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This book emerges out of a need to map new understandings of the Canadian Muslim diaspora as a site of struggle, contestation, and change. Muslim communities have become increasingly salient in the social, cultural, and political landscape in Canada. This has been due largely to the aftermath of 9/11 (which is this book’s starting point) and the racial politics of the ongoing “war on terror,” which has cast Muslims as the new “enemy within.” The narratives of citizenship, nationalism, and security have become inextricably linked in public discourse and policy making in ways that disproportionately target Canadian Muslims as potential threats to public safety and compromise their civil liberties. Driven by media sensationalism, narrow and limiting constructions of Muslims are commonly purveyed, reproducing Orientalist archetypes of illiberal and anti-democratic foreigners that test the limits of Canadian multiculturalism. Islam has become a permanent feature in the Canadian hinterlands, and Muslim cultural politics have become prominent flashpoints in the social and political landscape.

Increasingly, Muslims figure prominently in contemporary public debates that shape our national consciousness and public policies, from the Maher Arar case, security certificate detainees, and the arrests of eighteen Muslim males in Toronto on alleged charges of “home-grown terror,” to racial and religious profiling, Ontario’s debates over shar’ia (Islamic law) tribunals, and Quebec’s questions of “reasonable accommodation,” its banning of Islamic headscarves and face veils, and its xenophobic “citizen’s codes.”
Although these issues dominate media attention, other experiences that shape and impact the lives of Canadian Muslims rarely make headlines, such as migration, settlement, education, access to jobs and resources, poverty, racism and Islamophobia, institutional and organizational development, social-movement building, political resistance, and negotiations of theological pluralism.

The Canadian Muslim diaspora is a complex, contradictory, and hybrid space filled with a mix of liberatory possibilities and productive tensions occurring within and against certain oppressive social and political conditions that create the terrain for a distinctly “Canadian Islam.” Islam in Canada has been a highly generative site for new epistemological and ontological positionings. Beyond sectarian orientations, there are new movements toward “moderate” or “progressive Islam” that have gained currency and have spearheaded controversial moves such as female-led prayers and encouraged the promotion of gender equity within religious sites. More gender-conscious forms of mobilization occurred as secular and faith-based Canadian Muslim feminists organized around the widely debated proposal for shar’ia-based arbitration in Ontario. There are also new cultural drivers shaping the Muslim presence in the Canadian national imaginary. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s (CBC) groundbreaking comedy series Little Mosque on the Prairie, created by Canadian Muslim filmmaker Zarqa Nawaz, has catapulted Muslims into primetime television and the national consciousness in new and challenging ways.

Despite the widespread interest and dynamic social and political engagements relating to Islam and Muslims in Canada, there has been little attempt to document and address Muslim cultural politics within Canada. This collection provides a space to construct multiple readings of Islam and Muslims in the Canadian diaspora through a variety of empirical and theoretical contributions to this field. As an entry point into these discussions, I want to map some groundwork on which the contributions in this collection must be read by articulating some broad political, cultural, and empirical frames that shape the contours of the Muslim presence in Canada. I want to briefly reflect on the social, political, and cultural foundations of the discussions in this collection, which are anchored in questions of diaspora, nation, citizenship, and multiculturalism. These are increasingly sites of contestation in the social, cultural, and political landscape in Canada and are being shaped by the global dimensions of neo-imperial wars and the ruptures between secular modernity and “postsecular” religious politics, social formations, and insurgent forms of identity.
The Canadian Muslim Diaspora

“Diaspora” is a contested signifier. Although the term is rooted in the often violent historical ruptures that lead to exile, displacement, migration, and reformations of communities outside their places of origin, in its most current and perhaps most common usage, it describes postmodern migrant communities that have resettled outside their ancestral homelands due to a variety of social, economic, and political factors. Many of these forces stem from the imperialist, neoliberal foundations of globalization and the dislocations caused by its upheavals. Moghissi and colleagues (2009, 3) note that the term “diaspora” has come to refer to “populations of refugees, migrants, guest workers, expatriates, and the exiled and self-exiled.” This new reality means that there is no longer a single narrative for transnational migration and settlement that result in the re-rooting of migrant communities, cultures, and identities in adopted homelands. However, what remains consistent – whether or not the context of migration is forced or voluntary – is the fraught process of reinventing the narrative of “home” and recapturing feelings of familiarity and belonging, the absence of which creates deep social and psychological tensions that can be difficult to reconcile.

On the other hand, a fact often overlooked when Canada’s multiple immigrant diasporas are heralded as a multicultural success story is how this story of the nation serves to obscure the realities faced by Aboriginal peoples, who have been further displaced by their presence. The exclusion, isolation, and geographic marginalization of Aboriginal communities in their own ancestral homelands have created a forced diasporization that is muted by celebratory notions of multiculturalism that conveniently overlook this violent history (see also Moghissi et al. 2009). It is an inconvenient truth in the grand narrative of multicultural pluralism that the diasporas of early white European settlers permanently displaced Aboriginal populations from their homelands in Canada and elsewhere. Postcolonial histories are thus rewritten to exclude the memory of violent conquest and imposition, and the notion of diaspora remains untainted by this history.

As generations adapt and acculturate over time, more hybrid social and cultural formations develop that transform both the diasporic and the dominant culture. Yet this plurality and cultural interpenetration occur within unequal relations of power. The incorporation of immigrant groups occurs through their insertion into hierarchal relations of racial, ethnic, and class-based privilege that relegate most of these groups to positions of subordination and marginality (see also Moghissi et al. 2009). These cleavages mark the fault lines between belonging and disavowal and define the space between
citizens and outsiders. Cultural dissonance that occurs from residing within these liminal spaces can result in romantic longings for the homeland, yet these attachments are believed to compromise loyalty and kinship within the adopted society. Diasporic communities are derogatorily labelled “ethnocultural ghettos” and “insular enclaves” — evidence of the failure of multiculturalism and a justification for reviving more assimilationist models of social integration. The “vertical mosaic” of Canada has been forged on this unequal footing, which continues to privilege the diasporic histories, cultures, and conquests of white settlers, thereby positioning indigenous and immigrant communities as subordinate national subjects through their “exaltation” (Thobani 2007).

Muslims in Canada have a longer history than one might imagine. The genealogy of Muslim migrants can be traced back to the arrival in 1854 of a Scottish family – James and Agnes Love and their newborn son. According to Hamdani (1997), James Love, named after his father, was born in Ontario in 1854. He was the eldest of eight children. The youngest one, Alexander, was born in 1868, one year after the Canadian confederation was formed. Lorenz (1998) tells the story of the arrival of the first Arab immigrants in about 1882. Many of them, mostly young men, came from Ottoman Syria fleeing conscription into the Ottoman army. Most of these early migrants were Christians, but a few were Muslims. Most of these wayfarers settled in the East, but a few headed west and arrived at the most remote outposts of Canada’s western frontier. In a rare historical narrative of Muslims during this period, Lorenz (1998, 28) relates the story of early Arab migrants who came as peddlers and pioneers:

“The Syrian peddler was something of an institution in most Western settlements,” wrote Gilbert Johnson. “Sometimes on foot, with a pack on his back and a case of trinkets and smallwares in his hand, but more often with a horse and a light wagon in summer, or with a sleigh in winter, he travelled the prairie trails on more or less regular routes ... His arrival often provided a welcome relief from the monotony of pioneer life.”

Such stories narrated by Lorenz shed light on the early foundations of the Muslim presence in Canada. One of the first pioneers with any recorded history was Salim Sha'aban. He was born an Ottoman subject in 1880 and arrived in New York as a twenty-year-old, eventually making his way to Iowa in 1908. He peddled goods on foot and later on horseback until he had earned enough to return to Lebanon to find a bride in 1910. Two years later
he returned with the hope of finding greater prosperity in Canada. Leaving his wife and their first child behind, Sha’aban set his sights on Alberta, where he built a homestead. His wife’s journey is recounted in the passage below as a story of passion, endurance, and perseverance:

For the young Arab woman who landed, tired and bewildered, at the port of Montreal, a long train trip across the prairies still lay ahead, followed by more travel by horse and wagon. The railway link to Edmonton had been completed in 1904, and agricultural settlement existed only in a band 50 kilometers (30 miles) wide on each side of the single railway line. Beyond that, the great prairies were still the land of the Cree, Assinaboine [sic] and Blackfoot. The winters could hardly have been less welcoming: One 1907 blizzard drove the mercury down to 48 degrees below zero (–55°F). Yet Larry Shaben, Sha’aban’s grandson and a leader of today’s Alberta Muslim community, recalls that his grandmother, who lived to be 99, was “fiercely passionate” about Canada, and called it “a wonderful country.” (Lorenz 1998, 29)

By 1901 Canada’s Muslim community had grown to 47 members, who settled in Alberta and Saskatchewan. By 1911 there were 1,500 Canadian Muslims, most of them Syrian and Turkish migrants, many of whom worked on the construction of the western railways (Abu-Laban 1983, Hamdani 1997). According to Lorenz (1998, 29),

By the late 1920’s, a handful of Muslim families were scattered throughout Alberta, earning their livings as fur traders, mink ranchers and, shopkeepers. Shaben, now in his 60’s, recalls that when he was growing up in Endiang there was only one other Muslim family in town, and his grandparents “knew every Muslim in Alberta.”

By the early twentieth century, governments were enforcing policies of racial exclusion in order to stem the flow of Asian immigrants. Abu-Laban (1983) reports that when the First World War broke out, many Turkish immigrants were classified as enemy aliens and sent back to their country of origin. As a result of these policies, Canada’s Muslim population remained relatively small between 1911 and 1951. The 1931 census recorded only 645 Muslims – a figure that had grown to perhaps 3,000 by 1951 (Abu-Laban 1983, 76). After the Second World War, a time when the economy was shifting from wartime to peacetime production, Muslims began entering Canada
as skilled labourers. By the end of the twentieth century, Muslims were the largest non-Christian religious group in Canada, having surpassed the Jewish population in 1996 (Hamdani 1997).

Presently, Islam is the fastest growing religion in Canada. According to an Environics report based on the 2006 census, there are 842,200 Muslims in Canada comprising 2.6 percent of the population. With a steady growth in population size and a diverse ethno-racial mix of cultures from South Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Continental Africa, and the Caribbean, the Canadian Muslim community is a heterogeneous ethno-racial population that is even further distinguished along sectarian lines. Although there is a predominant Sunni Muslim community in Canada, there are prevalent Shia, Ismaili, Druze, and Sufi communities in the larger diasporic makeup. The challenges of pluralism that affect Muslims in Canada are therefore internally as well as externally driven. Ideological differences are often pronounced and create schisms among community groups and representatives that sometimes take oppositional stances in important community debates, such as the shar’ia tribunals (see Chapter 2). The Muslim community in Canada is far from homogeneous demographically and ideologically despite the essentialized representations and narrow conceptions that commonly shape perceptions of who Muslims are, what they believe, and how they behave.

**Muslim Social, Cultural, and Economic Politics in Canada in a Post-9/11 Context**

Since 9/11 greater attention has been paid to how Muslims are integrating within Canada. Much of this interest is driven by the fear that social and cultural isolationism could lead to possible “sleeper cells” of jihadi extremists threatening public peace and safety. The case of seventeen Muslim youth and one Muslim adult arrested in 2006 on alleged terror charges was a flashpoint for fear of “home-grown” terror (see Chapter 10). The idea that Canadian-born Muslims could be involved in potential threats against the nation was unsettling to many. In trying to make sense of these arrests and the threat of the “enemy within,” public discourse often turned to the question of values. A 2006 public opinion poll revealed that 65 percent of Canadians were concerned that too many immigrants were not adopting “Canadian values” (Adams 2007, 94). The reasoning followed, then, that the misguided Toronto youth had been deprived of access to “true Canadian values” that would have bound their allegiance to the state and prevented any other form of identification that had the potential to divide their loyalty.
Adopting “Canadian values” was touted as the antidote to the threat posed by those who manifest more questionable ties to citizenship and the nation. These irreconcilable citizens were constructed as “anti-citizens” who threatened to unsettle the narrative of Canada as a peaceful and benevolent nation (see Chapter 1). Muslims at large were seen as residing outside of the common framework of “discursive citizenship” based on a set of shared national values and were therefore in need of “cultural rehabilitation” through the inculcation of Western values. These troubling narratives persist in the ongoing contestations surrounding Muslim cultural politics in Canada that this book seeks to explore.

Despite public concern over the integration of Canadian Muslims, an Environics survey of 500 adult Canadian Muslims conducted between 2006 and 2007 collected interesting data on how Canadian Muslims view their identity and their sense of belonging and satisfaction within Canada. Reporting on these findings, Adams (2007) notes that although about 90 percent of Canadian Muslims were born outside of the country, a vast majority articulated a strong sense of attachment to Canada. It was reported that 94 percent said they were proud to be Canadian, a figure that matches the national average of 94 percent (161). Of those expressing pride in being Canadian, 73 percent acknowledged they were “very proud.” Even more recent newcomers living in Canada fewer than five years expressed a high level of national pride: 73 percent reported being “proud” to be Canadians, and 54 percent were “very proud.” Immigrants who had resided in Canada fifteen years or more had the highest expression of pride as Canadians. In this category, 99 percent reported being “proud,” and 88 percent were “very proud” (161). Also, according to Adams, Muslims noted that freedom, democracy, and multiculturalism were the sources of their pride, which was consistent with what Canadians at large reported feeling. These findings demonstrate that far from being isolationist, Muslims in Canada feel an allegiance to the nation and a sense of pride as Canadians. This outlook, however, does not preclude their right to be critical of the nation and its policies or to assert claims for the recognition and accommodation of their own values, beliefs, and practices. All too often when immigrant groups express dissent or are critical of the conditions of their adopted homeland, they are met with claims of disloyalty or ungratefulness. When they advocate for inclusion and recognition of their cultural beliefs and practices, they are seen as threatening the cultural integrity of Canada and are confronted with the “when in Rome” argument. Therefore, although a significant number of
Muslims have expressed satisfaction and pride in being Canadian, this does not guarantee that they are regarded by others as having the unconditional right to claim a stake within the nation.

Amid an otherwise positive assessment of being Canadian, the findings also revealed significant concerns about discrimination that unsettle the ideal of a multicultural utopia in Canada that Adams (2007) suggests. The report revealed that 66 percent of Muslims surveyed were concerned about discrimination and that 30 percent were “very concerned” (166). Youth reported higher levels of concern than did their immigrant parents. Adams attributes this to their having grown up in Canada, which he argues gave them a stronger sense of entitlement in comparison to their parents, who likely expected some level of hardship as immigrants to a new country and could “overlook an epithet here or there” provided their lives were otherwise improving (166). Yet economic concerns were as highly rated as concerns over discrimination. These categories are not easily separated given the high number of foreign-born and educated Muslim immigrants and the lack of recognition of foreign credentials, which has led to underemployment. The cab driver with a doctoral degree and the medical doctor working as a security guard represent the reality that many immigrants to Canada face, despite the promise of economic gains and multicultural equality.

My 2002 study on homelessness among Latin Americans and Muslims in Toronto (Zine 2002, 2009) found that in a sample of 300 participants (predominantly newcomers), the higher the level of education they reported, the lower their employment status. For example, of those in the workforce, 57 percent had achieved only a high school education, 26 percent had attended a community college, 10 percent had a graduate degree, 6 percent had no formal schooling whatsoever, and 4 percent had an undergraduate degree. Of those who were foreign-trained professionals, only 4 percent had found work in their field, leaving the rest to be underemployed or out of work (Zine 2002, 30). Environics survey data also show that Muslims in Canada are better educated than the population at large (45 percent hold a university degree as compared with 25 percent of all Canadians); however, with respect to income, Muslims fall behind the national average (Adams 2007, 167). Not only are these findings counterintuitive, given that education is promoted as a gateway to economic success and therefore that a positive correlation between levels of education and employability is expected, but these findings also clearly demonstrate that whereas the doors to professional fields may be closed for newcomers with foreign degrees, the doors to the unskilled, low-paid labour force are wide open. Although Adams (2007,
also speaks to these concerns stemming from the Environics study, he is hesitant to label this as “discrimination in its purest form,” reserving this category for more conscious acts of refusing to hire on the grounds of religious difference. His analysis, however, fails to account for the structural barriers that limit employment opportunities not on the basis of “in your face” racism and Islamophobia but on the grounds of other often more subtle and less visible forms of exclusion and systemic discrimination.

For example, one Canadian study found that Muslim women who wear the hijab (headscarf) suffer from discrimination in the workplace. Persad and Lukas (2002) have identified significant barriers to veiled Muslim women in their efforts to find work. As part of the study, two sets of women were sent “undercover” to apply for the same job. They provided almost identical resumes, ages, and ethnic backgrounds; the only difference was that one of the women wore the hijab. The study found that twenty-nine of the thirty-two Muslim women surveyed said that an employer had referred to their hijab while they were applying for work in the manufacturing, sales, and service sectors. Twenty-one of the participants were asked to remove their head covers; one-third were told at least once that they would have to remove their headscarf if they wanted a job. This study highlights how gendered forms of Islamophobia operate on social, cultural, and ideological levels to deny employment opportunities to Muslim women (see Chapter 8) and at the same time reminds us that the multicultural utopia that Adams (2007) proclaims operates more as a national fiction than as a social reality.

Veiled Differences: The Fashioning of Sartorial Nationalism

The issue of veiling, particularly the highly contested face veil, or niqab, has been a major flashpoint in Muslim cultural politics in Canada. This has been the case most notably in Quebec, where legislation is presently being proposed to prevent women who wear the face veil from accessing government services and public institutions. The controversial Bill 94 was recently introduced in the National Assembly by the Quebec Liberals, although this is not the first time the Quebec government has raised the issue of veiling as a significant political concern. According to Khan (2010), “politicians have shamelessly used veiled women as cheap electoral targets”:

In the 2007 Quebec election, complaints forced the chief electoral officer to ban the face veil at the voting booth (even though veiled women never asked for an exemption). In a 2008 by-election, Prime Minister Stephen
Harper seized on Quebec discontent with the face-veil by adding his disapproval. The political stigmatization and ensuing “mob mentality” created a climate of fear for a minority who wished to exercise their democratic right to vote.

These attempts by politicians to ban the face veil and their public proclamations condemning its use have resulted in “niqabophobia” and have created the ideological groundwork for the current anti-niqab legislation. Not only are niqabi women’s rights to make reasoned choices about their bodies curtailed as a result of these moves, but it also remains unclear what democratic gains are achieved, particularly when these same women are prevented from exercising their right to vote. Indeed, these are anti-democratic moves based on knee-jerk reactions to religious and cultural difference that ironically undermine the very values politicians claim to uphold.

Similar reactionary politics govern the current attempt to exile women from public services and public space through Bill 94. This latest attempt to legislate Muslim women’s dress came into effect after an Egyptian immigrant, Naema Ahmed, was expelled from a French-language class for refusing to remove her niqab. Later, when she attempted to enrol in a different school, the Quebec immigration authorities located her, and she was expelled again. The irony here lies in the fact that she was attempting to learn French in order to better integrate into Quebec society but was expelled from the class and further marginalized by her attempts to learn the language. She has since filed a human rights complaint to contest her treatment at the hands of Quebec immigration authorities. A second woman, a permanent resident from India, was also expelled from her French class for refusing to remove her niqab. A spokesperson for Quebec immigration defended the decisions in these cases on pedagogical grounds, stating that “it is important for the teacher to see the student’s mouth to teach good elocution” (Scott 2010a). Yet this pedagogical rationale for the government’s actions is not defensible since these isolated incidents do not warrant a province-wide policy regulating women’s dress; rather, it signals the failure of school authorities to negotiate a suitable arrangement that would ensure these students feel safe in class and also meet the educational needs of the program. These incidents hardly justify the expulsion of these students or the development of legislation that dangerously compromises civil liberties. This puts the government in the wildly ludicrous position of legislating women’s dress as a pretext for mediating cross-cultural difference and fostering “communication.” It is evident that in the clear absence of sound social or...
political reasoning, this legislation is being built on a campaign of racial and religious demonization and fear that, far from facilitating “communication” across cultural difference, will lead only to further xenophobia and racist backlash against Muslims in Canada. Yet there is little to warrant such overblown concern. According to the Muslim Council of Montreal, there are presumed to be about twenty-five women in all of Quebec who actually wear the niqab. Further, out of approximately 118,000 people who accessed Montreal’s health board services in 2008 and 2009, only ten asked for accommodation, and out of approximately 28,000 who accessed city services, not one asked for special treatment (Shakir 2010).

Given the implications of this draconian legislation, which would effectively prevent women from accessing healthcare, education, social services, and public transportation based on their attire, Bill 94 has been the topic of heated debate across Canada. Opposition from Muslim groups and broader social justice organizations has been mounting. Amnesty International warned that the ban “would violate the rights to freedom of expression and religion of those women who choose to express their identity or beliefs in this way” (Siddiqui 2010). One grassroots Muslim women’s group in Ontario echoed these concerns in a press release:

The proposed legislation, Bill 94, barring individuals who wear the face veil from accessing government services and public institutions, is in direct violation of Canada’s own Charter of Rights and Freedom (Section 2), the Quebec Charter and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights which guarantees all Canadians the right of freedom of expression and religion. The role of a democratic nation is to protect an individual’s pursuit of religion or identity without scrutiny or judgement from their respective government. (Coalition of Concerned Muslim Women of Kitchener-Waterloo 2010)

This statement employs a rights-based framework that has interestingly been used by those arguing both for and against the ban. Those individuals and groups arguing against Bill 94 as in the statement above invoke national and international human rights covenants to support their claims for religious freedom, which would be unduly infringed on if the state became the arbiter of women’s religious dress. Broad coalitions of Muslim groups, secular women’s organizations, student associations, and anti-racist and social justice organizations have galvanized to contest this legislation as an undue form of state control over women’s bodies that would effectively trample on
their rights and civil liberties and deny them access to basic necessities of life such as education, healthcare, and social services.

Those in favour of banning the niqab also use the same liberal, rights-based framework to build their case. They argue that because the niqab symbolizes the subjugation of women, it contradicts the liberal, secular values of Canadian society and should be banned. Although with respect to freedom of expression and religion, the ban itself also compromises the same liberal rights of women who choose to cover their face, this consequence becomes a matter of necessary “collateral damage” in a larger battle against illiberal minorities. Proponents of this ban (both state and nonstate actors) unwittingly undermine the very liberal values they claim to be championing under the guise of “rescuing” Muslim women from their illiberal values, their faith, and ultimately their “illiberal” clothing. This enacts what I call a form of “sartorial nationalism” where veiled Muslim women within what Anderson (1983) describes as the “imagined community” of the nation are rendered “unimaginable” as citizens and therefore positioned outside of the nation and political community. Their bodies cannot be coded within the dominant boundaries of national belonging due to their dress, which has been described by Christine St-Pierre, the Quebec minister responsible for the status of women, as “ambulatory prisons” (quoted in Peritz 2010). Ironically, they are politically and socially outcast at the same time by their style of dress and by the state's attempt to regulate it. The niqab therefore operates as a negative signifier included within the state only by virtue of its exclusion. In this move, citizenship and national belonging are determined sartorially, as the nation is not only circumscribed by dominant cultural values and beliefs (that veiling is seen to abrogate) but is also configured through the kinds of dress that signify belonging and allegiance to these same values. Under Bill 94, the niqab is a sartorial signifier of national exclusion that is seen as betraying dominant liberal values and thereby positioning Muslim women as outsiders to the nation and deviants within the law. This debate signals a broader attempt to decide the legitimate cultural, and in this case sartorial, representations of the nation and who has a right to belong to it.

The role of the state in determining the way Muslim women should dress in order to render themselves docile national subjects who dutifully demonstrate their allegiance to dominant liberal norms through their dress code needs to be challenged for its racism and sexism. The paternalistic desire to “unveil” and “liberate” Muslim women on the part of Western, secular states is best articulated in Spivak’s (1988) famous terms of “saving
brown women from brown men” and is part of the deeper impetus for “res-
cuing” Muslim women from their backward beliefs and from attire presumably forced on them by misogynistic Muslim men. Their right to choose as agentic subjects and to maintain a sense of bodily integrity is nullified by the state’s intervention in deciding for them what lies in their best interest. This authoritarian paternalism of the Canadian state mirrors the religious mandates requiring women to cover themselves that the mullahs of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Afghanistan use in similar ways to regulate the bodies of Muslim women and to deny them the right to decide how to express their identity and faith.

Interestingly, the proposal for legislation regulating Muslim women’s dress was first put forward by a Muslim organization. The impetus for the niqab ban was spearheaded in 2009 by the Muslim Canadian Congress (MCC), which appealed to Ottawa to introduce legislation to ban the wearing of masks, niqabs, and the burka (full body cloak) in all public settings. In a press statement, the MCC argued that the ban is necessary to ensure public safety since “not only is the wearing of a face-mask a security hazard and has led to a number of bank heists in Canada and overseas, the burka or niqab are political symbols of Saudi inspired Islamic extremism.” The MCC links the niqab and burka to criminality and terrorism in much the same way as do other openly Islamophobic neoconservative fear mongers. There is perhaps some surprise that this proposal and the troubling arguments underpinning it come from a Muslim organization. This is a prime example of the fact that the Muslim community is not a singular entity and cannot be essentialized. Muslims are ideologically and politically as well as racially and ethnically diverse and hold internally competing views on many issues. Of concern, however, is that Muslim organizations are being oriented around neoconservative and xenophobic views such as those espoused by the MCC and in other cases along more patriarchal and puritan religious lines. The situation of Muslim women hangs in the balance between the competing frames of reference and ideologies being purveyed by Muslim organizations (religious and secular) that position themselves as political vanguards for these women. The narrow views of the MCC, which reflect the “Orientalism of Orientals” and the patriarchal and puritan fundamentalist views purveyed by certain religious sectors of the community, place Muslim women in between equally limiting polemics (see, for example, Zine 2004). Both ideological vantage points produce authorizing discourses that leave little space for Muslim women themselves to articulate their sense of agency, womanhood, faith, and citizenship.
Although Muslim women are increasingly claiming spaces within Islam and within the national narrative, they are left unsupported by some women’s groups, such as the Quebec Council for the Status of Women, which instead have taken up a paternalistic mode of feminism in their support of Bill 94 as a means to preserve “gender equality” despite the fact that the bill will allow only *some* women the right to choose how to dress (if they want access to healthcare, education, or social services) and will deny this to others. The Canadian Council of Muslim Women has in response rightly pointed out that Bill 94 is short-sighted since its implications are in fact highly detrimental to women:

> We are concerned that those women who want to wear the face covering will become further isolated and marginalized if they are refused services. Their active role as parents may also be restricted and this will harm their children. This does not bode well for integration and participation for women and their children. (Canadian Council of Muslim Women n.d.)

On the other hand, the MCC and others have made troubling claims that the niqab is a threat to security. These discourses are rooted within a culture of fear that has emerged and framed most debates regarding Muslim cultural politics since 9/11 (see also Chapters 2 and 10 for emergent political and cultural debates). Fear makes such rhetoric an easy sell in a climate of increased militarization abroad that includes Canada’s role in Afghanistan, the ongoing “war on terror,” and domestic anti-terror legislation and security policies (see, for example, Chapter 9). Fear provides the rationale for many repressive policies and practices that are easily legitimized by the public out of “rational” concerns for safety and security. As Agamben (2005) notes, a “state of exception” has been created where exceptional measures reserved for emergency have become the normative practices of modern governments, leaving civil liberties hanging in the balance. In Canada the geopolitical context of the “war on terror” and its impact on domestic policies have affected the way Muslim women’s bodies and dress are being coded and regulated. As in France, Germany, and Turkey, where there are similar bans on the hijab, this proposed legislation has raised critical questions about how religion should be negotiated within a secular society and within the multicultural public sphere. That these contestations are occurring under the backdrop of the “war on terror” and heightened fears regarding public safety has been critical to the way these concerns are now being
linked to Muslim women’s bodies. The state’s role in perpetuating these new Orientalist politics of veiling is evident in the way Quebec premier Jean Charest promoted the necessity of Bill 94 for reasons of “identification, security and communication” (Chung 2010). Contestations over Muslim women’s dress have been co-opted into this climate of fear and represent the new battleground on which the nation is forging its identity as the secular, liberal champion of women’s rights and values. The results are telling: as Canadians at large weigh in on the debate, public opinion polls already show disturbingly strong support for Bill 94 inside and outside of Quebec. A 2010 poll conducted by Angus Reid for the Montreal Gazette newspaper reported that 95 percent of people in Quebec and three out of four people in the rest of Canada supported Bill 94 (Scott 2010b).

Through these debates, productive tensions have led to the negotiation of Islam in the public sphere not only through the accommodation of religious practices but also by way of contesting and challenging the theological veracity of particular claims, such as whether the niqab is a religious requirement. Organizations like the MCC have made the case that the niqab is not a religious requirement (i.e., not mandated by the Qur’an or hadith) and that there are thus no legitimate theological grounds on which to argue that banning the niqab is a violation of religious freedom. However, as Khan (2010) notes, “Canada’s Supreme Court has ruled that the state is not an ‘arbiter of religious dogma’ – what matters is the sincerity of the individual’s beliefs. If a woman honestly believes it is part of her faith to cover her face in public, the state cannot counter that a different religious opinion carries greater religious legitimacy.” Many Canadian Muslims, including scholars and activists, do not accept the niqab as a religious requirement and do not support the practice but nonetheless are supportive of women’s rights to make reasoned choices about their bodies and therefore stand in solidarity against Bill 94.

Earlier in the fall of 2009 the Conservative federal government refused to consider the proposal for the niqab ban put forward by the MCC. Prime Minister Stephen Harper acknowledged that “in an open and democratic society like Canada, individuals are free to make their own decisions regarding their personal apparel and to adhere to their own customs or traditions of their faith or beliefs” (in Harris 2010). However, the federal government has since back-peddled from these assurances and has come out in support of Bill 94. Challenges to as well as support for Bill 94 have poured into the Quebec Legislature. This fraught terrain is a complex mix
of the legal, political, and discursive gendered politics that mark the contemporary formations of Muslim cultural politics in Canada as spaces of struggle, activism, and negotiated citizenship.

**Nation, Citizenship, and Belonging? Muslims and the Canadian Security Regime**

On September 26, 2002, Maher Arar was detained by US officials at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York and interrogated about alleged links to al-Qaeda while enroute to Canada from a vacation abroad. After being detained for twelve days, Arar found himself chained, shackled, and on a flight bound for Syria, where he would be held in a small “grave-like” cell for ten months and ten days before being relocated to a different prison. In Syria he was beaten, tortured, and forced to make a false confession. Accused of having links to al-Qaeda, Arar was far from the violent militant extremist the Canadian and US governments had accused him of being. He was a thirty-four-year-old wireless technology consultant who, although born in Syria, had immigrated to Canada with his family at the age of seventeen. He became a Canadian citizen in 1991. He did not have a criminal record and by all accounts was a decent law-abiding citizen. Innocence, however, provides no guarantees in a world governed by the politics of risk and “racial securitization.” A new era of “border racism” enacts contemporary regimes of surveillance where race, ethnicity, and religion are markers of risk that demand proof of innocence, loyalty, and citizenship. In collusion with domestic immigration policies such as security certificates and anti-terrorism legislation that allow for acts of extraordinary rendition and the outsourcing of torture such as Arar faced, these measures are regarded as necessary rather than as "states of exception" within the rule of law.

Arar’s case is instructive in guiding us to consider specific questions about the politics of citizenship and belonging within the nation, namely who is entitled to claim the right to citizenship and who is subject to having this right forfeited, and to examine how the politics of racial and religious difference secure this divide. Although noncitizens in Canada are subject to the security certificate regime and related practices of holding secret trials and maintaining secret evidence that violate and suspend civil liberties (see Chapter 9), Canadian citizens have increasingly become at risk of being situated as “citizen-outsiders” and potential threats to the nation. In these formulations, the nation is being constituted and reconfigured within the global landscape of neo-imperial war and domestic securitization, which operate as racialized processes, and all of this has incited new constructions of Muslims as “subaltern citizens” in the West (see Chapter 1).
Enloe (1989, 45) describes the nation as “a collection of people who have come to believe that they have been shaped by a common past and are destined to share a common future,” and this “belief is usually nurtured by a common language and a sense of otherness from groups around them.” Similarly, Hage (2000, 39) contends that “nationalist practices cannot be conceived without an ideal nation being imagined by the nationalist.” Defining Otherness as the antithesis of the ideal thus becomes a precondition for imagining the nation. This social and political dialectic shapes the contours of nation building and the myths that sustain national ideologies. The binary construct of nationhood defines and epitomizes the terms and conditions for social citizenship, on the one hand, and identifies potential outliers and threats, on the other. In the post-9/11 political landscape, Islam in the West has become the marker of undesirable citizens and in effect represents “subaltern citizens” (see Chapter 1). Positioned either as threats to national security or as being culturally irreconcilable with Western values and norms, Muslims living in Western societies face social, political, and cultural challenges that have been shaped by the violent contours of the global “war on terror.”

I recently heard Tariq Ramadan – a European academic and public intellectual widely heralded as one of the most influential Muslim reformers of our time – speak at a Canadian forum about the situation of Muslims in the West. He instructed Muslims to claim and assert their rights as *citizens,* not just as *Muslims.* I understood his point to be that in positioning ourselves in this way, we claim legitimacy under the auspices of citizenship and a shared stake in the country. By locating ourselves as *Canadians,* not simply as Muslims, we can assert our citizenship rights and status and can then stake our claims as *insiders* of the nation. Although I agree with the political spirit Ramadan calls us to adopt, I have two points of contention to raise here. First, such claims rely on the consent of others in recognizing us as “real citizens” and members of the imagined community of the nation (Anderson 1983). Second, the logic of this position dictates that when we speak only as *Muslims* we are locating ourselves *outside* of the narrative of citizenship and national community. Rather than solidifying our status and rights as citizens, this move seems to further shore up the perceived irreconcilability of “Canadianness” and “Muslimness.”

This point was brought home to me when I was part of a Muslim panel on a national radio program in the weeks after 9/11. After my co-panelists and I spent two hours positioning ourselves as peaceful “home-grown Canadians,” rather than foreign threats, the final question posed to us by the
moderator was, “but where do your loyalties lie?” It was sobering to realize that we were still suspected of having divided loyalties after firmly locating ourselves as Canadians. Our Muslimness was perceived as tainting our allegiance to the nation and positioned us as irreconcilable subjects. Was this question prompted by the fact that the three women on the panel (including myself at the time) wore the hijab? Or was this dissonance created because one of the men wore a kufi (traditional hat) and a beard that may have seemed a bit too long? Were these markers of identity perceived as tell-tale signs of violent fundamentalist tendencies that made us fundamentally irreconcilable with liberal democratic society? One thing became clear to me in this exchange: although racially and religiously marginalized groups may have legal rights and obligations in their relationship with the state as Canadian citizens, this does not guarantee their sense of actually belonging within the nation. Multiculturalism is a contingent form of politics that hinges on the ability of minoritized groups to render themselves “citizenship-worthy” through the performance of dominant ideals, values, and practices.

A more recent example of this contingent form of citizenship and the racial and cultural politics that collude in the perpetuation of this subaltern identity is the new Canadian citizenship guide, released by the Conservative government’s minister of citizenship and immigration, Jason Kenney. The guidebook, called Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Canadian Citizenship (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2009), contains a special section on “The Equality of Women and Men,” which states, “In Canada, men and women are equal under the law. Canada’s openness and generosity do not extend to barbaric cultural practices that tolerate spousal abuse, ‘honour killings,’ female genital mutilation or other gender-based violence. Those guilty of these crimes are severely punished under Canada’s criminal laws.” This statement disturbingly reinscribes the racist civilizational discourse of colonialism and social Darwinism that branded non-Western cultures as inherently “barbaric.” By invoking social-evolution discourse, the Canadian citizenship policy now openly employs colonial ideologies of racial and cultural difference to distinguish between desirable and undesirable citizens. At the same time, Canada is reinforced and produced as a benevolent and gender-just state that must preserve its values against the encroachment of “uncivilized” foreign interlopers. This once again recalls the “saving brown/black women from brown/black men” narrative, as the Canadian state is positioned as rescuing immigrant women from their barbaric societies and cultures.
Conservative commentators in Canada and the United States heralded this move by Canadian immigration authorities as “courageous” and a “banner day for immigrant women” (Kay 2009). The statement does not refer to any specific cultures, but honour killing and female genital mutilation are often associated with Islam (even though neither practice has any specific religious connection to Islam). Thus Muslim women are encoded within this text as the beneficiaries of paternalistic state protection. Raising the issue of honour killings, American neoconservative writer Phyllis Chesler supports the statement as a safeguard against this practice, arguing that “these people are coming from countries where these behaviours are never punished. There are people who bring this mindset when they come to the west” (in Carlson 2009). The derogatory reference to “these people” should be enough to discredit Chesler’s comments as racist and xenophobic, but they are instead echoed by the Muslim Canadian Congress, as spokesperson Farzana Hassan also maintains that “we cannot ignore this [honour killing] in the name of multiculturalism” and further argues that the statement did not go far enough and would not on its own be able to counter the “irrational religious zeal” out of which these crimes emanate (in Kay 2009). The neoconservative politics evident in these arguments over-determine religion and non-Western cultures, particularly Islamic ones, as the cause of violence against women. Locating gender-based violence as a foreign cultural import being brought into the benevolent Canadian state by “barbaric cultures” renders invisible the reality of violence against women in Canada as a domestic concern that affects more than just immigrant women (presumably at the hands of barbaric immigrant men). Jhappan (2010) is quick to dismantle such claims by outlining the ubiquity of violence against women in Canada as a reality that exists apart from such dubious links to immigration:

Has rape been experienced by many Canadian women, long before immigrants from African and Muslim countries were allowed to immigrate? Check √. Sexual assault? Check √. Spousal abuse? Check √. Other forms of gender-based violence? Check √. So are they “barbaric Canadian cultural practices” then? What makes them specifically cultural practices when we find rape/sexual violence as well as non-sexual violence and many other forms of discrimination against women in almost every “culture” today? Surely these are patriarchal practices, not cultural ones, though they may be expressed, practiced, and resisted in culturally specific ways.
Jhappan rightly points out the false conflation of gendered violence and culture through this illustration and instead focuses our attention on patriarchy and how the various expressions of this form of oppression need to be understood and resisted in culturally specific ways.

Despite the fact that honour killing is rare (especially in comparison to other more generically labelled forms of domestic and sexual violence), it has nonetheless become a highly sensationalized practice in the West (see Chapter 1 for a discussion of the Aqsa Parvez case). This is not to say that it should not be a cause for concern and condemnation. Violence against women is a reality within the Muslim community, and along with other practices such as forced marriage, it must be challenged by men, women, community leaders, and religious authorities alike. Such initiatives are already beginning to take place within Muslim communities in Canada and elsewhere. However, greater gender justice does not come through promoting racism and Islamophobic sentiments and the false civilizational divides that the narrow and reductive neoconservative position produces; rather, what is required is a broader analysis of the interlocking social factors that come into play in the perpetuation of violence against women so that proactive community-based interventions can be forged. That the Canadian citizenship guide has attributed gendered violence to cultural differences emanating from non-Western cultures, more specifically Islamic ones, powerfully illustrates how colonial and Orientalist narratives are deployed to position Muslims as subaltern citizens who run the risk of threatening Canada’s “openness and generosity.” This presupposes the construction of a “good Canadian citizen” who is culturally shaped by Western values, which are portrayed as a necessary corrective in a project to rehabilitate and uplift non-Western cultures that lack the requirements for modernity and democratic citizenship. All of this is achieved under the guise of multicultural “tolerance” and liberalization.

Brown (2006, 166) describes how the “governmentality of tolerance” relies on the circulation of civilizational discourse to contain the “non-Western, nonliberal Other.” She outlines how the dominance of liberal subjects as the bearers of tolerance is constituted while at the same time non-Western subjects are deemed illiberal and therefore both intolerant and intolerable:

Within contemporary civilization discourse, the liberal individual is uniquely identified with the capacity for tolerance and tolerance itself is identified with civilization. Non Liberal societies and practices, especially
those designated as fundamentalist, are depicted not only as relentlessly and inherently intolerant but as potentially intolerable for their putative rule by culture or religion and their concomitant devaluation of the autonomous individual – in short, their thwarting of individual autonomy with religious or cultural commandments. Out of this equation, liberalism emerges as the only political rationality that can produce the individual, societal and governmental practice of tolerance, and at the same time, liberal societies become the broker of what is tolerable and intolerable. (Brown 2006, 166)

Within the governmentality of tolerance, then, the white liberal subject is produced as the arbiter of civilizational norms and of who and what should be deemed worthy of toleration, which in turn positions the white liberal as ontologically superior and culturally and civilizationaly dominant. The reproduction of this process – now enshrined within Canadian citizenship policy – is guaranteed. This is another example of how immigration and citizenship policies and practices are increasingly tied to notions of security, whether the cause for concern is threats that are political or, in this case, cultural. In this context, Muslims represent “cultural terrorists” with pre-modern values that threaten the heart of enlightened Western values, norms, and society. Immigration and citizenship practices targeting Muslims like the use of immigration videos in the Netherlands and citizenship tests in Germany are other examples of how “cultural eugenics” are being employed to weed out undesirable immigrants and to distinguish “good” from “bad” Muslims, at the same time preserving the multicultural fantasy of Western liberal democracies (see Chapter 1).

Canadian Multiculturalism and Its Discontents
Related to notions of citizenship and security are the ongoing debates about the state of Canadian multiculturalism in a post-9/11 context, which is another salient social, cultural, and political reality that informs the writings within this book. The emergence of multiculturalism as a federal policy in Canada came into effect in 1988 through the Multiculturalism Act, but this legislation was precipitated by a number of social, cultural, and political developments that began decades earlier. Multiculturalism in Canada was born out of tensions with francophone Quebec, struggles over Aboriginal land claims and sovereignty, and the growth of immigrant communities of colour seeking the rights of citizenship and inclusion within the national narrative. Thobani (2007, 150) points out another significant context within
which multiculturalism was shaped through the politics of race due to an "international crisis of whiteness." She argues that a crisis of whiteness developed in the postwar period due to the rise of fascism in Europe, due to ideologies of biological racism, white supremacy, and eugenics promoted by the Nazi regime, and due to the Western model of the nation-state, which manifested violence and global war and undermined the European imperial order (Thobani 2007, 150). White supremacy as the basis for scientific and social policies was discredited, and therefore whiteness needed to be recuperated from its ties to racism, fascism, violence, and Aboriginal genocide. A new national narrative needed to be forged in Canada and other Western nations, and multiculturalism became a way to recast whiteness as part of a more benevolent process of national identity formation. According to Thobani (2007, 154),

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\text{As in Australia and Britain, the embrace of multiculturalism allowed Canadians to resolve the crisis of whiteness through its reorganization as tolerant, pluralist and racially innocent, uncontaminated by its previous racist history. Because multicultural whiteness claimed to be tolerant of difference, even when besieged by a bewildering global array of diversity it could not re-cast itself as uniquely committed to pluralism and thereby exalt its basic goodness.}
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This allowed new narratives of the nation to be constructed around diversity and pluralism that recuperated whiteness as tolerance. However, this creation of a new national identity muted rising global anti-racism movements by focusing on culture (largely through creating ways to manage and contain non-Western cultures) and thereby depoliticizing race.

As race was depoliticized, culture became the centrepiece of the new social formation as something to be celebrated through festivals of song and dance and to be managed and contained if it transgressed the limits of white multicultural tolerance. In this way, multiculturalism operates as a spectacle of cultural diversity that masquerades as a liberalizing social policy that is in fact rooted in deep structures of white Eurocentric power and privilege, which it has failed to disrupt and in fact reinforces. Hage (2000) reminds us that multiculturalism was an offer of tolerance that proceeded from unequal relations of power and thus could always be withdrawn. Speaking of the Australian example, he argues that “White multiculturalism cannot admit to itself that migrants and Aboriginal people are actually eroding the centrality of White people in Australia. This is because the very viability of
White multiculturalism as a governmental ideology resides precisely in its capacity to suppress such a reality” (Hage 2000, 22). Increasing pluralism and the integration of multicultural groups into the political sphere have reconfigured the nation in ways that disrupt the imperialist nostalgia (or longing for a white-settler past that conferred unencumbered dominance) on the part of some nationalists who – to borrow Hage’s terms – “recall themselves as masters of a territory in which they have managerial rights over racialised/ethnicised groups or persons which are consequently constructed as manageable objects” (Hage 2000, 48). It is also the memorializing of this past and the need to assert the certainty of this order within the present that create the need to discipline groups that step outside of the bounds of multicultural conformity and become “unmanageable.” Muslims are viewed as one of these recalcitrant groups. When cases such as the “Toronto 18” arrests of seventeen Muslim youth and one Muslim adult on alleged terrorism charges emerge, public discourse immediately begins to question the “limits of multiculturalism” and the extent to which wayward illiberal groups with questionable national loyalty are testing and abusing liberal tolerance. Such incidents catalyze calls to reign in an unbridled multiculturalism that allows illiberal minorities to run amok and threaten the sanctity of liberal values and democratic rule.

As religion becomes a more central feature of the multicultural landscape, questions about how to accommodate religious diversity have occupied a new salience in multicultural discourse. Recent debates on “reasonable accommodation” have dominated the political landscape in Quebec, spurred by some highly publicized human rights cases that centred on the clash between religious rights and freedom and the secular nature of society. Headed by Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, a commission on “reasonable accommodation” was forged, called the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences and later dubbed the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. Public hearings were held across the province to address issues such as wearing the hijab in martial arts, accommodation of prayers and provision for halal and kosher food in public and private institutions, and the designation of female staff to cater to Muslim or orthodox Jewish women in healthcare facilities. These and other situations where recognition was sought for religious practices were troubling the balance between upholding the duty to accommodate religious diversity as enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, on the one hand, and preserving the distinct nature and secularism of Quebecois society, on the other. Secularism has deep roots in Quebec that are grounded in the
Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, which shifted the social and political foundations of society toward secularization and separatism. According to the architects of the infamous Citizen’s Code in Hérouxville, “Contrary to the rest of Canada, the Quebec Nation long ago abandoned its religious foundations during the ‘Quiet Revolution’ back in the sixties. The theocracy of the past has been replaced by a consensus bringing Quebecers to define themselves as members of the laity” (Drouin and Thompson 2007). These sentiments situate Quebec as distinct from the multicultural context of Canada through the exile of religion within the public sphere. This has since created tensions with communities of faith that seek inclusion of their religious practices within public and private institutions. Immigrants in particular are seen as “ungrateful guests” who bring their religious and cultural baggage to the door and refuse to adapt to the local norms and customs. The Muslim immigrant in particular is constructed as a disruptive, religiously and culturally overdetermined subject whose ways are fundamentally irreconcilable with the demands of secular modernity.

Bouchard and Taylor (2008b, 19) describe the tensions that emerged during the hearings on reasonable accommodation in Quebec, which began in 2007:

The so-called wave of accommodation clearly touched a number of emotional chords among French-Canadian Quebecers in such a way that requests for religious adjustments have spawned fears about the most valuable heritage of the Quiet Revolution, in particular gender equality and secularism. The result has been an identity counter-reaction movement that has expressed itself through the rejection of harmonization practices. Among some Quebecers, this counter-reaction targets immigrants, who have become, to some extent, scapegoats.

This statement reads as a polite assessment of the often virulent racism and Islamophobic sentiments expressed at the hearings, on talk radio, and in Internet blogs. Although there was also affirmation of more openness and acceptance, it would be disingenuous to downplay the fact that these forums became the stage for public performances of racism and xenophobia.

In their report, Bouchard and Taylor (2008b, 121) conclude that Canadian multiculturalism “emphasizes diversity at the expense of continuity” and therefore is an unsuitable model for Quebec, a sentiment that they note was expressed by most of the interveners at the public consultations, who preferred the model of “interculturalism.” According to Sharify-Funk (2009,
13), Bouchard and Taylor see multiculturalism as leading to “ghettoization,” whereas interculturalism “assumes that people of different cultures will interact with, and be transformed by, encounters with each other while maintaining some basic social values,” which she notes may be “the middle ground between the ‘mosaic’ and the ‘melting pot.’” The report goes on to argue that “interculturalism fosters the edification of a common identity through interaction between citizens of all origins” (Bouchard and Taylor 2008a, 88). In talking about the “edification of a common identity” through cultural encounters and interactions as a hallmark of interculturalism, the report does not take into account the relations of power between dominant and subaltern communities and identities and thereby assumes there is a level playing field for these encounters to take place. Not situating this process within the histories and legacies of subordination on the basis of race, class, ethnicity, religion, language, and culture denies the real imbalances of power and privilege in Canadian society that are hidden beneath the rhetoric of multicultural inclusion. Along with liberal multiculturalism, the discourse of interculturalism also depoliticizes race through a colour-blind politics of denial. In a 2007 survey on racism in Quebec conducted by Léger Marketing on behalf of three Montreal media sites, 59 percent of Quebecers admitted that they were racist (Granofsky 2009, 12), yet the Bouchard-Taylor Commission’s report fails to provide any coherent plans for anti-racist initiatives. A representative of the Canadian Race Relations Foundation (CRRF) raised similar concerns. Ayman Al-Yassini stated that the CRRF “is disappointed with the almost casual dismissal in the Bouchard-Taylor report of the role of racism and discrimination in shaping the views of some Quebecers towards members of racialized communities” (in Sharify-Funk 2009, 31). Yet Bouchard and Taylor (2008b, 239) remain wary of “playing the race card”:

French-Canadian Quebecers are sometimes severely criticized. Caution is in order here. We must always be wary of imputing to racism certain attitudes or remarks that in actual fact stem from collective insecurity or, more precisely, from the exploitation of this insecurity. That being the case, it is true that these two factors, racism and insecurity, are not always easy to untangle.

This statement creates a space of innocence for racist ideologies and sentiments. Moreover, the denial of racism is rationalized by invoking the discourse of “security” and the threat that specific bodies (i.e., Muslims)
presumably pose, thereby creating an insecure nation. Discussing the basis for security and nationalism, Hage (2000, 40) draws our attention to the affective nature of “feeling secure” in the context of the nation and reminds us that “security is impossible without familiarity and community, but it also involves the possibility of satisfying one’s basic needs and an absence of threatening otherness.” For dominant nationalists, the fears of encroaching difference and the disrupted familiarity that comes with cultural pluralism create a greater need for feeling secure. The narratives of familiarity, community, and security have become interrelated in new ways in the present context of protracted imperialist wars and global Islamophobia. That “dangerous foreigners” are being proclaimed and charged with changing the face of the nation and with threatening physical and cultural security feeds into this form of “paranoid nationalism” (Hage 2003) evident in some sectors of Quebec society.

A more recent move that exemplifies this paranoia is the Quebec government’s plan to force new immigrants to sign a declaration pledging their respect for “Quebec’s common values.” This move builds on the paranoid sensibilities that informed the Hérouxville Citizen’s Code and manifests them writ large as the foundations for immigration to the province (see Chapter 1). Such xenophobic policies create further divides and contribute to the alienation of already marginalized groups. This threatens the fragile communities of difference that must be accommodated within the multicultural nation. Quebec has been officially defined as a nation within Canada, so it is important to consider how this nation is being imagined and constituted. To further engender inclusion, there needs to be a reshaping of the national imaginary in addition to addressing national policy. Colourblindness and the denial of racism couched in the rhetoric of liberal multiculturalism or a new guise of interculturalism are faulty premises with which to counter the racial myths of nation building, as these bland gestures obscure the relations of power embedded within narratives of nation, citizenship, and belonging.

Challenges to the sanctity of the benevolent multicultural nation sully the international prestige associated with this image of Canada and are likely to be seen by many as “un-Canadian.” However, it is by upholding the values of equity and social justice that we keep them from corruption and from being further eroded in a climate of heightened fear and risk. In different ways, the contributions to this collection gesture to current tensions within Canadian multiculturalism. It is by being attentive to these tensions and the formations of power underlying them that we can imagine new ways
Introduction
to navigate through the politics of difference in ways that do not result in fragmentation or alienation and guilt but rather inform new possibilities for social, political, and cultural reform as a collective project. This often tenuous relationship between marginalized identities and the dominant cultural spaces of the nation underscores the tensions with which this book grapples and provides the context within which all the contributors must write.

Mapping the Book
It is significant that all but one of the contributors to this collection self-identify as Muslim. This was in part a conscious decision to highlight the scholarship of Canadian Muslim academics (both established as well as emergent scholars) about Muslims in Canada. This move recognizes the presence of academic forms of colonialism in which the narratives and lived experiences of Muslims have been co-opted by those who do not share in this identity or in the costs and implications of labelling and defining the experiences of others. This book allows for a space where Muslim academics can articulate their research and political concerns about issues that are not only of academic interest to them but also implicated in their lives, work, and families.

As a result, the book presents contributions that are based on empirical research of the Muslim presence in Canada as well as critical essays that open up questions about how contemporary Muslim cultural politics are being shaped and formed in relation to specific debates. Some authors have chosen to weave part of their own identity and narrative into their chapters, whereas others have decided not to take this approach. Both of these choices reflect the style, political engagements, and considerations of the authors. Some of the contributors to this collection write from a more liberal framework, whereas others work from anti-colonial and anti-racist paradigms. All but one of the contributors are also female, and some work from anti-racist feminist standpoints, whereas others do not identify their scholarship in explicitly feminist terms but are advocates for gender justice. These varying analytical commitments reflect the intellectual engagements of contemporary Muslim academics and the kinds of political voice they bring to bear on the issues that engage them as scholars and as Muslims. Therefore, although there is no common voice or analytical framework in Muslim studies, those contributing to this volume all acknowledge the saliency of Muslim cultural politics in Canada and the need to make critical interventions into this field as scholars and activists. Unfortunately, there is an absence of scholarship from Quebec, which limits the range of possible voices in this collect-
tion. It is hoped that a future volume will provide analysis of Muslim cultural politics in Quebec and of the distinctive social, political, cultural, and linguistic contexts from which they arise.

The first section of the book begins by critically examining gender and Muslim cultural politics in Canada. Issues relating to Muslim women have, as we have seen, become significant cultural and political flashpoints in Canada. In Chapter 1, I provide an overview of some of the contemporary formations of gendered politics that have revolved around “the Muslim women question,” such as the issue of shar’ia-based tribunals in Ontario, the Hérouxville Citizen’s Code in Quebec, the sartorial, religious, and cultural politics involved in the banning of headscarves on Quebec soccer fields, and the tragic death of a Pakistani teenage girl dubbed a Canadian “honour killing.” In this chapter, I ground my analysis in three specific tropes – disciplining culture, death by culture, and death of culture – in order to problematize how these issues have been discursively constituted and how the racialized and gendered politics in which they are embedded unsettle and reconfigure the nation.

The second contribution to this section picks up on one of these specific issues: the highly contested case for shar’ia-based tribunals in Ontario. Changes to the Ontario Arbitration Act in 1991 opened the door for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to be applied in civil family matters and allowed for the use of any laws agreed to by the involved parties. This legal permission provided the means to utilize religious laws for binding arbitration in private agreements. Jewish rabbinical courts (or Beis Dein) and Aboriginal healing circles are examples of religious and cultural systems of mediation that are used to adjudicate civil matters in Ontario. However, in 2003 an organization called the Islamic Institute for Civil Justice began to advocate for the use of Muslim law in ADR and sought to develop a Muslim Arbitration Board (Darul Qada) where civil disputes such as divorce, child custody, and inheritance could be settled, invoking *fiqh*, or an Islamic system of jurisprudence. Serious public debates erupted in the media over this proposal, which ignited fear and concern about the implementation of patriarchal and fundamentalist versions of shar’ia in Canada and about how in particular this would impact Muslim women. Public dialogue surrounding this issue was largely framed against a backdrop of rampant Islamophobia generated by the “war on terror” and the pervasive negative images of Islam that support it. The debates positioned various actors within civil society and the public at large as either for or against the proposal. In Chapter 2, Itrath Syed provides a critical analysis of the public debate by focusing on
the positions taken by opponents of the proposal and on the implications this opposition held for Muslim women’s agency and representation. Syed examines some of the key interlocutors in this debate who stood in opposition to faith-based arbitration being extended to include the integration of Islamic law. Using a discourse-analysis approach, she maps the contours of what was largely a feminist engagement (both secular and faith-based) with these issues and discusses her own involvement as a Muslim scholar-activist within the debates. She also engages media representations and challenges the way Muslim women were constituted within the national imaginary as infantilized and politically immature subjects through these representational practices. Importantly, her discussion delves into the ways these varied discourses “fossilize” Islamic law and render it incapable of changing to accommodate greater gender equity.

Finally, the third contribution to this section moves beyond the narrow and limiting parameters that cast Muslim women as victims in need of national, imperial, and/or feminist rescue and instead focuses on their agency as politically engaged activists. In Chapter 3, Katherine Bullock provides a framework for investigating Muslim women’s political engagement within Canadian society. This chapter provides an important intervention by highlighting the long-term political work of Canadian women who self-identify as Muslim and articulate their faith as integral to their political activism. The counter-story Bullock provides serves to rupture the stereotypical notions of Muslim women as voiceless and passive and at the same time draws on both her personal involvement and empirical observations to tell us about the history and trajectory of Muslim women’s community work. All three of the chapters in this section make important interventions into the emergent field of Canadian Muslim women’s studies.

The second section of the book focuses on the cultural production of Muslims in Canada. The chapters in this section provide critical examinations of media and the representation of Muslims in Canada through print journalism, television, and memoir. In Chapter 4, Yasmin Jiwani helps us to consider the ways that the print media shape our ideas about the imagined community of the nation and how this has played out in terms of the way Muslims have been read into the Canadian national imaginary since 9/11. Her discussion provides an examination of two Canadian newspapers, the Globe and Mail and the National Post, and what she describes as the “hegemonic affinity” between these dailies, which are otherwise viewed differently by their audiences. This affinity, Jiwani tells us, lies in the way they both produce specific narratives about the nation and similarly situate Muslims
within Orientalist tropes as the demonic, fanatical followers of a ruthless faith. Unpacking the context within which these narratives are purveyed, Jiwnani provides an important overview of media concentration in Canada and the kind of national storytelling that it produces. The particular story Jiwnani delves into in this chapter is the immediate aftermath of 9/11 as narrated through these two national newspapers. She critically maps the representational politics of these dailies and how they collude in producing racialized and gendered accounts of the 9/11 attacks. Jiwnani’s analysis is critical in unpacking how these representational practices collude with the imperial politics of the ongoing “war on terror.”

In Chapter 5, Meena Sharify-Funk examines the explosion of popular literature on Islam and Muslims since 9/11. In particular, the genre of memoir promises the reader an “insider” view that goes “behind the veil” of Islam to provide often sensationalized accounts of “real” Muslims. Sharify-Funk examines two particular texts – The Trouble with Islam Today, by Irshad Manji, and Their Jihad ... Not My Jihad!, by Raheel Raza – that sell as “tell-all” accounts of Islam authored by Canadian Muslim women. Although these are not traditional memoirs per se, they operate in a similar fashion as “insider accounts” of Islam that are legitimated by virtue of first-person narratives that interweave the personal histories of the authors with the textual material; in the case of Raza’s book, this is done using a diary-like format. As a result, these authors perform the role of “native informants” who provide the Western reader with authorized accounts of Islam and the Muslim world that are presented as “truth tales” but ones mediated by their ideological and personal desires and ultimately by the status of these books as sources of personal economic gain, notoriety, and prestige. Sharify-Funk is concerned with reading and understanding these texts through the broader lens of identity negotiation and meaning creation within the Canadian Muslim community. She provides a thematic analysis of these texts to elucidate their relation to larger intra-Muslim debates about reform, Western liberalism, and women’s emancipation with a view to challenging some of the stereotypical assumptions these debates often raise.

The final contribution to this section, by Aliaa Dakrouny, focuses on a Canadian television phenomenon, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s sitcom Little Mosque on the Prairie. The brainchild of innovative Canadian filmmaker Zarqa Nawaz, the show has become an unlikely hit in Canada and is now syndicated worldwide. Based in part on Nawaz’s own journey from the metropolis of Toronto to the prairies of Saskatchewan, the show – set in the fictional town of Mercy – tells the story of a small-town,
mosque-based Muslim community that must negotiate its integration into a largely white, Christian community. As I and a colleague have written elsewhere,

The themes and plot lines of the show present the multicultural possibilities of Canada as a place for differences to be engaged and negotiated through productive intercultural and interfaith tensions but also show the reality of racism and religious discrimination often obscured by the more celebratory rhetoric of liberal multiculturalism. The show represents Muslim cultural politics in the Canadian diaspora as challenging yet resolvable features of life in a racially and religiously plural society. (Zine and Bala 2009)

The show, therefore, is a unique intervention in Canadian television, and as Dakroury notes in her chapter, it has precipitated a significant shift in the representation of Muslims, countering both the Orientalizing and exoticizing One Thousand and One Nights depiction and the more nefarious image of the Muslim terrorist, stereotypes that otherwise inform the standard stock images and narratives through which Muslims are represented in film and television. Dakroury locates this show within the emergent genre of Muslim comedy in North America, which has primarily taken the form of stand-up comedy. She argues that it is important for public broadcasting in Canada to continue to nurture these more subaltern forms of comedic cultural production, which are less likely to be given air time where neoliberal economies have a strong hold and dominate media programming decisions. Despite criticisms of the CBC for not truly developing alternative media frames, Dakroury heralds its support of Little Mosque on the Prairie as an example of the democratizing possibilities of public broadcasting.

Along with the media, educational systems are also important institutions within civil society that shape our understanding of the world and our own identities. In the third section of the book, education is the focus of the chapters by Nadeem Memon and me. Both contributions are based on empirical research into Islamic education in Canada. In Chapter 7, Memon provides an important historical mapping of the development of mosques in Canada, which provided the first sites for the development of Islamic educational institutions. He then takes us through the philosophical underpinnings of Islamic education and provides a historical overview of the emergence of Islamic educational sites, including madrassas (or weekend religious schools), full-time Islamic schools, and home schooling. In addition to mapping the historical contours of education in the Canadian Muslim
diapora, Memon highlights various sociological, philosophical, and pedagogical challenges and possibilities that emerge through the negotiation of faith, education, and citizenship among Muslims in Canada.

Using a critical ethnographic mode of inquiry, my chapter takes a different approach to examining Islamic schooling in Ontario. Chapter 8 is based on qualitative fieldwork conducted in a gender-segregated Islamic high school and focuses on the experiences of Muslim girls and the politics of veiling. I critically explore how these young women reside at the nexus of dual oppressions, confronting racism and Islamophobia in society at large and at the same time contending with patriarchal forms of religious oppression in their communities. The chapter provides an overview of the historical context for veiling within the Islamic tradition, which is useful in situating contemporary contestations about this practice. I also situate the discussion within attempts to ban the hijab in Europe and in Canada, which provides a political backdrop for the debates that have ensued. It is within the fraught terrain of religious edicts and secular political backlash that young Muslim girls who choose to wear the hijab must negotiate their sense of faith, identity, and citizenship. Through interviews with young Muslim women, the chapter provides an analysis of what I call “gendered Islamophobia,” which refers to “specific forms of ethno-religious and racialized discrimination levelled at Muslim women that proceed from historically contextualized negative stereotypes that inform individual and systemic forms of oppression.” The narratives of the young women in my study reveal their day-to-day experiences with this form of discrimination in secular public schools. I then examine the situation they confront when they enter the discursive spaces of Islamic schools, where they are socialized to conform to the prevailing religious norms. Islamic schools provide a refuge from gendered Islamophobia but are nonetheless places where conservative religious norms determine specific parameters for their dress, identity, and behaviour. This chapter explores the ways that Muslim girls negotiate their identities within these often polarized spaces. It is interesting to note that even though the fieldwork for this study was completed just prior to 9/11, the narratives related by the interviewed Muslim girls reveal levels of racism and gendered Islamophobia comparable to today. This serves as a reminder that Islamophobia did not begin on September 11, 2001 (Zine 2002).

Some of the most significant shifts since the 9/11 tragedy have been the development of draconian security policies as a response to “home-grown” threats of terror. The final section of the book addresses racialized securitization in Canada through an analysis of policies such as security certificates...
and Bill C-36, the Anti-terrorism Act. Chapter 9, by Jacqueline Flatt, critically examines the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), which stipulates policies for immigration and refugee regulations as well as terms and conditions of detention and deportation. This policy also provides the means for security certificates to be issued to noncitizens who may be detained and deported if it is alleged that they pose a risk to the security of Canada. This policy has received attention more recently due to the detention of five Muslim men – Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub, Mahmoud Jaballah, Hassan Almrei, Mohamed Harkat, and Adil Charkaoui – but this provision within the IRPA has existed in Canada’s immigration law since 1978. In this chapter, Flatt provides a critical analysis of this policy and its implications and then examines the way the discourse surrounding security certificates has been taken up in Canadian print media through an examination of news articles in the *Globe and Mail* and the *National Post* from 2004 to 2008. Flatt provides a comprehensive view of how both the policy and the negative construction of Muslims were narrated within media and security discourses purveyed through these dailies. The analysis further reveals significant findings on how national belonging is defined and policed and on how this is connected to the dismantling of rights for noncitizens in Canada that has been enabled within the current “state of exception” (Agamben 2005).

Chapter 10 continues the examination of the Canadian security regime with an analysis of Bill C-36 and its deployment in the “Toronto 18” case of alleged domestic terrorism by a group of seventeen Muslim youth and one Muslim adult. In this chapter, Shaista Patel begins by employing an anti-colonial and anti-racist feminist analysis to map out the role of law in configuring the colonialist Canadian nation-building project and then uses an anti-Orientalist lens to examine and unpack how Bill C-36 is being used to safeguard the nation from “dangerous Muslims” as a way of preserving what Hage (2000) refers to as the “white nation fantasy.” Patel interrogates the way techniques and technologies of surveillance emanating from this policy have led to racial and religious forms of profiling targeting Muslims. This chapter provides an important account of how racial securitization has become an institutionalized practice in Canada that continues to be shaped and legitimated by the imperial politics of the “war on terror.” Patel’s analysis helps us to understand how policies constitute the formation of dangerous populations that must be policed and regulated by the state and how specific racialized ontologies emerge from this encounter. Her anti-Orientalist reading of Bill C-36 is an important and innovative approach to unpacking the implications of this policy and how it has been applied specifically to
Muslim Canadians. Her analysis further reveals how such policies shore up the image of Canada as a benevolent nation being threatened by “enemies within” and the implications this holds for Muslims who are left out of the national narrative until they are determined to be “good Muslims” rather than “bad Muslims” (Mamdani 2004).

Patel ends her chapter with a query about “how to claim humanity as Muslims of colour in a nation built on colonial and racialized violences.” This is a question that is critical to this book and to the future Muslim presence in Canada. This book offers a contribution to this collective struggle for greater understanding, critical awareness, and social justice, as a form of “jihad” (which refers to a struggle but not to a “holy war,” as this term is often erroneously reduced to signifying). This is in fact the true spirit of the word “jihad” within Islam, so let us reclaim this meaning here and articulate this project as a struggle for Muslims and other marginalized communities to lay claim to the space of the nation as one of belonging and inclusion. In this sense, this book navigates beyond the hegemonic ideologies that dominate the representation of Islam and Muslims and instead allows subaltern voices in the Canadian Muslim hinterlands to be critical interlocutors within the cultural and political landscape of the nation we all call home.

NOTES
1 Adams (2007) notes that, in 1993, 73 percent of Canadians expressed concerns about the integration of immigrants and their adoption of Canadian values but that these figures declined slowly over time to 58 percent by 2005. However, according to Adams, the surge to 65 percent of Canadians expressing concerns about immigrant integration by 2006 can be attributed to flashpoint issues such as the debate regarding shar’ia tribunals in Ontario (see Chapter 2). This demonstrates the volatile effect of Muslim cultural politics on public opinion and public fears in Canada.
2 *Niqabi* is the term for women who wear the face veil known in Arabic as *niqab*.
3 http://www.muslimcanadiancongress.org/.
4 The case put forward by Tarek Fatah and the MCC against the niqab and burka is the same as that argued by the infamous Islamophobe Daniel Pipes. See, for example, http://www.danielpipes.org/.
5 Hadith refers to the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad as recorded and collected by his close companions and later codified into a seminal corpus of knowledge by religious scholars in the ninth century. These serve as a major source of religious knowledge and as a companion to the Qur’an.
6 By “racial securitization,” I am referring to sets of regulatory ideological and political policies, strategies, and techniques employed by the state as well as some nonstate actors that are constituted and enacted through conflating the otherwise disparate categories of racial and religious identities with the assessment of risk and public
safety. Here, I am expanding on the notion of a “security industrial complex” (Hayes 2006), which is defined as a process by which “the boundaries between internal and external security, policing and military operations, have been eroded” and new forms of surveillance of “public and private places, of communications and of groups of individuals” have been accelerated by the “war on terror.” Racial securitization, therefore, links race to the security-industrial complex as an integral feature of this governing apparatus that provides the basis on which threats to public safety are determined and safeguarded against.

In Canada awareness surrounding domestic violence and forced marriages is being raised by Muslim leaders, women’s organizations, and activist groups such as the Canadian Council of Muslim Women (CCMW), the South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario (SALCO), and emergent groups such as AQSAzine, a collective of Muslim women and transpeople developed in honour of murdered teen Aqsa Parvez. In addition, these concerns have made their way to the minbar (pulpit) of mosques, where some religious leaders are raising greater awareness about these concerns from an Islamic perspective in their sermons.

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