups among Toronto's elected officials. Recall that the proportionality index measures a group's share of total elected positions relative to its share of total population.

Statistically under-represented groups have a proportionality index under 1.00, while over-represented groups are over that mark.

Women comprise the majority of Toronto's population, but they are badly outnumbered by men in elected office. While 52 percent of the population is female, women hold only 25 (28 percent) of the 90 political positions in Toronto. As Table 1.3 shows, this yields a poor proportionality index of just 0.54 for women. Toronto would have to elect twice its current number of women for them to achieve statistical parity with their share of total population. Relatively speaking, women's representation is better at the municipal

Table 1.3

Proportionality indices for select groups of Toronto's elected officials

Group	% of elected officials (2004)	% of Toronto population (2001)	Proportionality index
Gender[a]			
Male	72.2	49.3	1.46
Female	27.8	51.7	0.54
Visible minority[a]			
Total	11.1	42.8	0.26
Black	4.4	8.3	0.54
South Asian	3.3	10.3	0.32
Chinese	2.2	10.6	0.21
Filipino	0	3.5	0
Immigrant/foreign-born[b]	33.3	49.4	0.67
Ethnic origin[a]			
Italian	18.9	7.5	2.52
Anglo-Saxon	45.6	24.9	1.83
Ukrainian	3.3	2.2	1.5
Polish	4.4	3.2	1.38
Greek	2.2	2.3	0.96
Jamaican	3.3	3.6	0.92
Portuguese	1.1	3.9	0.28
Religious affiliation[a]			
Christian	92.2	62.2	1.48
Jewish	5.5	4.2	1.31
Muslim	2.2	6.7	0.32
Hindu	0	4.8	0
Buddhist	0	2.7	0
Young adults (age 20-39)[c]	7	32.6	0.21

a Based on information on 90 elected officials.
b Based on information on 84 elected officials.
c Based on information on 73 elected officials.
Source: Author's calculations and Canada, Statistics Canada (2001b).

level, where females hold 31 percent of seats, compared with 26 percent of federal and 23 percent of provincial seats. Gender is the sole identity characteristic for which there is a significant "municipal advantage" over other levels of government. Toronto has more women serving on city council (14) than sitting in the federal and provincial parliaments combined (11). Toronto, then, may be taken as evidence of the continued relevance of earlier academic studies that identified the greater participation and success rate of women in municipal politics (Trimble 1995; Maillé 1997).

Age is a particularly stark marker of electoral success in Toronto. It pays to be grey(ing), it would appear. Based on the 73 politicians whose ages I could establish, in the year 2005, 7 percent were aged 18-39, 70 percent were from 40 to 59, and 23 percent were aged 60 or over. The youngest politician is 28 years old, the most elderly is 74. However, the general population is distinctly younger than its political representatives. Across the city, 33 percent of the population is aged 20-39, 27 percent is from 40 to 59, and 17 percent is 60 years of age or older. Accordingly, as Table 1.3 shows, young adults aged 20-39 have a worse rate of representation, measured by their 0.21 proportionality index, than other groups such as women and visible minorities. Clearly, political office is a career that favours the middle-aged and elderly over the young. This under-representation has not been helpful to a city grappling with problems of youth unemployment and youth violence.

There is also an evident premium for electoral success attached to length of residency in the city. Toronto's elected politicians (based on the 55 for whom we have such data), have lived in the city for an average of forty-one years. Length of stay confers a number of benefits, including familiarity with local institutions and issues, enhancement of reputation and networks, opportunities for career and status advancement, etc. A particularly significant advantage of longer residency in the city is the time it takes to climb the political ladder. Of the 72 politicians for whom we have such data, 31 (43 percent) held *another* elected office in Toronto prior to the position they currently occupy. In most instances, the initial stepping stone was a school board trustee position leading to a municipal council seat, or a municipal council seat leading to a federal or provincial seat.

The benefit of longer residency in the city does not augur well for the huge numbers of recent immigrants to Toronto. Recall that by 2001, over one in every five Torontonians had only been in Canada for ten years or less. As can be inferred, the proportion of immigrants in elected office – especially recent immigrants – lags behind their population share. While immigrants in 2001 comprised 49 percent of Toronto's population, only 33 percent (28 in number) of our politicians were born outside Canada. (This is based on 84 of the 90 politicians for whom I could ascertain place of birth.) Moreover, the vast bulk of these 28 immigrant-origin politicians arrived long ago from Canada's "traditional" source countries of migration. Seventeen were born

in Europe and 2 in the United States. By far the largest "exporter" of future politicians to Toronto was Italy – 10 of Toronto's 28 foreign-born politicians migrated to Canada from Italy. The Caribbean is the next regional source of note, accounting for 5 politicians: 3 hailing from Jamaica and 1 each from Trinidad and Grenada. Rounding out the foreign-born cohort, 2 were born in Asia (South Korea and Hong Kong), 1 in Africa (Tanzania), and 1 in South America (Ecuador). Interestingly, for the 9 Toronto politicians born outside Europe or North America, their average length of residency in Toronto stands at 35 years, with the lowest period of stay among the group being 29 years. Clearly, the massive wave of immigrants who have arrived in Toronto over the past 30 years are encountering difficulty taking their place in the political arena. A later section of this chapter seeks to explain the statistical mismatch between the population of Toronto and its elected representatives.

Visible minorities are especially under-represented in the ranks of Toronto's politicians. Comprising 43 percent of the city's population in 2001, visible minorities held only 10 (just 11 percent) of the 90 elected positions in the city. As Table 1.3 shows, this yields a particularly low proportionality index of 0.26 for visible minorities in elected office. Toronto would need to elect four times as many visible minority politicians for them to achieve a statistical representation equal to their share of city population. Of Toronto's 10 visible minority politicians, 4 are Black, 3 are South Asian, 2 are Chinese, and 1 is Korean.

The representation gap is more pronounced among some visible minority groups than others. As Table 1.3 indicates, all large visible minority communities in Toronto are significantly under-represented in elected office, but some are excluded to more extreme degrees than others. The proportionality indices for the city's four largest visible minority communities are 0.21 for Chinese, 0.32 for South Asians, 0.53 for Blacks, and 0 (none elected) for Filipinos. The converse of this picture, of course, is the statistical over-representation of Caucasians (Whites) in elected office. Whites comprised 57 percent of the city population in 2001 but held 89 percent – 80 of the 90 – elected positions, for a proportionality index of 1.48.

Relatively small variations exist in visible minority representation across the three levels of government: 5 representatives are municipal, 3 provincial, and 2 federal. Visible minority politicians thus comprise 11 percent of city councillors, 14 percent of provincial MPPs, and 9 percent of federal MPs in Toronto. Interestingly, the representation of women among Toronto's visible minority politicians is significantly higher than the gender distribution among Caucasians. Women comprise 40 percent of the 10 visible minority politicians, but only 26 percent of Caucasian politicians. This pattern matches findings in this volume for Vancouver and the federal Parliament, suggesting a greater opening for women of colour than for White women, relative to their male counterparts.

Ethnic origin representation among Toronto politicians highlights the overwhelming pre-eminence of two groups: persons of Anglo-Saxon and Italian ancestry. Anglo-Saxons account for 41 of 90 elected positions. This total includes politicians who variously self-identified their ancestry as Anglo-Saxon, British, English, Scottish, and Irish. Thus, while Toronto's Anglo-Saxon community in recent decades has diminished in population predominance, it continues to supply by far the largest number of city politicians. Italians are the second largest ethnic group in the ranks of city politicians, holding 17 seats. Across the remaining 32 seats, only six ethnic groups hold more than a single seat: Jewish (5), Polish (4), Jamaican (3), Ukrainian (3), Chinese (2), and Greek (2).

As Table 1.3 shows, both Anglo-Saxons and Italians are significantly over-represented in elected office relative to their population. Anglo-Saxons hold 46 percent of positions with 25 percent of the population, while Italians claim 19 percent of the seats with under 8 percent of the population. Thus, Italians have the highest rate of statistical over-representation of any group in Toronto, with a proportionality index of 2.52, followed by the Anglo-Saxon rate of 1.83. The rate of Anglo-Saxon representation shows little variation across all three levels of government, while Italian representation is greater municipally and provincially than federally. Nor is this preponderance of Anglo-Saxons and Italians in elected office a new phenomenon. For instance, four municipal elections earlier, in 1994, Anglo-Saxons made up 51 percent of Toronto's municipal politicians while Italians accounted for 14 percent (Siemiatycki and Saloojee 2003, 254). Much as in Hamilton and Montreal, which are discussed later in this volume, Italians have proven to be Toronto's most successful ethnic minority community in electing members to public office. And as in most Canadian cities, Aboriginals in Toronto hold no elected municipal, provincial, or federal positions.

Religious identity also reproduces uneven patterns of electoral representation in Toronto. The city's recently burgeoning non-Christian religions have minimal representation. Muslims, who comprise 7 percent of the city population, hold 2 elected positions for only 2 percent of all seats. Faring worse still are Hindus at 5 percent of the population and Buddhists at 3 percent. Neither group has elected any members in Toronto. The position of the Jewish community, with its considerably longer presence in Toronto, is significantly better. Accounting for 4 percent of the city's population, Jews hold almost 6 percent of elected positions – 3 municipal and 2 provincial. The vast majority of Toronto politicians are Christian. At 62 percent of Toronto's population, Christians hold 83 (92 percent) of the elected positions.

Occupationally, the great majority of politicians are drawn from the professions and the business sector. I have information on the earlier occupations of 82 of 90 politicians. Forty politicians had earlier careers in the professions,

with 17 educators (teachers, principals, professors, instructors) and 13 lawyers leading the way. Twenty-three politicians were business owners or executives before being elected. The next largest career path to elected office was being employed as staff to an elected politician (assistant, researcher, community liaison). Nine politicians had served in such roles, and this was particularly prevalent among current municipal politicians, who accounted for 7 of the 9 former staff. It would appear that in municipal elections, where the absence of political parties makes name recognition and personal networks so important, serving as political staff to a municipal council is a significant way to build a personal base of contacts and supporters. Very few elected politicians emerged from leadership positions in community organizations or the labour movement – only 4 and 2 respectively. None appear to have come from Toronto's vast retail, clerical, hospitality, or manufacturing workforce. Given their occupational backgrounds, most politicians enjoyed above-average income and educational attainment, compared with the city's total population. Thus, while 25 percent of Toronto residents reported holding a university undergraduate degree or higher in the 2001 census, this applied to 92 percent of the 72 politicians for whom we could establish an educational profile.

Like the cities discussed in other chapters of this collection, Toronto's elected politicians may be said to embody something of a civic identity crisis. They differ markedly in their identity and background from the pluralistic population they represent. As we have seen, there is such a thing as a "typical" politician in Toronto. The winning formula is: Canadian-born White male, middle-aged or older, long-time city resident, Christian, of Anglo-Saxon origin, with a university degree and either professional or business career experience.

Beyond this prototype, four other groups should be acknowledged as having positions of note among Toronto's elected officials. First, since women constitute over half the city's population, even at a rate of representation that is barely half of what their numbers warrant, women hold a significant number of positions – 25 of 90. Second, Toronto has elected openly gay and lesbian politicians at all levels of government: a total of 4 (3 gay, 1 lesbian) among Toronto's 90 elected politicians. Third, as members of statistically the most over-represented ethnic group, politicians of Italian origin hold an impressive 17 seats. Finally, Toronto's Jewish community is the only non-Christian religion statistically over-represented in elected office, with 5 elected positions.

The groups that remain offer a compelling profile of those statistically most marginalized in terms of Toronto's elected officials: young adults, immigrants who arrived in the past three decades, racial minorities, adherents of non-Christian religions, and those not in business or professional careers.

More Torontonians today fit these characteristics than the more restrictive prototype for a successful politician described above. Why does Canada's most diverse city not elect a more diverse cohort of politicians?

Explaining Toronto's Political Identity Gap

It would be prudent to adopt a spirit of intellectual modesty in attempting to explain who gets elected in Toronto. Election results, after all, reflect the decisions and choices made by huge numbers of people. For instance, the 2003 municipal election in Toronto had a total eligible electorate of 1,825,483 (City of Toronto 2004). Nonetheless, several important contexts and causes shaping Toronto's political profile are clear.

To begin, it should be noted that the current patterns of relative over- and under-representation of groups among elected politicians are not a new phenomenon. Siemiatycki and Saloojee found the same relative over-representation (of Anglo-Saxons, Italians, and Jews) and under-representation (of women and visible minorities) among Toronto's elected officials resulting from the previous round of elections across all three levels of government held in 1999 and 2000 (Siemiatycki and Saloojee 2002). The municipal arena exemplifies how entrenched these patterns of political inclusion and exclusion are. Reaching back four municipal elections earlier, to the civic vote of 1994, the profile of Toronto's elected municipal politicians then included Anglo-Saxons (51 percent), women (25 percent), Italians (14 percent), and visible minorities (8 percent). After the 2003 municipal vote, the distribution was Anglo-Saxons (45 percent), women (31 percent), Italians (20 percent), and racial minorities (11 percent). While there have been some fluctuations for each group, the compelling picture is of sustained electoral imbalance over four trips to the ballot box through a ten-year period of massive migration and population change in Toronto.

Several aspects of our electoral system, identified in other chapters as well, have come into play here. As in Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, and Hamilton, a municipal merger in Toronto substantially reduced the number of available municipal council seats from 106 in 1994 to 58 in 1997 to the current 45 since the year 2000. At the same time, the Ontario government reduced the number of seats in the provincial legislature, eliminating 6 positions in Toronto. Thus, at the very time Toronto was experiencing its greatest wave of global migration, the number of elected positions shrank substantially. The total number of municipal, provincial, and federal positions in Toronto in 1994 was 156; the current total is 90. The ripple effects were not only fewer available positions but also the consequent creation of much more populous constituencies (especially at the municipal level), which raised the cost of running for office and reduced the ability of particular ethnoracial population concentrations to determine voting results.

In normal times, unseating an incumbent in municipal politics is difficult enough. But new faces stood little chance as 106 incumbents scrambled among themselves to hold onto a substantially reduced number of positions following the municipal amalgamation. Thus, after the civic vote in 2000, only 3 of 45 members of Toronto City Council had not held a pre-amalgamation seat in the 1994 election. One "career transition" exercised by embattled municipal politicians was to seek provincial or federal office. Eight of Toronto's 45 current provincial and federal elected members had held municipal council seats prior to amalgamation. The effect of Toronto's municipal amalgamation, therefore, was to delay the entry of new faces into elected office at all three levels of government.

However, the elections of 2003 and 2004 showed that a change in the guard among Toronto politicians would not necessarily enhance the position of traditionally excluded groups. The elections of these years produced the greatest turnover in decades, amounting to 36 percent, 31 percent, and 17 percent among provincial, municipal, and federal politicians for Toronto respectively. But of the 26 newly elected members at all three levels, only 1 (4 percent) was a young adult under the age of 40, only 4 (15 percent) were visible minorities, and 14 (54 percent) were Anglo-Saxon. More impressive were the gains made by women, who won 11 (42 percent) of these seats. Also noteworthy among this cohort of newly elected were the first Muslims ever elected in the city – 1 federally and 1 provincially.

Yet, given the rate of turnover in these elections, it is disappointing that more youthful and visible minority candidates, in particular, were not elected. At the municipal level, the problem is not a lack of candidates so much as their apparent lack of sufficient networks and support to mount a credible challenge. In the 2003 municipal election, visible minorities accounted for one of every five candidates running for office. But barely one in ten winning candidates was from a visible minority community. And the great majority of visible minority candidates fared poorly at the polls, with 80 percent failing to win even 10 percent of the votes secured by the winner. Federally and provincially, as well, the great majority of visible minority candidates running for office for one of the major political parties polled far behind the winning candidate.

Elsewhere, Siemiatycki and Saloojee have contended that the identity outcomes of elections "reflect and reinforce basic social power relations" (Siemiatycki and Saloojee 2003, 259). Thus, Toronto's Anglo-Saxon, Italian, and Jewish communities (each statistically over-represented among elected officials) have a number of collective advantages that position them well for electoral success. Anglo-Saxons are Toronto's traditional dominant culture, and they have controlled the City's political institutions for two centuries. Significant residual status still accrues to Anglo-Saxons as the "natural"

political leaders in Toronto. Thus, of the five federal ridings in Toronto with the highest visible minority population, four have elected Anglo-Saxon MPs; the other has an MP of Greek origin (Matheson 2005, 41). Minority communities typically require large residential concentration in a constituency in order to elect a politician of their own identity. Anglo-Saxons, by contrast, are electable anywhere as a result of their historic identification as the founding, dominant culture. Anglo-Saxons also, of course, occupy major positions of leadership in Toronto's economic and professional spheres, and as a group they enjoy well-above-average income and home ownership – key markers of successful political participation (Ornstein 2000).

Toronto's most successful minority communities in the political arena have been Italians and Jews. Both have drawn on relatively similar collective capacities to achieve electoral gains for their members. These are large, longstanding communities in Toronto. They have strong institutional roots in the city (including advocacy and service organizations, ethnic press, religious institutions, and corporate organizations) that have nurtured community leaders and an active tradition of civic participation. Both groups have a strong sense of collective identity, which may explain their high degree of residential concentration in the Toronto area. As a result, both Italians and Jews comprise significant blocs of population in some electoral constituencies. Both groups also enjoyed above-average income and homeownership rates – Italians, in fact, had the highest rate for any ethnoracial group at 89 percent (Ornstein 2000). Thus, both inside the City of Toronto and in its neighbouring suburbs, Italians and Jews have succeeded in electing politicians of their own identity.

To enumerate the electoral advantages of the Italian and Jewish communities in Toronto is also by contrast to identify some of the barriers impeding the electoral success of visible minorities. Thus, in his comprehensive study of ethnoracial inequality in Toronto, Michael Ornstein concluded that "visible minorities are prominently represented among the most disadvantaged groups in the City of Toronto" (Ornstein 2000, ii). Nowhere that free elections are practised does socio-economic disadvantage constitute a political advantage. Undue rates of unemployment, poverty, lack of official language skill, and relatively low home ownership – alone and certainly in combination – will inhibit community political participation and efficacy. Add to this a recent arrival in the country and the challenges of newcomer resettlement, and the barriers for immigrant communities can mount even higher.

Yet, we also need to be cautious in generalizing about the diverse communities comprising the categories of immigrants and visible minorities. Different visible minority communities, for instance, reveal significant variation in electoral representation. As we have seen, politicians in Toronto of Jamaican origin have achieved elected office at a rate close to their share of the population. Compared with other visible minority groups, Jamaicans

have benefited from relatively earlier arrival in Canada, facility with English as a mother tongue, and a well-developed set of community institutions. It may also be noted that while South Asian representation lags badly behind this community's share of Toronto's population, this group is achieving considerably better electoral representation in the suburbs. Particularly compelling is the case of Brampton, northwest of Toronto, where South Asians hold 3 of 4 federal seats and 2 of 3 provincial seats. All 5 of these positions are held by individuals of Punjabi Sikh origin, giving this community a proportionality index of 3.55 – one of the greatest rates of over-representation for any demographically identifiable group anywhere in Canada. A variety of factors contribute to this pattern of electoral "suburban success," including dramatic increases and concentration of residential settlement in periphery edge cities, the strong homeland political participation traditions of South Asians and Punjabi Sikhs in particular, and the eagerness of political parties to field minority candidates in these suburban constituencies (Siemiatycki and Matheson 2005). And, as other chapters show, South Asian candidates have also been successful in Vancouver, Calgary, and Edmonton.

Toronto's Chinese community constitutes a stark contrast. As we saw, it accounts for 11 percent of Toronto's population, yet it holds only 2 of 90 seats in the city. (Recall, for contrast, that Italians hold 17 seats with under 8 percent of the population, and Anglo-Saxons hold 41 seats with 25 percent of the population.) The difficulty of explaining electoral outcomes is evident from the Chinese experience. This is a group with large concentrated numbers in Toronto. Indeed, in 2001 they were the largest "single response" ethnic origin group in more wards in Toronto (12) than any other group! They have major communal institutions in the city, including three daily newspapers, a host of service and advocacy organizations, and significant economic holdings. They also have considerably above-average home ownership rates and at-average university degree completion rates (Ornstein 2000).

So why are so few Toronto politicians of Chinese origin? Beyond the electoral and institutional factors we cited as inhibiting immigrant and minority representation, some ethno-specific factors may enter into play. The majority of Chinese in Toronto are recent arrivals whose mother tongue is not English. Settling, integrating, and acquiring English proficiency are critical initial adaptations that take time. Moreover, while our census identifies Chinese as a single community, there are significant divisions of language and nationality among them that may interfere with the emergence of a single voice for the entire community (Lo and Wang 1997; Szonyi 2002). Additionally, homeland political traditions and culture may have an impact. Some scholars have identified the relative absence of liberal democracy in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan as a factor in retarding the political and electoral participation of Chinese-origin immigrants in Western societies

(Ku and Pun 2004; Lam 2005). More community-specific research would illuminate barriers and pathways to political involvement, integration, and inclusion.

Toronto's Culture of Political Inclusion

As we have seen, Toronto's diverse demographics are not reflected among its elected politicians. There are many reasons one might wish they were: to signal the inclusion of all segments of society in making the rules by which we will live; to leave no segment of society feeling marginalized and excluded; to assure the widest range of experiences are heard before decisions are taken; to draw leaders from the widest possible pool of talent. In particular, there is a fear that imbalanced patterns of representation may lead to one-sided government, favouring some segments of society over others.

Paradoxically, Toronto's experience suggests that political inclusion does not primarily depend on the identity of elected politicians. Their values may well be more significant. In matters of political access, equity, and human rights, the Toronto record over recent decades is one of non-reflective elected bodies championing the rights of minorities. Toronto City Hall is the clearest arena in which to see this pattern at play. Over the years, Toronto's White, male, Anglo-Saxon dominated city councils have adopted an impressively broad range of inclusive policies and initiatives. These include a Workplace Human Rights and Harassment Policy, a Hate Activity Policy and Procedures initiative, an Employment Equity Policy, a Multilingual Services Policy, a Vision Statement on Accessibility and Diversity, a Plan of Action for the Elimination of Racism and Discrimination, an Immigration and Settlement Policy Framework, and an Immigration and Settlement Communications Framework. The tenor of these policies is reflected in council's resolve, through its Plan of Action for the Elimination of Racism and Discrimination, to "act upon the City's multiple roles as policy maker, employer, service provider, grants provider, regulator, and purchaser of goods and services to ensure an equitable society." In particular, council resolves to "lead a responsive organization that recognizes that diverse groups experience discrimination based on the intersection of their identity, including gender, race, disability and sexual orientation" (City of Toronto 2003).

Beyond these policy initiatives, Toronto has established a series of permanent advisory committees designed to promote the participation and voice of diverse communities in civic affairs. Five community advisory committees have been established, creating a venue where community representatives meet regularly with select city politicians and staff. These five are the Aboriginal Affairs Committee, the Disability Issues Committee, the Status of Women Committee, the Race and Ethnic Relations Committee, and the Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Issues. Beyond these, four working groups have been established whereby intersecting issues can

be addressed by community members, city politicians, and staff. These are the Working Group on Immigration and Refugee Issues and the Working Group on Language Equity and Literacy Issues.

Finally the city's staff structure and appointments reflect a commitment to diversity. Administratively, Toronto is led by a city manager and three deputy city managers. Currently, the city manager is a racial minority female, and the deputies include a racial minority male, a White female, and a White male. This team oversees the entire municipal scope of policy development and program delivery. Additionally, the city has established specific organizational units such as the Access and Equity Centre, the Human Rights Office, and the Office for Disability Issues to support specific equity policies and programs cited above.

Interestingly, the political lead on these equity initiatives at Toronto City Hall has typically been taken by White politicians. Thus, the chair of Toronto's Task Force on Community Access and Equity, established shortly after municipal amalgamation in 1998, was Councillor Joe Mihevc of Slovenian ethnic ancestry. The head of Toronto's Working Group on Immigration and Refugee Issues has been the current mayor and former councillor David Miller of Anglo-Saxon ancestry. And on the city's important Police Services Board, Councillor Pam McConnell of Anglo-Saxon ancestry has been a consistent voice for heightened police responsiveness to diverse minority communities.

Conversely, it is ironic that some of the more controversial interventions on issues of diversity in Toronto happen to have come from visible minority members of council. In 1997, a councillor of Chinese origin referred to Roma refugees as a community full of "pimps and criminals" (Swainson 1997). In the summer of 2005, amidst escalating gun violence linked to the city's Black community, a Black city councillor sparked an outcry of his own with calls for police to step up random searches of Black youth in problem areas. Against a backdrop of longstanding Black complaints over racial profiling by police, the councillor's suggestion was roundly condemned by civic, police, and media leaders (Lewington 2005; Gonda and Teotonio 2005; James 2005).

In an earlier study of political representation in Toronto, Siemiatycki and Saloojee found that minority community leaders and the city's leading social justice organizations endorsed the re-election of few of the visible minority members of Toronto City Council. The electoral system appears to privilege the election of more moderate, rather than militant, voices within visible minority communities (Siemiatycki and Saloojee 2002). Toronto reminds us that identity markers such as race and ethnicity cannot predict the outlook of politicians. Interestingly, Rose Lee, the coordinator of diversity management for the City of Toronto, has stated: "I don't think there is a correlation between the number of visible minority councillors and diversity friendly policies" (cited in Matheson 2005, 13).

At the same time, minorities have been crucial to the consolidation of Toronto's civic culture of political inclusion. The existence of a large and diverse civil society network of identity-based service and advocacy organizations has created the climate in which Toronto politicians of all backgrounds have embraced commitment to diversity and inclusion. Pressure from a wide array of movements – feminist, gay and lesbian, immigrant and refugee, minority ethnic, racial, and religious – anchored in the growing size of these communities, has transformed Toronto's image of itself.

In recent decades, Toronto has come to redefine itself as a diverse city. Global migration, in particular, has conferred on Toronto the reputation of a city that values its varieties of population. But Toronto's experience reminds us that our political process can be very slow to reflect the representation of such diversity in elected office. Women and youth, visible, ethnic, and religious minorities, and working-class Torontonians are badly under-represented in elected office. The enduring success of Italian-origin politicians has been the most notable exception to the pattern. The level of government has not been a significant factor of differentiation in representation; as we saw, Toronto does not bear out the assumption that municipal government, being "closest to the people," will have consistently more diverse membership than its federal and provincial counterparts. But Toronto's experience also suggests that regardless of who is elected, a city can develop a civic culture of valuing diversity and inclusion. Better still if our elected, governing institutions themselves fulfilled such laudable goals.

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