

Globalizing Citizenship

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Kim Rygiel



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*To my son Jamie Emre Rygiel-Baban,
who always asks the important questions in life*

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Globalizing Citizenship

Introduction: Globalization, Security, and Citizenship

SCHOLARS OF GLOBALIZATION HAVE extensively noted that one of the principle outcomes of late globalization is the growing tension between conflicting modes of organization based on a deterritorialized global capitalist system, on the one hand, and on a territorial nation-state system, on the other (e.g., Coleman 2005; Held and McGrew 1999, 2002; Hollifield 2004; Pellerin 2005; Scholte 2000). This tension is a result of the fact that the global accumulation of capital demands open borders, enabling the relatively free movement of goods and services (and some people) across them, while the nation-state system and state-centric notions of security are founded upon relatively fixed territorial borders and populations. It is this governing problem, which has existed for some time, that was made particularly visible after 11 September 2001, with governments seeking to thwart terrorist attacks by exercising greater control over their territorial borders but without jeopardizing the global capitalist economy. It is within this context that new ways of governing populations have become increasingly important as a means of responding to these competing systems of governance.

Citizenship is one primary mode of governing populations that has been strengthened in the late twentieth century. Border controls and increased immigration and asylum detention have flourished, particularly since the 1980s, with neoliberal restructuring of the state and the economy as well as with greater human mobility. Neoliberal restructuring and a globalizing capital economy have generated the movement of multiple forms of goods, people, services, ideas, and capital and, thus, increased geographic, social, economic, and symbolic forms of mobility. Human mobility, for example, has increased in both numbers and forms, ranging from forced displacement due to wars, famine, poverty, and ecological destruction; to travel for leisure and study; to migration for work, family reunification, or asylum. Moreover, this increased and more diverse mobility is made more complex by the fact that it is not linear but, rather, consists of circuits of return and repetition (see, for example, Stasiulis 2008; Goldring 1998; Bash, Glick Schiller, and Blanc-Szanton 1994).

Within this context of globalization, neoliberal restructuring, and greater mobility, citizenship has become an increasingly popular means by which governing authorities regulate these diverse flows. This is, in part, because citizenship discourses, practices, and policies have simultaneously enabled the

facilitation of the flow of goods and the disciplining of populations and their mobility – a need that, while certainly not new, has been identified as all the more pressing after 2001. Thus, while citizenship policies (such as border controls and detention arrangements) may now be framed in the language of security, many had, in fact, been under development (and increasingly relied upon) prior to 2001. This has been in response to challenges posed by globalization and, in particular, the need to control the mobility of people in the context of increasing migration and calls for more open borders for trade. In this sense, the events of 2001 and the “war on terror” provide a microcosm of a much larger problematic: how to effectively and efficiently manage global mobility and govern populations without undermining the open borders necessary to trade and commerce. For this reason, my discussion of shifts in citizenship as a globalizing regime of government begins by first situating and explaining them within the broader historical context and familiar debates around globalization, neoliberalism, migration, and security/securitization.¹

Scholars have debated the impact of globalization processes on the state from a variety of perspectives.² I view globalization not only as linked to long-term historical processes but also as involving significant changes in the speed, spatial configurations, and intensity with which changes are taking place today – changes that are historically unprecedented (Held and McGrew 1999, 7-9). Globalization does not, therefore, involve linear or predictable outcomes; rather, it contains contradictions and tensions arising from different territorial and non-territorial spatial forms of political, social, and economic processes. Resulting from these processes are new patterns of global inequalities and levels of displacement.

Looked at from this perspective, globalization has brought about such changes as the emergence of offshore production and marketing, the increase in transnational corporate alliances and intrafirm transactions, and growing EU integration, all of which are indicative of the need to think about territorial processes and space in terms of deterritorialization, reterritorialization, and supraterritorialization as well as in terms of complex relationships of governing (e.g., multilayered governance and multiperspectival polities) (Harvey 1989; Scholte 2000; Ruggie 1993; Sassen 1998, 2000) and global governmentality (Foucault 1994, 1988; Hardt and Negri 2000; Larner and Walters 2004; Perry and Maurer 2003; Zureik and Salter 2005). In particular, arguments presented in Chapter 3 depend on a notion of “supraterritorialization” as a key factor of globalization (Scholte 2000). Scholte (2000, 15-17) argues that supraterritoriality is what distinguishes globalization from overlapping concepts such as internationalization, liberalization, universalization, Westernization, and modernization. Supraterritorialization refers to the “trend whereby social relations become less tied

to territorial frameworks. From this perspective borders are not so much crossed or opened but transcended” (Scholte 1997, 431). Yet, more than this, as renewed research illustrates, borders are not simply transcended but remade and re-defined. They are delocalized and diffused throughout the domestic space of the state (Balibar 1998, 2002; Bigo 2002; Côté-Boucher 2008; Nyers 2003; Pickering and Weber 2006; Rumford 2006; Salter 2004; Walters 2006a).

Moreover, deterritorialized spaces always exist alongside territorial spaces in complex relationships such that states are neither obsolete nor static but, rather, are transformed in ways that create supraterritoriality. In other words, states remain key economic and political assemblages, but where state authorities facilitate the globalization of capital, doing so often leads to the compromising of state sovereignty (Scholte 2000, 102). For example, as discussed in Chapter 3, one of the ways that supraterritoriality is created is through the standardization of regulations pertaining to such things as new technologies, documents, and procedures (Scholte 2000, chap. 6). State authorities, in conjunction with other actors, develop and implement a harmonized set of rules and regulations; however, in doing so, they create a level of standardization that contributes to supraterritoriality, which then weakens sovereignty and redistributes governing powers to substate, suprastate, and private market actors (103).

Just as important as this spatial reconfiguration, however, is the way globalization creates new forms of stratification between groups of people. For example, feminist scholars Marianne Marchand and Anne Sisson Runyan (2000) argue that it is important to understand how globalization processes – and global restructuring in particular – generate new forms of hierarchy and inequality that are highly gendered, classed, and racialized. Similarly, Saskia Sassen (1998) shows how new patterns of global inequality are concentrated within certain nodal points such as globalizing cities, which reconfigure spaces of inequality, thus rendering it more accurate to speak of the peripheralization of the core and vice versa rather than First World and Third World, core and periphery. Globalizing cities have become centres in which transnational financial capital is concentrated, along with large pools of low-wage labour, thus providing the “infrastructure” for the global economic system – a system that consists largely of immigrant and refugee populations and, particularly, women of colour (Sassen 1998, 87). It is important to note that much of what gets counted as globalization is highly gendered, based on highly masculinized processes centred on technology-driven capitalism, or “techno-muscular” capitalism (TMC), but that these processes are often connected to more feminized processes of globalization based on “a regime of labor intimacy” (Chang and Ling 2000, 27). Feminist scholarship points out that many populations from countries in the global South – and women in particular – participate in

globalization processes through service work (including domestic service, care work, and sex tourism), often in the form of low-skilled, low-wage, casualized employment (Bakker 1999; Connelly 1996; Enloe 1989; Marchand and Runyan 2000; Pettman 1996; Stasiulis and Bakan 1997, 2005; Wonders and Michalowski 2001). In other words, globalization is connected to spatial reconfigurations of territory and governance as well as to increased inequality between groups of people.

Finally, not only has globalization brought about spatial, gender, sex, race, and class dislocations, but it has also produced large-scale displacements of peoples. For example, as Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson (2000, 9) note, while migration is not a recent phenomenon but, rather, an integral part of processes such as colonization and industrialization, the postwar period has been especially marked by the “sheer scale” of migration, which affects “all regions and most countries of the world simultaneously.” Figures suggest that there are “around 175 million people currently residing in a country other than where they were born” and that “the number of migrants in the world has more than doubled since 1975, with most living in Europe (56 million), Asia (50 million) and North America (41 million)” (UN 2002). This number is “up from 80 million three decades ago” (Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees 2004). These migration figures include some 20.6 million people under the care of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), including “10.4 million refugees (51%), 1 million asylum seekers (5%), 2.4 million returned refugees (12%), 5.8 million internally displaced persons (28%) and 951,000 others of concern (4%)” (UNHCR 2003, 14). UNHCR figures also suggest that there may be as many as 9 million stateless people worldwide (UNHCR 2003). Furthermore, global estimates suggest that as many as 700,000 to 4 million people are “trafficked” yearly (USA Department of State 2004).³ In terms of net migration, figures suggest a movement from the global South to countries in the industrialized North – “the world’s more developed regions gained an estimated 2.3 million migrants from the less developed regions, or nearly 12 million over the period 1995-2000” (UN 2002) – with the largest gains being made by North America. However, these numbers should be situated within a larger context of “enforced immobility,” with the norm being confinement within one’s country of birth (Zolberg 2006, 118).

While migration is not itself a new phenomenon but, rather, part of the human condition, as Anthony Messina and Gallya Lahav (2006, 1) note, “it only became politicized, and hence legally and politically circumscribed, beginning in the nineteenth century, when the modern nation-state arose and erected political-territorial borders around ethnocultural communities.” Strictly speaking, one can look at international migration as a distinct phenomenon from

the middle of the fifteenth century onward “since its distinctiveness is predicated on the organization of global space into territories controlled by sovereign states that have the right to control the movement of people across their borders” (Zolberg 2006, 112). During this period, mass migration often included such forms of enforced mobility as forced labour and slavery; trade, exploration, and settlement (as in the case of the relocation of European settlers to colonies in the New World); and forced expulsion or flight in the newly created European states. Mass migrations of the nineteenth century, by contrast, had a more *laissez-faire* approach, with many European states foregoing restrictions on entry and exit, leaving migration to be dictated by “push” and “pull” factors (115). As Zolberg notes, it is during this time that the “freedom of exit came to be established as a *sin qua non* of liberal regimes” (ibid.). In contrast to these earlier periods, the contemporary period of migration is marked by tighter border controls, “restricting access to relatively small numbers of people of the receivers’ choosing” (ibid.). It is for this reason that Nandita Sharma (2006, 128) argues that today’s migrants, especially those moving from the global South (hereafter referred to as the South) to the global North (hereafter referred to as the North), experience an increasingly restrictive border control regime that regulates their mobility. This use of border controls to regulate migration in general and immigration in particular is directly connected to the emergence and expansion of the nation-state as the predominant form of political organization. The use of border controls to regulate migration thus needs to be situated within the larger history of the expansion of centralized territorial and national state control as well as within the globalization of the capitalist economy. In the current period of late globalization, the trend towards more flexible sources of labour demands both the tailoring of the labour force according to country-specific needs and the creation of more vulnerable, and thus cheaper, sources of readily available labour (Bacon 2008; Sharma 2006).

As forms of human mobility grow (e.g., displacement, asylum, travel for work, study, family, and leisure), and as regulatory controls become more restrictive, “legalized,” regular, and regulated forms of migration produce irregular, and what has increasingly become “illegalized,” forms of movement across borders (De Genova 2002). The increased implementation of border controls on the part of governing authorities has enabled the greater segregation (and differential treatment) of “‘legitimate’ mobilities such as leisure and business, from ‘illegitimate’ mobilities such as terrorism and illegal immigration” (Amoore 2006, 336). This “illegalization” of migration is produced by greater securitization, particularly by wealthy postindustrial societies in the North. In the process, certain bodies are perceived as threatening, disruptive, and risky and, therefore, in need of being securitized, regulated, and controlled. At the same time, these

bodies are rendered vulnerable and are perceived as an invaluable source of cheap and exploitable labour (Bacon, 2008; Bigo 2002 and 2007; Bigo and Guild 2005; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Coleman 2005; Epstein 2007; Pickering and Weber 2006). Since 2001, they have frequently taken the form of the immigrant, the refugee or asylum claimant, and the undocumented migrant; however, they are also exchangeable and racialized, such that people of colour and those from countries in the South, as well as people of Muslim, Arab, and/or Middle Eastern background, have come to be viewed as risky subjects (Thobani 2004).

It is within this context, then, that citizenship has increasingly become a way of governing individuals and populations. Despite the criss-crossing and transgression of territorial state borders and the reconfiguration of the state as a result of globalization, citizenship as a form of governing has been strengthened through innovative strategies and technologies of power, becoming an increasingly effective way of controlling populations in a globalizing environment. The reason for this is that, under the logic and discourse of citizenship, a host of strategies have been implemented to further open borders and liberalize trade and the flow of capital in ways that simultaneously maintain the role of the state with regard to controlling population and enforcing security. This is why Barry Hindess (2003, 24) argues that we can best understand this seeming contradiction between the promotion of open borders for goods, on the one hand, and the simultaneous restriction on the mobility of people, on the other, “if we view them both as parts of the one regime of population control.” This has been especially evident since the events of 11 September 2001, which have led to the increasing use of citizenship as a means of governing the tension between an increasingly deterritorialized political economy and a territorialized political system. This is the context within which the principle arguments are situated.

Border Control and Detention Policies

The current period of securitization has seen the development of numerous border control and detention policies, many of which, after 2001, have been particularly discriminatory towards certain groups of people of Muslim, Arab, and/or Middle Eastern background as well as towards refugees and asylum seekers, immigrants, and non-status and undocumented migrants more generally. The 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and the subsequent attacks in Bali (October 2002), Istanbul (November 2003), Madrid (March 2004), and London (July 2005), played an important role in providing an opening for justifying the implementation of a range of border controls and detention practices that have led to incidents that target certain groups of individuals and populations in specific ways. For example, fighting a “war on terror” has provided the opportunity to conduct massive surveillance, to harass, to interrogate,

to arrest, and to detain people throughout industrialized countries in the North. And it has also resulted in the creation of poverty and the destruction of societies in the South. Consider, for example, Iraq, where Amnesty International (AI) reports suggest that tens of thousands of Iraqis have died since 2003 as a result of military operations (AI 2005d). Similarly, the war on terror has resulted in a global attack on women's rights, ranging from cutbacks on social spending due to increased military spending, to initiatives curtailing women's rights (e.g., the United States' imposition of a "global gag rule" prohibiting foreign aid to family planning clinics supportive of women's right to abortion), to the subjection of women, men, and children to conditions of militarization and violence in their respective societies (Hunt and Rygiel 2006). In the name of fighting terror, forms of terror and control are being enacted against people of Muslim, Arab, and/or Middle Eastern background as well as against asylum claimants, immigrants, and non-status peoples.

In Toronto, on 2 June 2006, seventeen young men suspected of terrorist activity were arrested.⁴ As Canadian media reports, like those in the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere, increasingly embrace rhetoric that refers to Muslims as "the enemy within" and to "homegrown terrorism" (Kelley 2006), we need to be acutely aware of how the 11 September attacks have been used to justify a range of initiatives directed at population control. These include the targeting and harassment of individuals perceived to be of Muslim, Arab, and/or Middle Eastern background, with incidents of anti-Muslim sentiment increasing throughout Europe and across Britain, Canada, the United States, and Australia. Such incidents include the denial and/or termination of work due to religious dress; discrimination in airports due to names, appearances, and travel destinations; the interrogation and arrest of Muslims based on profiling; raids on Muslim homes and businesses; the refusal to accommodate religious practice at work or school; and, finally, incidents of harassment and violence, including murder (CAIR 2002).⁵

In the United States, the war on terror also resulted in the arrest and detention of some twelve hundred non-citizens immediately after 11 September 2001, none of whom was charged with involvement in the attacks but 752 of whom were charged with immigration and visa violations (Parker and Fellner 2004). Others put this figure much higher since the government stopped releasing figures after early November 2001, when it had already detained some 1,147 people (Cole 2002, 960). Further to these arrests, as of 2004, numbers suggest that approximately 15,300 asylum seekers had been detained at US borders and airports (Welch 2004, 113), with some figures suggesting that the total number of people detained for terrorist-related reasons by the Bush administration may be as high as eighty-three thousand (Siddiqui 2005). In other words, the fight against

terrorism produced its own terror in the form of subjecting certain individuals and groups to unlawful and extraterritorial forms of detention.

Included in the number of people detained after 11 September were approximately 650 who were held in US custody in Guantánamo Bay without charge or trial. (Since US President Obama came to power and signed an executive order to close the prison, this number has been reduced to 198 detainees as of December 2009.) Of these, plans are under way to try five detainees in a federal court in New York City and another five elsewhere in the United States. They were incarcerated in such desperate conditions that two hundred participated in hunger strikes, with three committing suicide in June 2006 (AI 2006a; Shephard 2006). In addition to these detentions, reports have surfaced about the US government's use of secret prisons in undisclosed countries in Eastern Europe and the Middle East – prisons in which detainees are held outside of the public eye and are interrogated, often with techniques that amount to torture (HRW 2005b; Grey 2005).

Finally, in the name of fighting terrorism, countries (particularly those in the North) have used the terrorist attacks as an opportunity to implement a range of border control and detention programs. These include biometric forms of identification, such as biometric passports, as called for by the UN agency known as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). They also include various forms of biometric identity cards. In the UK, three types of identity cards are available for those over sixteen who are British citizens, citizens of the EU or European Economic Area or Foreign Nationals. In Canada, as of 2002, a permanent resident identity card (Maple Leaf card) is required for all permanent residents. Plans under way in 2003 for a broader Canadian national identity card have since been put on hold (House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 2003). As well, the United States implemented the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act, 2002, stipulating mandatory biometric passports for all travellers without visas, which replaced the former National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS), which had been applicable to all non-citizens of Middle Eastern nationality.

Other forms of border programs, such as those outlined in the Canada-US Smart Border Declaration of 2001, use risk-profiling and data-aggregation/data-mining technologies. These include the joint Canada-US border inspection program known as NEXUS (in operation at land border crossings) and the NEXUS-Air program, which was implemented in 2003 to expedite low-risk travellers. In addition, the joint Canada-US initiative, Free and Secure Trade (FAST), has operated since 2002 at certain border crossings in order to harmonize commercial processes, including facilitating travel and expediting the

shipments of low-risk companies across the US-Canada border. There is also the border control program, implemented by the Canada Border Services Agency and Citizenship and Immigration Canada, called CANPASS. CANPASS provides an immigration and customs pre-screening program to help expedite the movement of low-risk travellers. For example, CANPASS-Air provides pre-clearance and uses iris scans in order to expedite air travellers who come through certain airports (e.g., those in Edmonton, Winnipeg, Calgary, Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver). Also under way are plans for joint border control initiatives to facilitate the sharing of information on high-risk travellers through the implementation of advanced passenger information and passenger name record (API/PNR) systems. In the United States and Canada, these have been fully operational since 2003 and are being integrated with European systems to enable the sharing of passenger information.

Since 11 September 2001, in addition to these border controls, new detention arrangements have also been implemented involving what are often extraterritorial and extralegal forms of detention camps. These include camps such as those brought about by Australia's 2001 "Pacific Solution," which led to the creation of offshore processing camps for asylum seekers and to the removal of territory from its migration zone. They have also included (now rejected) proposals for the creation of so-called "zones of protection" in Europe, including regional protection areas and transit processing centres, as outlined in the United Kingdom's *A New Vision for Refugees* (Cabinet Office and Home Office 2003). As well, new detention arrangements include extraterritorial and extralegal detention camps for terrorist suspects (such as Guantánamo Bay) as well as revised anti-terror legislation that is intended to provide greater powers of detention. To this, a range of detention practices have either been introduced or are being used more prevalently since 9/11, including the use of security certificates in Canada, the US practice of extraordinary rendition, and electronic forms of detention and monitoring such as those introduced in the United Kingdom's Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, and its Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act, 2004.

These are just some of the many ways in which certain individuals and groups have been subjected to border controls and detention practices that are justified in the name of security, and it is these examples of border controls and detention arrangements, and the specific policies just described, that are the focus of this book. While many of these incidents have emerged in response to the 2001 terrorist attacks, those events and the subsequent 11 September project need to be understood within a much larger theoretical and historical perspective. I situate these events within a larger discussion of the way border controls and

detention practices function as technologies of citizenship used to govern populations and to regulate their mobility. The focus of this book is to achieve an understanding of the changing nature of citizenship as a regime of government within the context of globalization and securitization processes.

Overview of the Book

Globalizing Citizenship examines how the politics of citizenship are changing within the context of globalization and securitization, particularly after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (and subsequent attacks arising thereafter). Many countries – but especially those white settler societies cooperating as part of an Anglo-American coalition in fighting the so-called war on terror (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia) – seized this moment as one in which to further securitize their societies by implementing new border and detention controls. As noted, many of these controls, however, were already under development prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks. Many countries, especially wealthier countries in the North, were faced with the problem of how to more “efficiently” manage their populations in light of greater migration in response to globalization, neoliberal restructuring, and global capitalism’s demand for more open economic borders. As Didier Bigo (2007, 30) observes: “The political program of liberalism on a worldwide scale is dedicated to freedom of movement. But it is not applied in a homogeneous manner. The freedom of capital, goods, and services is a source of profitability; the freedom of human movement is not necessarily so. Those who are profitable and economically solvent are to be separated from those who are not, but this must be done without checking everybody. Such is the price of managing speed.” The 11 September moment may have intensified, and has certainly made more visible, this pre-existing problem of governing. Thus, this moment should be read not so much as one in which politics changed and a new security-related challenge was introduced as one in which the existing difficulties of the economic, political, and social orders were made visible and publicly articulated as key governmental challenges.

The starting point of *Globalizing Citizenship* is that it would be misleading to view the policies implemented in the name of greater security as simply a response to global terrorism. One must understand how they are integrally tied to challenges of governing in light of globalization and the problems of human mobility and security. It is within this context that governmental authorities have increasingly turned to the discourses and practices of citizenship as a way of responding to these challenges. In the process, however, citizenship is becoming a globalizing regime governing global mobility. To follow this argument

requires a conceptual shift in the way we understand citizenship. It requires a shift from the narrow definition of citizenship as a legal institution entailing rights and responsibilities within the nation-state to a broader definition of citizenship *as government*.

Globalizing Citizenship examines recent changes to border control and detention policies, aimed at more efficiently governing global mobility, from the perspective of *citizenship politics* – that is, the ways that governing bodies utilize technologies, policies, practices, and discourses of citizenship to govern populations. This examination reveals that it is through citizenship that a restructuring of rights is occurring. Following Michel Foucault (1979, 1988, 1994), I approach citizenship as government. This involves viewing citizenship as having to do with the practices, discourses, technologies, forms of power, and political subjectivities used in the governing of individuals and populations. My work is thus situated within a small but growing body of critical scholarship that approaches citizenship as a set of governing practices and as constitutive of political subjectivities (Cowen and Gilbert 2008; Cruikshank 1999; Hindess 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004; Isin and Wood 1999; Isin 2002, 2004; Nyers 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2008; Stasiulis and Ross 2006; Walters 2002). This approach differs in substantive ways from more traditional approaches that view citizenship as a modern legal institution within the nation-state by drawing attention to sociological aspects of and shifts in the articulation of citizenship to reveal how citizenship is used globally to regulate mobility.

The principal argument of this book, then, is that citizenship is *globalizing* as a *regime of government*. It increasingly involves new configurations of power and collaboration not just *within* but also *across* and *between* states. This includes the harmonization around border controls and detention policies between industrialized countries (especially, but not exclusively, within North America, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Australia); the displacement of state power to other actors (such as international organizations and private companies); and, finally, a shift towards governing through border controls and detention practices that control and discipline the individual body. Taken together, such changes in governing suggest that citizenship has become *internationalized*, *privatized*, and *individualized*, such that it is now becoming a globalizing regime for governing mobility.

To argue that citizenship is a globalizing regime of government is to critically intervene in debates over the impact of globalization on citizenship and the state. For much of the 1990s and early 2000s, the revival in citizenship studies occurred, in large part, in response to debates concerning the effects of globalization on citizenship. Within these debates, scholars were divided between

those who saw the erosion of the nation-state as having a negative impact on citizenship and those who saw it as providing an opportunity to rethink citizenship in terms of more inclusive models (e.g., postnational, cosmopolitan, and transnational models). Rather than seeing citizenship and globalization as counter-posing forces, I argue that globalization is strengthening citizenship and, consequently, globalizing inequality by creating an exclusionary regime for governing populations. From a citizenship-as-government perspective, the transformation of the sovereign state in response to globalization processes does not mean the erosion of modern citizenship as an institution and governing regime, as many scholars of citizenship have argued (including those favouring more communitarian as well as postnational forms of citizenship, such as Hettne 2000; Jacobson 1996; Turner 2000; Miller 2000; Soysal 1994). Rather, from this critical perspective, globalization may be seen as transforming citizenship in ways that disrupt its close association with territorial borders not in the progressive ways suggested by postnational scholars (Soysal 1994) but, rather, in more exclusive ways, strengthening it to make it a more powerful regime for governing individuals, populations, and their movement between and across borders. This is the starting point, from which I develop an alternative perspective on citizenship as government.

In Chapter 2, I outline an understanding of citizenship as government. Rather than viewing citizenship as an institution, a legal status, and a membership in the polity (usually the nation-state), a citizenship-as-government approach views it as a form of politics, an exercise of power, a relationship that involves the governing of others as well as oneself. This entails examining the rationalities, discourses, technologies, and power relations that citizenship engenders. Fundamental to this perspective is the idea that a *politics* of citizenship must be at the front and centre of analysis. This requires investigating not only the way in which citizenship involves institutions, legal status, and membership but also the way in which it operationalizes discourses, technologies, and practices of governing individuals and populations – in the process producing citizens and non-citizens. In other words, a politics of citizenship means paying attention to the practices of citizenship, both by citizens and non-citizens. For one can engage in the practice of citizenship even if one lacks official legal citizenship status. From this perspective, citizenship is dialogical and performative, involving embodied ways of being and acting on the part of citizens and non-citizens. It is thus always about political struggles to constitute ourselves as political subjects. Such an approach necessitates an investigation into the ways in which subjects engage with technologies of power, whether through acquiescence, negotiation, or outright resistance.

Chapter 3 argues that citizenship is a globalizing regime of government. This argument is developed through a discussion of the work of Hannah Arendt and Barry Hindess and then through an introductory discussion of border controls and detention. The point is to show, through critical policy and discourse analyses, how citizenship is becoming internationalized, privatized, and individualized, such that it is becoming a globalizing regime for governing mobility. However, citizenship is not just a globalizing regime of government: it is also a biopolitical one. In Chapter 4, through a discussion of the concept of biopolitics in the work of Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, and Giorgio Agamben, I show how, in an era of globalization and weakened territorial borders, biopolitics is crucial to the role that citizenship plays in the management of populations across borders. More important, citizenship as biopolitics involves managing populations through the construction of desirable and undesirable citizens, non-citizens, and abject populations. If border controls aim to place people into different groups and manage their mobility according to a regime of differential mobility rights, then, through a biopolitical form of governing society, detention practices are designed to halt the movement of certain individuals and groups altogether.

In Chapter 5, I present an in-depth examination of border controls, particularly identification systems that depend on biometrics, risk-profiling, and data-aggregation/data-mining technologies to control mobility. I examine the logic and rationalities of border controls from the perspective of citizenship as a globalizing biopolitical regime of government and look at how border controls produce gendered, classed, and racialized populations based on notions of risk. In Chapter 6, I examine spaces and practices of detention. Detention practices, such as extraterritorial detention camps, extraordinary rendition, and security certificates, are designed to contain the mobility of high-risk groups, often removing them from society altogether. In effect, detention camps and camp-like spaces are places in which to house all those who have fallen outside of the nation-state system and who no longer have a polity to which they belong. In other words, detention spaces and practices are integral to the continued functioning of the nation-state system for they provide a way of dealing with all those who no longer have a political community in which to live. They provide a space for those undesirable or abject populations who are excluded from the body politic. If border controls construct certain individuals and groups as high-risk and as threats to society, as people whose movements need to be monitored and controlled (if not halted altogether), then detention policies and practices remove from society those who are deemed threatening, thus providing a biopolitical form of governing society. In each case, employing an

interdisciplinary approach, I use both critical policy and discourse analysis to theorize border controls and detention practices in the post-9/11 environment. My intention is to identify and to explicate the implications of certain governing rationalities in order to show what they say about recent changes to thinking about citizenship and governing populations in light of securitization and globalization processes.

Through my analysis of border controls and detention practices, I demonstrate that the post-9/11 period is about much more than state security: it is also about new claims and citizenship struggles for rights (especially mobility rights) and access to resources, for which mobility is a key strategy. If citizenship is indeed becoming a global regime for governing mobility, then such shifts have far-reaching implications for citizenship and the redistribution of rights and responsibilities that it entails. From the perspective of citizenship, securitization processes construct and then marginalize certain groups as threatening and undesirable. I argue that such shifts in governing are producing a more exclusionary mobility regime – one that deepens inequality along racialized, gendered, and classed lines while, at the same time, recasting what it means to be a citizen towards more technocratic and depoliticized understandings of citizenship. But shifts in governing also reveal the contested nature of citizenship as these same marginalized groups (asylum seekers, non-status or undocumented migrants, immigrants, and people of colour and/or of Arab, Muslim, and Middle Eastern origins) respond to securitization processes by making claims to the right to belong in a polity not only legally but also in terms of material, political, and cultural well-being. More than this, the politics of citizenship, to which securitization gives rise, extends beyond struggles for redistribution and recognition *within* a territorially defined polity like the state. This is because, through securitization processes, citizenship is itself transformed into a regime that involves the governing of populations globally, effectively restricting the access of peoples who choose to migrate (especially from South to North) as a way of gaining access to the North's greater resources.

Finally, I argue that the shifts in governing described here are significant for the way they change what it means to be a citizen, moving away from modern notions of a rights-bearing subject to more technocratic and depoliticized definitions of citizens as authorized bodies, with profound implications for the future of democratic citizenship. At the same time, such shifts in governing are also giving rise to new political movements and identities that are seeking to challenge border controls and detention practices. In Chapter 7, I look at examples of an emerging politics of resistance – a “movement on movement,” which involves, for example, No One Is Illegal and No Border movements, which

are actively challenging the securitization of citizenship. In so doing, they are also challenging the ground underpinning modern citizenship, which is based on notions of the securitized and legalized subject, through which rights and resources are either awarded or withheld. These movements present alternative visions of what citizenship might entail. I explore such changes in governing mobility, first, in terms of how they restrict citizenship politics by creating new forms of inequality and social exclusion and, second, in terms of how they generate new forms of political activism and citizenship identities in response to the globalization of citizenship.

Methodological Considerations

Beyond Exceptionalism: Contextualizing the “Post-9/11” Period

As I have already pointed out, the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and subsequent attacks elsewhere, now commonly referred to as belonging to the “post-9/11” or “war on terror” period, need to be understood within the theoretical and historical contexts of the relationships among globalization, neoliberalism, securitization, and human mobility. It is useful, therefore, to reflect on how to research and write on this period without succumbing to its exceptionalism. The events of this period may have provided the opening for many governing authorities to implement, rationalize, and justify a number of border controls and detention practices that were already under consideration well before 2001. So it is important to contextualize this historical period in order to avoid reading it as a moment in which “everything changed.” It is also useful to note what kinds of questions we foreclose by focusing on this moment and to where our gaze does (and does not) shift (Alexander 2006).

One obvious point is that, at one level, as a result of 9/11, the dynamics and discourses of security seem to have taken precedence in much academic scholarship. Prior to the war-on-terror environment in which we now live, much of our preoccupation with global politics revolved around globalization processes and concerns about whether and how such processes were transforming the state and whether governments were capable of governing in the context of increased capital mobility, global trade flows, and the growing global inequality resulting from neoliberal and structural adjustment policies implemented throughout the North and the South. Of course, these remain pressing issues. Yet, the 11 September moment seems to have shifted our focus to the securitization of territorial borders and the state as well as to certain geographical locations

(such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Middle East) and away from other places (such as Darfur in western Sudan). It has also shifted our focus away from other forms of terrorism, such as poverty, gender oppression, and racial apartheid (Hunt and Rygiel 2006). The same is true in the field of citizenship studies. Prior to this period, the focus of much citizenship scholarship was the impact of globalization processes on citizenship. The shift towards concerns with security, surveillance, borders, and war potentially forecloses analysis of questions pertaining to political economy and certain regions in the South (e.g., Africa).

Of course, the reference to “our” preoccupation must also be problematized. To what extent is this preoccupation with 9/11 – or even the preoccupation with security and securitization – particular to certain hegemonic, relatively wealthy, industrialized countries and their “neurotic citizens” (Isin 2004)? To what extent does this preoccupation participate in the production and recasting of a white Western imperial subject as “vulnerable, endangered, innocent and the subject of the irrational hatred of this fanatic non-Western Other” (Thobani 2007, 170)? How does this create a vulnerability for the West, which most peoples in the world have experienced for a long time? In other words, it is important to bear in mind that the perspective offered here must be appropriately situated. Different countries will have internalized this historical moment in different ways, depending on their own political situations and geopolitical histories.

This raises a further caveat. Throughout, I argue that citizenship is a globalizing regime of government. Yet, many of the examples provided as evidence of this involve policies, practices, and technologies that come from the “usual suspects” – that is, state and non-state actors located within the so-called “developed world.” In what sense, then, can such examples be said to be evidence of a global shift towards governing through citizenship? Admittedly, this is difficult to answer simply because shifts are always a process and never a completed project (hence they are referred to as *globalizing*). Just as policies, practices, discourses, and technologies of governing are repeated and reproduced, so, too, are they also simultaneously rejected, resisted, and transformed. Nevertheless, if the aim is to trace certain shifts in patterns of governing at a particular moment, then examples from specific locations of power may be seen to be representative of a globalizing shift towards governing through citizenship in the following ways. First, the term “globalizing” generally refers not so much to the global as to a distinct scalar level of space that transcends the state and the international. However, I use the term *globalizing* to refer to the way policies and processes are practised in and across different spaces (e.g., sub-national, national, international) in ways that disrupt the very idea of these scalar levels

as distinct and separate spaces. In other words, governing power is displaced, for example, from centralized state governments to state authorities working in conjunction with one another at an international level as well as to non-state actors such as private companies and individuals.

Second, to the extent that these shifts in policies and practices come from actors located within hegemonic powers that are part of the international state system, these actors are able to structure the rules of the game by which all state and non-state actors must play. One of the advantages of a Foucauldian analysis of power is that power can be understood not just as a tangible resource but also as a discursive effect. In other words, shaping the discourse and framing of policies, the administrative and legal rules, and the managerial structures also becomes an effective expression of power.

Third, in so far as the shifts in policies and practices from within countries located in the North affect populations not just there but also in the South, their effects can be said to be globalizing in scope. Where shifts in governing through citizenship are illustrated by examples from countries like Canada, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and those in the European Union, their effects can be said to be globalizing. This is because they undo or restructure key cornerstones of what has come to be understood as constitutive of the modern world system (e.g., the international refugee system, the system of modern state citizenship, and an international mobility system based on passport and visa systems). It is in this sense that I use the term “globalizing.” For it is not just the fact that certain countries have spillover effects and agenda-setting power but that the effects of governing global mobility participate in the redistribution of rights and resources on a global scale. Thus, I see specific examples located in the North as indicative of trends that are much more wide-sweeping in their effects.

Above all, if we are to avoid succumbing to the exceptionalism of this period, we need to continuously ask how the 9/11 moment connects to the larger historical moment of globalization, neoliberalism, global capitalism, and migration. For these reasons, I view the events of this period as part of the continuing debates (under way before 2001) over governing in light of securitization and globalization processes (often misleadingly posed as simply oppositional). In other words, reading the post-9/11 moment simply as a period of resecuritization, hyper-securitization, or the re-entrenchment of national security is to miss the changes that were already occurring around citizenship and government. This moment can be understood as one that has enabled governments to introduce a host of policies and ways of thinking about citizenship as a means of governing populations, thus enabling the continuation of the expansion of

global capitalism and globalization. It is through citizenship that mobility rights are regulated, and it is through geographic mobility that access to rights and resources are being restructured.

Research Approach and Sources

The question of how one chooses to research and study border control and detention policy and, indeed, to investigate citizenship as government, is an important one. I employ an interdisciplinary theoretical approach and use a variety of research material, ranging from academic scholarship (e.g., Cole 2002; Isin 2002; Isin and Wood 1999; Lyon 2003a; Nyers 2003) to policy documents (e.g., Canada 2001a; UK Government 2003; Vanstone 2003) to NGO reports (e.g., HRW 2002a; PI 2004c) to media reports (e.g. Priest 2005) to activist list serves and bulletins (e.g., Homes Not Bombs 2007; No Border Network 2001, 2002; TASC 2003) to public forums (e.g., Coderre 2003; Dershowitz 2003; St. Lawrence Centre Forum 2006) and conferences (Alexander 2006; Sassen 2002). Because the subject matter under investigation involves issues of “national security” and places not accessible to the general public, I have had to depend on sources of information such as activist literature and public gatherings (e.g., those involving groups like No One Is Illegal) and campaigns (e.g., Campaign to Stop Secret Trials in Canada). Similarly, information about Guantánamo Bay has come from reports written by NGOs such as Amnesty International (AI 2003b) and Human Rights Watch (HRW 2005a). Only now are first-hand accounts starting to emerge (e.g., that written by recently released British detainee Moazzam Begg [2006]). Critical journalistic investigation that has brought to public attention such covert issues as undercover detention practices (e.g., the US government’s use of extraordinary rendition [e.g., Priest 2005] and secret prisons [e.g., Beunderman 2005; Grey 2005]) have also been extremely important. As well, policy and legal documents pertaining to the range of implemented border controls and detention policies have been crucial sources of research both for supplying actual information on changes to the law and for enabling an understanding of the discursive underpinnings of the subject of citizenship. In utilizing these sources, my purpose has been to analyze the information in terms of what it reveals about the logic of practices of government that are broadly understood as the regulation of the conduct of individuals and populations.

Finally, my research is informed by a wide range of academic sources spanning several fields of study, including citizenship studies, migration studies, political science and international relations, sociology, feminist studies, and surveillance studies. The point of using an interdisciplinary approach is to bring together a wide variety of material that might otherwise remain disparate. In

doing this, my hope is to bring new questions and insights to the study of both citizenship and security. For example, I examine border controls and detention practices from the perspective of citizenship rather than from the perspective of security. This enables me to investigate changing definitions of politics, emerging political subjectivities, and forms of both oppression and resistance to oppression. It also permits me to demonstrate how recent policy changes are as much about governing populations as they are about protecting territory and governing borders.

A Note on Terminology

In *Globalizing Citizenship*, concepts such as “nation,” “state,” “citizenship,” and “borders” are used in ways that may differ somewhat from those to which the reader may be accustomed. As understanding this terminology is crucial to understanding my argument, I now consider some of these concepts.

Nation and State

The terms “state” and “nation-state” are frequently conflated in social science literature and, particularly, in international relations literature. The problem with this is that it results in these two terms’ being treated as though they both stand for one and the same political body. This occurs despite the fact that rarely (if ever) can the membership of the political community be said to consist of the same national group; rather, states are made up of individuals and groups with diverse origins, including varied national origins.

This conflation of nation and state can lead to a problematic and often violent form of politics based on the exclusion of all those who do not share the same nationality. More than this, though, the conflation of nation and state hinders our ability to understand how the organization of political community and citizenship as government might be changing. This is because it makes the assumption that, if globalization weakens or disrupts the connection between a nationally defined body politic (nation) and its political authority (the state), then this, in turn, weakens both the state and citizenship. Yet, this second assumption does not necessarily follow from the first. The ability to forge a unified national group may be made more difficult, yet, this does not mean that either the state or citizenship are consequently weakened. A state can become stronger, for example, by governing a multinational population or by governing transnational and diaspora populations. Consider the case of the Philippines, which has used its ability to market labour for export – especially that of Philippine women – to temporary worker programs in receiving countries (e.g., Canada’s Live-In Caregiver Program for foreign domestic workers) in order to generate income in the form of remittances (Stasiulis and Bakan 1997, 125).⁶ Similarly,

citizenship as government can become stronger as a result of the state's being able to govern over a wider population, independent of a territorially defined political body.

To avoid such confusions, I use the term "nation-state" to refer to that specific form of the state that emerged in the early 1900s, where the territorial boundaries of the political community were "imagined" as coinciding with those of the nation (Anderson 1991). In contrast, I use the term "state" to refer to an assemblage of economic, political, and social processes and authorities that usually govern a specifically defined population and territorial space. In other words, the term "state" refers to a broad set of governing relations and processes rather than, as is common in political science, to a specific governing body or political authority. The reason for maintaining this distinction is that much of the literature on globalization and the nation-state conflates the concepts of "state" and "nation" and reduces the former to a sovereign political actor. This leads to the misconception that the transgression or transformation of state borders leads to (1) a weakening of the state as a political player and (2) to understanding citizenship in a way that conflates the territorial with the nationally identified political community.

Making this conceptual differentiation is crucial for understanding my central argument: that citizenship is a globalizing regime of government that is stronger today because its regulatory and exclusionary powers are spread more pervasively throughout the state due to the fact that governing is shared with international, private, and individual actors. Arguments that "globalization processes are eroding or transgressing the nation-state" are problematic if, from the outset, we understand the state as an assemblage of governing relations and processes. Employing the ideas of philosophers Giles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to their work on the "surveillant assemblage," Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson (2000, 608) explain assemblage as consisting of multiple flows of networks, objects, institutions, persons, and ideas that "'work' together as a functional entity" and that come to be temporarily fixed in time and space. Together, various types of assemblages make up what we commonly know as the state. However, this state is not understood as "the traditional apparatuses of governmental rule studied by political scientists" (609) but, rather, as a form of governing based on "the tendency to create bounded physical and cognitive spaces, and introduce processes designed to capture flows" (*ibid.*). These "flows exist prior to any particular assemblage, and are fixed temporarily and spatially by the assemblage," a process that is related to the coalescing of "systems of domination ... which allow for some to direct or govern the actions of others" (608-9).

From this perspective, the weakening of the nation-state may not necessarily mean the weakening of the state as assemblage. In fact, it may mean just the

opposite, since it is conceivable that a stronger state (in the sense of a particular assemblage restricting the political options available, thus more tightly shaping the “conduct of conduct”) might be one that displaces governing from the traditional apparatuses of governmental rule to a variety of actors both within and beyond the state. In other words, what much of political science and international relations scholarship means by the state (i.e., the state as a political actor consisting of government, institutions, executive/legislative apparatuses, etc.) may be weaker in the sense of having less direct control over certain economic, social, and political outcomes. However, the state itself (in the broader sense of a variety of assemblages of processes and actors) may be stronger in the sense that governing is spread more pervasively throughout the social body. In this way of looking at the state, power is enacted in ways that are hard to detect and challenge since they operate, for example, through control over the individual body or through bureaucratic and scientific forms of control such as biometric and other surveillance technologies. Admittedly, as Haggerty and Ericson (2000, 609) note, the very act of speaking of the state as assemblage is subject to difficulties since it risks creating the image of the assemblage as a stable and fixed entity. While this problem cannot be completely avoided, the hope is that, by shifting the focus onto governing processes, technologies, and discourses, and by examining their logic and effect as they are enacted by a range of individuals and actors, the vision of the state offered here is fluid and multifaceted. As Haggerty and Ericson (*ibid.*) also note, because of its multiplicity and instability, the assemblage cannot be taken apart simply by dismantling a particular technology, government bureaucracy, or institution. With respect to openings and possibilities for resistance, this means that resistance is made more difficult because it must take multiple forms and be directed towards multiple sites. Yet, from another perspective, the fact that there are more sites and openings from which to build resistance suggests, paradoxically, new potentialities for it.

Government

As with my use of the terms “nation” and “state,” my use of the term “government” also deviates from the way it is used in much mainstream political science and international relations scholarship, where it refers to the legal and administrative governing body that has authority over a defined political community (whether the international community, state, province, city, or town). Instead, I use the term in a more Foucauldian sense to refer to the broader political relations implicated in the “conduct of conducts” involving the relationships of power, discourses, practices, technologies, and subjectivities involved in governing others and in self-government (Foucault 1994, 138). This usage is significant

because it enables us to think about citizenship in terms of governing practices, technologies, and relationships rather than in more institutional and legal terms. As such, it provides a way of discussing citizenship that loosens the connection between citizenship and the state since these governing relations, while they may be articulated in and through the state, may equally take place beyond, between, and across states as well as through non-state actors and various forms of self-government. This theoretical shift is key to being able to trace certain shifts in the articulation of citizenship and the way it is used to regulate global mobility. It should also be noted that this approach to government is complemented by – and complements – critical social science scholarship (international relations and security studies, in particular) on globalization and the state, which attempts to challenge notions of state borders as territorially fixed and to draw attention to the way global, international, national, and local levels of politics are intertwined and transformed as a result of globalization processes (e.g., Scholte 2000; Hardt and Negri 2000; McNevin 2006; Ong and Collier 2005; Zureik and Salter 2005). My use of the term “government,” with its focus on practices and relations of governing, is useful in that it avoids the assumption and reproduction of the idea of the pre-existence of distinct and separate levels of governing.

Citizenship

Modern citizenship is commonly understood to refer to a legal institution and status of membership within a political community (usually that of the nation-state) that entails certain rights and obligations. While the specific articulation of these rights and obligations varies according to the character of the nation-state (e.g., whether it is defined in more ethnic or more civic terms [Ignatieff 1993, 3-5]) and according to its type (e.g., whether it is neoliberal, welfare, or social democratic), modern citizenship typically includes various degrees of political, social, and cultural rights (Marshall 1950).

However, in recent years the study of citizenship as a modern legal and political institution has broadened to include a more critical, sociological understanding of citizenship. Rather than viewing citizenship primarily as a legal institution, a sociological approach views it “as a social process through which individuals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding or losing rights” (Isin 2000, 5). In other words, critical citizenship scholarship and sociological approaches emphasize the way individuals are “politically engaged” or are “practicing citizenship” and, thus, on the “norms, practices, meanings and identities” that constitute citizenship (ibid.). As Isin and Wood (1999, 4) explain, “Citizenship can be described as *both* a set of practices (cultural, symbolic and

economic) and a bundle of rights and duties (civil, political and social) that define an individual's membership in a polity ... Citizenship is therefore neither a purely sociological concept nor purely a legal concept but a *relationship* between the two" (emphasis in original). Informed by this sociological approach, critical citizenship studies expand the modern understanding of citizenship from a focus on the study of rights and obligations to a focus on the substantive experiences and practices of citizenship (Isin 2000, 2002; Isin and Wood 1999; Nyers 2003, 2006a, 2006b; Muller 2004; Walters 2002).

Viewed from this perspective, citizenship is seen as "a contested and contingent field," a field of political struggle for rights, status, and recognition (Isin and Wood 1999, 5). Moreover, as feminist scholarship on citizenship has long pointed out, the claims to universality often embedded in modern citizenship are, in fact, particularistic and gendered, based on the claims of particular groups (often groups of men) and dependent upon gendered notions of citizenship (Young 1989; Yuval-Davis 1999; Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999; Joseph 1996, 2000). Feminist scholarship notes that one's experience of citizenship is always mediated by one's membership in other groups and networks besides the nation-state. It therefore needs to be understood as "a negotiated relationship" (Stasiulis and Bakan 1997) and as "a multi-layered construct, in which one's citizenship in collectivities in the different layers – local, ethnic, national, state, cross- or trans-state and supra-state – is affected and often at least partly constructed by the relationships and positioning of each layer in specific historical context" (Yuval-Davis 1999, 122). Citizenship scholarship thus needs to investigate the formation of and struggle between various identities and groups and the way citizenship claims are made through the politicization and formation of these identities and groups rather than simply assuming their existence a priori (Isin and Wood 1999, 20). Furthermore, this investigation must occur not just from the perspective of the dominant groups who are making claims to citizenship but also from the perspective of those who are rendered citizenship's Others (e.g., non-citizens and abject subjects). In other words, a perspective on the politics of citizenship always involves an inquiry into the politics of these Others as they attempt to engage in practices and acts of citizenship. As is elaborated in Chapter 2, this view rests on Foucault's (1994) understanding of power as something that is not simply constraining but also productive of responses, reactions, and subjectivities. It is also informed by Jacques Rancière's (2004) notion of politics as "dissensus" (moments of engagement in which those who "have no part" challenge an injustice, calling into question the seemingly "normal" order of things and inserting their right to exist as political subjects). This view of politics is developed in the work of Peter Nyers (2003) and Engin Isin

and Greg Nielsen (2008), who address the performative aspects of citizenship as “acts of citizenship,” whereby non-citizens can assert their right to be recognized as political subjects, a necessary precursor to being recognized as legal citizens.

Finally, as feminist scholarship also reminds us, citizenship politics and subjectivity are *embodied* ways of being and engaging in political acts. Consider, for example, how women engage as citizens through their gendered roles as biological, symbolic, and cultural reproducers of the nation, as boundary markers and makers, and through their roles as active participants in nation-building and nationalist projects (Yuval-Davis 1997; Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989). Thus, ethnic and nationalist wars and nation-building projects have frequently been waged through the attempt to exert control over women’s bodies. This occurred with the rape of women in Bosnia as part of ethnic cleansing (Meznaric 1994), the use of “virginity testing” for Kurdish women in Turkey (AI 2003d), and eugenics programs in Canada (e.g., the forced sterilization of Aboriginal and lower-income women and those with mental disabilities [McLaren 1990]). More recently, the control over women’s bodies has been integral to the war on terror, both with regard to the restrictions around education, work, and dress imposed on Afghan women by Taliban fundamentalists and with regard to the restrictions on women’s reproductive and sexual rights imposed by the Bush administration in its attempt to court the right-wing Christian fundamentalist vote (Rygiel 2006, 151). As I write elsewhere (2006, 115), “controlling women’s bodies, especially their sexuality and reproduction, has to do, in large part, with the aim of protecting national identity by regulating the biological reproduction of the nation or, in other words, with keeping the nation ‘pure’ from the mixing of unwanted ‘others’ by regulating women’s sexual and reproductive activity” (Yuval-Davis 1997).” Such feminist insights into the engendered and embodied nature of citizenship are important when it comes to thinking about strategies of control as well as developing an abject politics of resistance as an embodied form of politics.

This alternative approach to citizenship not only broadens the study of citizenship to include a range of types of citizenship, with each engendering different forms of political relationships and identities and envisioning different possible ways of constructing the political community. It also places politics at the heart of citizenship as it requires seeing political practice as preceding legal definitions and settled statuses of citizenship (and non-citizenship). This is significant because it means that, rather than assuming the existence of settled citizen and non-citizen identities, the construction of these identities must be examined as a fundamental part of the politics of citizenship. Normatively, this provides the potential for thinking about citizenship politics in terms of how

marginalized groups are able to assert political agency and make claims to citizenship rather than simply as power struggles between those with rights, recognition, and status and those without.

Borders

Admittedly, I focus on border controls and detention practices in a few select countries, now popularly referred to as the “Anglo-American axis,” of which Canada is considered to be a part. In other words, *Globalizing Citizenship* does not comprehensively address the changes in these countries but, rather, maps general directions in the conceptualization of borders, governing, and citizenship. Of course, not all borders are governed and managed in the same way. As reinvigorated research into border theory suggests, contemporary borders are “networked borders” – that is, borders that are “increasingly differentiated” rather than “singular and unitary” (Rumford 2006, 157) and that have come to take on a “sorting function” that involves filtering risky bodies from more desirable populations (Walters 2006, 197). Moreover, as borders have become more “ubiquitous” (Balibar 1998, 220; Lyon 2005), they have also become “both multiplied and reduced in their localization and their function, they are being thinned out and doubled, becoming border zones, regions or countries where one can reside and live” (Balibar 1998, 220). Different borders, in other words, produce their own governing dynamics and rationalities as well as forms of resistance. The borders between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, for example, are being governed through very different practices than are those between Canada and the United States. Bearing this in mind, I address the practices and policies within white settler, particularly Anglo-American, countries because it is these countries that have been leading the so-called “fight against terror.” Nevertheless, recognizing that this is an incomplete picture that emphasizes the more formal and regulated aspects of governing mobility in certain locations, I hope here to outline a general shift in the way border controls and detention practices are used to govern global mobility. In so doing, I hope to draw attention to the way that globalization processes can strengthen citizenship as government and, in the process, globalize inequality through rights to movement.