THE MUSLIM QUESTION IN CANADA

A STORY OF SEGMENTED INTEGRATION

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In his controversial book entitled *The Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington (1996) predicts that conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims will start to rise all over the world. Proposing a conceptual framework for understanding the post-Cold War world, he suggests that global conflicts will no longer be driven by ideological convictions but, rather, by cultural affiliations. The new fault lines, according to him, are going to be found not between countries with different political ideologies – such as Marxism/capitalism – but between relatively homogenous cultural blocks. This new dynamic is expected to create two types of conflicts: (1) inter-civilizational at the global level and (2) inter-ethnic at the local level. The emerging cultural/civilizational blocks, according to Huntington, are African, Japanese, Orthodox (Russian), Islamic, Western, Hindu, and Sinic (Chinese); and the relationship between each pair of civilizations could vary from non-existent to “less conflictual” to “more conflictual.” In his view, the Islamic civilization is in a class of its own in that four of the five relationships it has with other civilizations are “more conflictual” (Huntington 1996, 245). So the tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims are expected to escalate everywhere in the years to come. And, indeed, many developments after 1996 seemed to confirm this expectation.

However, Huntington’s thesis revolves mostly around nations and historically shaped ethnic minorities, not immigrant communities. Huntington discusses such communities only marginally, a fact reflected in his allocating
fewer than ten pages to a discussion of the place of immigration in this newly emerging world. In these pages, he acknowledges the presence of an “immigrant invasion” on both sides of the Atlantic – with a Hispanic/Mexican invasion in the United States and an Arab/Muslim invasion in Europe. However, he treats the former as tentative and uncertain, and the latter as declining. Regarding the latter, he writes: “The problem of Muslim demographic invasion is ... likely to weaken as the population growth rates in North African and Middle Eastern societies peak, as they already have in some countries, and begin to decline ... Muslim immigration could be much less by 2025 ... and the threat to Europe of ‘Islamization’ will be succeeded by that of ‘Africanization’” (Huntington 1996, 204). This prediction is in clear contrast to the situation on both sides of the Atlantic today. In the almost two decades since Huntington wrote those lines, not only did the issue of Muslim immigration continue, even intensify, in Europe but it also emerged in North America. This issue is now the subject of one of the hottest debates of our time.

The rise of Muslim immigration as a socio-political issue during the opening decade of the twenty-first century is related to an emerging perception that the integration of Muslim immigrants into Western liberal democracies has been particularly problematic. The attacks on the Twin Towers and Pentagon on 11 September 2001 were a major trigger in this process, particularly in the United States. Shortly after, Europe witnessed a series of violent and/or terrorist events – the assassination of the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh in 2004, the Madrid train bombing in 2004, the London subway bombing in 2005, and the social unrest in France in 2005 – all of which involved individuals of Muslim backgrounds. As a consequence of these events, the already-existing European debates on Muslim immigrants greatly intensified and took on new dimensions. Later, in 2006, the arrest of eighteen terrorism suspects in Toronto brought similar concerns to Canada. The involvement of individuals of Muslim backgrounds, and the fact that many of them were second-generation immigrants, raised serious questions about the degree to which Muslim minorities could live peacefully with the native-born populations and other minorities in immigrant-receiving countries.

The reasons given for the perceived non-integration of Muslims into liberal democracies were just as influential as were the aforementioned events in turning the issue of Muslim immigration into a socio-political problem. A popular response quickly surfaced, most visibly in Europe, according to which the source of the problem was considered to be either the
unwillingness or the inability of Muslim immigrants to integrate into the immigrant-receiving countries. The building blocks of this “standard” answer are: (1) Muslim immigrants tend not to integrate into host societies; (2) this is a conscious decision; (3) this decision is made because the goal of Muslim immigrants is to dominate, rather than to blend into, Western societies; and (4) there are no variations within Muslims in this regard, no extremist-moderate and no conservative-liberal distinctions (for an elaborate discussion of these views, see Saunders [2012b]).

At the heart of all this is the notion of “Muslim exceptionalism” – that is, a perceived fundamental difference between Muslim and other immigrants with regard to their interaction with host societies. By allowing the experiences of Muslim immigrants to be viewed as an exception to the rule and as something related to Muslim immigrants themselves, the resultant discourses allowed both the problem and the responsibility for resolving it to be shifted away from the host populations and towards the Muslim immigrants. This not only grossly oversimplifies a complex and multifaceted problem but also removes the possibility that the mainstream population might have to take some moral responsibility for it.

When it comes to explaining a complex socio-political problem, such oversimplifications are hardly helpful: when they begin to influence major state policies, they are clearly dangerous. And this is exactly what is happening with regard to the simplistic notion of “Muslim exceptionalism,” which has influenced several major policy debates in Western Europe and North America – debates on the balance between civil liberties and security measures, on secularism, and on multiculturalism (Cesari 2005). In the latter case, while critiques of multiculturalism policies have been around since the early 1970s, they have greatly intensified since the mid-2000s, and, recently, Muslims have been at the heart of the debate. As Modood (2007, 4) points out: “Muslims have become central to the merits and demerits of Multiculturalism as a public policy.” Interestingly, Kymlicka (2005) observes that the strength of the opposition to multiculturalism in various countries has been proportional to the size of their Muslim immigrant populations. In sum, in the politically correct cultural environment of many of these countries, as Kalin (2011, 4) argues, “attacks on multiculturalism have become indirect attacks on Islam and Muslims.”

**Canadian Multiculturalism**

The debates around multiculturalism are particularly relevant for Canada as it was the first country to adopt multiculturalism as an official policy and is
often referred to as a nation whose experiments with this policy have been reasonably successful (Reitz 2009a). However, despite its success story, and more than four decades of experimentation, even Canada seems to be grappling with multiculturalism. A brief historical sketch of these four decades will help us to better appreciate the implications of the current study.

Dewing (2009) presents the history of multiculturalism in Canada as occurring in three phases: (1) pre-1971, the incipient phase; (2) 1971-81, the formative phase; and (3) 1982-present, the institutionalization phase. It was in 1971 that Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau adopted the policy of multiculturalism. This was followed, in 1982, by the addition of a clause in section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that states: “[the Charter] shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians” (5). This was an important change, and it resulted in the passing of several other pieces of legislation, all of which were influenced by a new interpretation of the Charter. And this paved the way for the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, which Parliament adopted in 1988.

The process through which Canadian multiculturalism came about was not an easy one, nor was it without controversy. Trudeau’s initial declaration of his multiculturalism policy, for instance, was strongly criticized by Quebec, which perceived the new legislation as having the potential to undermine the distinct status of French Canadians by treating them as one culture among many as opposed to one of two (alongside English Canadians); there were also some worries that the promotion of ethnic languages could eclipse the French language, particularly in Quebec (Reitz 2009a). The special case of Quebec aside, there were more general concerns about the degree to which an emphasis on multiculturalism might come into conflict with the three main liberal-democratic values of freedom, equality, and solidarity (Kymlicka 2010) (this set of concerns, however, arrived on the scene a little later).

Despite some scattered academic works on multiculturalism during the 1970s and 1980s, according to Kymlicka (2010), the most serious wave of scholarship on this issue began to surface in the 1990s. A hallmark of this new wave was Charles Taylor’s (1992) Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, in which he tries to provide a political-philosophical justification for the concept of multiculturalism by treating it as an essential component of one’s outlook on the world and the self. In Taylor’s view, society’s “recognition” of one’s ethnic/cultural background constitutes an essential part of one’s sense of identity.
Taylor’s work marks the beginning of a golden decade for the idea of multiculturalism. But, even in that golden decade, the idea did not go unchallenged. Two years after the initial publication of Taylor’s work, it was republished in an expanded form, which included a few other contributions from scholars who critiqued the concept from many different angles, most of which concerned the potential conflicts between such a recognition and the fundamental values of a liberal democracy (i.e., freedom, equality, and solidarity). However, the critics were kept at bay for quite some time due to the rapid increase in the worldwide popularity of both the concept and the policy of multiculturalism during the 1980s and 1990s, as reflected in the increasing number of countries that adopted them and the growing number of legislative rulings within each country that was influenced by them.

The events of 9/11, however, triggered a new phase in the life of multiculturalism, and a new wave of critiques surfaced in academia and in the broader society. Frequent references (implicit or explicit) were now made to Muslims’ being an example of why multiculturalism is not a good policy and as evidence of why it cannot work. While the issue of Muslims was never absent in the previous debates on multiculturalism, it now took centre stage.

So, in the global debates on multiculturalism, special places are occupied by Canada and by Muslims: Canada is used as evidence that multiculturalism works; Muslims are used as evidence that it does not. Given this, it is important to examine the experiences of Muslim immigrants in Canada. Such a study should serve to introduce a welcome nuance to the existing debates in the field.

**The Muslim Question**

The distinct place of Muslim immigrants in Western liberal democracies and the debates surrounding it comprise what I call “the Muslim question.” At the heart of this question lies a perception of the uneasy relationship between Muslims and the rest, and the idea that the roots of this relationship are to be found in the cultural orientation and religious beliefs of Muslims themselves. I also use this phrase because it echoes “the Jewish question,” bringing to mind the similarities between the experiences of Muslim immigrants today and those of Jewish minorities in late-nineteenth-century Europe (for a similar adoption of this concept, see Norton, 2013).

The Jewish question was constituted by a perception among Christian populations in Europe that people of the Jewish faith – particularly those originating from Eastern Europe – comprised a distinct group, whose perceived defining features were very similar to those listed for Muslim...
immigrants today. According to Saunders (2012b, 129), it was believed that Eastern European Jewish immigrants maintained “strange and conservative religious customs and seemed determined not to integrate”; that they were “potential threats” and were “associated with criminality and violence” – so much so that “the new immigrants’ dark clothes and head coverings soon became emblems of civilizational conflict.” Later, this perceived civilizational and cultural distinction was combined with a perceived tendency to embrace political radicalism and extremist platforms. According to Saunders, the image of the Jew had become that of “an impossible-to-assimilate outsider ... a key backer of radicalism and violent revolution” (134). The strong similarities between the experiences of Jews in late-nineteenth-century Europe and those of Muslims today is well captured by Huntington (1996, 200): “In Western Europe, anti-Semitism directed against Arabs has largely replaced anti-Semitism directed against Jews.”

To what extent is the Muslim question a Canadian issue? This is an important question because, as mentioned earlier, Canada is often viewed as a country whose unique experiences make it a model when it comes to issues concerning the immigration system, the integration of immigrants, ethnic diversity, and multiculturalism. This is frequently mentioned by researchers in the field, both Canadian and non-Canadian (see, for instance, Banting and Kymlicka 2004; Kazemipur 2006; Modood 2007). As well, in the specific case of Muslims, a few cross-national comparative studies of the assimilation experiences of immigrants in Europe and North America show that Canada is ahead of all other immigrant-receiving countries with regard to many indicators of successful integration (see, for instance, Vigdor 2011). A distinct history, a unique geography, and a special institutional profile are often cited as potential contributors to this “Canadian exceptionalism.”

Given the notion of Canadian exceptionalism, a study of Muslim immigrants in a Canadian context is necessary for several reasons. First, the claim that things are different in Canada needs to be substantiated by more thorough studies. Second, if things are indeed different in Canada, we need to know what features of Canadian society have contributed to this difference. An inadequate or inaccurate understanding of the reasons behind the Canadian advantage would fail to provide clear targets for policy-making efforts to reinforce it. Third, even if the Canadian context is very different from that of Europe (or the United States, for that matter), improvements in communications technology mean that European and American concerns could migrate to Canada, generating similar responses to a problem that may not even exist. The great danger in a situation like this is that the
responses given and the solutions adopted in one country have the potential to be viewed as universal and, therefore, to be uncritically adopted and implemented in other countries (which may have totally different histories and contexts). This is far from a remote possibility as the political discourses surrounding the Muslim question in various European countries and in the United States have already started to converge, despite enormous contextual differences (Cessari 2005).

Against this background, the focal point of *The Muslim Question in Canada* is an examination of the issue of Muslim exceptionalism in the context of Canadian exceptionalism. This is a timely and needed task as these phrases, with their respective connotations of uniqueness, could function to hinder further probing and could blind us to subtle changes in the situation. In a global environment filled with constant economic, technological, and cultural change, and with a high degree of population and capital mobility, the status quo is not static. This book is an attempt to determine (1) whether Canada is an exception with regard to the issue of Muslim immigrant integration and, thus, capable of serving as a model for the rest of the world; or (2) whether Muslim immigrant integration is a problem in Canada as well and, thus, in need of greater study.

In trying to address these issues, I have been guided by two fundamental considerations – one being more methodological in nature, the other more conceptual. Methodologically, I have been guided, for the most part, by empirical and triangulatory research. As much as possible, I have tried not to stop at the level of theory but, rather, to go beyond that to test competing hypotheses. This is a consequence of my dissatisfaction with the purely theoretical nature of a large portion of the existing work in this field of research. While very helpful with regard to suggesting theoretical possibilities, such contributions do little to tell us which of these are actually occurring on the ground. The studies that have attempted to add empirical data to theoretical discussions, on the other hand, have done so by using only one or another source or type of data. To mitigate this limitation, I use both qualitative and quantitative data from multiple sources while trying to incorporate as much empirical information as possible.

The conceptual considerations that guide this study are related to the theoretical framework used to examine the integration of immigrants. My reading of the literature has shown me that a better understanding of the nature and the future of the relationship between Muslim immigrants and host societies requires a shift in our conceptual framework, from one based on *culture* to one that takes into account the *structural* and *relational*
dimensions at work. A culturalist approach gives too much weight to the influence of cultural orientations in shaping one's attitudes, behaviours, and position in society; it also treats those orientations as fixed. Not only does such an approach fail to explain the current state of affairs but it also presents the situation as unchangeable. A structuralist approach, however, adds more to the picture by taking into account economic, political, and social elements, hence offering a much richer understanding. For its part, given its premise that the current state of affairs is the outcome of a history of interaction between individuals and groups, a relational approach allows for flexibility and change.

Using the above theoretical premises, I break down the integration of immigrants – including Muslim immigrants – into the receiving societies as a multidimensional process involving four different domains: (1) the institutional, (2) the media, (3) the economic, and (4) the social. Depending on the nature of the relationship between the two groups in each of these four domains, one could expect to find either positive or negative, healthy or unhealthy, normal or problematic situations. As well, distinguishing these four domains allows us to locate the problematic areas more precisely, which, in turn, results in a more refined picture for further analysis, more sharply focused research, and more effective policy interventions.

At the risk of offering my conclusions prematurely, I would like to mention some of my general findings. First, the status of the relationship between Muslims and the rest of Canadian society is not as worrisome as seems to be the case in some Western European countries, such as France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. That said, despite the relatively better status of Muslims in Canada, when Muslims are compared with other immigrants in the country they fall behind in many different areas. Also worrisome is the fact that Muslims have serious concerns about their future in Canada. Last, the major obstacles Muslims face in integrating into Canadian society lie not in the institutional or media domains but, rather, in the economic and social domains. This particular combination is found neither in the United States nor in Western Europe. It seems to be a uniquely Canadian situation and, therefore, the responses to it should also be place-specific.

**General Approach**

In conducting the research for this book, I was greatly influenced by the late French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, and it is his approach to social phenomena that influences both the theoretical and methodological aspects of my...
work. Bourdieu’s first influence on my work involves his disciplinary and theoretical eclecticism, reflected in what Loic Wacquant describes as his “utter disregard for disciplinary boundaries, the unusually broad spectrum of domains of specialized inquiry ... and its ability to blend a variety of sociological styles” (quoted in Webb, Schirato, and Danaher 2002). Such eclecticism is characteristic of mature problem-oriented research as, clearly, social problems do not recognize human-made boundaries. Just as physical reality consists of a tangle of chemical, physical, and biological components whose boundaries are impermeable, so social reality consists of a tangle of social, political, economic, and psychological components. To the extent that it is humanly possible, a researcher should be open to the possibility of moving across disciplinary boundaries and into non-comfort zones. I have tried to make this the foundation of my approach to Muslim integration and, in so doing, have, when required, left my home discipline (sociology) to delve into political science, economics, political philosophy, and social psychology.

A second Bourdieuan influence involves my use of a few of his key concepts, such as “field,” “habitus,” and “capital” (Bourdieu 2005). A detailed discussion of these concepts is provided in the following chapters, but it is necessary here to point out that, for Bourdieu, the use of these concepts provided a way out of the unhealthy debate between “structuralist” and “agency-based” theoretical camps within the social sciences. The former emphasizes the role of non-individual mega-forces (e.g., culture and structure) in shaping social developments, while the latter emphasizes human agency (for a thorough discussion of this debate, see Archer [1996, 2001]). In their most extreme versions, these two camps suggest, respectively, a purely deterministic view of social dynamics and a purely voluntaristic view. Bourdieu provides a way out of this dichotomy that is both flexible and explanatory.

Third, like Bourdieu, instead of adopting an atheoretical empiricist position or indulging in “pure” theorizing – which, in the words of Webb, Schirato, and Danaher (2002), is typical of the Anglo-American social sciences and the more philosophy-oriented fields like philosophy, literature, and cultural studies, respectively – I opt for a healthy dialogue between the two (for examples of this approach, see Bourdieu and Coleman [1991]). Bourdieu shows his great commitment to the dialogue between theory and empirical research in the preface of one of his first works, Algeria 1960:

Regarding this text, written more than a decade ago, I more than once felt the wish to refine and systematize the analyses, by investing in them all that
subsequent work has yielded ... But, conscious of the futility of all forms of “theoretical labour” that are not accompanied by empirical work on the things themselves (which would mean, in this case, a return to fieldwork which is not possible at present), I have refrained from doing so. (Bourdieu 1979, viii)

Fourth, in trying to inform theoretical arguments through empirical research, I followed Bourdieu, who utilized a wide spectrum of data and data-gathering methods, “from painstaking ethnographic accounts to statistical models” (Wacquant, quoted in Webb, Schirato, and Danaher 2002). Examples of this approach may be found in many of Bourdieu’s works (e.g., Bourdieu 2005). Bourdieu (1993) describes his approach as deliberate and as based on the fact that ethnographic observations and statistical analyses have two entirely different goals. This is because the former “can only be based on a small number of cases” while the latter allows the researcher to “establish regularities and to situate the observed cases in the universe of the existing cases.” He adds that “the analyses that are described as ‘qualitative’ are ... essential for understanding, that is to say fully explaining, what the statistics merely record” (14).

While Bourdieu’s methodological heterodoxy was not shared by many social scientists of his time (who were still trapped in their methodological paradigms), its popularity is now on the rise and, since the mid-1990s, has been embodied in the newly emerging methodological approach known as “mixed methods” (Creswell 2006; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009). The philosophical foundation of the mixed methods approach to social issues is pragmatism, which, according to Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009, 7), involves “advocating the use of whatever methodological tools are required to answer the research questions under study.” In utilizing a mixed methods approach, “investigators go back and forth seamlessly between statistical and thematic analysis” (8). In my work, the reader will find many examples of this movement between qualitative and quantitative data. With some exceptions, my research basically involves using (1) quantitative methods to detect general patterns and anomalies and (2) qualitative methods to develop hypotheses and theoretical possibilities. The latter two are then used to make sense of the former two.

At the heart of the above exercise is a notion that Bourdieu uses widely but discusses only briefly – that is, comparative method (see, for instance, Bourdieu 1984). Initially, comparative method was viewed as an antidote to
statistical method. For example, in response to Smelser’s argument regarding the inferiority of comparative method to statistical method, Ragin (1987) argues that the former is superior to the latter for four different reasons. First, “the statistical method is not combinatorial,” meaning that it treats each independent variable separately, even when controlling for the impacts of other relevant variables. In other words, statistical method cannot effectively address the impact of the combination of independent variables. He acknowledges that this can be done through adding interaction effects to the analysis but finds the sheer number of such effects to be incorporated prohibitive. Second, comparative method pays closer attention to irregularities and outlier cases (as opposed to statistical method, which focuses on regularities and general patterns), and this is particularly useful “for the task of building new theories and synthesizing existing theories” (16). Third, “the comparative method does not require the investigator to pretend that he or she has a sample of societies drawn from a particular population so that tests of statistical significance can be used.” And, finally, “the comparative method forces the investigator to become familiar with the cases relevant to the analysis” and to “examine each case directly and compare each case with all other relevant cases” (ibid.). According to Ragin, the difference between comparative method and statistical method is that the former is case-oriented while the latter is variable-oriented. However, combined strategies also exist, and they fall into one of two camps: “Examples of combined strategies include variable-oriented analyses supplemented with case studies ... and case studies reinforced with quantitative analyses” (17).

The problem with comparative method, particularly when used by qualitative scholars, is that, while it helps with theory building, it does not allow for theory testing. So, in a sense, this method is more an extension of theory than a research method per se. Ragin (1987, 11) himself acknowledges this when he says: “but many comparativists, especially those who are qualitatively oriented, are not often involved in ‘testing’ theories per se. Rather, they apply theory to cases in order to interpret them.” I combine comparative and statistical approaches by using variable-oriented quantitative work to find general patterns and to test theories, while using comparative qualitative methods to develop insights, theories, and hypotheses, to interpret quantitative findings, and to make sense of anomalies.

The general points that inform my conceptual framework and methodological strategy are as follows:
I use a disciplinary and theoretical eclecticism, drawing on the relevant findings and propositions of scholars in various academic fields and of different theoretical persuasions.

I apply an integrated theoretical-empirical approach, in which every effort is made to empirically test and verify the theoretical hypotheses. Also, when theories are unable to explain the observed trends, I attempt to formulate an alternative theory or to suggest modifications to the initial propositions.

I employ a combined quantitative-qualitative research method, using various sources of data and types of analysis, from the statistical analysis of survey data, through the analysis of face-to-face interview data, to participant observation. With occasional variations, I use the qualitative data to develop conceptual understandings and hypotheses (i.e., theory building) as well as to analyze and interpret the quantitative findings. I use quantitative data to detect trends and anomalies as well as to test theories.

To the extent that it is possible and useful, I use a comparative approach to put things in perspective. I do this by drawing comparisons between various groups (e.g., between immigrants and the native-born, and between genders, religions, and national origins within immigrant groups).

Outline of the Book

*The Muslim Question in Canada* is divided into four parts. Part 1 deals with the big picture – that is, the broad outlines of the issue of the Muslim question and the existing perspectives on this issue. Chapter 2 reviews the socio-demographic aspects of the encounter between Muslims and Western liberal democracies, while Chapter 3 reviews how the Muslim question has been understood and addressed. I provide examples of each of the main perspectives and review their strengths and weaknesses.

Part 2 includes Chapters 4 and 5, which discuss the conceptual framework that I propose for studying not only the Muslim question but also the more general issue of the integration of immigrants into host societies. This framework has been influenced primarily by the sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Charles Tilly, the Nobel-Laureate-economist-turned-political-philosopher Amartya Sen, and the various “contact theory” scholars in the field of social psychology. Its overarching assumption is that the nature of the integration of (Muslim) immigrants into their new countries depends on the quality of the interaction between them and the host society, including the latter’s institutional, media, economic, and social domains.
The chapters included in Part 3 examine various aspects of the lives of Muslims in Canada. The goal of these chapters is to determine the extent to which the Canadian situation is similar to or different from those in Europe and the United States. Chapter 6 looks at the qualitative discussions on this issue, while Chapter 7 looks at the quantitative data. The findings reported in this section show that the Muslim question is not as severe in Canada as it is in some other countries, but they also indicate that there are areas in need of particular attention.

Part 4 includes four chapters that dig deeper into the factors behind the patterns found and reported in Part 3. Chapter 8 examines the economic factors while Chapter 9 addresses the social. Chapter 10 offers some suggestions regarding the kind of measures that could improve the status of Muslims in Canada, while Chapter 11, the last chapter, discusses the implications of this study. These implications are discussed under two headings: (1) those concerned with immigrant settlement policies and practices, and (2) those concerned with theoretical issues in debates about multiculturalism. Chapter 11 also attempts to offer some general ideas about possible future paths for the relationships between Muslims and native-born Canadians. It concludes with a brief list of areas that need to be addressed in future research.

The content of each chapter is based on a variety of data sources, both qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative data are taken from a series of face-to-face interviews conducted with Muslim immigrants between 2009 and 2011. The twelve interviewees – all in their twenties and thirties – were selected through snowball sampling in the Prairie provinces, and efforts were made to maximize the diversity of the cases with regard to gender, national origin, and Islamic sect. The purpose of this component of the study is to gain insight into the situation of Muslim immigrants and to develop hypotheses that, later, would be examined through the use of quantitative methods. Some individuals were interviewed at a later time in order to help make sense of the quantitative findings.

The quantitative data come from the extensive nationwide surveys conducted by Statistics Canada, including the General Social Surveys (GSS), the Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS), the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC), and the Canadian Census. In addition, I used two simultaneous surveys of Canadian Muslims and non-Muslims conducted by Environics in 2006. The first of these two surveys had a sample of five hundred Canadian Muslims, and the second had a sample of twenty-five hundred non-Muslim Canadians.