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Introduction

The division of the world into discrete, sovereign nation-states makes international migration a fundamentally political problem. Border crossing “is not merely movement in relation to environmental space, but a process whereby, in deviation from the universal norm in which the world is organized, individuals ... are transferred, temporarily or permanently, from the domain of one state to another” (emphasis added).¹ This change of domains on the part of migrants provokes receiving states to distinguish their status, rights, and membership prospects in relation to those of members of the established “national” society. This is true of all international migrants, be they carefully selected knowledge workers admitted with permanent resident status, temporary foreign workers whose stay and rights are bounded by strict contracts, or uninvited asylum seekers fleeing persecution. The rationale driving border crossing and distance travelled are of incidental importance; what matters conceptually “is the crossing of a border.”²

This defining characteristic of international migration generates what I call the migration-membership dilemma. On the one hand, admitting migrants may help meet labour market requirements and serve related economic purposes or advance other ideological or political interests, as the acceptance of refugees often does. At the same time, the satisfaction of these objectives often provokes sharply negative reactions from actors with conflicting material interests and from those with a different set of normative priorities, such as the protection of national identity.³ Efforts to address this
clash of distinct interests and concerns drive the politics of membership. Immigration and citizenship policies not only determine whom states admit, on what grounds, to what ends, and in whose interests but also, in so doing, speak to more basic questions of identity: Who are we? Who do we wish to become? Does the admission of immigrants help us reach that goal? "And most fundamentally, which individuals constitute the ‘we’ who shall decide these questions?"4

This book explores Canada's and Germany's responses to the migration-membership dilemma in the twentieth century. My decision to compare Canada and Germany may strike some readers as puzzling. Canada and Germany have been assigned distinct statuses by students of immigration and citizenship politics. Canada is classified as a “classical immigration country” shaped by successive waves of migration, while Germany is cast as a prototypical “labour recruiting nation” grappling with the unfamiliar consequences of unwanted immigration.5 As the “most-different-cases” approach to comparative research argues, however, these striking differences between Canada and Germany are what make them excellent cases for comparison.6 Despite their differences, Canada's and Germany's responses to the migration-membership dilemma followed remarkably similar long-term trajectories. Both countries began the century by prohibiting the entry and incorporation of immigrants deemed undesirable because of their putative racial or ethno-national characteristics. Canada developed an array of policies and administrative practices that barred non-white migrants and upheld a vision of Canada as a “white man's country,” while Germany combined a system of temporary foreign worker recruitment with a descent-based citizenship law that excluded “unwanted groups” and reinforced an ethno-cultural conception of German nationality.

Yet, by the end of the century, both Canada and Germany had developed into de facto multicultural societies as a result of liberalizing changes to their migration and citizenship policies. In Canada, the introduction of a universal admissions policy in 1967 and its entrenchment in the Immigration Act, 1976, shattered the foundations of “white Canada” and created the conditions for Canada's development into one of the most culturally diverse countries in the world. Whereas immigrants from “non-traditional” source regions, including Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, and Africa, comprised only a tiny fraction of Canada's total immigration intake from 1946 to 1966, by 1977 they constituted over 50 percent of annual flows.7 Today, “visible minorities” (the Canadian census term for “persons, other than
Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour”) make up half of Toronto’s population and significant percentages in other large cities, such as Vancouver and Montreal.8

In Germany, failure to implement an effective mechanism for ensuring the “rotation” of temporary foreign workers in the 1960s and early-1970s led to mass immigration. On the eve of the “recruitment stop” of November 1973, Germany was host to some 2.6 million foreigners, including 605,000 Turks. But the 1973 recruitment stop did not put an end to immigration. Family reunification and refugee admissions pushed the total number of foreigners in Germany to 4.5 million, or 7.4 percent of the total population, by 1983, and the flow has continued since.9 The presence of so many “foreigners” provoked intense debates over the appropriateness of Germany’s restrictive citizenship law. Ultimately, the liberalization of naturalization policies in the early 1990s and the introduction of jus soli in 1999 granted former guest workers and their children greater access to German citizenship and, in so doing, transformed the boundaries of German nationhood.10 This has led, in turn, to recent efforts to integrate Islam into Germany’s elaborate system of church-state relations.11 These developments speak to the profound changes postwar immigration has wrought in Germany.

The principal aim of this book is to explain how and why these consequential transformations in Canada’s and Germany’s membership regimes took place and, in so doing, to contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of membership politics and policy making in contemporary liberal-democratic countries. I explore three interrelated questions. First, I ask a question about long-term outcomes: Why did two countries so determined to limit cultural diversity through the first half of the twentieth century find themselves so thoroughly transformed by immigration at the beginning of the twenty-first? What explains the similarity in outcomes, especially given the striking differences between Canada and Germany in some respects? Second, I ask a question about timing and conflict. Although both countries ultimately changed their policies in fundamental ways, liberalizing change came relatively quickly and quietly in Canada and was slower, more contentious, and subject to compromise in Germany. What explains this difference? Was it due to the fact that Canada was a classical country of immigration and Germany was not? Or was it the result of other factors? Finally, I ask a question about the dynamics of the policy process. To what degree were the changes in Canadian and German policies the result of deliberate choices by policy makers, and to what extent were they the
unintended outcome of other factors? Were policy dynamics similar in the two cases (like the fundamental transformations that took place in both) or different (like the differences in timing and conflict)?

In response to the first question, I argue that world-historical events and epoch-defining processes, including the Holocaust, decolonization, and the emergence of a global human rights culture, gave rise to a distinctive normative context in the post-Second World War period that discredited long-standing discriminatory policies. As self-declared liberal democracies, Canada and Germany found that their postwar commitments to human rights sat uneasily with their established immigration and citizenship policies – a point highlighted by domestic and international critics of racial and ethno-national discrimination. I argue that the similar transformation of membership policies in Canada and Germany was ultimately due to the preceding and profound underlying transformation of the normative context within which liberal states operated. Norms and corresponding ideas played a fundamental role in shaping answers to questions of membership.

With respect to explaining differences in the timing and degree of conflict accompanying policy change in Canada and Germany, I argue that two factors were of particular importance. On the one hand, I argue that differences in Canada’s and Germany’s respective traditions of nationhood and migration histories played a key role. This fits with arguments advanced by other scholars (and repeated with varying degrees of sophistication by politicians and members of the media and broader public). On the other hand, I also argue that politics played a much more important role than many scholars have recognized and that variation in the political dynamics shaping membership debates in Canada and Germany were not simply the result of the underlying differences in conceptions of nationhood and migration but were also shaped in large part by differences in political institutions and corresponding political opportunities. In short, if the similarity in long-term outcomes shows that norms and corresponding ideas matter, differences in the timing and degree of conflict show that politics also matters.

Finally, with respect to the question of policy dynamics, I argue that changes in the two cases followed a remarkably similar pattern despite the differences in timing and degree of conflict. This was not, however, because policy makers embraced the underlying shift in the normative context of liberal democracy. On the contrary, in both states policy makers initially resisted these ideological changes. Rather than comprehensively amending their policies to meet the expectations of a new normative context, policy makers made modest adjustments to established policy regimes in an effort...
to co-opt critics. Their central objective in both cases was the preservation of prevailing notions of membership. In both cases, this strategy backfired, as seemingly modest concessions aimed at mollifying critics and preserving the status quo encouraged further challenges, which, in turn, necessitated additional amendments. In time, once-coherent policy regimes devolved into confused and confusing patchworks that were of little use to officials charged with administering their country’s membership policies. In both Canada and Germany, policy makers were compelled to reconsider their approaches to the migration-membership dilemma in a more fundamental way than they had intended, ultimately introducing changes that aligned their states’ immigration and citizenship policies with the standards of the prevailing normative context.

The remainder of this chapter unpacks the arguments and resulting analytical framework sketched above. I begin by detailing my understanding of how global normative contexts intersect with and influence domestic politics. Next, I consider how to account for “variation within convergence” – that is, how to explain differences in the precise timing and nature of broadly similar outcomes. Finally, I outline my conceptualization of the dynamics of norm-driven policy change.

The approach developed in this book is reflective of what Ira Katznelson dubs “configurative macro-analysis”: Agents’ actions are situated in distinctive world-historical periods and domestic political contexts to track “how structures constitute and cause identities and actions by tilting and organizing possibilities.” As the chapter summary that concludes this introduction suggests, meeting this end requires pivoting from theoretically informed comparisons of normatively distinct historical eras to tracing processes of policy change via detailed case studies. My methodological approach is in keeping with the complexity of the book’s subject matter and the challenge of explaining processes as profound as those that so transformed Canada and Germany in the second half of the twentieth century.

Argument and Analytical Framework

Normative Contexts
States’ responses to the migration-membership dilemma depend on a host of factors, including economic requirements, real and perceived demographic needs, and distinctive traditions of nationhood. Limiting our attention to these domestic variables, however, obscures more encompassing structures that influence outcomes across states. As Aristide Zolberg notes,
domestic policy making “takes place within the context provided by changing conditions in the world at large. Hence ... analysis must take into account the configuration of international conditions that generates changing opportunities and challenges in relation to ... immigration.” Zolberg’s efforts to explain the development of immigration policies in relation to changing “world systems” – shaped by the “dynamics of world capitalism, on the one hand, and the international state system, on the other” – represents one important effort along these lines.

Scholars associated with the “Stanford School” of sociological institutionalism argue that global macrostructures extend beyond the interstate system and global economy to include a distinctive “global culture.” This global culture is rational and modernizing, privileging certain modes of social organization and understandings of progress. Among the most important attributes of world culture in the post-Second World War period are human rights; indeed, the Stanford School sociologists maintain that legitimate statehood is premised on states’ acceptance of human rights. Global culture is thus understood as an independent force shaping state development – ensuring that states otherwise separated by geography, history, and local cultures come to share strikingly similar institutions in core areas of social organization.

Alan Cairns’ work on the transformation of indigenous peoples’ politics in Canada provides a useful application of the Stanford School’s approach. In *Citizens Plus*, Cairns argues that the dramatic contrast in historic assumptions governing Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations in Canada and contemporary paradigms – specifically the move from assimilationist models to models based on self-government – cannot be understood without recognizing the impact of changing global norms, in particular the demise of European colonialism:

Put simply, if somewhat exaggeratedly, the world turned over in the decades following the Second World War ... The independence of dozens of former colonies in Africa and Asia eroded the close correlation between whiteness, or Europeanness, and imperial power that had long prevailed. In that former era, the message that tumbled across state borders in Canada and other Western countries made the subject, marginalized, and outsider status of Aboriginal peoples appear to be in the nature of things. Now, the nature of things outside our Canadian window is very different. A pale skin no longer carries with it an entitlement to rule over those whose skin is pigmented or whose cheekbones are differently shaped.
Postnationalist theories of citizenship also emphasize the importance of global culture in explaining the extension of rights to non-citizens in the postwar period. Yasemin Soysal argues that postwar changes in the organization and ideologies of the global system “shifted the institutional and normative basis of citizenship to a transnational level ... extend[ing the] rights and privileges associated with it beyond national boundaries.”21 Similarly, Saskia Sassen contends: “the legitimization process of states under the rule of law calls for respect and enforcement of international human rights codes, regardless of the nationality and legal status of the individual” (emphasis added).22

Constructivists in the field of International Relations usefully note that the “power” of global norms varies across cases in relation to regime type.23 According to Jeffrey Checkel, international norms are embraced more readily in cases in which they cohere with domestic norms – liberalizing norms will likely have greater purchase among liberal regimes.24 Amy Gurowitz adds that states concerned with their standing internationally will also be more vulnerable to criticisms levelled by reformers.25 Foreign policy interests, particularly regarding states’ efforts to join or lead the “international community,” influence the degree to which they acknowledge and incorporate global norms. Christian Joppke, formerly a staunch critic of postnationalist arguments,26 now acknowledges that the “outlawing of race” following the Allies’ victory over Nazi Germany prompted the emergence of a global human rights culture that made it difficult for liberal-democratic states to maintain discriminatory immigration policies.27 Like Gurowitz, Joppke stresses the importance of foreign policy considerations in driving liberal states’ embrace of non-discrimination in immigration policy after the Second World War.

My conceptualization of “normative contexts” builds on these insights. Normative contexts consist of complex configurations of global structures (e.g., the international state system), processes (e.g., colonialism, decolonization), and beliefs (e.g., scientific racism versus human rights) that encompass and shape domestic policy making, authorizing particular political identities, policies, and practices while discrediting others. The legitimacy of domestic institutions – understood broadly to include rules, practices, and policy frameworks – is based not only on their efficiency but also on their “fit” with the generic norms of appropriate behaviour that constitute international society.28 These rules are subject to change: shifts in normative contexts throw policies enacted under previous contexts into doubt as the grounds of legitimacy underpinning them are challenged.29 Normative
contexts thus embody a particular era’s moral foundations: states’ decisions as to whom to admit into their national space and on what grounds have much to do with how their decision makers think about the morality of exclusion as measured against prevailing normative standards.

I distinguish between two periods with distinct normative contexts. The first period spans the turn of the twentieth century until the Second World War. The second emerges as a consequence of the war and related developments, including the Holocaust, decolonization, and the emergence of a global human rights culture. Both contexts had a profound effect on immigration and citizenship policies in Canada, Germany, and other immigrant-receiving countries. Solutions to the migration-membership dilemma devised at the turn of the twentieth century through the interwar period were influenced by prevailing attitudes towards racial and ethnic difference, nationalism, and state sovereignty, tending, on the whole, to legitimize discriminatory exclusions and the heavy-handed use of state power. Immigration selection was predicated on notions of racial suitability. Certain peoples were deemed incapable of contributing to the development of “civilized” nations. Just as eugenics policies sought to limit the influence of “substandard” domestic groups and individuals through instruments such as sterilization, discriminatory immigration and citizenship policies and practices were devised with an eye to guarding the nation against foreign threats. Prevailing views of state sovereignty also justified the indiscriminate use of coercion, exercised most decisively through the summary deportation of “unwanted aliens.” In short, the illiberal worldviews and ideas that so marked the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries informed and sanctioned states’ illiberal responses to the migration-membership dilemma.

The discrediting of scientific racism, integral nationalism, and white supremacy as a consequence of the Second World War, the Holocaust, and decolonization established a starkly different logic of appropriateness for states claiming a liberal-democratic identity in the postwar period. The group-centred racism of the prewar period gave way to an individualist ethic, holding that all persons were endowed with fundamental rights regardless of their race, ethnicity, or nationality. This message was advanced through postwar social science, international organizations such as the United Nations, and the human rights statements and instruments that proliferated during this period. As a result, established policy regimes came under pressure as individual rights-based claims for equal treatment made by and on behalf of previously excluded groups clashed with the rights-
denying policies and practices they informed. Canada’s and Germany’s identification as liberal-democratic countries that respected the rule of law and human rights made them especially vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy by domestic and international critics of their immigration and citizenship policies. This is not to say that racial discrimination disappeared after the Second World War; rather, the discrediting of racism and integral nationalism as legitimizing principles made discriminatory policies harder to defend and maintain in the face of normatively sanctioned criticism. In both Canada and Germany, governments’ sensitivity to these views created the conditions for policy change.

Politics and Policy Change: Explaining Variation within Convergence

Although analogous forces drove changes in Canada’s and Germany’s immigration and citizenship policies, the precise timing and nature of policy change in the two cases differed. Policy change in Canada was characterized by what Hugh Heclo refers to as “puzzling” – processes of trial and error shaped by the pursuit of relatively well-defined goals on the part of relatively small and insulated groups of experts. Conversely, liberalization in Germany was very much in line with “powering” in that change was more politicized, less coherent, and subject to delay and compromise.

Three factors shaped Canada’s and Germany’s respective paths towards reform. First, distinctive “traditions of nationhood” played a key role in steering actors’ choices of issues and symbols, helping to determine which battles were fought, how broadly reformers’ criticisms resonated, and what solutions emerged. Canada’s self-identification as a settler country meant that immigration itself was accepted (if at times grudgingly), and debate revolved instead around the legitimacy of criteria used to regulate admissions and to grant immigrants access to citizenship via naturalization. Germany’s quite different migration history meant that the very idea of Germany’s being an immigration country was hotly contested. In the absence of consensus on such a basic point, it was all the more difficult to rationally debate the incorporation of former guest workers and their children.

Second, formal political institutions such as electoral laws, party systems, federalism, and judicial review shaped actors’ political strategies, enabling support for reform in some instances while creating opportunities for opposition in others. A key difference in this regard lay in the manner in which institutions engendered political consensus in Canada while prompting its erosion in Germany. In Canada, “one party government in a
parliamentary system ... tended to reinforce the effects of executive policy-
making by dramatically curtailing avenues for challenging ... policies.\textsuperscript{35} The
dominance of the federal Cabinet in the sphere of immigration policy dur-
ing the period under consideration allowed for an insulated form of policy
making that engendered experimentation, elite learning, and the relatively
rapid implementation of new policies.

In contrast, the combination of frequent electoral cycles and multiple
veto points in Germany provided opponents of liberalization opportunities
that were unavailable to their counterparts in Canada.\textsuperscript{36} We should not im-
agine that differences in conceptions of nationhood and experiences of mi-
gration made it impossible for political actors in Germany to consider any
fundamental change in membership policy. On the contrary, Germany’s
unwillingness to expel workers who had been explicitly admitted on the
understanding that their stay would be temporary, and its acceptance of on-
going family reunification for immigrants in Germany after the 1973 re-
cruitment stop, show that the new postwar normative context was already
setting important limits to the power of traditional understandings of
German nationhood and policies towards migrants. Indeed, citizenship re-
form was being advanced by mainstream German political leaders as early
as the 1970s.\textsuperscript{37} As was true in Canada, changes in normative contexts pro-
foundly shaped Germany’s membership debates and policies. Unlike Can-
da, however, opponents of liberalization were able to exploit opportunities
made available to them by virtue of Germany’s institutional configuration
when they concluded that it was in their interests to do so. As a result, policy
making during much of the 1980s and 1990s was marked by highly sym-

tic, rhetorically charged debates that typically ended in non-decisions,
policy drift, and awkward compromises that left all sides dissatisfied and
were suboptimal from the standard of policy effectiveness.

Finally, it is important to note the importance of historical contingency
in shaping the tenor of membership debates and policy making.\textsuperscript{38} Canada’s
turn to a universalistic admissions regime occurred during a period of gen-
eral economic prosperity, which coincided with efforts to distinguish
Canada’s national identity from that of Britain and the United States.\textsuperscript{39} As
Richard Alba persuasively argues, the extension of membership boundaries
typically generates less opposition where prosperity limits the losses in so-
cial and economic standing of hitherto dominant groups (the theory of
“non-zero sum mobility”).\textsuperscript{40} Conversely, Germany’s transition occurred
during a more fraught period, marked by the end of the postwar economic
boom, the onset of unemployment, and the massive social-political disruption generated by the end of the Cold War and reunification. Not surprisingly, under such conditions, calls for changes in membership boundaries did elicit concern among members of the broader public. Political entrepreneurs responded to and exacerbated this concern for self-interested political ends, transforming migration policy from an issue based on political consensus to one marked by divisiveness and often bitter acrimony.

Theorizing Normatively Driven Policy Change: Stretching, Unravelling, and Shifting

If, as I claim, broadly encompassing normative contexts influenced domestic politics and policy making, what were the conduits through which this normative context worked? Given the differences in the timing of change and the degree of contestation, were the dynamics of change similar or different in the two cases?

I identify three mechanisms through which the changing normative context influenced Canada’s and Germany’s immigration and citizenship policies: policy stretching, unravelling, and shifting. My use of the term “stretching” aims to capture the dynamic tension that arises when entrenched policy regimes that reflect taken-for-granted ideas, terminology, and practices carry over into new normative contexts. The result of such conjunctions is not abrupt and radical transformations in policy, as theories of punctuated equilibrium would suggest; rather, change unfolds incrementally as policy makers seek to reconcile the unfamiliar demands of a newly emerging normative order with the deeply engrained, path-dependent logic of established policy frameworks. As per evolutionary models of institutional change, extant policy regimes are adapted to meet these new demands through modest adjustments at their margins.

Stretching is thus a variant of incrementalism, albeit with an important twist: whereas standard incrementalist theories cast policy makers as modestly groping towards some new end in a cost-averse manner, in the sense understood here, their actions are directed towards preserving the overarching goals of the established policy regime. Stretching is not so much about “muddling through” policy challenges as it is about deflecting them in the name of staying true to established goals. It is a reactive strategy with a conservative purpose, similar to Peter Hall’s conceptualization of “normal policymaking,” wherein policy makers “adjust policy without challenging the overall terms of [established] policy paradigm[s]” through “first and
second order change” – alterations to the settings of policy instruments and, on occasion, more substantive changes to the instruments themselves.\textsuperscript{46}

With regard to the cases at hand, while the disjuncture between postwar norms and established immigration and citizenship policies was quickly registered by Canadian and German policy makers, they did not respond by searching for radically new solutions to the migration-membership dilemma. Rather, their initial response to the friction generated by this clash of discordant political logics was to stretch policies to address inconsistencies without abandoning the core premises and objectives of extant frameworks.\textsuperscript{47} These initial changes were therefore instrumental and cosmetic, undertaken with the aim of diffusing criticism rather than altering prevailing policy objectives.

Contrary to policy makers’ intentions and expectations, however, these modest responses propelled the unravelling of the policy frameworks they were meant to serve. Most important, attempts to answer critics with tactical concessions affirmed the normative validity of their claims. This had two important effects. First, it drew policy makers into discursive exchanges that privileged the language of their critics while further undermining the fundamental premises of established frameworks.\textsuperscript{48} As per Thomas Risse’s “spiral model” of norm diffusion,\textsuperscript{49} a process of discursive “self-entrapment” drove the reform process forward, engendering what Seyla Benhabib usefully terms “democratic iterations[:] complex processes of public argument, deliberations, and exchanges through which universalist claims are contest- ed and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned.”\textsuperscript{50} Once they committed to speaking the language of rights, policy makers could not easily end their conversations or return to prewar tropes and standards in defending their positions.

Second, policy stretching enhanced domestic critics’ standing and helped generate support for their projects. As demands for reform grew louder, more frequent, and increasingly sophisticated, policy makers were forced to make additional concessions that further undermined the coherence and administrative efficacy of existing policy paradigms. Over time, policy stretching reduced once-coherent frameworks to messy patchworks held together by contradictory principles working at cross-purposes.

The unravelling of established policy regimes created opportunities for the formulation of approaches to the migration-membership dilemma that were more consistent with the postwar normative context. The elaboration of alternative approaches to the migration-membership dilemma and their
translation into public policy marked the transition from policy unraveling to policy shifting. The implementation of new approaches was subject to institutionally patterned political dynamics, which affected the timing of and degree to which new approaches to the migration-membership dilemma were entrenched in law, administrative practices, and governing mindsets.

In sum, changes in broadly encompassing normative contexts in the postwar period challenged Canada’s and Germany’s ability to shape their responses to the migration-membership dilemma as they had in the past. While both states were subject to comparable pressures and reacted in similar ways, their unique histories, conceptions of national identity, and political institutional configurations shaped the politics of membership in distinctive ways, leading to variation in the timing and nature of policy change. In important respects, however, change followed a similar pattern: policy makers in both countries responded to changing normative contexts by enacting small-scale, symbolic concessions in the name of mollifying critics and preserving extant regimes to the greatest extent possible. These small changes had powerful and unexpected consequences, opening the door to further challenges and, ultimately, the reorientation of membership policies in both countries.

Overview of the Book
Chapter 2 explores the origins of Canada’s and Germany’s initial solutions to the migration-membership dilemma, tracing their development from the turn of the twentieth century through the interwar period. I argue that forces unleashed by the second industrial revolution and improvements in transportation technologies increased the scale of international migration to new levels, forcing both countries to develop policies that regulated admissions, residency, and citizenship. By the end of the 1920s, Canada and Germany had developed distinctive policy frameworks entrenched in legislation, institutions, and practices. Exclusions based on prevailing notions of race and ethnicity were institutionalized to reinforce dominant conceptions of national homogeneity. Canada’s and Germany’s responses to the migration-membership dilemma during this period were in keeping with the prevailing normative context, reflecting the influence of scientific racism, integral nationalism, and contemporary understandings of state sovereignty. The chapter concludes by describing how the radicalization of völkisch nationalism under the Nazis and the racist exclusions dominating Canadian immigration
policy intersected in the late 1930s, gravely influencing the fate of European Jews who were fleeing fascism.

Chapter 3 describes how normative contexts shifted as a result of the Second World War and its legacy. I discuss the impact of the Holocaust in this regard, linking the horror of Nazi barbarity to the emergence of the global human rights movement and the discrediting of scientific racism. The impact of decolonization on the international system is also explored. I then demonstrate how the normative context forged by these world-historical developments influenced Canada’s and West Germany’s approaches to the migration-membership dilemma in the early postwar period.

Policy makers in Canada and Germany reacted to changing norms by stretching familiar policy frameworks to co-opt real and anticipated criticism. This entailed dropping explicitly racist and otherwise morally dubious language and granting symbolic concessions to critics. In both cases, however, policy stretching generated unintended effects that drove policy unravelling. In Canada, the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act and the enfranchisement of Asian Canadians granted this group political voice, which it used to lobby officials through the 1950s and 1960s. Concessions to other groups, including the establishment of an annual quota for immigration from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, also signalled that the state recognized the dubious implications of continuing racial discrimination. In Germany, failure to implement effective mechanisms for ensuring the “rotation” of guest workers allowed millions of foreign workers to settle in the Federal Republic. Their presence prompted changes to policies concerning residency and family reunification, which, in time, challenged the ethnically exclusive nature of German citizenship law. In both Canada and Germany, then, incremental changes associated with policy stretching undermined the intellectual coherence and administrative efficacy of established policy frameworks, hastening their unravelling and opening space for the introduction of new ideas and initiatives.

The final part of the story documents the emergence and implementation of alternative solutions to the migration-membership dilemma. Chapter 4 analyzes the dismantling of racially discriminatory immigration policies in Canada from 1962 to 1967 and the institutionalization of a universal admissions policy in the Immigration Act, 1976. I argue that the rejection of discriminatory admissions criteria in 1962 was not driven by economic concerns, as is often claimed, but by the need to respond convincingly to charges that Canadian immigration policy was racist. The introduction of civil
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rights legislation by federal and provincial governments and efforts to fashion a distinctive Canadian foreign policy based on principled opposition to colonialism and apartheid made it impossible to continue stretching the established immigration policy regime and necessitated a break with past practices. However, the changes introduced in 1962 failed to satisfy critics, who argued that the Canadian state’s commitment to universal admissions criteria was a ploy meant to mask ongoing discrimination. I contend that the points system was developed as a response to critics’ demands that Canada introduce a transparent set of criteria for judging immigrants’ skills and education. It also addressed policy makers’ concerns regarding the flow of sponsored immigrants from “non-traditional sources.” Thus, the points system was not simply a tool to harness immigration for economic needs; it was also a unique innovation intimately linked to the liberalization of Canada’s immigrant admissions regime.

Chapter 4 concludes with a discussion of the institutionalization of Canada’s universalistic policy paradigm in the 1970s. I explain how political consensus in support of the new policy regime was maintained despite growing popular concern over the impact of “Third World” immigration on Canadian national identity. “New” immigrants’ concentration in urban electoral ridings and demonstrated ability to mobilize in defence of their interests made them an important political constituency that no political party could afford to alienate – all the more so given the extremely competitive nature of the party system in the early-1970s and the disciplining function of Canada’s single-member plurality (“first past the post”) electoral system. Opponents of reform lacked an institutional venue for expressing their discontent and were therefore shut out of debates, which, in turn, limited their influence on policy making. The result was a process characterized by elite consensus and bereft of the partisan politics that was to be so decisive in Germany.

Chapter 5 examines policy shifting in Germany. Although the settlement of millions of guest workers in the Federal Republic led some officials to recognize the need for robust integration policies, their recommendations were largely ignored as the government of Helmut Schmidt opted for a policy of “temporary integration” based on the notion that Germany was “not an immigration country.” The futility of this position was evident in the early 1980s as the number of foreigners in Germany increased and the need for their integration became undeniable. Yet, in marked contrast to the Canadian case, the shift from a failed policy of “temporary integration” to
the recognition of Germany’s de facto status as an immigration country stalled as “foreigners policy” (Ausländerpolitik) became politicized.

The period of Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union hegemony (1982-98) marked the breakdown of cross-party political consensus, with the Union parties initially opting to encourage the voluntary return of “foreigners,” while their coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party, along with the Social Democratic Party, the Greens, and a determined coalition of civil society groups, demanded more liberal policies on residency, family reunification, and citizenship. Contrary to Rogers Brubaker’s claim that the stasis of the 1980s and early-1990s reflected an elite consensus on the inviolability of ethnic German nationhood, I demonstrate that change was effectively blocked by the standoff between conservatives and reformers—a confrontation exacerbated by changes in the German party system and federalism after unification.

Despite this, the period of the late-1980s and early-1990s witnessed the development of new solutions to the migration-membership dilemma. The election of the Social Democratic Party-Green coalition government in 1998 created an opportunity for the implementation of these ideas through the official recognition of Germany’s status as an immigration country and the introduction of policies such as *jus soli*. Even here, however, political opposition to reform enabled by Germany’s institutional configuration led to strained solutions that embodied conflicting principles. The most glaring of these compromises is the 1999 law’s simultaneous embrace of *jus soli* and rejection of dual citizenship. As a result of this paradoxical combination, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-three, children born in Germany of foreign parents must choose between their German citizenship and that of their parents. I conclude with a brief synopsis of German citizenship policy making in the years since the 1999 reform, paying attention to the consequences of the compromises struck in the course of passing the 1999 reform.

In Chapter 6, in light of the insights generated by my case studies, I revisit the question of how broadly encompassing normative contexts shape politics and policy making. I argue that norms enable rights-based politics by changing the rules of the political game. While policy change is driven by domestic politics, we cannot make sense of similarities in broad outcomes without taking seriously the power of broader global norms and ideas. Hence, analyses of the role of norms should treat them as resources that influence politics rather than as definitive rules that dictate policy.
I conclude with a brief consideration of the ongoing politics of membership in Canada and Germany, paying particular attention to the re-emergence of religion in considerations of liberal-democratic nationhood. While both Canada and Germany have acknowledged the momentous social transformations wrought by postwar immigration, they are still searching for means of adapting national membership to the challenges of cultural plurality, particularly as it relates to religion. As such, the process of becoming multicultural – of adapting existing institutions, policies, and practices rooted in longheld assumptions to a new, more plural reality – constitutes an ongoing project whose importance is likely to increase in the years ahead.