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Introduction

ROD MACRAE, ELISABETH ABERGEL, AND MUSTAFA KOC

The traditional approaches to food and agriculture policy making in Canada are in question, and this volume sets out to identify new ways for nonstate actors to influence the evolution of sustainable and health-promoting food systems. Chronic food system problems remain unresolved, with many still unaddressed. There have been only modest improvements in some agricultural conditions, while others such as greenhouse gas emissions and nutrient contamination of waterways continue to worsen.¹ National farm finances have generally been poor for years, complicating the challenges of helping the farm sector move toward more sustainable production systems. The food system, it seems, is increasingly implicated in creating the conditions compromising human and environmental health. The nutritional health of Canadians continues to deteriorate, with rising obesity levels serving as the most acute indicator of nutrition policy and program failures. Food bank use is not coming down significantly, and some 10 percent of the Canadian population remains unable to acquire a nourishing diet at an affordable price.² Food safety scares are now regular occurrences, and consumers are increasingly disenchanted with the ways in which the Canadian food supply is being managed. These tendencies are exacerbated by the entrenchment of food and agriculture policy making in ineffective and unresponsive, and somewhat closed, institutional networks.

Many blame broad structural forces within the capitalist food economy for the current state of affairs, with the unsuccessful efforts of governments to curb the negative effects of these forces a significant contributing measure. It can be argued that states are responsible for establishing the structure of
the global food system, including its financialization, with its incentive to expand a productivist, export-oriented agricultural agenda. With increasingly complex problems has come the realization that traditional Canadian government policy goals, and institutional arrangements and instruments, are insufficient. Earlier eras of state regulation revolved around a productivist paradigm that worked well when the state had significant capacity, the issue was targeted, but the policy actors were recalcitrant. But in the neoliberal era of bilateral and multilateral trade arrangements and international institutions, many of the traditional policy and regulatory tools have been removed, replaced in some cases by new policy orientations that reflect changing trends. More dramatically, it appears as though some states have given up their capacity to determine national priorities because of international trade commitments. Some may have deregulated their capacity to respond to local or regional agri-environmental pressures. Governments are searching for new and effective regulatory instruments that might work without unduly straining apparently limited human and financial resources. Food and agricultural policy themes are acutely affected by this reality, by the complexities of the subject, by larger shifts in the loci of the state’s decision making, and by the new prominence of health concerns related to food. According to Busch,

To be sure the role of the State has changed and perhaps diminished. Nation-states are now far less likely to regulate directly and far more likely to delegate regulatory authority to other organizations. Moreover, the opening of the world economy has restricted the ability of nation-states to intervene in markets without significant and often negative consequences. In response to this devolution of the State, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have shifted their tactics. Rather than lobbying nation-states to change the rules by which companies may operate, many NGOs now focus on the direct lobbying of large companies in an effort to get them to modify their behaviour.

Although many critics point to governance gaps in the global economy, it has become clear that these gaps have opened up new spaces for political involvement by civil society actors eager to advance a fuller set of policy goals and effect change in the food system. However, these civil society actors, although looking for alternative approaches that might have greater chance of solving problems, have been slow to realize that shifts are underway within the state and have not necessarily recognized the opportunities and challenges inherent to government efforts to find “next generation” policy and regulatory instruments. In Canada, the slow response time by
nongovernmental actors has been blamed on a weak civil society sector lacking strong institutional and organizational capacity, as well as on a clientelist policy environment that prevents meaningful political participation by concerned groups or individuals. Nonetheless, as this volume demonstrates, there is sufficient, if not ideal, capacity to exert influence in a newly configured policy context.

With these challenges and regulatory shifts have emerged a broader set of actors, touching on a broader set of issues that affect agriculture and food. Beyond traditional preoccupations, such as soil erosion and water contamination, policy actors are involved in such matters as toxics management, climate change and biofuels, the obesogenic environment, and food poverty as part of the debate. This broadening of policy goals and networks is in part a response to these persistent government failures, to the added complexity, and to the loss of traditional policy instruments. However, the development of such policy networks has not simply been imposed on government, in that treasury board edicts and other directives have for some time been pushing civil servants to consult more widely. The effectiveness of the public consultation process is uncertain, given a lack of resources and skills within the civil service and, depending on the government of the day, the degree of political commitment to it. Inherent in the structure of the government-driven consultative processes is their legitimacy in light of ideological goals and international commitments. In the case of genetically modified foods, the consultative process itself became a rallying point for many civil society actors opposed to government directions. Certainly, the balkanization of organizational participation has been a consistent criticism of the new approach to consultation. In this environment, civil society organizations (CSOs) are under pressure to form new alliances among themselves or with other nongovernmental actors, necessary adjustments to become more effective in policy advocacy. These alliances can also be necessary in times of dwindling resources allocated by governments and others to the nonprofit sector.

What Are CSOs?

This study is ultimately about improving the ability of CSOs to create sustainable and health-promoting food and agricultural policy in Canada. In recent usage, the term “CSO” has been used quite interchangeably with “NGO” (nongovernmental organization), referring to a community-based, not-for-profit organization working for the public interest, for the most part independently of governments and private sector organizations. In its historical context and more complex meaning, the term “civil society” includes all nonstate actors, even those involved in the for-profit sector. Arguably, the
line between for-profit and not-for-profit can be blurred when one surveys the diversity of NGOs operating in most countries. In the food and agriculture system, however, the term “CSO” aptly describes the mix of community-based and environmental groups, farming organizations, and commodity trade associations that might constitute a policy network. The discourse on the role of CSOs has emphasized their function as vital drivers of change and the democratization process, contributing to the transparency and accountability of policy making; introducing new information, experiences, and perspectives; and contributing to the practical implementation of various initiatives. This has included filling the gaps in service delivery unfulfilled by public programs. Many CSOs have steadfastly provided the backbone for social movements fighting against hunger, poverty, homelessness, and environmental degradation, often working in close cooperation with their global partners.

This wide range of CSO forms, ideological foundations, and purposes is equal parts strength and Achilles heel. When corralled, this eclectic mix of organizations has had significant influence. While scattered, the various actors may compete with each other for resources and attention, significantly undermine each other’s work, and compromise opportunities for change. They are nonetheless a vital part of the democratic process. Abergel, in particular, picks up on this theme in her chapter on civil society and biotechnology.

In the food system, the line between nonprofits and some profit making representatives, including farm, commodity, and trade organizations, is often a bit blurred because their work can sometimes extend beyond what is directly beneficial to their memberships. Many organizations do display a stewardship ethic that demonstrates a higher order social objective than strictly the operational conditions of their members. And although, in a neoliberal economic environment, trade associations and business lobbies do have considerable influence on government priorities and considerably greater financial heft to implement their agendas, such influence is not uniformly applied or necessarily well received across government units. Such lobbies are also affected by the changing governance dynamics, often unable to present their case effectively when it is unclear to whom the case must be made. It is in these less “invaded” spaces that many CSOs may have room to operate, and where unusual alliances between traditionally unfriendly actors may be possible. However, as alliances between environmental groups and corporate actors have shown, these initiatives are threatened by possible greenwashing and co-optation.

In this study, we attempt to account for some of these realities when discussing CSO functions. We then offer a series of Canadian case studies.
to illustrate how CSOs and policy makers might learn from past mistakes, in the hopes that new configurations of power might be made visible and might better contribute to sustainability. For those interested in theoretical and conceptual dimensions of the state-CSO relationship, Abergel’s chapter is an important read on many CSO themes, as she elaborates on theoretical and practical aspects of civil society. In addition, Koc and Bas provide an important overview on policy change in democratic societies in a context of institutional stability, a review of theories that help explain the context for CSO activity in Canada. A key question arising from these various case studies is how to bring about effective policy making through a variety of different collaborative learning and decision-making opportunities that consider not only the values of different stakeholders but also a wider agri-environmental vision.

Sustainable and Health-Promoting Food Systems through Coordinated and Integrated Regulatory Pluralism?

To their credit, Canadian governments have been making food and agriculture programmatic changes for some time, but not because of paradigmatic shifts coming from the bottom up; rather, they are responding primarily to top-down external and international market-related pressures. If paradigmatic changes occur when sustainable food systems are framed thus:

Sustainable food systems use design and management procedures that work with natural processes to conserve all resources, promote agro-ecosystem resilience and self-regulation, minimize waste and environmental impact, while maintaining or improving farm profitability. Such systems improve the condition of the natural resources on which they depend and the health of those consuming [their] products[.] Then no Canadian governments have embraced such significant changes. The Agricultural Policy Framework, first implemented in 2003 and renewed in 2008/09, reflects an awareness that there are significant environmental issues to be addressed, especially to maintain Canada’s international reputation for agri-environmental performance, but the series of programs implemented to date are having only a very modest impact. Moreover, new programs, such as investments in biofuels, may actually have more detrimental environmental and economic impacts over the long term.

Civil society, and some farm organizations, has been pushing for progressive implementation of new approaches, potentially leading to broad paradigmatic changes in the food and agriculture system, ones that reflect a focus on sustainability and health (and even multifunctionality). But
are they having an effect? Although these CSOs may be blunting some of the efforts of neoliberal agricultural actors to push policy makers to embrace even more significant free trade frames, such forces could equally push the system away from sustainability and more toward further trade liberalization, with its many attendant challenges for sustainability and health. And some CSOs may inadvertently be contributing to the reinforcement of neoliberal frames, caught in service responses to the voids created by state contraction of welfare and related functions, as in the case of food banks. In many ways, CSOs are trying to fill political gaps by working outside traditional institutional networks, strengthening their own capacity, but with the unintended consequence of justifying the lack of state intervention around issues of agriculture and environment. Nevertheless, it seems that there are missed opportunities for CSOs to translate their concerns about food and agriculture policy, and the ways it is conspiring to damage human and environmental health, into effective state policies.

It is clear that new forms of governance are emerging – but not necessarily for desirable reasons or with effective conception and implementation. Although a number of these new governance approaches have been described in the literature (see, for example, Gunningham), in the view of the contributors to this volume, most rely excessively on voluntary and private sector initiatives to be successful. A guiding premise of this volume is that a governance regime that embraces a wide range of coordinated and integrated instruments (including some traditional command and control regulations), well matched to the desired effect and implemented by an equally wide range of state and nonstate actors, may have the best chance of success in the long run (see Winfield for the lessons from energy policy in California). Such an approach has sometimes been referred to as regulatory pluralism or, on the instrument side, a “symphony” approach to effecting change.

But adapting to these new approaches represents a significant challenge for governments and CSOs. CSOs have tended to define their role as primarily an extra-parliamentary one, trying to influence political actors sufficiently to change legislative development, parliamentary reports, and voting patterns. At one point this was a sensible strategy given that the government is supposed to make policy and Parliament’s role is to hold government to account for its activities. But Parliament’s capacity to do this has somewhat eroded in the era of neoliberal restructuring and “governing from the centre,” challenging the foundation of CSO strategy. Numerous forces have pushed Parliament away from substantive policy critiques and solutions. It would seem government legitimacy is eroding, along with its potential to deal with complex policy problems that deserve substantial oversight.
It is now unlikely that a complex, multidimensional, and multidepartmental food policy issue would undergo substantive parliamentary discussion, given the roadblocks at all levels.20 Such policy is unlikely to be a priority of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). Cabinet participation in policy making has been eroded, so that agriculture or health ministers are not likely to bring forward significant food and agriculture legislation without PMO approval.21 This has effectively removed many potential levers of action for CSOs directly involved in the issues.

Committee capacity to review is compromised by the complexity of most bills and by the limited resources of the committee and individual parliamentarians. MP-bureaucracy relations are generally strained because many elected officials believe public servants now have too much influence over policy development. More specifically, some parliamentarians are dismissed by their limited capacity to provide oversight on legislative implementation, especially pertinent in an era of implementation and enforcement-related cutbacks. Some parts of the civil service are now viewed as political liabilities because of their failure to respond to politicized issues in ways that remove pressure from elected officials. In turn, public servants question the competence of many elected officials, viewing them as adversaries, given civil service loyalty to the government of the day.22

It is also important to recognize that many governmental bureaucracies tend to support the status quo, rather than tackling complex files in a substantive way. These change-resistant tendencies typically include avoidance of contentious out-of-the-box initiatives; emphasis on crisis management; reluctance to allocate sufficient resources to programs; secrecy and confidentiality; and avoidance of public and parliamentary scrutiny. Issues addressed are frequently those with electoral implications, leaving many substantive, but less visible, issues unattended.

It is also true that increasingly states must coordinate policy efforts with international and supranational bodies, altering the capacity of governments to respond effectively in specific areas and thus removing the strategic focus of CSO actions. Hence, the changing policy-making context demands innovative approaches and a greater role for national and subnational actors in the process.

At this stage of evolution, different government units can be seen to be dabbling with new instrument choices, attempting to determine which ones will produce the best results. It is not currently obvious that governments or CSOs have the knowledge, structures, will, or capacity to work in either formal or loose networks of collaboration. Equally, the imbalance in resources and authority between the state and CSOs suggests such collaborations
will be difficult to manage. Each sector has stories of attempting unsuccessfully to engage the other, with each accusing the other of not having the competencies or will to properly implement new policies, approaches, and tools. There may be ideological commitments that preclude an open policy process, and issues of trust and legitimacy that go to the heart of what permits a democracy to function.

**Case Selection**

We used an exploratory case study approach, with explanatory, intrinsic, and instrumental elements that combine the analysis of authors as academics but also as experts in their particular field of agri-environmental policy. Our hope is that a combination of cases will reveal new understanding, accumulated over time and in different contexts, of the relationship between policy-making events and CSO involvement.

We focus on cases with the following characteristics:

1. A significant intersection with, or impact on, agri-environmental or agri-food and health issues; cases aren’t always food and agricultural, but they have food and agriculture implications and inform food and agriculture policy networks (e.g., there could be actors and networks in common, working on both food- and nonfood-related agendas concurrently).
2. Some civil society actors and businesses – including farm associations, faith groups, and health associations – have, or should have, a significant role to play in service or policy networks related to the case; the role could be positive or negative.
3. The issues are not always parliamentary discussions (but should be), or if they are, the process reveals significant weaknesses in parliamentary capacity to address the issue in a way that promotes sustainability or problematic relations between elected and nonelected officials.
4. The decision makers and decision-making places are not so obvious; traditional parliamentary advocacy will not likely succeed (although elected officials may have some role to play), and current advocacy is generally focused in the wrong places.
5. International bodies are likely influencing Canadian policy processes, and that influence is an impediment to advancing sustainability, or may provide some entry point for CSOs to engage in policy networks; in contrast, it may also block indigenous or local capacity to organize.
6. There are new opportunities for civil society to have influence, but it may require significant changes in tactics and reallocation of resources and talents, including a different form of parliamentary advocacy.
The jurisdictional quagmires that are Canada’s food, agriculture, and health systems, with presentations of state – CSO interplay at municipal, provincial, and federal levels – are reflected.

**Organization of the Volume**

The challenge for CSOs is how to better insert themselves and their policy objectives into the policy decision system. A working presumption is that policy influence can arise from interactions with middle and senior management, and not, on many files, from trying only to influence parliamentarians under traditional rules of political engagement. Essentially, this volume explores two major aspects of CSO involvement in the policy process that could signal effective collaboration between concerned actors. We focus on whether paradigmatic change in policy making is real or perceived, what roles CSOs have played to date, and the potential for CSOs to effectively participate in agenda setting (including organizational issues of alliances and common policy goals).

The key overarching questions for each case study were:

- Is a new agri-environmental policy paradigm emerging or foreseeable?
- Are there new moments for policy change that are not based on crises?
- Is coordinated and integrated regulatory pluralism possible or emerging?
- What roles have CSOs played to date, and what ones might they play in the future?
- Are new institutional arrangements and policy networks in play that signal better opportunities for the state and CSOs to collaborate and advance sustainability and health? Or are there new institutional arrangements and policy networks currently creating better opportunities?

In trying to address the potential for CSOs to participate in agenda setting and implementation, authors address two sets of issues: first, the lessons that can be learned and, second, the opportunities for paradigmatic changes.

Each chapter addresses this common set of questions, but different paradigmatic and theoretical frames are used by the researchers. The authors all have a long history of working in multidisciplinary environments and projects and bring this tradition to their work in this volume. In addition, the authors feel that the range of theoretical and methodological approaches represented in this volume makes important contributions to the policy literature and to the practical understanding of Canadian agricultural policy more specifically.
Lessons learned

- Have CSOs played a substantial role in better policy problem definition? If not, could they?
- How can mutual agendas be arrived at (where they exist), and what additional capacities do policy network actors need to have to advance mutual agendas?
- Given the level of federal inactivity on food policy implementation, how can CSOs help create an agenda, and help those civil servants committed to action on food security advance their internal agendas?
- Do such networks represent a real shift from more traditional producer/consumer dichotomous interpretations of food system change and power to a fuller set of demands on food system actors?

Paradigmatic change?

- Do the parties in these expanded policy networks understand how to work in these new environments/networks?
- Is it possible for civil society, as more relationships with diverse actors are built and produce tangible outcomes, to better advance paradigmatic change?
- As civil society and government participate in such networks, can they establish the base or create the conditions for a wider consensus on a new paradigm?
- What changes in CSO tactics are required?
- At which scale are Canadian CSOs most effective: local, regional, national, and/or international – or all of the above? In other words, which strategies of scalar politics should they adopt?
- Are CSOs their own worst enemies? Is the lack of CSO institutional capacity in Canada a liability toward achieving sustainable policy goals?

Authors provide first a contextual narrative for their thematic or comparative cases, identifying the key shifts in policy making, the relative significance of those shifts related to sustainability, any changes in the locus of decision making over that time period, and the key roles played or not played by CSOs in all these changes. These narratives reflect the different jurisdictional and temporal levels and scales on which each chapter is focused. The thematic cases address a range of primarily domestic jurisdictions, some over extensive
periods, others more focused on the past few decades. The comparative chapters look to either different fields or external jurisdictions to identify lessons for Canadian actors.

Following this narrative, authors explore the theoretical underpinnings of the phenomena described and use both theory and the examined events to identify the strengths and failings of the interactions between CSOs and the state. Out of this analysis, each author derives some key lessons for CSOs that could potentially generate greater possibilities of pushing the state toward a paradigm shift.

In Chapter 1, Grace Skogstad, a political scientist, looks at the emergence of multifunctionality in the European Union as a way to examine the conditions that must be in place for paradigmatic change to occur. She then examines briefly the historical agricultural policy paradigms in Canada and whether conditions for a paradigm shift to multifunctionality currently exist.

In Chapter 2, Alison Blay-Palmer, a geographer, explores whether it is possible to open up spaces in federal policy where food activism and sustainability can be combined more effectively. She suggests that there are gaps in the policy environment at the national level that translate into barriers to creating local sustainability.

Mark Winfield, a political scientist with extensive experience in the environmental NGO sector, provides in Chapter 3 broad lessons for agri-environmental and health advocates from Canadian environmental policy making.

In Chapter 4, Elisabeth Abergel, whose work addresses science and technology policy, both domestically and internationally, opens up the case study discussion by evaluating how a civil society boycott of certain biotechnology consultations was symptomatic of the state’s inability to engage the Canadian public in meaningful policy discussions because of ideological constraints relating to the federal government’s commitment to biotechnology.

In Chapter 5, Rod MacRae, a political ecologist, with former World Wildlife Fund Canada colleagues Julia Langer and Vijay Cuddeford, employ a variant on grounded theory,24 appropriate given their lengthy experience as policy practitioners. Participant observation, document analysis, and interviews all generated data for their study. Their chapter uses a narrative approach as they attempt to identify theory that explains the phenomena witnessed while working to create more sustainable pest management in Canada. Their research led them to find explanatory value in the theory and praxis literature on next-generation instrument choice and governance,25 policy communities and networks,26 and the exercise of political power in the territory between elected and permanent government officials.27
In Chapter 6, Aleck Ostry, an epidemiologist, and Tasnim Nathoo, a social worker, outline the changing social determinants of breastfeeding behaviour in Canada since the early 1920s against the background of changing federal policies enacted to promote breastfeeding among Canadian women. They find that secular changes (especially the emergence of the women’s movement in the 1970s and increasing access to higher education for women) likely did more to improve breastfeeding rates after this time than the various federal breastfeeding health-promotion policies enacted after this period.

In Chapter 7, Mustafa Koc, a sociologist, and Japji Anna Bas, a PhD candidate in environmental studies, employ a blend of structuralist, pluralist, and symbolic interactionist frames, mixed with chaos theory, to address the state of food security development in Canada, looking particularly at the construction of Canada’s Action Plan for Food Security and subsequent implementation failures.

In Chapter 8, Tony Winson, a sociologist, Rod MacRae, and Aleck Ostry explore structural dimensions of obesity in schools, using interviews and document analysis to construct a picture of the state-CSO interplay in this domain.

In Chapter 9, José Etcheverry, a geographer who focuses on sustainable energy research and is also an international and local activist in the renewable energy sector, uses CSO-state interplay frameworks to draw out practical lessons that can be used by activists in other fields, particularly those engaged in smart growth and agricultural land protection.

In Chapter 10, Sarah Robicheau, a recent graduate of the joint law/master of environmental studies program at York University, uses some of the themes of this volume through surveys and interviews to examine the role of Everdale Organic Farm and Environmental Learning Centre in improving programs for new farmers. Her chapter represents a real-world testing of the validity of some of the ideas about state-CSO interactions.

We conclude with overarching lessons from the case studies on the themes of the volume. Readers will no doubt reflect on the potential for CSO participation in policy making in sectors beyond agri-environmental questions and may conclude that it is indeed a daunting prospect. However, the book is a hopeful reminder that broader participation (in many forms) is key to improving decision making in vital areas such as agriculture and the environment.

Notes
1 Lefebvre, A., et al., eds., Environmental Sustainability of Canadian Agriculture, report no. 2 (Ottawa: AAFC, 2005).
Introduction

13 The framework’s second five-year version, Growing Forward, is in the process of being implemented.
14 In truth, very few Canadian agri-environmental programs have been properly evaluated.
15 Gunningham, “Reconfiguring Environmental Regulation.”
17 Gunningham, “Reconfiguring Environmental Regulation.”
18 Winfield, “An Unimaginative People.”

20 Note that more limited and highly politically charged issues, such as the fate of the Canadian Wheat Board, are still occasionally part of parliamentary debate.

21 Savoie, *Government from the Centre*.

22 Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain*.


25 For example, Eliadis et al., eds., *Designing Government*.


27 For example, Savoie, *Government from the Centre*; Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain*.
PART 1

Paradigms, Scales, and Jurisdictions
Scrutiny of agriculture and food (agri-food) production practices and public policies has increased across industrialized countries, including in Canada. Those concerned about the environment are more closely inspecting the impact of agriculture on the physical environment, consumers are questioning the ability of current food production systems to ensure a safe and high-quality food supply, and other citizens have doubts about the capacity of contemporary agri-food systems to contribute to healthy and viable rural communities. Simultaneously, some (others) have trained their eye on the trade impacts of domestic agri-food policies, demanding that they not protect or discriminate in favour of domestic producers at the expense of their foreign counterparts. In this context, existing agri-food policy paradigms as well as governing paradigms find themselves challenged as critics advocate for both new policy goals for agriculture and food, as well as for new forums and actors of agri-food decision making.

This chapter adds to the debate about appropriate policy and governing models for Canadian agriculture by examining existing and alternate models for Canadian agriculture and food. These models include the state assistance paradigm of agriculture that dominated in Canada and other industrialized countries in the post-Second World War period, the market liberal paradigm ascendant in the global trading regime, and the multifunctionality paradigm of agriculture associated with the current Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the EU. At issue is the possibility for a Canadian transition toward the multifunctionality paradigm and whether and how such a transition might occur.
The first section begins by discussing the concepts of policy and governing paradigms and sketching the state assistance and market liberal paradigms. The second section examines the evolution of the EU’s CAP to a multifunctional paradigm that explicitly ties public support for agriculture to social and environmental goals, as well as economic ones. It argues that the transition was a result not only of exogenous reformist pressures in the global trade regime from the market liberal paradigm but also because of endogenous EU pressures to find a new legitimation basis for EU agricultural policy. The discussion then turns to Canada to examine evolution in the existing policy and governing paradigms for Canadian agriculture and food. It finds that elements of the multifunctionality paradigm as policy goals of food safety and quality and a more environmentally sustainable food supply system have acquired higher priority. These additional goals are seen as necessary to render the Canadian food production system competitive and profitable. With respect to the governing paradigm, agricultural ministries and agricultural organizations remain at the centre of policy making for the sector, but the latter do not speak with a single voice. The chapter concludes with an appraisal of the conditions that will induce further paradigmatic change in Canadian agri-food policy and the role of nonagricultural CSOs in such change.

Agri-Food Policy and Governing Paradigms

When governments devise programs that address problems – low farm incomes, for example – or embark on new initiatives – to promote biofuels, for example – they typically do so within a set of ideas shared among decision makers and dominant societal groups in the policy community. These ideas include broad beliefs about the place of agriculture in the economy and society, the goals for the sector, and the respective roles of governments and markets in realizing these goals. They also include ideas about appropriate means or policy instruments – be it regulation, financial incentives, or an informational campaign, for instance – to achieve policy goals. Together, these ideas constitute a *policy paradigm* that keeps program and policy reforms “inside the box” of acceptable ideas.1 Governments also make policies within a set of shared ideas and practices about who has the right to participate in policy making and who does not. This *governing paradigm* determines which institutions and what state and nonstate actors make agri-food policy.

From the end of the Second World War through to the late twentieth century, the agri-food policy paradigm that dominated in North America and Europe was built around the idea that agriculture is an exceptional sector. Agriculture is exceptional by virtue of its provision of unique outputs – most prominently, safe and secure food supplies – in the face of unique...
problems that include unmanageable risks of weather and disease. Both attributes, it is believed, warrant government intervention in order to ensure that agricultural producers, consumers, and society at large are not adversely affected. Like their counterparts in Europe and the United States, Canadian governments defined agricultural policy largely in terms of the problems producers faced: low farm incomes, low and fluctuating commodity prices, unstable world markets, and limited farmer bargaining power in the marketplace. To address these problems, they used their expenditure and regulatory instruments, making payments to farmers, regulating domestic production and marketing of commodities so that domestic supply does not exceed domestic demand, imposing border controls that protect domestic food producers from foreign competition, and vesting producer-run marketing agencies with monopoly purchasing and/or selling powers.

Various labels have been attached to this policy paradigm. It has been described as a “state assistance” paradigm and a “dependent agriculture” paradigm to denote the centrality of the belief that government intervention and support for agriculture were needed to realize sectoral goals of productivity and profitability, as well as society-wide economic and social goals. That is, markets alone could not achieve societal goals for agriculture. Others describe the model as a “productivist” paradigm to emphasize that the intent and consequence of government intervention was often to encourage farmers to produce more, by making “two blades of grass grow where one grew before.” The productivist label is warranted by the plethora of government initiatives to encourage more efficient production as a way to greater agricultural profitability: programs that coupled farm payments to volumes of production, subsidized farm credit policies that encouraged farmers to become more efficient producers by expanding and mechanizing their operations, and government investment in the research and development of technologies and crop varieties that would enhance output while reducing production costs. Still, the productivist logic of rewarding farmers for producing more food had its limits. In Canada, as in Europe and the United States, production controls on some commodities were implemented in order to limit domestic supply to domestic demand and thereby keep prices higher than they would otherwise be. In Canada, these production controls or quotas were put in place in the 1970s for milk, eggs, chicken, and turkey.

Whatever the label, there is consensus that the agri-food policy paradigm in industrialized countries in the postwar period was accompanied by a governing paradigm that put agricultural departments and ministries and the agricultural sector at the centre of agri-food policy making. Even as farmers’ electoral power declined sharply, the organizational strength of
those who produce food gave them considerable influence over officials in agricultural ministries, and these officials in turn retained control over agriculture and food policy making. This governing paradigm, especially prevalent where farmers were united in one single farm organization, limited the influence of those who criticized the state assistance or productivist paradigm.

Certainly, there have been critics of the state assistance and productivist paradigms. Besides farm organizations that have faulted government assistance as often too little and too late, they have included, most prominently, agricultural economists committed to liberal markets. In Canada, CSOs representing consumer, environmental, and developmental perspectives were historically unlikely to weigh in on agricultural and food policy.9 As noted above, that situation no longer exists.

From the 1980s onward, critics of the state assistance model and proponents of a liberal paradigm attracted more attention. Committed to liberal economic principles of competitive markets, these critics zeroed in on the fiscal burden of state assistance for agriculture, its distorting effects on international agricultural markets, and the gains to be had by making agricultural markets more competitive. Through their economic analyses and models, they advanced and argued for an alternate, market liberal paradigm that rejected the premise of agriculture as a unique sector warranting exceptional treatment and argued that governments should reduce their role in the sector so that competitive markets largely determine producers’ incomes. As a transnational epistemic community – “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain”10 – these experts gained ascendancy when international institutions like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and international agreements like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), made agricultural reform a priority and convinced national governments to do the same.11

The most notable success of this epistemic community in the late twentieth century was to establish a new global liberal paradigm of agriculture in the global trading regime. The liberal paradigm was partially implemented in the Agreement on Agriculture as part of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (1986-93). The Agreement on Agriculture limited, but did not eliminate, the ability of governments to intervene in agricultural markets and to treat agriculture as an exceptional sector. The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was also part of the new global trading regime. Its powers extended to enforcing existing GATT agreements as well as those agreed to during the Uruguay Round negotiations.
The fact that the implementation of the paradigm in the global trade regime remained incomplete could be credited to the success of farm organizations, especially in Europe, in persuading their domestic governments that there continued to be good reasons to support the state assistance paradigm. As discussed below in Part 2, these reasons are associated with a new – multifunctionality – agricultural paradigm.

In Canada, the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture required governments to find less trade-distorting ways to support farm incomes, to curtail export subsidies, and to replace import controls on supply-managed products with tariffs. However, governments were not prevented from transferring money to farmers to support their incomes and the Canadian Wheat Board’s export monopoly over Prairie-grown wheat and barley exports remained intact, as did the three pillars in supply management of production controls, regulated pricing, and high border protection.12

Nor did liberalizing trade agreements in North America end agricultural exceptionalism and the state assistance paradigm. The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, which came into effect in January 1989, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), implemented in January 1994 and including Mexico, did require governments to remove some of their protective measures (most notably, tariffs) for agricultural products. However, neither agreement affected Canadian policies to enable supply management in the dairy, poultry, and egg sectors, or the marketing authority of the Canadian Wheat Board.

The ascendance of the market liberal paradigm in the global trade regime has provoked a backlash as agri-food issues have attracted greater attention from CSOs. Many of these groups equate the market liberal model of agriculture with the productivist goals of large-scale, input-intensive farms.13 The range of preoccupations of CSOs is considerable, but one common concern of many is with how food is produced. Here the quest is often for production systems that give higher priority to goals of food safety, environmental sustainability, and animal welfare; that avoid the use of biochemical inputs and modern technologies like genetic modification of plants; and that limit corporate control of the food production and supply system by encouraging local markets.14 Although these beliefs are clearly part of the societal discourse in North America, it is in Europe where they have been most forcibly articulated and where they have had the greatest impact in terms of effecting changes in food production and marketing systems. Critics of the productivist and liberal models of agriculture have also directed their political activity beyond the domestic or regional (EU) level to the global arena and global trading rules, making specific issues such as the regulation and labelling of genetically modified crops and foods a priority. Others have
also been committed to ensuring agri-food production systems in the global North do not profit at the expense of development goals of the global South.

In terms of governing paradigms for agriculture and food, the global WTO-centred trade regime also is in potential tension with domestic governing paradigms that are responsive to the preferences of domestic voters (even if some of these domestic voters have disproportionate influence). The WTO regime often looks to experts as a source of authority on trade-related agri-food policies. The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, for example, vests scientists and scientific evidence with the authority to determine whether domestic measures to protect animal, plant, and human health and safety are legitimate and legal, rather than protectionist and illegal. Domestic and transnational mobilization of consumer and environmental groups against genetically modified foods and hormone-fed beef are two instances where the expert authority of scientists as to the safety of these products is at odds with the preferences of local (EU) consumers and environmentalists.

In summary, since the mid-1990s, domestic and global paradigms for agriculture and food have been in tension in many countries. National governments have had to respond to pressures to align their domestic agricultural paradigms with the ascendant liberal market paradigm in the global trading regime, even while this liberal paradigm itself has weak legitimacy for many CSOs and, possibly, as well, for the public as a whole. The next section addresses how the members of the EU have reformed their agricultural paradigm in the midst of these tensions.

The EU, the CAP, and the Multifunctionality Paradigm

Although there is no single definition of “multifunctional agriculture,”\textsuperscript{15} usage of the term directs attention to the multiple functions of agriculture that are joined to its economic activity of producing food and fibre (cotton, linen).\textsuperscript{16} These activities implicate environmental, social, and rural development goals. To elaborate, agricultural production practices can have negative effects on the environment: for example, nutrient and pesticide runoff, soil erosion, loss of biodiversity and wildlife habitat, and air pollution from manure. Conversely, (other) agricultural production practices can yield environmental benefits of not only soil conservation and preservation of biodiversity and wildlife habitat but also landscape preservation and scenic vistas. In terms of social functions of agriculture, they too can be either positive or negative in terms of agriculture’s effects in assuring a safe and available food supply, eliminating hunger, preserving family farms, and safeguarding a cultural heritage. With respect to rural development goals,
agricultural activity is linked with rural income and employment, as well as to viable rural communities. The OECD incorporates these multiple functions of agriculture in its definition of multifunctionality: “Beyond its primary function of producing food and fibre, agricultural activity can also shape the landscape, provide environmental benefits such as land conservation, the sustainable management of renewal natural resources and the preservation of biodiversity, and contribute to the socio-economic viability of many rural areas.”

A multifunctional paradigm of agriculture puts value on the non-commodity social, environmental, and rural development outputs of agriculture, and recognizes that the market either will not produce them or will underproduce them – and rewards agriculture for doing so. That is, farmers are paid in one way or another for their role in producing these “goods.” In its recognition that agriculture is an exceptional sector that warrants state intervention, there are clear affinities between the state assistance and multifunctional paradigms. Although farmers’ inferior position in the market economy was a major rationale under the state assistance paradigm for government intervention, an implicit premise in the paradigm was also that agriculture is exceptional because it provides public goods, like a safe and secure food supply and preservation of rural communities – goods given value in the multifunctional paradigm. Still, an important distinction between the state assistance and multifunctionality paradigms is the legitimation basis for continuing government transfers to agricultural producers. Under the multifunctionality paradigm, farm support is conditional on systems of agricultural production that do not put producers’ needs ahead of society-wide public values and goods, including consumer preferences for “quality insurance” and citizen preferences for sustainable food production systems.

What are the implications of a multifunctionality paradigm for agricultural policies? What are the appropriate public policies to ensure that societal values of environmental protection, viable rural communities, and so on are incorporated into agriculture and food production systems? There is a broad literature around this question, but it is not in consensus. On one view, the multifunctionality paradigm entails “a complete rethinking of the institutional system surrounding agricultural production.” Reforms need to extend beyond “income support systems to farmers” to include “daily practices of farmers,” “contractual relations between farmers and other stakeholders,” and “the development of new marketing and cooperation systems” to remunerate agriculture’s contributions to public goods. According to this view, a multifunctionality paradigm requires not just a change in policy
goals and instruments; it also requires a change in the governing paradigm
such that farmers’ institutionalized relationships with other stakeholders
– including, presumably, with a wide array of CSOs – also need to change.

For the purposes of discussion here, it is useful to distinguish the substanti-\-tive policy goals of a multifunctionality paradigm from the question of what
kind of governing paradigm accompanies a multifunctionality paradigm.
In terms of substantive policy goals, I rely on those that Van Huylenbroeck
equates with a multifunctionality paradigm. They are (1) public support for
farmers is decoupled from production (farmers don’t get larger payments
for producing more), (2) agricultural producers are required to comply with
regulatory standards (for example, for food safety, animal welfare, and en-
vironmental protection) in order to receive government payments, and (3)
there is an increase and shift in public funds to rural development. The
decoupling of producer payments from the volume of production (and
lowering the maximum payment per farm) is based on the logic and evidence
that larger farmers, albeit usually more efficient, often have more negative
than positive outputs when judged against environmental, social, and rural
development and cultural values. In terms of governing paradigms, theor-
izing suggests that goals in multifunctionality paradigms – such as environ-
mental stewardship – are likely best assured by decentralizing policy and
decision making to subnational levels of government, including at the local
or community level.

Although it was not the first to use the multifunctionality concept, the
EU embraced it explicitly in the 1990s to provide a new rationale for public
financial support for agricultural producers. The EU agriculture commis-
sioner, Franz Fischler, formally articulated the rationale in the European
Commission’s Cork Declaration in 1996, and EU heads of state formally
approved it in 1999 in the Agenda 2000 proposals. In the run-up to the
Doha Round of international trade negotiations, European officials de-
fended the multifunctionality concept as a way to preserve the European
model of agriculture. They argued that farm income retrenchment would
significantly reduce farm incomes and cause farmers either to switch to more
profit-oriented and less environmentally sustainable farming systems or to
withdraw from farming and leave marginal areas devoid of rural popula-
tions. These results, in their view, would threaten certain public goods
produced by European farming, such as the preservation of the rural land-
scape and provision of natural habitats for wild species, that are valued by
European citizens.

The implementation of multifunctionality principles into the CAP has
come through a series of reforms over the 1990s and 2000s. These reforms
have, first, uncoupled income support for EU farmers from production
decisions. That is, government payments to farmers are designed to have neutral effects on what and how much they produce. Second, these farm payments are tied to farmers’ compliance with a number of regulations, particularly environmental, animal health and welfare, and food safety regulations. One result from this cross-compliance is a more environmentally benign CAP that favours less intensive production methods and provides positive incentives for environmental enhancement. Third, there is a new emphasis on reconciling agriculture with rural development, including via the promotion of culture, tourism, and recreation in rural areas. Cumulatively, these reforms are consistent with a multifunctionality paradigm of agriculture whose objectives extend beyond producer income support and management of agricultural markets to include environmental sustainability, landscape preservation and rural development, food quality and safety, and animal welfare.

The reform of the CAP on the basis of a multifunctionality paradigm is generally explained as being necessary to (re-)establish CAP’s legitimacy with the European public and with foreign countries. More concretely, the different factors that induced reforms at different times included international pressures to reduce CAP tariffs and subsidies during trade negotiations and as a result of trade agreements, budgetary crises arising from high CAP costs, and pressures to contain these costs as the EU enlarged. Others emphasize that the CAP had to change to bring it into closer alignment with the changed values of Europeans. From the mid-1980s onward, the value Europeans attached to sustainable ecological and land management led to closer scrutiny of the CAP’s contribution to environmental protection, as did, in the wake of food safety scares, the value placed on food safety and food quality when consumer organizations questioned the ability of existing policies to ensure food safety. Garzon argues that another value change was “a new sensitivity” to developing countries’ food security and poverty alleviation concerns and a greater value on local food production as part of a rejection of global markets in standardized commodities.

Were CSOs implicated in the reforms? On the one hand, CAP reforms have come without any major institutional changes in agricultural decision-making processes. The political institutions at the EU level that have traditionally been at the centre of agricultural policy making continue to be so. And, although agricultural interests have become somewhat weaker, they still are more powerful than groups representing nonagricultural interests – at least as far as income support for farmers is concerned. On this view, the major impetus for change inside the EU has been the European Commission, acting as an ideational policy entrepreneur as it exercises its exclusive authority among EU institutions to introduce legislation.
On the other hand, the European Commission – and specifically the Directorate-General for Agriculture – clearly believed that the CAP had to be reformed in order to affirm the support of the broader European public for it. CSOs played a role in the reformist pressures. Consumer, environmental, animal welfare, and development-oriented groups mobilized and succeeded in having their policy ideas penetrate agri-food policy networks in EU member states as well as EU-level institutions like the European Parliament. In the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, where food safety scares (most prominently, the BSE or “mad cow” fiasco) were linked to closed corporatist networks of agricultural groups and agricultural bureaucrats, beleaguered politicians reorganized agricultural ministries to give greater prominence to consumer and environmental concerns as a way to restore state regulatory legitimacy.\textsuperscript{41} As Delgado and colleagues note, agricultural groups initially resisted the inclusion of rural policy within the CAP, fearing it would substantially reduce the direct income transfers they received.\textsuperscript{42} The switch to the multifunctionality paradigm has thus entailed compromises that sustain income transfers to European agricultural interests.\textsuperscript{43}

Pushed by the EU, the OECD’s twenty-nine agriculture ministers recognized the multifunctional character of agriculture in 1998.\textsuperscript{44} At the WTO level, the EU abandoned its early quest to have multifunctionality recognized as a legitimate objective of domestic agricultural policy in the global trade regime. The United States has been a vigorous critic of the concept, suspicious that multifunctionality is a guise to maintain EU protectionist and trade-distorting agricultural policies and its “productivist subsidy culture of European agriculture.”\textsuperscript{45} Although US farm bills do contain environmental provisions aimed at sustainable use of land and water resources for agriculture and others geared toward rural development, Freshwater argues that these separate provisions are not linked into a coherent whole and not tied to commodity price support – as a multifunctionality paradigm would require.\textsuperscript{46} Indeed, an effort to reorient US farm support consistent with a multifunctionality approach was blocked in what became the 2002 farm bill.\textsuperscript{47}

Canada has joined the United States and other agricultural exporting countries that comprise the Cairns’ trading bloc to oppose the multifunctionality paradigm.\textsuperscript{48} At the same time, as the next section documents, Canada has incorporated elements of the multifunctionality paradigm into its own domestic policies.

**Canadian Agri-Food Policy and Governing Paradigm Developments**

Canadian governments are increasingly emphasizing the multiple functions that Canada’s agricultural sector provides for Canadian society that extend beyond the production of food and fibre. At the same time, there is little
evidence of a shift toward a new governing paradigm in which CSOs other than those directly implicated in the products of the new agricultural economy have a say.

As clarified above, evidence of a shift toward the multifunctionality paradigm entails, first, recognition that state intervention in agricultural markets and public (fiscal) support for agriculture is necessary to provide goods valued by society, and second, explicit linking of support for agriculture and food producers to its provision of noncommodity outputs that include food safety, environmental protection and sustainability, and preservation of rural communities and landscapes.

As measured against these criteria, there is some evidence that Canadian agricultural policies have embraced elements of the multifunctionality paradigm. The outline below, which extracts visions and goals for Canadian agriculture that governments have formally articulated at four junctures in agricultural policy discussion and reform, shows a diversity of policy goals. They include stalwarts of the state assistance model, such as financial security for producers and their ability to obtain “sustainable” returns from the marketplace, as well as a goal linked to the market liberal paradigm: improving the domestic and international competitiveness of the Canadian agri-food sector. Goals associated with the multifunctionality paradigm also became more evident over time: food safety and quality, environmental sustainability, and the promotion of regional interests and rural communities. The latter are associated with the implementation of the Agricultural Policy Framework (APF) in 2003. Under the APF, federal and provincial governments agreed to a cost-share five-year funding package that included five pillars: farm income support programs to help farmers manage their business risks (labelled “business risk management”), food safety and quality, the environment, renewal (of farmers’ skills), and science and innovation. This framework was renewed in another five-year agreement, effective from 2008 to 2013, called Growing Forward.

Politicians have occasionally articulated multifunctional principles by way of justifying government support for agriculture. The Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, in its June 2006 interim report, stated: “Agriculture does more for us than just supply food – it creates jobs in towns and cities, it provides habitat to wildlife, environmental benefits such as storing carbon in the soil, and it is a source of innovative products such as biofuel. It is truly the backbone of rural Canada.” In its June 2008 report, Beyond Free Fall: Halting Rural Poverty, this same Senate committee repeated agriculture’s multiple societal benefits beyond its primary activity of producing food and fibre and argued that farmers need to be compensated for providing them:
First, crops may be a source of renewable fuel, or natural medicine or pharmaceuticals, or raw material for industrial production. Second, farmland may provide intended or unplanned side-effects such as the protection of biodiversity, watersheds, land conservation or the prevention of soil erosion. It can also be managed in such a way as to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or to help prevent damage by fires or floods. Third, domestic agriculture performs a wide range of social functions: it can ensure food security, improve nutrition and health protection,

PROBLEM DEFINITIONS, POLICY GOALS, AND VISIONS FOR CANADIAN AGRICULTURE

1989 Growing Together¹

*Problem:* Existing programs and supply chain practices slow adjustment to a more competitive marketplace and changing consumer demands.

*Vision:* “A more market-oriented” agri-food industry, “a more self-reliant sector that is able to earn a reasonable return from the marketplace,” “recognizing and responding to regional diversity,” “environmentally sustainable.”

*Policy goals:* Develop and liberalize markets, diversify agriculture, recognize regional diversity, increase environmental sustainability, protect food safety and quality.

1994 Future Directions for Canadian Agriculture and Agri-Food²

*Problem:* High public debt unable to sustain large expenditure role; Canada not capturing share of world market growth.

*Vision:* “A growing competitive, market-oriented agriculture and agri-food industry that is profitable and responds to the changing food and non-food needs of domestic and international customers; is less dependent on government support; and contributes to the well-being of all Canadians and the quality of life in rural communities while achieving farm financial security, environmental sustainability and a safe, high quality food supply.”

*Policy goals:* Sustainable growth; rural opportunities; long-term financial security; resource and environmental sustainability; safe, high-quality food supply.
provide rural employment, populate remote areas, and help preserve local markets and rural heritage. 51

Agriculture ministers, not just senators, have occasionally also articulated this view. Speaking to the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food in the House of Commons in 2002, the minister of agriculture and agri-food, Lyle Vanclief, joined arguments about agriculture's exceptionality to those of its multifunctional character to justify government spending in

2003 Agricultural Policy Framework

*Problem:* Declining competitiveness of Canadian bulk commodities; lower real farm income and lack of farmer profitability.

*Vision:* Canada to become the world leader in food safety, innovation, and environmentally responsible production.

*Policy goals:* Business risk management (to encourage producers to be proactive to reduce business risks), food safety and quality, the environment, renewal (of farmers’ skills), science and innovation.

2006-07 Growing Forward

*Problem:* Lack of global competitiveness as commodity exporter; future international trade agreements will require reductions in government support; consumer demand for healthy food.

*Vision:* “A profitable and innovative agriculture, agri-food and agri-based products industry that seizes opportunities in response to market demands and contributes to the health and well-being of Canadians.”

*Policy goals:* Build a sector that can compete successfully in domestic and international markets; achieve sustained growth and profitability; ensure the sector contributes to society’s priorities for safe food, the environment, and health and wellness; be proactive in managing income risks.

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support of farm incomes. If consumers wanted assurance of safe food and if taxpayers expected farmers to produce in a way that was environmentally sustainable, said Vanclief, then they had to recognize that there was a price to pay for these benefits. The minister thus justified state assistance for agriculture on grounds specific to the income risks of farm households as well as broader social and public goods considerations. The long-standing Conservative minister of agriculture and agri-food in the Harper government, even though supporting programs that are associated with a multifunctional view of agriculture, is more inclined to stress the economic contribution of agriculture, stating his government’s plan to be “supporting agriculture as a core economic driver in this country.”

Through to 2011, Canadian governments have not embraced the multifunctional paradigm in the same sense as the EU has. Although funding can be a misleading measure of governments’ priorities (since regulatory measures may be more appropriate), funding allocated under the APF for environmental sustainability and food safety paled in comparison to funding in support of farm incomes, with the latter absorbing 90 percent over the 2003-08 period. Monies allocated for rural development under a separate program, Canada’s Rural Partnership, were modest as compared with those for producer income support ($46 million over the four years, as compared with a federal contribution of $800 million for business risk management programs over five years). More significantly, and in contrast to Europe, government-funded on-farm environmental programs are decoupled from farm income support programs. That is, payments to farmers for adopting management practices whose objectives are to reduce a farm’s environmental footprint, protect water quality, reduce GHG emissions, enhance biodiversity, and conserve wildlife habitat are paid independently of any payments they receive to support and stabilize their incomes. Making farm support payments contingent on good environmental practices would be more consistent with tying support for agriculture to its provision of socially valued ecological goods and services.

The overwhelming thrust of Canadian agricultural policy reform in the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s has been within the productivist and market liberal logic. This model has not ruled supreme; Canadian governments remain substantially involved in Canadian agriculture and have not abolished protectionist policies within the state-assistance paradigm, such as supply management in the dairy and poultry sectors. Defenders of supply management often invoke values associated with a multifunctionality perspective. They do so by citing not only the benefits to the local economy of producing food locally but also those to the environment when food consumed locally does not have to be transported thousands of kilometres.
However, raising and stabilizing producers’ incomes – within the rules of the global trade regime – and rendering competitive the agri-food sector as a whole (not only producers but also processors) have been foremost preoccupations of provincial and federal decision makers. To the degree that food safety goals have acquired increased attention, it is largely because they are seen to be the route to enhancing the sector’s competitiveness at home and abroad.

Policies of national and provincial governments in Canada to support biofuels should also be seen as a way to augment farm and rural incomes. Any environmental benefits they provide – in terms of GHG emission savings, for example – are an acknowledged societal benefit, and certainly the Senate Standing Committee on Agriculture and Forestry argues producers should be compensated for such benefits. But, in Canada, environmental goals have not been the primary rationale for government expenditures and regulations to promote the production and consumption of renewable fuels. Indeed, in contrast to the EU and the United States, Canadian legislation does not require biofuels to meet environmental sustainability criteria – that is, to demonstrate that these fuels result in GHG emission savings relative to fossil fuel-produced fuels like petroleum, for example, and/or do not undermine biodiversity.

Why have Canadian governments not seen fit to move further toward adoption of the multifunctionality paradigm when European governments did so? There are undoubtedly several reasons for the different approaches. The first and most important is that Canadian decision makers have not perceived the same need to build a new legitimation basis for government support for agriculture – because Canadian agriculture has not experienced the legitimacy crisis that befell European agriculture and the CAP. Although Canadian farm income program costs rose in the 2000s, they have constituted a far smaller portion of government budgets in Canada than did the CAP in the EU budget. Moreover, at least until the summer of 2008 when the listeriosis crisis in the Maple Leaf factory was linked to the deaths of twenty Canadians, the Canadian food supply system has not been implicated in a food safety crisis in the way EU production practices were in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The discovery of BSE in Canadian cattle in 2003 and thereafter was not a food safety crisis; no Canadians died from eating “mad” cows as they did in Europe, and indeed, Canadians increased their consumption of beef following the discovery (as beef prices fell). Nor has there been the same link drawn in Canada, as there was in Europe, between agricultural production practices and environmental pollution and loss of sustainability. Although environmentalists raise the issue, a majority of the Canadian public believes Canadian farmers are
taking appropriate actions to minimize the impact of their activities on the environment.\textsuperscript{62} It may well be that the environmental consequences of large-scale farming are less visible to most Canadians than they are to those living in densely populated Europe. Four in five Canadians live in urban areas, and Canada’s vast geography often separates them by considerable distances from the Canadian farms where water and air pollution can occur. In short, the perceptions of policy failures that surrounded the CAP in the EU appear to be neither as evident nor as politically salient in Canada.

Second, rather than a crisis of loss of public support for the sector, the crisis that enveloped Canadian agriculture from the late 1990s well into the 2000s was an economic crisis that arguably garnered it public sympathy. Depressed commodity prices (for grains and oilseeds, hogs and then cattle following the BSE discovery in 2003) exposed large parts of rural – especially Prairie – Canada to an income crisis.\textsuperscript{63} For governments and the farm community, the challenge has been to get beyond ad hoc solutions to shore up farm incomes and design more permanent programs to stabilize farm incomes. With its agri-food sector far more reliant on export markets than that of the EU (or the United States),\textsuperscript{64} and exposed to greater competition from American agri-food interests in its own internal market as a result of NAFTA, the overwhelming preoccupation of Canadian governments has been to find ways to address the income problem without undermining the sector’s competitiveness.

In this income crisis situation, there were clearly voices in the Canadian farm community that advocated a multifunctionality model of agriculture that puts a higher priority on goals of rural development and small- and medium-sized farmers’ contribution to that goal – as compared with the goal of maximizing farmers’ productivity and competitiveness in a global economy. The National Farmers Union (NFU) is the major champion. It has forged alliances with other CSOs to argue for agricultural policies that put a priority on the social sustainability of the family farm and rural community, and advocated for government policies and trade agreements to advance these goals. The Canadian farm community is, however, pluralist in perspective and organization, and does not speak with one voice in terms of the desirability of liberal market and multifunctionality paradigms. The NFU is joined at the national level by the larger Canadian Federation of Agriculture (CFA), whose members include provincial farm organizations and national commodity groups. The CFA generally favours a compromise between the market-oriented and multifunctionality models, a course that both the Conservative and Liberal Parties have tended to pursue once they have formed the government of Canada. An additional ten or more national
organizations represent specialist commodity growers, and most of these espouse a market liberal paradigm of agriculture. 

The pluralization of the farm community draws attention to a third factor that helps to explain the failure of the multifunctionality paradigm to resonate in Canada to the degree it does in Europe. It is the governing paradigm. Since the late 1980s, the Canadian government has stressed the need for a stronger partnership across components of the agri-food sector, not only in the marketplace but also in the policy process. The partnership goal has been more about bringing those upstream of the farm (input suppliers, bank creditors) and downstream of it (food processors and retailers) into policy-making circles. The list of organizations invited to participate in the formulation of the agricultural policy framework for the 2008-13 period does not include any consumer groups, and the few environmental and health groups invited are overwhelmingly outnumbered by organizations representing producers, food processors and manufacturers, food retailers, suppliers of inputs to farming, and academic-based research institutes. Despite the organizational and ideational fragmentation of this pluralist network, Canadian government officials nonetheless rely on it. The network’s policy expertise and stamp of approval are needed for effective and legitimate agri-food policies.

**Looking Ahead**

This chapter has traced the evolution of the state assistance paradigm for agriculture and food in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, juxtaposing the market liberal paradigm that has gained the upper hand in the global trade regime with the multifunctionality model that has been officially endorsed by the EU. Canadian governments have resisted articulation of a single model for Canada. Instead, they have added goals and programs associated with the multifunctionality paradigm onto the state assistance paradigm, even while continuing to see their role as largely assisting farmers to become more competitive within a global liberalizing political economy. At the same time, there has been no significant shift in the governing paradigm. Those who produce and retail food and who supply farmers with their inputs, and the government ministries responsible for agriculture, dominate the making of agri-food policies, including agri-environmental policies, to the exclusion of a broader array of civil society actors.

In its attention to the paradigms that are uppermost at the national level, this chapter has overlooked the steps toward a multifunctionality paradigm being taken by the provinces. Although there is considerable agreement
across the two orders of government in Canada on goals for the agri-food sector, provincial governments have considerable latitude to steer their agricultural sectors in ways that correspond to the needs and expectations of society writ large regarding environmental goods and rural development. Under the five-year intergovernmental agreement on agricultural policy, 2008-13, the Conservative government devolved considerable responsibility to provinces for farm income support programs. On-farm food safety and environmental programs (the latter, largely a provincial responsibility) are also decentralized programs. These developments make provinces, local communities, and farms themselves the front line in advancing many of the practices that are associated with the more sustainable agriculture evoked by the multifunctionality paradigm.

Besides governments, the marketplace is a potential arena for consumers to advance some of the goals associated with the multifunctionality paradigm, in particular those associated with environmental sustainability and rural development. The exponential growth in local food markets and the expansion of organic food sales are indicators of the value consumers put on locally produced food and environmental sustainability. Governments have abetted these developments to some degree via programs of financial assistance but also by Buy Local promotional programs. Although there is clearly a niche market for food retailers and the restaurant business to respond to consumer demand for local products, the capacity of markets to reimburse food producers for the societal “goods” they provide should not be exaggerated.

I conclude on an optimistic note. It comes in the form of evidence that those who are well placed to influence the course of future agri-food policy in Canada are adopting a more holistic view of agriculture’s place in society, the economy, and the environment. Governments, policy institutes, and farm organizations have become interested in recent years in defining a national food policy or strategy for Canada. Such a policy would differ from past policy in integrating agri-food programs more closely with those that are designed to advance other goals, most notably, the health of Canadians and the sustainability of Canada’s environmental resources. An important stimulus to integrating agriculture with health policy, for example, is to help governments curtail their escalating costs of health care by enabling Canadians to make healthier food choices. These efforts at integrating agriculture to other policy fields provide an opening for a broader array of civil society actors to influence the substance and direction of agri-food policies in Canada.
Notes
2 Besides natural risks, there was also a recognition that agricultural markets are subject to inequities in the bargaining power of market participants and sharp fluctuations in commodity prices. Both phenomena lead to less than optimal outcomes in the form of farm incomes below those of nonfarm workers and unstable consumer food costs.
6 Wilson, G.A., Multifunctional Agriculture: A Transition Theory Perspective (Wallingford, UK: CABI, 2007), chap. 5.
9 One of the few times food security surfaced as a political issue was in 1978, when food prices rose rather dramatically. The Canadian government hosted a national conference on “a national food strategy.” The issue of food prices soon faded.
13 Coleman, Grant, and Josling, Agriculture in the New Global Economy, chap. 3.
14 Chapter 6 of Wilson, Multifunctional Agriculture, discusses the post-productivist model of agriculture that is advocated by critics of the productivist model.
15 Chapter 8 of Wilson, Multifunctional Agriculture, provides an overview of current conceptualizations of multifunctionality, noting both that the term has become “almost ubiquitous” (185) and that it is defined in a wide number of ways, some of which are contradictory.
16 Economists use the language of joint production to refer to a relationship between the two outputs of an economic activity whereby an increase or decrease in the supply of one affects levels of the others.


As far as the public good of an adequate and affordable food supply is concerned, there was an explicit premise of agriculture’s link to public goods in Europe. The Treaty of Rome that established the European Community incorporated the goal of the CAP to include assuring consumers food supplies at reasonable prices.


Van Huylenbroeck, “Preface,” xiii.


The UN Food and Agriculture Organization introduced the concept in the mid-1990s. With respect to the EU, analysts point out that EU policies dating back to the mid-1970s effectively embraced the multifunctionality concept by, for example, subsidizing farmers in mountainous and hilly areas where agriculture could not be competitive. See Delgado, M., E. Ramos, R. Gallardo, and F. Ramos, “Multifunctionality and Rural Development: A Necessary Convergence,” in Van Huylenbroeck and Durand, *Multifunctional Agriculture*, 28-29.


A modest level of CAP funding (5 percent) is shifted to rural development to support the environment and countryside, promote the diversification of the rural economy and an improved quality of life, and improve the competitiveness of agriculture and forestry. In addition, since the Agenda 2000 reforms, individual member states can increase the funds at their disposal for rural development measures so long as they do so in a way that is neutral to the EU budget.

In terms of policy instrument change, the 1992 MacSharry reforms were novel in shifting government payments directly to farmers and away from supporting commodity prices. The 1999 Agenda 2000 reforms continued the increase in direct payments and gave member states the option of making these payments conditional on farmers complying with environmental standards. It also established rural development as a second pillar (alongside producer support measures) of the CAP. The 2003 Fischler reforms are significant in shifting government farm support to a single payment based on land ownership and unrelated to what or how much the farmer produces.


39 Daugbjerg and Swinbank, “Ideational Change in the WTO”; Lynggaard and Nedergaard, “The Logic of Policy Development.”


41 Greer, A., *Agricultural Policy in Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Ansell and Vogel, *What’s the Beef?* Note that different EU member states prioritize different aspects of agriculture’s multifunctionality. Whereas the United Kingdom’s multifunctional focus is on agriculture’s role in developing the rural economy, France equally prioritizes the multifunctional economic, social, and environmental aspects of agriculture (Wilson, *Multifunctional Agriculture*, 194).


45 Freshwater, *Applying Multifunctionality to U.S. Farm Policy*.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 The Cairns’ trading bloc, named after the Australian city where the bloc was first formed in 1986, seeks the reduction or elimination of domestic support schemes for agriculture, as well as an end to border measures that restrict trade in agricultural products. Besides Canada and the United States, its members are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Paraguay, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand.

49 Substantiation of this argument is found in Skogstad, *Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture*.

50 Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, *Agriculture and Agri-Food Policy in Canada: Putting Farmers First!* (Ottawa: House of Commons, Standing Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 2006), 3.

51 Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, *Beyond Free Fall: Halting Rural Poverty; Final Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2008), 55.
52 Vanclief, L., “Evidence,” Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food, House of Commons, 37th Parliament, 1st Session, Meeting no. 42 (February 6, 2002).
53 Gerry Ritz, “Evidence,” Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food, House of Commons, 40th Parliament, 3rd Session (March 17, 2010).
55 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture, chap. 5.
56 See statement of GO5 – Coalition for a Fair Farming Model – the group that speaks for the supply managed sectors. GO5, “WTO and Agriculture: Supply Management,” http://www.go5quebec.ca/.
57 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture, chap. 3.
58 Ibid., chap. 6. A 1980 Agriculture Canada report states: “A high level of food safety helps us to maintain our reputation as an important supplier of high quality, safe food to world markets.” Growing Together (Ottawa: Agriculture Canada, 1989), 62.
59 Effective 2010, regulations under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act require 5 percent average renewable fuel content in gasoline; by 2012, diesel and heating oil will require 2 percent renewable fuels (biodiesel).
60 Public opinion data are meagre, but those that exist show that Canadian taxpayers are sympathetic to the farmer and support governments subsidizing farm incomes. See Thompson, S., Summary of Consumer Attitudes on Farms and Farming (Ottawa: Canadian Agri-Food Policy Institute, 2006), http://www.capi-icpa.ca/pubs.html, as well as Ipsos Reid, “AAFC Strategic Issues Survey: Part A – General Public,” POR-297-06 (Winnipeg: Ipsos Reid, 2007).
61 The 2007 Ipsos Reid poll cited in note 60 found that 84 percent of Canadians were confident that food produced in Canada is safe. There are no published data to show whether this confidence has diminished as a result of the listeriosis outbreak in the summer of 2008.
62 An Ipsos Reid survey found that this view is held by 52 percent of the 1,500 Canadians they surveyed. Ipsos Reid, “AAFC Strategic Issues Survey: Part A.”
63 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture, 85-100.
64 In 2008, just over 50 percent of Canadian primary agricultural products and about 23 percent of processed food products were exported. See An Overview of the Canadian Agriculture and Agri-Food System (Ottawa: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2009), 5.
65 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture, 38, table 1.1.
67 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture.
68 The Canadian Agri-Food Policy Institute (CAPI) is playing a leadership role in this endeavour, holding workshops and issuing research reports that highlight the need for a more holistic agri-food plan, including one integrated to health policy. Its reports can be found at http://www.capi-icpa.ca/pubs.html. Besides CAPI, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and the Conference Board of Canada have also been developing national food strategies, as has Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada and a community-based network, the People’s Food Policy Project.
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