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This book has its origins in a conference to honour Ken Carty, and his impact on political science is visible at its every turn. Each contributor has close ties with Carty, and our emphasis is always on intellectual connections. Not that personal ties have been precluded; that would be unimaginable when dealing with someone as attuned to the personal as Ken Carty. Each contributor has something to say about parties and party systems. The full complement of contributors brackets the volume’s key theme: the imperative for students of parties and students of party systems to learn from each other and to work together.

*Parties and Party Systems* follows two parallel arcs: (1) the study of parties and (2) Ken Carty’s career. The parallel is no accident as Carty is one of the leaders in the comparative study of party organization. He came to UBC as a student of comparative politics, plunged into Canadian waters, made himself far and away the leading student of Canada’s parties, and then took insights derived from the Canadian case back to the global stage.

Ken Carty has never lost his fascination with the grassroots. His UBC colleagues know that he reads a room better than anyone and that he has a bottomless archive of life stories. His first book, *Party and the Parish Pump*, exemplifies this. Who knew that it is possible to write the ethnography of the single transferable vote? *Party and the Parish Pump* remains one of the most distinguished contributions to the study of Irish politics. Ireland may also have been the perfect bridge to Canadian politics, at least as it was
practised at the time. For decades, Carty has worked the rooms of Canadian parties, observing how national politics are articulated at the local level. Canadian parties are like cicadas, dormant except when they are called to reproduce – that is, during elections and the selection of leaders. This may explain why this journey led Carty back to the link between centre and periphery. Why would actors on the periphery spend their time advancing the interests of the centre? How can the centre keep its grip on the wheel? What implications does all of this have for overcoming – or failing to overcome – Canada’s centrifugal tendencies?

Out of these questions grew Carty’s intuition about parties as franchise systems. This idea was first put forth in his 2002 presidential address to the Canadian Political Science Association, an address that reminded his listeners of the charm and wisdom of Stephen Leacock. The idea went global with an article in *Party Politics*, and it complemented a Canadian theme that goes back to Carty’s all-time favourite book, Siegfried’s *The Race Question in Canada*. This is the idea of the brokerage party, a peculiarly fascinating one for Canadians. Brokerage is front and centre in *Parties and Party Systems*, with Carty once again leading the way. This book is intended to honour Ken Carty and, in doing so, it showcases yet another of his trenchant insights and may be the springboard to yet another decade of scholarship. No doubt much of this scholarship will be conducted by Carty himself.
Acknowledgments

Our contributors generated an amazing two days of academic exchange. But they were only some of the academic participants at this book’s editorial conference. Several colleagues and students, past and present, served as discussants and moderators. We particularly wish to thank Nathan Allen, Gerald Baier, Donald Blake, Munroe Eagles, Lynda Erickson, Andrea Nuesser, Ben Nyblade, Netina Tan, Daniel Westlake, and Şule Yaylaci. A special role was played by John Aldrich and Matt Shugart, who embraced the task of summarizing the event and locating it in the study of parties.

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Parties and Party Systems could not have become a reality without financial and moral support from UBC Press. We are especially grateful for the professionalism and enthusiasm of the press’s director emeritus, Peter Milroy, and our editor, the indefatigable Emily Andrew.

Finally, we must mention two contributors who could not make it to Vancouver: Peter Aucoin and Peter Mair. They were missed at the time. We miss them even more now.
PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS
The modern study of parties began with Duverger (1954), who offers an integrated account of their internal organization and their systemic relations with each other. But, over time, parties as organizations became a separate object of study from parties as systems. The next landmark in the study of parties is Sartori (1976), who unintentionally highlights this divide. Although the title of his book refers to both “parties” and “party systems,” the focus is on the latter, and it is still the outstanding text in the field. If the study of party systems flourished in the following years, it did so by narrowing its focus to counting parties and then relating that count to electoral formulas, with Cox (1997) as the industry standard. This literature largely ignores what made Satori’s work distinctively systemic: his analysis of the interaction between the number of parties and their ideological positioning. (A striking exception is Meguid 2008.) In this sense, the party system literature is stalled (Mair 2002; Wolinetz 2006). Satori’s title includes the tantalizing “volume one.” Volume two never appeared, however, and this missing volume might have done for the study of organizations what the existing one did for the study of systems. It is tempting to suggest, however, that the absence of the landmark volume liberated students of party organization to think for themselves. Certainly, the study of organizations seems to have flourished and to have outdone the systems literature in creativity and originality. It is time, as Bardi and Mair (2008) argue, to reconnect the literatures and to make students of organizations and students of systems talk to
each other. Such an objective is a major inspiration for *Parties and Party Systems*.

**Themes**

*Parties and Party Systems* juxtaposes problems and analyses that should provoke further integrative thinking. It follows four themes: (1) brokerage across lines of division in society; (2) keeping the partisan team together in the face of the centrifugal pressures that necessitate brokerage; (3) the ensuing complications in principal-agent relations within parties; and (4) the institutional context, both as it constrains all the foregoing and remains quite fragile.

Brokerage as a type for either party organization or party system appears in neither Duverger nor Sartori. Indeed, the concept originates in the study of North American party organizations and seems to have a special attraction for Canadian scholars. But reflection on its morphology, bases, and organizational or behavioural entailments immediately takes us to the organization-system nexus. The brokerage party may be the organizational type for Satori’s “polarized pluralism.” It may also be a thing of the past. Students of Canadian parties were mesmerized from the start by the notion of brokerage. The Ur-text for Canada is André Siegfried’s (1907, 113-14) *The Race Question in Canada*, and here is its primary claim:

Aware of the sharpness of certain rivalries, they know that if these are let loose without any counter-balance, the unity of the Dominion may be endangered. That is why they persistently apply themselves to prevent the formation of homogeneous parties, divided according to race, religion or class – a French party, for instance, or a Catholic party, or a Labour party. The clarity of political life suffers from this, but perhaps the existence of the federation can be preserved only at this price.

The intuition is that Canadian party leaders sense that encouraging division would be fatal to the polity. Although avoidance of such division might seem to be nothing more than convergence of the parties on the median voter, as argued by Downs (1957), in fact most party systems exhibit non-centrist party positioning, with the middle commonly empty or occupied only weakly. So if it is true that Canadian parties (one of them, at least) straddle the middle of the policy spectrum, then there must be something about the Canadian case that privileges centrist parties as much as it does centrist voters. Whatever this is, it should have analogues in other systems with a dominant, centrist party.
Introduction

Brokerage politics places a special premium on reconciling the need for a common message with the equally pressing need for mobilizing grassroots enthusiasm. But it does so as a polar case, not as something qualitatively distinct. The challenge of keeping the team together proves to be ubiquitous – but so are solutions. Indeed, the literature presupposes that these twin challenges exist in a zero-sum relationship. Reality may be more complicated – and more forgiving. Brokerage as a system challenges brokerage parties as organizations. Parties are required to balance national leadership – embodied either in a strong leader or a tight factional coalition – with a mobilizational requirement for local autonomy. As already noted, however, brokerage organizations may be a polar, but not a qualitatively distinct, case. All large parties face a coordination challenge – at least they do in parliamentary systems. And here lies a dilemma: MPs are at one and the same time servants of two masters – their local constituents and their leader. Inherent limits on legislative time make control of the agenda a central issue, and, in the Westminster context, the press of public business drives governments to discipline their followers (Cox 1987). Time pressure in Parliament can also bring opposition parties to see the logic of party discipline (Koss 2012). All this, seemingly, runs against the grain of local electoral mobilization. Both elements are central to the logic of parliamentarianism, yet they are obviously in tension with each other.

To date, the literature on parliamentary accountability has been preoccupied with how institutions moderate the trade-off (Cox 2006), in particular the extent to which electoral institutions permit local candidates to cultivate a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995). The argument presupposes that the need for cohesion follows from the core logic of parliamentarianism: the dependence of governments on majorities in the confidence chamber. Is it possible, however, that merely conducting elections suffices? The logic of elections – the requirement for party signalling and the maintenance of a “reputational premium” (Sniderman and Stiglitz 2012) – may be as critical as the logic of cabinet formation.

Whatever its source, the challenge of keeping the team together blurs lines of accountability – of principal-agent relations. In almost all of the literature, local MPs or candidates are agents, never principals (contra romanticized popular or journalistic notions of what parties should be). Carey (2009) alerts us to one complexity: that MPs serve two masters – the party leadership and their local selectorates. What matters for Carey is the relative balance between local principals and national principals. The suspicion lingers, however, that party leaders can use ostensibly independent selectorates...
to pursue ends they choose for themselves. Equally, we suspect that the real lines of accountability in local organizations do not routinely make the MP the servant of the local organization.

We think of principal-agent relations within parties as being conditioned by institutional context. This is the central intuition in Carey and Shugart (1995). The same is true for Carty (2004), who describes the adaptability of his “franchise” model (Carty 2002) to all spatially dispersed electorates with single-member districts. Is it possible, however, that the challenge of keeping the team together overrides variation in party structures and in the overarching institutional context? And institutions that seem to meet the test of time cancrumble quickly. The literature on rational-choice institutionalism generally regards institutions as fixed precisely because they induce self-enforcing behaviour (Thelen 1999). Electoral institutions in particular are assumed to be changed only by external forces, basically by expansion of the franchise (Boix 1999). The rationalist literature has only begun to consider how institutional change might be generated from the inside (Greif and Laitin 2004). Historically, however, institutions can be at odds with each other and institutional change can be driven from within (Thelen 1999). Even adaptation at the margin can have massive implications.

**Plan of the Book**

In sum, parties live in two domains: (1) a public sphere constrained by partisan competitors, electoral rules, and parliamentary practice and (2) a private sphere created by a network of members and supporters, party officials, and elected representatives. This book brings together a distinguished body of research on both domains in order to integrate the study of parties as organizations with the study of parties as systems. The sequence of chapters is dictated by these four themes. However, as several chapters touch on more than one theme, the sequence is rough.

**Brokerage**

All parties face the structural problem of having to maintain the energy and responsiveness of a dispersed party membership without losing the central direction necessary for the party to succeed in winning government. In the Canadian context, to explain how this accommodation has traditionally been made by governing parties is to talk of brokerage politics – the idea that party leaders can engage the support of political interests in a regionally and socially diverse society through instituting a series of separate deals, each entailing a distinctive regional payoff. But Carty’s innovative analysis in
Chapter 1 of this collection shows that the idea of brokerage parties only makes sense within a narrowly defined context. He argues that there can only be one brokerage party in each system at any given time since only one party can make credible claims to accommodate the range of competing interests across the whole electorate. The brokerage party in this sense spans sectional interests that “would otherwise provide the organizational basis for electoral division and enduring partisan alignments.” This analysis means that, in Canada and elsewhere, a party relying on brokerage is bound to collapse once politics – whether from social or political change – becomes more ideologically polarized and the conditions for cobbling together a series of sectional deals disappear.

The implications of this analysis are further explored by Johnston (Chapter 2), who makes a powerful case for the critical role of Quebec in both the operation and the recent decline of brokerage politics in Canada. Given the need, since 1867, for the Canadian polity to encompass widely differing provincial communities, each with a distinctive political agenda, he examines how regional brokerage has provided an effective way of producing single-party majorities in the Canadian Parliament. A consequence has been that, through a combination of size and the disposition of electoral support since the 1870s, Quebec has become a regional “pivot” for gaining sufficient electoral support to form national governments. Like Carty’s, Johnston’s analysis implies that changing demographics and a move to more polarized party competition across Canada will undermine both the possibility of brokerage politics and the ability of Quebec to maintain a pivotal role in building national majorities.

The transformation from brokerage to a more ideological politics is illustrated by Stewart and Sayers (Chapter 3) in their study of the 2004 Canadian election. This marked the consolidation of the Conservative Party as a party defined by a distinctive set of social values rather than by the accommodation of diverse interests. All three chapters argue that regional variations in partisan voting across Canada will remain but that they will be driven more by differential support for sets of broad policy goals than by the aggregation of disparate regional interests.

Keeping the Team Together
But there is more to intra-party dynamics than brokerage, and, even for brokerage parties, there is the question of how central control of the party can be combined with the local organization required to select candidates and to mobilize supporters at election time. The variety of ways this linkage
can be structured – and the corresponding variety of attempts at categorizing them – is dealt with in a masterly survey by Wolinetz (Chapter 4). His point of departure is the idea of the franchise party (Carty 2002, 2004), which enables him to describe the way in which party discipline in Parliament can co-exist with the much looser control that is in evidence when local candidates conduct their election campaigns. Candidates are franchisees of the party name but are responsible for their local election campaigns and, if elected, must either follow the party line in Parliament or lose their party franchise. Although originally developed to explain the operation of national parties in Canada, the idea of the franchise party has found much broader application. Wolinetz examines how this form of party structure fits with other families of party organization, and he looks at the implications for internal party operation.

The variety of relationships between leaders and the broader party membership is well shown in the following three chapters, each of which deals with a different political system. For Farrell, Mair, Ó Muineacháin, and Wall (Chapter 5), the concern is combining highly disciplined voting by members of the Irish Parliament with the dominance of local concerns for members. Part of the explanation for this disjunction can be found in the form of proportional voting used to elect members – the single transferable vote – which requires successful candidates to have strong community support in addition to party endorsement. Concentrating on servicing local communities has meant that members have little inclination to monitor the broader policies of the party leadership. The authors argue that, by contributing to the lack of effective scrutiny of government policy, what may have been a convenient working arrangement for both the leaders and members of governing parties can have dysfunctional effects on the parliamentary system as a whole.

A similar disjunction is examined by Hazan and Rahat (Chapter 6) in their study of Israeli parties. Both the attempt to broaden the party base in response to demands for greater inclusiveness and the attempt to democratize the selection process for candidates have the potential to weaken party unity. A more diverse party membership and a candidate selection process that is more open to factional competition can threaten the maintenance of the discipline required for effective parliamentary parties. Yet the authors observe that, as the price for achieving party coherence in Parliament, most parties have found a workable compromise by permitting limited dissent in some forums. Nonetheless, they stress that the compromises are fragile and
that internal tensions remain a continuing challenge to the task of preserving party unity.

In their analysis of parties competing for representation in the European Parliament, Bardi, Katz, and Mair (Chapter 7) take a different tack. In dealing with complaints about the democratic deficit in the government of the European Union, some have suggested that the solution is to be found in the emergence of pan-European parties that will replace the present loose coalitions of national parties. But Bardi, Katz, and Mair argue that the absence of a single, system-wide set of parties at elections for the European Parliament is only a sign of failure if the goal is to replicate the executive-dominated parliaments that characterize member states. The more modest goal of mobilizing local support within member countries for cooperative ventures under the umbrella of the European Parliament should not be ignored – an example of a franchise party system with multiple franchisors.

The View from the Grassroots
Another virtue of Carty’s franchise party model is that it encourages the study of local party workers and the critical role they play in the mobilization of electoral support. The following three chapters focus on the concerns of the franchisee and supporters: the view of the party from the perspective of the MP, the local campaign organizer, and the party member. Koop (Chapter 8) examines the informal resources that an MP can use to help with tasks expected of a local member, from recruiting constituency volunteers to fundraising and running the local election campaign. These are critical tasks, yet there are few inducements that the member can provide for volunteers. Koop shows the variety of ways in which an MP who is a skillful manager can use praise, gossip, and inside knowledge to keep party workers engaged and the local party association working effectively.

This theme is repeated by Cross and Young (Chapter 9), but their focus is on the ability of the candidate to adjust the local campaign to suit constituency expectations in the face of demands for policy consistency from the party’s head office. They survey Liberal Party and New Democratic Party candidates to chart the variation in the mix of central and local influences at work in an election campaign. Like Hazan and Rahat (Chapter 6), Cross and Young point to the running compromise required to accommodate party diversity within the constraints of parliamentary unity.

Van Haute (Chapter 10) deals with party organization from the standpoint of the individual member. Much of the research on party membership
concerns the reasons for joining the party and the changing profile of members; however, as Van Haute points out, there is little research on members’ views of the party organization and why they stay or leave. With the general decline of party membership in established democracies, Van Haute calls for more research on the attitudes and aspirations of party members in order to gain a better understanding of the way party cohesion is established, maintained, and/or lost.

**Institutions**

To this point contributions have been concerned with the private sphere of party operation – that is, with the internal dynamics of parties as essentially voluntary organizations. But parties are increasingly subject to the constraints of government regulation, whether parliamentary, electoral, or financial. The following four chapters examine what is now an integral component of the Canadian party system: the rules imposed on parties as actors in the public sphere.

The problem for governments and parties alike is to know which issues can be dealt with by changing the rules and what the consequences of such rule change would be. This explains the ambivalence of parties towards institutional change, even though, as Courtney (Chapter 11) indicates in his magisterial summary, over the past fifty years the legal status and regulation of Canadian parties have been transformed. The growth of the regulatory regime surveyed by Courtney has been less the consequence of partisan initiatives and more the consequence of sequential responses to a series of alterations in the context of parliamentary politics, changing public expectations of the role of parties, and the intervention of the Supreme Court of Canada under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The public funding of parties is a good example of the complex effects of rule changes and the mix of partisan advantage and public interest in considering electoral fairness. Aucoin and Bakvis (Chapter 12) examine the per-vote subsidy to parties introduced by the Liberal government in 2004 and its abolition by the Conservatives in 2015. As they note, this scheme, with its annual subsidy to parties based on actual votes cast in the previous election, looks like a scheme to cartelize political parties – to recognize parties as formal components of the governmental system. But Aucoin and Bakvis see the scheme and its repeal not as an even-handed response to competing views of the role of parties but, rather, as a partisan move by the government of the moment to reduce its chief rival’s access to financial resources.
If these schemes for public funding of parties can be seen to have a partisan payoff, this has been less clearly the case in recent attempts at electoral reform. Sharman and Attanasio (Chapter 13) argue that a surge in proposals for electoral reform in five of Canada’s ten provinces was driven by an attempt to increase confidence in the legitimacy of parliamentary government. This explains the unusual commitment, common to all proposals, to include the public in deliberations about electoral reform. In this context, calculation of partisan gain, far from driving the proposals, was the principal reason that governing parties shied away from implementing change.

Yet the key place of fair representation in maintaining a sense of legitimacy in parliamentary government is well illustrated by Cutler and Hooper (Chapter 14). Survey evidence captured during the 2005 and 2009 British Columbia referendums on electoral reform indicates that nothing undermines citizens’ sense of involvement more than knowing that the voter’s preferred party is a persistent loser at elections. From this evidence, government interest in electoral reform is justified even if governing parties cannot bring themselves to adopt it.

The Way Forward
The last chapter, by the editors, returns to the common themes of the book. It identifies commonalities and tensions among the chapters and shows how they unsettle common presumptions. It also identifies gaps. Few definite conclusions emerge, but then that was never the point. Rather, the purpose of Parties and Party Systems is to goad scholars into reconsidering their theories and into taking new directions in their empirical investigations.

References