

# **Give Me Shelter**

## **The Failure of Canada's Cold War Civil Defence**

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## Abbreviations

ARP	Air-Raid Precautions
CBC	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CCCRH	Canadian Committee for the Control of Radiation Hazards
CCEP	Cabinet Committee on Emergency Plans
CD	civil defence
CDO	Civil Defence Order (1959)
CDC	Cabinet Defence Committee
CFMM	Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
COG	Continuity of Government
COSC	Chiefs of Staff Committee
CVB	Central Volunteer Bureau
DRB	Defence Research Board
DSO&P	Directorate of Survival Operations and Planning
EASE	Experimental Army Signals Establishment
EMO	Emergency Measures Organization
FAP	Financial Assistance Program
FCDA	Federal Civil Defense Administration (United States)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GOC	General Officer Commanding
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GWCDC	Greater Winnipeg Civil Defence Committee
IACCEP	Interdepartmental Advisory Committee of Emergency Planning
ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile
ISD	Information Services Division
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD	North American Air Defence
NSAWS	National Survival Attack Warning System
PMQ	Permanent married quarters
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
SMTP	Special Militia Training Plan
WBC	War Book Committee



## **Give Me Shelter**



## Introduction

AT 10:20 A.M. ON 23 April 1952, an atomic bomb detonated in the centre of Ottawa. The force of the blast toppled the Parliament buildings, and the intense heat turned even the sturdiest towers into burnt-out shells. Shock waves burst underground water mains throughout the city, causing insurmountable difficulties for the city's meagre firefighting forces. Twenty-five percent of the residential neighbourhoods near to ground zero were destroyed, and fire threatened the remaining homes. The bridges across the Ottawa River and the neighbouring city of Hull were almost completely destroyed, and flames ravaged the Gatineau Hills. By mid-afternoon, thousands of the homeless crowded into the fairground at Lansdowne Park to receive food and water. As sunset approached, the fires still burned, and 25,000 people were counted dead at the end of the first day, 50,000 were injured, more than half seriously, and over 105,000 were without shelter.<sup>1</sup>

This was one scenario devised for an exercise by Canada's federal civil defence organization, an agency created in the early days of the Cold War to develop strategies to protect civilian population and infrastructure in the event of a nuclear war. Under the shadow of the atomic bomb, civil defence (CD) plans reached into every corner of daily life. From 1948 to 1963, Canada's CD planners attempted to bring the message of preparedness to every citizen with the use of public exercises, publicity campaigns, and educational programs. Yet, in spite of the great risks facing Canadians, the public largely rejected CD. Its failure hinged on the nature of the relationship between the state and its citizenry, the government's inadequate plans, and the balance of civil-military relations in Canada during the Cold War.

Civil defence planning in Canada took shape over three stages, distinguished by the reach of CD policy into the public sphere and the strategy for defence crafted under each plan. The first stage lasted from 1948 to 1954, during which planners articulated a strategy of self-help for targeted Canadian cities, based loosely on the model of rescue, first aid, and firefighting that British and German cities had adopted to combat the bombing campaigns of the Second World War. While planners recognized the power of the atomic bomb, they concluded that it was just another bomb, albeit a powerful one, and they believed a country



FIGURE 1 AND 2 (*facing page*) Parliament Hill and the National War Memorial, destroyed by the atom! *Source:* Library and Archives Canada/National Defence collection/Accession 2008-0377-R112/No. Z-9436-1-A, No. Z-9436-2-A



could absorb its blow and survive. The federal government attempted to place most of the responsibility for organizing and financing CD on the shoulders of the target cities. During the self-help stage, recruiting, public education, and training were directed at enlisting the residents of Canadian cities as volunteer firefighters and wardens who could save life and property in their community.

Civil defence's perception of the atomic bomb as simply another weapon disappeared forever in 1952, when the United States successfully detonated the hydrogen bomb, prompting a revolution in CD planning. What point was there in fighting fires when the entire city would be cratered? A new stage of civil defence planning was thus defined by the evacuation strategy, which gradually replaced the notion of self-help from 1954 to 1959. The evacuation policy required preparations within target cities so that they could secure their citizens' co-operation for an orderly exodus within three hours of an attack warning. It also demanded provisions to feed, shelter, and care for nuclear refugees in reception areas in rural municipalities surrounding the target city. Civil defence publicity



and recruiting expanded accordingly from the cities into the countryside. With federal and provincial assistance, Canadian cities carried out major CD exercises involving tens of thousands of people in urban and rural areas. The policy encountered major obstacles as evacuation warning times drew shorter and as the sinister threat of radioactive fallout, which was expected to irradiate much of the populated areas of the country, came to be better appreciated by CD officials and the public alike.

The last phase of CD, which took effect in 1959, shifted the focus from an evacuation to a “national survival” strategy. The problem of fallout was not easily resolved, nor, because of its unpredictable nature, could CD planning be confined any longer to target areas. To prepare a capable warning system and to develop a network through which civil authorities could co-ordinate the survival and reconstruction effort, the federal government devised a comprehensive national survival program. It contained provisions for Continuity of Government measures, which were designed to ensure that the basic machinery of government could withstand the disruption of attack and continue to direct the country’s wider survival efforts. The public was instructed to build fallout shelters within their homes that they could use to survive the most lethal period of radioactive fallout following a nuclear attack. Unlike previous plans, which had concentrated on recruiting and publicity in a handful of cities across the country, the national survival plan that unfolded required that all citizens take on some responsibility to defend their homes. By 1962, however, CD was fading away, its plan rejected or ignored by the public, underfunded, and increasingly irrelevant as relations improved between the East and the West.

The obligations of citizenship formed a major theme of CD policy and publicity in Canada during the early Cold War. Canada’s CD structure, like that of the United States and the United Kingdom, depended on the voluntary participation of its citizens in local CD organizations and the relationship – the implicit contract – between the state and its citizens. The international literature of citizenship studies is wide and varied, sparked by post-Second World War reflections on the relationship and exchanges between the individual, the community, and the state.<sup>2</sup> In Canada, the trajectory of these studies has flowed in two directions: the first examining the evolution of the political and social rights associated with changing citizenship regimes and the second dissecting the concept of citizenship as a form of belonging to the national polity, and its relationship and relevance to fragmented regional, ethnic, and linguistic identities.

Citizenship became a national project of the federal government in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The passage of the Canadian Citizenship Act into law on 1 January 1947 created the legal definition of

Canadian citizenship as a birthright – distinct from the status that Canadians already possessed as British subjects.<sup>3</sup> The new legislation was enacted during a time when the relationship between Canadians and the state was substantially changing, heralded by the massive social welfare program brought into effect at the end of the Second World War. The federal government, greatly strengthened by the wartime centralization of economic and constitutional power, expanded its support for social security to meet the expectations of a public weary of the deprivation and uncertainty caused by over a decade of depression and war.<sup>4</sup>

The social welfare program sought actively to use the power of the state and its public monies to provide individuals with protection against want. In so doing, it effectively changed the nature of the contract defining the network of social relations between the public and its government.<sup>5</sup> The Keynesian “civic bargain” was a system in which the universal contribution of taxes by the population undergirded political and legal rights with universal coverage of social welfare. This influential relationship characterized the citizen-state nexus throughout most of the Western world from 1945 to the 1970s, when it began to erode under economic pressure and social divisions.<sup>6</sup> State responsibility for social welfare was complemented by similar forays into publicly funded cultural projects and the efforts of immigration officials to define who counted as a citizen and who did not.<sup>7</sup> The policies of public agencies in these years exercised influence over not only the relationship between the citizen and the state but also the relationships between citizens within their communities.<sup>8</sup> As political scientists have observed, state agencies have the potential to write their priorities into the social fabric of the country. The state defines and redefines not just the rights privileged to citizens but also the obligations expected of them.

After 1948, as Civil Defence Canada struggled to obtain public recognition, build its base of volunteers, and ensure that Canadians would comply with the policies developed to protect them, its officials developed a prescriptive, obligation-based model of citizenship. The concept of citizen-as-defender was in many respects a traditional ideal in Canada, with several historical precedents. During the siege of Quebec in 1759, when the parish church bells sounded the alarm, it was the legal obligation of every loyal Canadian to rush to the scene of a fire with leather bucket in hand and work together to prevent flames from spreading.<sup>9</sup> Popular memory of the War of 1812 credits the volunteer militia made up of average Canadian citizens, not the professional British forces, with saving Upper Canada from invasion.<sup>10</sup> The “militia myth,” the pervasive belief that volunteer forces were equal to standing military forces, had more to do with nationalist feeling and public disdain for professional soldiering than with the militia’s actual ability to defend the country. In practice, the belief that rapidly

trained and minimally equipped citizens could adequately defend the homeland bred complacency in defence preparations at the cost of military preparedness and effectiveness. Yet the ideal of the citizen-as-defender endured during the first half of the twentieth century, when hundreds of thousands of Canadians enlisted during both World Wars – only a tiny proportion of whom had any previous military experience – creating a popular memory of “democratic armies” of volunteers marching to victory against autocratic enemies with huge professional forces.<sup>11</sup> Civil Defence Canada’s recruiting strategy was intimately bound to this concept of a citizen’s obligation to serve in defence of his or her country.

The campaign for a Cold War civil defence had the ambition of preparing the populace, in the midst of optimistic post-war reconstruction, to absorb unimaginable damage and civilian casualties, in a country that had not seen a major war fought on its soil for over 100 years. Civil defence officials believed that their plans had little chance of succeeding unless the population prepared itself for the worst, well in advance of the outbreak of the next war, because there would be no comfortable period of mobilization in which the country could transition from peacetime to wartime. These same officials attempted to instil the concept of participation in CD as a civic virtue – a responsibility towards which every patriotic Canadian would have to contribute if the country was to withstand an attack using weapons that could transform cities into craters and scatter lethal radiation everywhere.

Civil defence’s appeal to civic virtue coloured virtually every contact between the Canadian CD organization and the public. These points of contact surfaced at CD exhibits, recruiting drives, an extensive publication program, civil defence exercises, and at hundreds of lectures in church basements, movie theatres, and mock shelters. The post-war concept of citizenship depended on the defence of public rights, but public duties figured heavily in the citizen-state relationship.<sup>12</sup> The Canadian government demanded support from the public for CD in the name of national security. The fact that most citizens refused to take responsibility for this duty is remarkable, suggesting that they were unwilling to fulfill their obligation to defend the country. Yet Canadians could not imagine how a defence was possible, and they believed that the actions of the government, whether through a change in foreign and defence policies or a publicly subsidized shelter construction program, would have more impact than the gestures of private citizens. The reverse proved true. Without the public’s consent, the government’s CD efforts could not succeed.

Since so many Canadians perceived survival as a responsibility of the government, the limits of government planning and policy making in the nuclear age constitute another major theme of this work. The atomic bomb was considered



FIGURE 3 Civil defence training officer Lieutenant-Colonel W. Arthur Croteau points to ground zero of an atomic explosion over Ottawa during a 1952 map exercise in Hull, Quebec. *Source: Toronto Telegram, Clara Thomas Archives, York University*

to be a threat to national security, but it was one that the federal government attempted to solve through planning. The national civil defence organization that resulted was a by-product of such thinking. Civil defence planning entailed preparation for disaster under the rubric of old and new government

responsibilities, such as communications, health care, and transport. The planning process involved many government departments with competing interests, and this confusion led to much discussion and little action.

Once the federal government decided on a firm course of action, CD policy became politicized as planners and their political masters solicited the co-operation of provincial and municipal governments. With a few exceptions, the provinces refused Ottawa's requests to finance CD efforts and pointed to the federal government's constitutional responsibilities for the defence of the country. The municipalities were early adopters of CD, and in some cases they moved ahead of the federal government to create some form of defence against the atomic bomb, but most balked when they learned of the heavy costs that would be needed to ready their cities and maintain a large body of volunteers.

Intergovernmental battles over CD, often toxic in nature, undermined public confidence and forced Civil Defence Canada into a steady retreat from its first principle that the provinces and municipalities needed to assume most of the responsibility for emergency preparations. The federal treasury amended the CD financing rules to provide incentives to other governments to prepare for disaster. As a result, federal funds initially provided half, and then three-quarters, of the cost of CD in Canada. Civil defence officials in the federal office, who were determined at first not to work directly with the municipalities, soon found that, if they did not, no city in Ontario or Quebec would have even the rudimentary tools needed to build their defence. The Canadian government took on ever-greater responsibility for emergency planning and never achieved the full co-operation of the provinces or municipalities in civil defence.

Disputes between Canada's levels of government created a CD system that was unable to respond quickly to the changing threats posed by the arms race. The technology of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems underwent several revolutionary advancements during the Cold War – none more important than the development of city-killing hydrogen bombs and the creation of inter-continental ballistic missiles to deliver them. Civil defence plans lagged embarrassingly behind these developments. Secrecy shrouded nuclear weapons, leading to delays in the disclosure of their effects to CD agencies in Canada and the United States. This delay, in turn, complicated strategies for public protection. Compounding this central difficulty was the task of developing a practicable plan that the provinces and municipalities would accept. Moving from an atomic defence to a thermonuclear defence took nearly two years, while the introduction of the missile threat threw the Canadian system into a frenzy of confused activity and planning adjustment that lasted right up until the Cuban Missile Crisis very nearly made any further discussion of the issue meaningless.

The relationship between civilian and military authorities in the preparation of CD measures is the third major theme of this work. Questions frequently emerged during federal and provincial disputes about whether or not support for a CD organization was a matter of self-help or national defence. This question also plagued CD and military planners within the federal government when they mapped out which government departments would fulfill CD tasks. What if preparations did not work, and CD measures could not protect Canadians? If Civil Defence Canada was the country's last line of defence, did the military have any responsibility to support or, if necessary, supplant the CD organization if it proved incapable of fulfilling the tasks assigned it?

Civil defence planners worried that the public might perceive CD as a military endeavour. Greater involvement by the armed forces in CD would have seemed to say that it was a military solution to a military threat and, therefore, a federal responsibility. As a result, the provinces and municipalities would have abandoned their organizations. Moreover, greater involvement from the military would have posed the risk of alienating support from voluntary civilian associations whose participation in CD was essential to local organizations' success. After all, if soldiers could be paid to assume rescue duties, why should the public do the job for nothing? Military involvement also blurred the line between community preparedness and national defence. Civil defence officials were concerned that it would prevent potential volunteers from registering, lest they be conscripted or placed under military command. Canada's senior CD officials, most of whom were retired military officers, were asked not to invoke their old ranks, and debates persisted over whether to change the name of Civil Defence Canada to "Civil Disaster." Despite these worries, in the end Canada's CD agency was only too glad to accept greater support from the military in shoring up the country's passive defences.

It was the military, in fact, that was most reluctant about its involvement in CD planning and organization. They were absorbed in the building and maintenance of a professional standing armed force whose aim was to fight alongside Cold War allies overseas. The Korean War, and the immense government investment in rearmament, helped the armed forces to achieve this goal. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee viewed support for CD as an obligation that could irreparably damage their ability to support Canadian units stationed with NATO forces in France and West Germany, which was the West's strategic deterrent to war. For most of the 1950s, the military fought to stay out of CD plans, with the exception of providing warning to Canadian cities.

Plans for national survival after 1959 altered this balance significantly. Local CD agencies had proven unable to attract and retain the volunteer manpower

that most observers believed was necessary to save lives in a nuclear war. The military was forced to take on full responsibility for rescue and re-entry, which was formerly the task of volunteers. The Canadian army's reserves were stripped of their role as reinforcements for a future war in Western Europe and instead tasked with saving lives and fighting fires. The new civil-military relationship was uneasy and short-lived, as militia volunteers lost interest in "snakes and ladders" exercises, and the public grew wary of the risks posed by giving the military too much authority in an emergency.

While in the past decade historians have begun to build a richer understanding of Canada's own Cold War home front, focusing particularly on the national security state as it affected immigration and political culture, CD has escaped the attention of all but a few.<sup>13</sup> With the exception of an unpublished organizational survey written for the fiftieth anniversary of Emergency Preparedness Canada, there is not an official history of Canadian civilian defence planning for today's revisionists to revise.<sup>14</sup> This work is the first to present the history of Canada's CD agency and plans in the early Cold War.

This work is the result of research conducted primarily at Library and Archives Canada (LAC), using the files of the federal government departments directly and indirectly concerned with planning Canada's CD policies. The manuscript group collections at the LAC contain many references to CD, specifically the prime ministerial fonds, the files of cabinet ministers such as Paul Martin and Douglas Harkness, and the files of senior CD staff involved in planning and training. This research has been complemented with work in the files of professional and voluntary associations who pledged their support to community CD, such as the files of the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire, the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, and other groups.

The Department of National Defence's Directorate of History and Heritage in Ottawa retains the seven-volume diary of Major-General Frank Worthington, who held the post of federal civil defence co-ordinator from 1948 until his retirement in 1959. These volumes contain reflections that are indispensable for the study of CD in Canada. The Canadian War Museum's Military History Research Centre's archival and library collections were also exploited for original oral histories, training manuals, and personal document collections. Similar research was performed in the Doug Beaton Library at the Diefenbunker Museum in Carp, Ontario.

There is an enormous body of North American literature dedicated to the study of the Cold War, and yet only a few of these texts examine CD. This is at once remarkable, considering the heated public debates held in Canada and the United States about CD during the early Cold War, and unsurprising, since the vast bulk of Cold War historiography has focused on the foreign policies and

military strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union. It was only in the late 1970s and early 1980s, coinciding with a renewed public discussion of the alleged benefits of a CD program, that the literature began to engage civil defence as a domestic aftershock of the Cold War.

The dominant school in the American literature about CD efforts emerged as part of the studies that addressed larger questions about how the atomic bomb and the concept of security were synthesized into American culture. Most American historians contend that federal and state governments deliberately misrepresented the effects of the atomic bomb and the feasibility of CD measures in order to reassure the public that they could survive a nuclear attack.<sup>15</sup> This act of deception, they allege, resulted in a “false consciousness.” The public, deceived into believing that they could survive, supported American foreign policies against the Soviet Union.<sup>16</sup> These authors build on the arguments of revisionist foreign policy historians such as Gabriel Kolko, who examine the economic underpinnings of American foreign policy to expose a self-interested, aggressive diplomacy aimed at asserting US hegemony in the world by cowering allies and threatening the Soviet Union.<sup>17</sup> With a few exceptions, most of the work done on civil defence in the United States castigates the program as an illiberal form of government control managed by the military and CD advocates, avoiding the study of the evolution of civilian defence policies. These historians work to correct the conception that Cold War America was uniformly quiescent, conservative, and in favour of the arms race.

Paul Boyer’s 1985 work remains one of the most influential historical assessments of the Cold War’s cultural impact.<sup>18</sup> The author, who was an active participant in the American disarmament movement in the 1960s, wrote at a time of renewed opposition to nuclear arms in the United States. Boyer investigates how the American public came to accept the atomic bomb, along with its horrific effects, as part of their lives during the Cold War. He examines articles published in leading American periodicals and magazines by American scientists, works of science fiction dealing with atomic war, and other cultural forums to determine how “Americans first confronted the bomb, struggled against it, and absorbed it into the fabric of the culture.”<sup>19</sup> He contends that government officials who emphasized the useful applications of the atom, and the atomic scientists and intellectuals who portrayed a destructive atomic future, used fear to gain legitimacy.<sup>20</sup>

Particularly relevant to Boyer’s argument was the body of literature that emerged after the Second World War from the medical community. Psychologists and sociologists wrote many reports in the post-war period indicating the dangers posed by mass panic and hysteria. Studies such as the one produced by Irving Janis, a Yale psychologist, advised that preparedness for nuclear war



could serve to “inoculate” the public against emotional overreaction to the bomb. These studies, paired with optimistic training booklets and films such as *Duck and Cover*, form the bedrock of Boyer’s thesis: “Reassuring and interconnected messages, emanating from so many authoritative sources as the decade ended, contributed powerfully to the emergence of a decisive and unsettling new stage in America’s cultural and political engagement with atomic weapons.”<sup>21</sup> His argument that CD was a means to regulate “atomic anxiety” has become an influential interpretation of CD’s role in America’s Cold War.<sup>22</sup>

Scholars have built on works about the atomic question to examine other aspects of normative Cold War culture. The revisionist school’s early portrayal of the Cold War is not marked by economic prosperity but, rather, by repression and imperilled liberalism and is characterized by atomic and anti-Communist paranoia. The apparatus of this system, the argument goes, was regulated by the agents of state authority who employed fear, whether through CD exercises or in chasing real and imagined subversives, to contain domestic cultures of dissent.<sup>23</sup>

In Canada, there is no evidence to suggest that CD planners operated in the service of such a conspiratorial agenda. While officials were as concerned about public hysteria as their allies to the south, they always opted to disclose, rather than censor, whatever information they had about nuclear weapons and used fearful imagery and rhetoric to underline the severity of the consequences arising from a nuclear exchange.

Investigation into the major themes of this work was inspired by Laura McEnany’s examination of American CD agency and its impact on American family life.<sup>24</sup> She argues that the voluntary participation of the public in CD raised questions about the responsibilities of citizens and the state in homeland defence. McEnany interprets CD as a point of contact between the relatively peaceful Cold War home front and the reality of international confrontation with the Soviet Union.<sup>25</sup> McEnany explains how the American government applied CD concepts to export responsibility for defence to private citizens, effectively creating a grassroots approach to national security. This process, she argues, transformed the American family into a paramilitary reserve and created a system designed to protect itself from external invaders and crush subversives within.

McEnany recognizes that the work of civil defence was two-tiered: the first a secretive and bureaucratic policy-planning process and the second constituting the work necessary to enlist the public to adopt the prescribed measures. McEnany found that the civil defence publicity used to promote the concept of “self-help,” with its emphasis on individual responsibilities and the defence of a distinctive way of life, “subtly transformed civil defense from a list of tasks

into a set of desirable personality traits.”<sup>26</sup> Almost unique among CD studies, McEnany’s perspective takes pains to illustrate that CD planners were genuinely concerned about the public and were often frustrated and puzzled by the hostile or apathetic reception that their plans received in the public. In this work, Canadian CD publicity is examined through the same lens, revealing what Canadian officials expected of their volunteers and, just as importantly, what type of volunteers were most sought after.

A study of the American literature brings out some of the common themes in North American CD measures, but this is first and foremost a national study. Canada’s proximity to the American superpower was a defining influence in post-war life. Nowhere was this effect as evident as in defence. The fortunes of the Second World War brought Canada into the American orbit and resulted in joint defence planning. After the war, continuing binational discussions and a growing network of liaisons and memorandums of understanding served to cement the relationship, leading to ambitious radar warning lines and the North American Air Defence treaty in the 1950s. Civil defence was no exception to this trend. The two countries shared similar vulnerabilities – densely populated industrial target areas surrounded by rural countryside; divisions of responsibility for emergency planning between federal, territorial, and municipal governments; and a populace complacent about the need for emergency preparedness in a nuclear age.

Canadian CD authorities, realizing their shared problems, consulted from the outset with their American counterparts, who were better funded and had greater access to intelligence about nuclear weapons and the Soviet threat. In 1951, this relationship resulted in a formal accord with the United States that mandated that, in the event of an atomic attack or major disaster, the two countries’ CD agencies would operate as if there were no border. In the interim, Civil Defence Canada borrowed heavily from their colleagues down south, reprinting American publications in whole or in part under Canadian letterhead, soliciting material from American specialists for publications in federal and local CD bulletins, and observing American nuclear tests and exercises.

While elements of Canada’s CD strategies were inspired by events in the United States, the Canadian government did not automatically ape American plans. Civil Defence Canada carefully weighed and tested each strategy against the special circumstances of Canada’s climate, politics, and means before reaching decisions on policy. Especially in the case of fallout shelters, the public noticed large discrepancies between Canadian and American plans, and, more often than not, turned to the more readily available American designs and demanded the Canadian government mark buildings that could serve as group shelters. However much Canadian CD authorities cherished their relationship

with the United States, Canada's decisions about CD plans and priorities were not crafted in Washington. This work examines the rise and fall of Canada's civil defence.

Canada's civil defence program failed for a constellation of reasons. Successive governments pursued and altered CD and drafted plans behind closed doors, but they never provided the public with the tools required to create a meaningful defence. Civil Defence Canada and its officials meanwhile limped by on a fraction of a percentage of the billions of dollars committed to the military defence of the country during the same period. This support was insufficient to provide the public with concrete evidence of the progress in implementing CD measures for their defence and made it an easy target for criticism and ridicule. In the public eye, air-raid sirens, additional fire trucks, and do-it-yourself shelter designs were no match for Soviet thermonuclear bombs and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and they were never enough to convince Canadians that their contribution to CD would satisfy the public good. Civil defence was remembered by the public most often when international crises made the theoretical threat of annihilation in war frighteningly real, and it was forgotten just as quickly when these menaces passed.

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*Series editor: Dean F. Oliver, Canadian War Museum*

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